GR# L-8437 ESTATE OF KH HEMADY VS. LUZON SURETY CO.

INC

Civil Law – Wills and Succession – Transmissible Obligations

Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on indemnity agreements (counterbonds)
subscribed by distinct principals and by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety (solidary guarantor). As a contingent
claim, Luzon Surety prayed for the allowance of the value of the indemnity agreements it had executed. The lower court
dismissed the claim of Luzon Surety on the ground that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not
chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.”
ISSUES: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claims chargeable against
the estate?
HELD: Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is that “Contracts take effect only as between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.” While in our successional system the
responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from
him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled — “Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession
are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties
with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased x x x which comes in
to their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of
him from whom they derive their rights.” The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists
when they are ‘not transmissible by operation of law.’ The provision makes reference to those cases where the law
expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support, parental authority,
usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership and agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate
guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the
surety.
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the
undertaking, nor by stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability therefrom
necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against
his estate. A contingent liability of a deceased person is part and parcel of the mass of obligations that must be paid if
and when the contingent liability is converted into a real liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation of the estate
must be deferred until such time as the bonded indebtedness is paid.

ALVAREZ vs. IAC – May 7, 1990

FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado
and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes,
are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib.

It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World
War II. According to Estelita, from the “Japanese time up to peace time”, they did not visit the parcels of land in question
but “after liberation”, when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.

After Fuentebella’s death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26,
1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda.
de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of the ownership and
possession of Lots 773 and 823.

During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment
ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed
or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court
that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said
heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs
or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have
been entitled to receive.

“Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties.

Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is
strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . .”

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father’s
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

Borja v. Borja, 46 SCRA 577 | Ang

FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of
Rizal.

He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had
taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death
and was appointed special administatrix.

Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise
agreement.

She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the
will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.

HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.

The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco and Josefa.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.

And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of
Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has
no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal
personality to sue.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.

HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing
the case up to its completion.
The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was
filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still
alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court “whenever a party to a pending case dies … it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death … and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representatives.” This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper
substitution of parties in the case.

The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue.

This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.”

From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them
even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in
the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent
Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily
and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.

It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and
to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint.

This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the
legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased.

Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the
Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in
the case.

593 Phil. 28 VALENTE RAYMUNDO v. TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ +

NACHURA, J.:

This petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 which reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders[3] in Civil Case
No. 51203.

First, the long settled facts.

Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez'[4] marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein
respondents, namely, Danilo,[5] Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,[6] all surnamed Suarez. During their
marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included the
following: (1) a parcel of land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30680; (2) property located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an area of 1,020 square meters
under Tax Declaration No. A-016-01003; and (3) Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by Tax Declaration No. A-01700723
(subject properties).

After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez,[7] executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,[8] partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, thus:
WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto who are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON, being
the surviving spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ,
MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate children of the deceased with the said
TEOFISTA ISAGON;

WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and
REGGINEO SUAREZ are represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, in her capacity as the guardian and legal
administrator of the property of the said minors;

WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of whatever nature and amount against the estate of the
deceased;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Parties have agreed to settle and liquidate the
assets of the conjugal partnership between the deceased and TEOFISTA ISAGON, and to settle and adjudicate the
estate of the said deceased, by and pursuance to these presents, in the following manner, to wit:

1.That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner of the deceased, shall receive in absolute and
exclusive ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the assets of the conjugal partnership of gains
between her and the deceased, to wit:

(a)
Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6938, situated at Sitio Pantayan,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;

(b)
Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6939, situated at Sitio Pantayan,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;

(c)
Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio Rosario,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;

(d)
Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio Rosario,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;

(e)
TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS AND NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with the Commercial
Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines, and THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P39.00) deposited with Prudential Bank.

2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN
SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, shall each and all receive and be entitled to a share
equivalent to one-seventh (1/7) of the estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which estate is comprised of the
following properties, to wit:

(a)
A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 30680, situated at Barrio Kaniogan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an
assessed value of P4,150.00.

(b)
Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 33982, 33983 and 33984, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P560.00.

(c)
A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an
assessed value of P440.00.
(d)
Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 42 and 44 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of
Lot 2 described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _____, situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P590.00.

(e)
Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43 and 45 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of Lot
2 described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _______, situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P1,190.00.

(f)
A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6, Block 269 of the subdivision plan pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2, Block 348, Psd-
3188, G.L.R.O. Record Nos. 375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of
P6,340.00.

(g)
A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal, with an assessed
value of P1,840.00.

(h)
TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by Certificate No. 71-5-B
(for 1,000 shares) and Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).

PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove mentioned shall be in common and the share of each heir being
pro indiviso.
Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate as forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. Not surprisingly,
Teofista continued to administer and manage these properties. On the whole, apart from those now owned exclusively
by Teofista, all the properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not
changed, with Teofista as de facto administrator thereof.

In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's
shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito
(plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739.
Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the
respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to
plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.[9]

When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs were the
highest bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a certificate of sale was
issued to them and registered in their favor on August 1, 1983. On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a
final deed of sale over the subject properties.

Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory
action against petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties. Essentially, respondents alleged in
their complaint that they cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been
impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither
be levied nor be sold on execution.

Meanwhile, the RTC, Branch 151, formerly the CFI, Branch 1, in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379, issued an Order[10]
directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or alienating
the improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion in peaceful possession

thereof, and (4) to surrender to them the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
Herein respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the subject
properties are co-owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of Civil Case No. 51203.
Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista's and herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which
included, among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming right under her, to vacate the lots subject of the
judicial sale.
Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders.
The appellate court, on July 6, 1987, dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents' petition, thus:
We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as purported case for certiorari it fails to show how the
respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The two orders being
assailed were preceded by a final judgment, a corresponding writ of execution, a levy on execution and a judicial sale, all
of which enjoy a strong sense presumption of regularity.

Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she was a
party in the consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal capacity. Since she did not
appeal from the decision, she cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong to the corporation.
And with respect to the children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this proceedings [herein respondents],
suffice it to point out that not being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have done was to immediately file
a third party claim. The moment levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs by virtue of hereditary
succession, they should have seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record discloses, however, the
children chose to remain silent, and even allowed the auction sale to be held, filing almost a year later a half-hearted
complaint to annul the proceedings which they allowed to be dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.

In Santos v. Mojica (10 SCRA 318), a partition case with third- party claimants, the Supreme Court came out with the
following ruling: "The procedure (a petition for certiorari) followed by him (a petitioner not party to the original partition
case) in vindicating his right is not the one sanctioned by law, for he should have filed a separate and independent action
making parties therein the sheriff and the plaintiffs responsible for the execution xxx. It can, therefore, be said that (he)
acted improperly in filing the present petition because his remedy was to file a separate and independent action to
vindicate his ownership over the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the restraining order previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs against
petitioners.[11]
On the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC
Pasig, Branch 155, on February 25, 1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion from
transferring to third parties the levied properties based on its preliminary finding that the auctioned properties are co-
owned by Teofista and herein respondents. Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the RTC,
Branch 155, at the instance of petitioner Valente for failure of herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of
events, the RTC, Branch 155, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons.

Thus, it was now petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's and Maria Concepcion's turn to file a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all rejected their bid to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.
The CA granted their petition, thus:
And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not parties in
Civil Case Nos. 21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata since, apart from the
requisites constitutive of this procedural tenet, they were admittedly the children of Teofista Suarez, who is the real party-
in-interest in the previous final judgment. As successors-in-interest of Teofista Suarez, private respondents merely
stepped into the shoes of their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property. Verily, there is identity of parties, not
only where the parties in both actions are the same, but where there is privity with them as in the cases of successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or where there is substantial identity.

Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much less
the third party claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19,
1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled; further respondent judge is ordered to
dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.[12]
From this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. In Suarez v. Court of Appeals,[13] we reversed the
appellate court, thus:
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner [herein respondents] and private
respondents [petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and the developments subsequent to the filing
of the complaint, [w]e cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en
masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should
have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case:

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided."

Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to
the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is different from and
adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo Sr.].
Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale
to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are
hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs
to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.

Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading filed by herein respondents, as plaintiffs
therein, was hotly contested and opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover, even at that
stage, when the case had been remanded with a directive to "determine that portion which belongs to [herein
respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion," Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled and
transferred, for varied reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig City. In between all these, petitioner Valente,
along with the other defendants, repeatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported failure of
herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to Dismiss were denied.

With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was raffled had to study the records anew.
Expectedly, part of the records went missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 71, to
which Civil Case No. 51203 was remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, to wit:
The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was recorded as received on June 20, 1990, by Sheriff
Alejandro O. Loquinario;

That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the Justice Hall,
and as the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and was still undermanned;

That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the Justice Hall;

That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of Appeals
that ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions of Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-
Claravall, the same was bound as volume 2 of the case;

That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was forced to hastily move all of its records and equipment
to branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were occupying was to be demolished in
order to meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;

That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the undersigned could make a last check to see if everything was
transferred;

That it was only later on that this office discovered that important documents were indeed lost, including transcripts of
stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;

That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its present location;

That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a Decision of the Supreme Court reversing the earlier ruling of the
Court of Appeals;
That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was bundled along with other cases which were decided
and/or archived, was reported as missing;

That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge Claravall ordered that a search for the same be made in all
of the offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well as the Court of Appeals, in the event that the
same was transmitted to said Court;

That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located anywhere;

That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the above-entitled case was probably lost during the
renovation of the Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with the use of documents in the possession of
the parties, or documents entered as exhibits in other Courts.[14]
In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records[15] of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente,
and the other defendants -- Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the motion.[16] However, the trial court
eventually granted the motion for reconstitution, and ordered petitioner Valente and the other defendants to submit a
copy of their Answer filed thereat and copies of other pleadings pertinent to the case.[17]

Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties' pleadings, are worth mentioning, to wit:

1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint[18] filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental
Complaint additionally prayed that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set aside,
as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties. The
Supplemental Complaint further sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties. Finally, it
prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion be cancelled and
TCT No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez, married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.

2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court)[19] filed by
herein respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had noted the current increased value of the subject
properties and that petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly enriched themselves in
appropriating the subject properties worth millions then, for a measly bid price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation
worth only P70,000.00.

3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to consider
the matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs][20] filed by therein defendants, including herein petitioner
Valente, pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch 67 Order commanding
them to submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for
the court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph 2, thus:
2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything possible to expedite the disposition of this case
while the plaintiffs [herein respondents] did everything possible to DELAY the disposition of the same obviously because
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are in full possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute. In its decision of
September 4, 1992, the SUPREME COURT nullified TWO final and executory DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an
unprecedented action. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with
evidence their personality as heirs of Marcelo Suarez, and after being able to do so, to adduce evidence that would
determine what portion belongs to plaintiffs hence the above matters need be litigated upon before the RTC can "annul
the sale with regard to said portion" (belonging to the plaintiffs alleged heirs).
On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the different branches of the RTC:

1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B. Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City, admitting
herein respondents' Supplemental Complaint.[21]

2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B. Santos resolving: (a) herein respondents' Manifestation
and Motion (to execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court), and (b) therein defendants'
(including herein petitioner Valente's) Request for Answer to Written Interrogatories.[22] The RTC, Branch 67, resolved
the incidents, thus:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of the
Supreme Court of September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial dispute, should be implemented for the
following reasons:

xxxx

On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the
proceedings where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts, which binds this court, the answer
sought to be elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely irrelevant, aside from having been filed way
out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the decision of the Supreme Court dated September 4,
1992 which mandates that:

"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioner and to annul the
sale with regard to said portion."

In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court orders that:

a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and subsequent proceedings in relation thereto are
declared null and void.

b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant Valente Raymundo is also declared null and void, and
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig City, is ordered to issue a new one in the name of the deceased Marcelo Suarez or
to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez.

c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00, plus legal interest from the date of issuance of this
order, and failing which, the portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to the surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez,
may be levied on execution.

d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby ordered to submit to this court any evidence showing
settlement of the estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to determine the portion in the estate
which belongs to Teofista Suarez.
Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied on May
29, 1996.

3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from
the January 22, 1996 and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders, and, therefore, not
appealable.[23]

4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella which declared, thus:
Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their
affiliation with the deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must be
complied with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to complete all
documentary evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today's scheduled pre-trial is re-
set for the last time to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.

In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is advised to secure all the documentary evidence she
needs material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this case.[24]
This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned another contentious issue between the parties. In this
connection, Judge Estrella issued an Order[25] requiring the parties to file their respective position papers due to the
"divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should be conducted in compliance with" our decision in Suarez. Both
parties duly filed their position papers, with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate executed by the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.

In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67, issued an Order dated January 11, 2000,
which reads, in part:
This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that the records of
this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

xxxx

It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203. Naturally,
there was no trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to adduce evidence to establish their respective
claims in the plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and in the defendants' [including petitioner Valente] counter-claim,
respectively. It is in this context that the Honorable Supreme Court reinstated the "action [of herein respondents] to annul
the auction sale to protect their [herein respondents] own interest.

While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] a chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants [including petitioner Valente] to
prove their defense, consistent with the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in its Decision promulgated on
September 4, 1992), the Court is, however, confronted with the very recent decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in
"Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" where it held that -
The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128). The trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2,
1999" it is left with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrine laid down in the case
of "Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" this case is dismissed without prejudice to the
plaintiffs' [herein respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent with said latest ruling.[26]
Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which, however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on March 14,
2000.[27]

Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
trial court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the trial court were impleaded
as private respondents in the petition. Yet, curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The appellate court
granted the petition, recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67's Orders dated January 11, 2000 and March 14, 2000, and
reinstated Judge Santos' Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996. It disposed of the petition, thus:
We agree with [herein respondents].

On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
mandates that Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to
Teofista Suarez. The sale of the parcels of land was declared null and void. Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809) in the
name of respondents was also declared null and void. xxx

xxxx

Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein
respondents], issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.

xxxx

[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed a notice of appeal on the order of Judge Santos. The
appeal, on motion of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10, 1996. Obviously, the decision of the Supreme
Court had become final and executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge Santos dated May 29, 1996 denying the motion
for reconsideration and the denial of the notice of appeal dated September 6, 1996 had also become final and executory.
The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling and setting aside the
Orders of Judge Estrella and reinstating those of Judge Santos because:

1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final and
executory, and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating that the questioned orders were
interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable; and

2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario[28] which held that a
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing in a petition that
the decision sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a
special civil action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of the merits of a special civil action, an original petition, filed
thereat by herein respondents. That disposition is a final and executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned
before, this Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such as petitioner Valente, via Rule 45.

On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. However, we have disregarded this procedural
flaw and now resolve this case based on the merits or lack thereof.

Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to a trickery to prevent an appeal against a
final order by claiming that the appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same order has become
final after declaring it to be interlocutory."
We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not comprehend the distinction between an
interlocutory order which is final and executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much less,
understand the available remedies therefrom.

We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and the end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.[29] It does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits.[30] Upon the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to
resolve the case.[31]

On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does it
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does
not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the
case.[32] The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are interlocutory, and
therefore, not appealable, as they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of
Judge Santos' Order dated May 29, 1996, herein respondents were directed to submit evidence showing settlement of
the estate of the deceased Marcelo Sr.

Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the CA's distinction between an interlocutory
and a final order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner Valente's Notice of Appeal attained
finality when he failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature of an assailed order determines the
remedies available to an aggrieved party. The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:
SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.--Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until
final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

xxxx
With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the appropriate remedy to be
taken from an interlocutory order, thus:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner Valente's) appeal from the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and
September 6, 1996 was in order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial was correct.

Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the CA
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090, which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely disposed of the
merits of the case with nothing more left to be done therein. The correct and available remedy available to petitioner
Valente was, as previously discussed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory
orders of the RTC which are unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA correctly
upheld the RTC. He should have filed a petition for certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final order of
the CA, he comes before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45.

In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals[33] we ruled in this wise:
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules.

Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of
the appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or
officer. In contrast, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific
grounds therein provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the petition does not fare otherwise. It must be
dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario,[34] herein respondents must
first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly,
conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs has been
firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.[35] True, this Court is not a trier of
facts,[36] but as the final arbiter of disputes,[37] we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of
their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we
ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's
representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation
with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in
our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of
Marcelo Sr.

Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The
following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as
legitimate children:

1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the
RTC, Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and
herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and[38]

2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of
Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.[39] We subsequently reversed this ruling on the
wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual
finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of
[herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein
respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their
deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]."

Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly
or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.

Articles 262,[40] 263,[41] 265 and 266[42] of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support
the foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of birth in
the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.

If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous
possession of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure
of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children
and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal
properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no
need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by
virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and
payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties
were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus,
upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was
transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778[43] of the Civil
Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of
heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession.[44] The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil
Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs,[45]
excluding secondary compulsory heirs,[46] and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the
decedent's estate.[47]

Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein
respondents' rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death.[48] Herein respondents' ownership
of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their respective
shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to
answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even
attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject
properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff
of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their
share in the subject properties.

We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[49] where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and
the cited cases of Litam v.

Rivera[50] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[51] and Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga[52] cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there
are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the
right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an
ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on
February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section of the Revised
Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec.
6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

xxx

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel
of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceedings. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed
by petitioners xxx.[53]
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.,
there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special
proceeding for a declaration of their heirship.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58090 is AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are
REINSTATED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.