[ AC. No.

10945, Feb 23, 2016 ]

ANGELITO RAMISCAL v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO +

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in
advancing and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a
serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him liable
for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal
services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants
seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of
Isabela.[1] Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the
trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As expected, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief.
Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an
additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in
the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. [2]

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals
of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They
endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain. When
they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a
motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be
belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later discovered
that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality,
eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth
of P3,391,600.00.[3]

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.[4]

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent
had violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law for one year.[5]
On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
829,[6] whereby it adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his
recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, "
and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
disregard of the notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the damage
suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently
discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

x x x x

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued
with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with
the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause
with utmost diligence, care and devotion.[7] To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the
client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be diligent in
handling the former's legal affairs.[8] As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship,
the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the
case.[9] The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.[10]
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration
in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in
that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession
of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the
members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his
irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. [11] He should always
bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. [12] He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with
it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in
general.[13]

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension
or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official
oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the
members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties. [14] Based on all the
circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-
month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[15] the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the
offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of the
IBP aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S.

ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez,
AC. No. 5325, Oct 19, 2011 ]

NEMESIO FLORAN v. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA +

DECISION

675 Phil. 443

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit/Complaint filed by spouses Nemesio (Nemesio)
and Caridad (Caridad) Floran against Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza) for unethical conduct.

The Facts

Spouses Floran own an unregistered 3.5525 hectare parcel of land, particularly described as
Cad. Lot No. 422-A, Pls-923 and situated in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The land
is covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal (Epal), a relative, who gave the
property to the Spouses Floran.

On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera filed an action1 for judicial foreclosure of mortgage
on the house situated on the land owned by the Spouses Floran with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 41. The action for foreclosure involved an amount of
P7,500.

Spouses Floran sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza. On 24 September 1996, Atty. Ediza filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 23 October
1996, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case without prejudice based on non-
compliance with barangay conciliation procedures under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare or 10,910 square meters of their 3.5525
hectare land to Phividec Industrial Authority (Phividec) for P25 per square meter totaling to the
amount of P272,750, payable in three installments - (1) P55,132; (2) P120,000, and (3) P97,618.
The installments were paid and released within the months of June to July 1997. The sale was
evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of Lot Owner executed by Nemesio and Phividec's
representative and notarized by Atty. Ediza on 31 March 1997.

Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver in Phividec's favor. The Spouses Floran
again sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the preparation and notarization of the waiver. Atty.
Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of
Absolute Sale in their favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal to
sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed
assent to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of
Nemesio for P2,000.
On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land. Out of the total amount of P272,750, which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses
Floran, Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38 for the titling of the remaining portion
of the land, other expenses and attorney's fees.

Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However, Atty.
Ediza failed to fulfill his promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered,
the Spouses Floran asked Atty. Ediza for the return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus,
Spouses Floran presented their complaint before the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental.

The IBP called the Spouses Floran and Atty. Ediza to a conference. During the dialogue, Atty.
Ediza refused to return the money but promised to tear a document evidencing sale by the
Spouses Floran to him of one hectare land of their property for P50,000. The Spouses Floran
claimed that they had no knowledge that they executed such document in favor of Atty. Ediza
and suspected that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty. Ediza told them not
to read. Afterwards, the Spouses Floran filed their formal complaint before the Supreme Court.

In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad alleged that Atty. Ediza gave them
certain documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale, for Epal to sign in order to transfer the
land in their name. However, the Spouses Floran later discovered that one of the documents
given by Atty. Ediza is a deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property executed by
Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza for a consideration of P2,000. When the Spouses Floran confronted
Atty. Ediza, he initially denied the document but then later promised to tear and destroy it.

In his Comment dated 23 January 2001, Atty. Ediza claimed that the Spouses Floran voluntarily
gave him one hectare of the 3.5525 hectare land as payment for handling and winning the civil
case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza explained that the Spouses Floran did not find the
lot interesting, lacking in good topography. He also stated that the property only had an
assessed value of P23,700 at the time it was presented to him.

Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned that Phividec was interested to
buy a hectare of the Spouses Floran's land, and considering that he has a hectare of undivided
portion in the property, he suggested to the Spouses Floran that both of them sell half a hectare
each and equally share in the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full payment, Atty.
Ediza gave fifty percent of the proceeds to the Spouses Floran and he kept the other half.
Thereafter, Atty. Ediza wanted his remaining share in the land consisting of 4,545 square meters
be titled in his name. Atty. Ediza conveyed this to the Spouses Floran and volunteered to take
care of titling the land, including the Spouses Floran's remaining share, with no cost to them.

Atty. Ediza stated that since Phividec had not yet applied for a separate tax declaration which
would segregate its portion from the remainder of the property, he thought of holding in
abeyance the separate survey on the remainder of the land. Also, Atty. Ediza was in a hurry to
have the land titled with the intention of selling it so he informed the Spouses Floran to just
follow up with Phividec.

At the IBP conference, Atty. Ediza stated that he only agreed to return the 4,545 square meter
portion of the land to amicably settle the case with the Spouses Floran. He asserted that the
Deed of Sale signed by the Spouses Floran in his favor served as payment for the dismissal of the
case he handled for the Spouses Floran. Atty. Ediza denied that the money he received was
intended for the titling of the remaining portion of the land. Atty. Ediza claimed that the
complaint against him stemmed from a case where he represented a certain Robert Sabuclalao
for recovery of land. The land was being occupied by the Church of the Assembly of God where
Nemesio Floran serves as pastor.

In a Resolution dated 7 March 2001, the Court resolved to refer the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On 14 August 2008, the investigating commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP submitted his Report and found that Atty. Ediza (1) failed to meet the standards prescribed
by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 15, and (2) violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be imposed the penalty of
six months suspension from the practice of law.

In finding Atty. Ediza guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Investigating Commissioner opined:

After careful evaluation of the claims of the parties vis-a-vis the documents available, the version
of the complainants appear to be credible while that of the respondent is shot through with
inconsistencies.

x x x

b. The foreclosure case of complainants involved only P7,500.00 and respondent Ediza filed
only a single motion and attended only two hearings. Thus, it is highly incredible [that]
complainants whom respondent Ediza claims were destitute will voluntarily and generously
donate to him 1 hectare of their land valued at P50,000.00. As it turned out, the 1 hectare
portion is worth not only P50,000.00 [but] more than P200,000.00.

c. The deed of sale of a portion of complainants' land to respondent Ediza is admittedly

simulated because while it states that the consideration for the sale is P50,000.00, neither party
claims that any money was paid by respondent Ediza to complainants.

d. As a lawyer, Atty. Ediza must be aware that a deed of sale involving real property must be
notarized to be enforceable. The document was unexplainably never notarized.

Thus, this Commission finds that respondent Ediza must have caused the complainants to
unknowingly sign the deed of sale of a portion of their property in his favor. It may further be
noted that in their complaint, complainants allege that they saw in the files of respondent Ediza
a copy of deed of sale of a property executed by Sartiga Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza which he
promised to destroy when confronted about it by complainants. This was never denied by Atty.
Ediza.

Such conduct fails to come up to the standard prescribed by Canon 1.01 that "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct" and Canon 15 that "A lawyer
shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transaction with his client."

On the second issue, x x x the claim of the complainants that they agreed to give P125,000.00 of
the proceeds of the sale of their property to respondent Ediza to register the remaining portion
also appears to be more credible for the following reasons:

1. There is no credible reason for complainants to expect and demand that respondent Ediza
undertake the registration of their property except that they have paid for it. If they were aware
that they gave 1 hectare of their property to respondent Ediza for handling their civil case and
that they are not paying respondent Ediza to register their property, it is not likely that simple
folks like them would be so bold to demand for such valuable service from him for free.

2. There is no credible reason for respondent to willingly undertake for free for complainants
the not so simple task of registering an untitled property.

3. As previously stated, the P 125,000.00 given to respondent Ediza by complainants is

obviously too generous for simply having handled the civil case involving only P7,500.00. There
must have been another reason for complainants to willingly pay the said amount to respondent
and the registration for their remaining property appears to be a credible reason.

It should also be noted that respondent Atty. Ediza does not even allege that he has taken any
step towards accomplishing the registration of the property of the complainants prior to the
filing of this complaint. Whether or not he agreed to do it for free or for a fee, respondent Ediza
should have complied with his promise to register the property of complainants unless he has
valid reasons not to do so. He has not also given any credible explanation why he failed to do so.

Such conduct of respondent Ediza violates Canon 18.03 that "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 26 June 2011, in Resolution No. XIX-2011-
433, the Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the findings of the investigating commissioner.
The resolution states:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no

cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial
ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-401 dated
August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court's Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings of the IBP and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Ediza administratively liable.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:

CANON 1

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x

CANON 15

A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

CANON 18

A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they had no knowledge that they signed a
deed of sale to transfer a portion of their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist that Atty.
Ediza failed to comply with his promise to register their property despite receiving the amount
of P125,463.38. On the other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land from the
Spouses Floran because of their "deep gratitude" to him in the dismissal of the civil case for
foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza further claims that the amount of P125,463.38 which he
received was his rightful share from the sale of the land.

It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to
unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza
also did the same to Epal when he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza
made it appear that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran.
Moreover, when the sale of the Spouses Floran's land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half
of the amount from the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into
thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the land.

Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the naïveté of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their
valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from
giving adequate attention, care and time to his client's case, a lawyer is also expected to be
truthful, fair and honest in protecting his client's rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not
true to his oath as a lawyer.

In Santos v. Lazaro [3] and Dalisay v. Mauricio,4 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a
client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a moral and legal
obligation as well. The Court will not tolerate such action from a member of the legal profession
who deliberately and maliciously did not protect his client's interests.

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is
warranted. Atty. Ediza is directed to return to the Spouses Floran the two (2) sets of documents
that he misled the spouses and Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza is also directed to return the amount of
P125,463.38, representing the amount he received from the proceeds of the sale of the land
belonging to the Spouses Floran, with legal interest from the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively liable for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective
upon receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to return to the Spouses Nemesio and Caridad
Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is
further ORDERED to pay Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran, within 30 days from receipt of
this Decision, the amount of P125,463.38, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully
paid. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other
copies be served on the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe,* JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 6238 (Formerly CBD Case No. 00-762), November 04, 2004 ]

LINDA VILLARIASA-RIESENBECK, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In a Verified Letter-Complaint[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
September 11, 2000, complainant Linda Villariasa-Riesenbeck charged respondent Atty. Jaynes
C. Abarrientos with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.

Complainant alleges that respondent was her lawyer in CA-G.R. CV No. 45655, a case she had
elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case was unfortunately decided against her, so she asked
respondent to prepare a Motion for Reconsideration.[2] She paid him P5,000 for the motion,
with the understanding that if it became necessary to file a petition for review with the Supreme
Court, she will pay him another P5,000 for the petition. Nevertheless, without first waiting for a
resolution of the motion and barely a day after the Motion for Reconsideration was filed, she
paid respondent the P5,000.[3]

Respondent, who anticipated a denial of the motion, then asked her to get certified true copies
of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision. She went to Manila on March 23, 2000, and got what
respondent had requested. But after she had given him the copies of the decision, respondent
failed to apprise her about the status of her case. Respondent never even called her at her
landlady's phone number which she left with him. [4]

Fearful that the period to appeal might lapse, she and her husband, Johannes, visited
respondent several times in May 2000 to ask if a resolution on the motion had already arrived.
In June 2000, she made the inquiries by herself while Johannes, who had meanwhile left the
country, continued to write and call respondent from Holland.[5]

When she heard that a resolution had arrived, it was not from respondent but from Johannes.
In the first week of June 2000, when Johannes called from Holland, respondent told Johannes
that a copy of a Resolution denying the motion had already arrived. Respondent also said that a
Motion for Extension of Time to File the Petition had also been filed with the Supreme Court.
She was surprised to hear this because respondent never told her about the Resolution or the
Motion for Extension of Time he supposedly filed, despite her follow-up visits to him in the last
week of May and early in June.[6]

She returned to respondent's law office on June 23, 27, and 30, 2000,[7] to ask for a copy of the
Resolution and to follow up on the petition, which she expected respondent was preparing
already. Respondent, who never gave her a copy of the Resolution, kept assuring her that the
petition would be filed on time.[8]
On July 3, 2000, respondent told her that the petition was ready to be filed the next
day.[9] When she arrived at his office on July 4, 2000, however, respondent astounded her with
the truth that the period to file the petition had already expired. Respondent confessed that he
received the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on April 18, 2000. She burst into tears
because she knew that because of respondent, she had lost all her hopes concerning the case. [10]

In his Answer filed on November 14, 2000, respondent insists he was diligent in the
performance of his duties. He claims that after he received the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on April 18, 2000, he tried to reach complainant. He had his secretaries call
her several times at the phone number she gave and even repeatedly sent a messenger to her
house at Humay-humay, Lapu-lapu City. Despite the messages they left for her, complainant
never showed up.[11]

When complainant did go to his office, it was only on June 23, 2000, long after the period to
appeal had lapsed.[12] He blamed her for coming late, and told her that even if she came on time,
he would tell her to look for another lawyer, as he was convinced that filing the petition was
futile. He also told her that filing a petition that merely reiterates the arguments in the motion
for reconsideration would render him liable for contempt. He advised her to tell her husband
these things.[13]

Complainant had agreed with him, according to respondent, adding that she had lost interest in
her case. She said that she was only there because her husband, Johannes, had been pressing
her to pursue the case even when she lacked the money to do as he wished. [14]

The next time he saw complainant was a few days after, on June 27, 2000. Although she knew
that the period to appeal had expired, respondent said she pleaded with him to file the petition.
He refused. On June 30, 2000, she returned to his office and reiterated her request. At that
point, he said that he returned the records to her.[15]

Respondent further alleges that from the very start, he made it clear to complainant and her
husband that she stood to lose the case even before the Supreme Court. [16] Still, complainant and
her husband insisted that the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals be appealed. [17]

His apprehension to appeal the case notwithstanding, he agreed to file the Motion for
Reconsideration. He did not, however, categorically agree to file the petition. Accordingly, he
apprised complainant that the P5,000 for the petition will only be paid if he decided to file
one.[18]

Respondent admits instructing complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse
decision of the Court of Appeals, but denies instructing her to go to Manila to get it.[19] He
likewise denies ever telling Johannes in the first week of June 2000 that a Motion for Extension
of Time to File a Petition for Review had been filed. [20]

In her Reply[21] to respondent's answer, complainant points to the Joint Affidavit[22] of Nesa Y.
Bentulan, her landlady, and Marilyn Baay, the latter's housemaid, who both averred that neither
of them received any phone call or visit from respondent or any of his personnel. Complainant
avers that they are the ones with whom respondent's personnel would have to talk to because
the phone number she left with respondent belonged to Bentulan. They are also the ones with
whom respondent's messenger would have to talk to in the compound where she lived. [23]

After investigating the matter, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline found respondent to have violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[24] In Resolution No. XVI-2003-173, issued on September 27, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the CBD findings, and recommended to this Court that respondent
be suspended for four months. It was likewise recommended that respondent be ordered to
refund the P5,000 complainant alleges she paid for the petition.[25]

We are in full accord with the recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

The proven facts of this case are contrary to respondent's assertion that his sole obligation to
complainant was to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The description of legal services in the
official receipts that he himself issued for the two partial payments complainant made shows the
extent of legal services he contracted to render. The first receipt reads as follows:

Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
representing the following:

PARTICULARS AMOUNT

Re: Partial Payment for Preparation of Motion for

Reconsideration & eventually Petition for Review to the
Supreme Court case of Linda Riesenbeck vs.
MAGICCORP CA-G.R. CV-45655 - - - P5,000.00

Balance Remaining:

P5,000.00 to be paid upon filing of the Motion

for Reconsideration;

P5,000.00 to be paid on or before October 30, 2000.

(SGD.)
ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS

Cebu City, Philippines, February 24, 2000.[26]

The second reads as follows:

Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
representing the following:

PARTICULARS AMOUNT
Re: Additional Partial Payment for the Preparation of
Motion for Reconsideration & Petition for Review case of
Linda Riesenbeck vs. MAGICCORP - - - P5,000.00

Balance Remaining:

P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the Petition for

Review to the Supreme Court.

(SGD.)
ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS

Cebu City, Philippines, March 04, 2000.[27]

As the first receipt shows, respondent bound himself to file not only the Motion for
Reconsideration, but also the petition for review. This is clear from the words "Partial Payment
for Preparation of Motion for Reconsideration & eventually Petition for Review to the Supreme
Court" in the first receipt. The second receipt, on its face, bears the words "Balance Remaining:
P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the Petition for Review to the Supreme Court." The
tenor of these words, which respondent himself had written, clearly shows the respondent's
obligations concerning complainant's case.

That respondent was supposed to elevate complainant's case is consistent with the fact that as
early as March 2000, during the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals, respondent instructed complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse
decision to be attached to the petition.[28] Not only is his action proof that he was obliged to
elevate complainant's case, his action is also proof he considered her cause meritorious.
Respondent's present claim that he apprised complainant from the very start that further appeal
or petition would be unmeritorious is, therefore, clearly a ruse.

Likewise unbelievable is respondent's claim that he repeatedly sent his messenger and had his
secretaries call complainant several times. Respondent alleges that complainant could not be
reached in time for him to withdraw his services while allowing complainant sufficient time to
hire other counsel. We note, however, that respondent never attempted to write complainant to
apprise her that he had already received the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Sending
a letter to her by registered mail would have been the simplest thing he could have done to
protect himself from liability if it were true that complainant could not be found in time.

What is more, complainant's landlady and the latter's housemaid averred in a joint affidavit that
none of respondent's personnel ever visited or called and left a message for complainant. Their
declarations, coming as they do from disinterested persons, are entitled to greater credence than
the statements from respondent's own personnel. We have little doubt that respondent had
invented a scenario to explain his negligence.

Respondent should be reminded that once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause.[29] The lawyer must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the client's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.[30] Otherwise stated, the lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of the lawyer's utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the
rules of law legally applied.[31] This simply means that the client is entitled to the benefit of any
remedy and defense that is authorized by law and may expect the lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense.[32] Until the lawyer's withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to
do his or her best for the interest of the client.

As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.[33]

Canon 19. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.[34]

Aggravating his negligence, respondent failed to demonstrate the candor he owed complainant.
Respondent kept hiding from complainant the fact that he had received a copy of the Resolution
as early as April 18, 2000, despite complainant's many visits to his law office. Worse,
respondent made complainant believe that the petition would be filed in time before this Court.

Needless to emphasize, a lawyer must not keep a client in the dark as to the status of and
developments in the client's case. The lawyer is obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a
client's request for information.[35] A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or
manner by which that client's interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or
omitted.[36] A lawyer who repeatedly fails to answer the inquiries or communications of a client
violates the rules of professional courtesy and neglects the client's interests. [37]

Respondent's failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of complainant caused
her grave material prejudice. Respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty
owed by him to his client. In line with our ruling in Abay v. Montesino,[38] respondent's
suspension is fully warranted. As recommended, we find that his immediate suspension from
the practice of law for four months is called for under the circumstances.

As to the alleged overpayment of attorney's fees, the IBP recommends that respondent be made
to refund the P5,000 that complainant claims she paid for the petition for review. We find that
based on the receipts complainant submitted, the entire amount of fees and expenses agreed
upon was P15,000. Of this amount, complainant already paid P10,000, corresponding to the
attorney's fees and expenses related to making the Motion for Reconsideration. From the
second receipt, it is clear that the remaining balance of P5,000 was payable upon the filing of
the petition for review with the Supreme Court, which was never done. Since evidence shows
that he did file a motion but he was thereafter negligent and lacking in honesty and candor in
dealing with his client, a refund is fair and proper, not of the entire amount of P10,000 but only
of P5,000.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS is found LIABLE for serious

misconduct and negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four (4) months, with warning that commission of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is also ORDERED to
refund the amount of P5,000.00 soonest to complainant.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent, Atty. Jaynes C.
Abarrientos, in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies hereof be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on leave.
EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 10868 [Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041], January 26, 2016 ]

CHERYL E. VASCO-TAMARAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Republic of fyt

Supreme Court
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading merit
the penalty of disbarment.

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty.
Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent
and forged her signature on the Petition.[1] She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.[2]

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte
Regala Tamaray.[3] To support her allegation, she attached the Affidavit[4] of Maritess Marquez-
Guerrero. The Affidavit states:

1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East Cafe at

Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;

2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us (Cheryl
and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty. Daquis'
husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the latter and got her
services;

3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the
presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his
marriage with Cheryl;

4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived and
shortly after, the group left;
 5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and 1) went to
McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.][5] (Emphasis supplied)

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City."[6] In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office
of Muntinlupa City.[7]

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty.
Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused. [8]

Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to
see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her.[9]

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty.
Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers
because she never resided in Muntinlupa City.[10] She attached a Certification issued by the
Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never ... a resident of
#9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan." [11] She
also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of
"#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City . . . from
2000 till present."[12]

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty.
Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.[13]

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that her
postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[,]"[14] which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by
the trial court were received by Encamacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives of
Leomarte Tamaray.[15]

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant
herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as
early as October 2006, not December 2006.[16]

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized
the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray.[17] Atty.
Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan
(Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena).[18]

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a
client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature.
Purawan stated that she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the
community tax certificate was provided by Vasco-Tamaray.[19]

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte
Tamaray but she refused to do so.[20]
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray
requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request
because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. [21]

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain
Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda
signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity portion of the birth
certificate.[22]

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers,[23] but
based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied.[24]

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because Vasco-
Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-
Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed
any petition, but she failed to do so. [25]

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated
September 27, 2014.[26]

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-
Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage.

This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.

By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.[27]

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte
Tamaray's counsel[28] but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006,[29] but did not refute[30] the
statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as
his lawyer.[31] Likewise, respondent admitted that she met with complainant
subsequently,[32] but did not refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the
meetings, she tried to convince complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to
annul their marriage.[33]

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. [34] Yet, there is no
explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they were introduced. It appears, then,
that respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit,
"Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was
because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[.]"[35]

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that complainant, not her client Leomarte
Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a probability that respondent did not want Leomarte
Tamaray to be the petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous
marriage, the admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.

In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be no
reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage
annulled."[36]

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court
process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The
Petition states that complainant is "of legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at
09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]"[37]

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that Leomarte's
residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while complainant's residence is at
"Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila."[38] Assuming that complainant lived with her
husband after they were married, complainant most likely did not receive court processes
because she left their home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:

P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They became
sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;

During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in their
house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as respondent worked in Japan;

Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996. They had no
children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;

Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another woman. As a

result, petitioner left their house.[39](Emphasis supplied)
Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor that she did not
file any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during the meeting on March 5,
2007, complainant had no knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name. [40] She obtained a
copy of the Petition after the March 5, 2007 meeting. [41]

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy,[42] this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal professions, engraves
an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct — determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty — depends
on the factual circumstances of each case.
. . . .
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By
no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar,
but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.[43]

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise,
she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.

II

Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a
forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized.[44]

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged.[45] Respondent merely denied
complainant's allegation.[46]

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." [47] The
records of this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards
issued by the University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." [48] In her
Complaint-Affidavit against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out
"CTamaray."[49]
A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and
"o." Further, complainant's signatures in the documents[50] attached to the records consistently
appear to be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c."[51] Hence, it seems that complainant's
signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was forged.

While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact
remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and
notarized.[52] In doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
These canons state:

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
. . . .

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

RULE 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In Embido v. Pe, Jr.[53] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty of
violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court
decision "in a non-existent court proceeding."[54] This court discussed that:

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions

can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.[55]

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she
prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.

Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a scuffle
inside court chambers;[56] openly doubting paternity of his own son;[57] hurling invectives at a
Clerk of Court;[58] harassing occupants of a property;[59] using intemperate language;[60] and
engaging in an extramarital affair.[61]

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is
tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon
10.

In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,[62] this court discussed the importance of Canon 10, Rule
10.01, as follows:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and
to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice."[63] (Emphasis supplied)

III

This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who
is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.

The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.:[64]

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord
the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest. The most
thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the
client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking
the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the
entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests
of the client and the pursuit of justice[.][65]

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal profession, as
discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez:[66]
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly,
"[ljawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."[67] (Citations omitted)

IV

This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her
appearance as counsel for complainant[68] even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte
Tamaray.[69] Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
. . . .

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era:[70]

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by
the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in
which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of
the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of
the client.[71]

The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat:[72]

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.[23] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.[74] When the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for
complainant.[75] If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is
conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.

On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015.
Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

. . . .

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

 Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
(a)
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall
recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth
(b) its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons
on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's
report.

The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and
(c) submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days
from issuance of the resolution.

(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.[76]

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the
power to "issue a decision"[77] if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of
"less than suspension or disbarment."[78] In addition, the case would be deemed terminated
unless an interested party filed a petition before this court.[79]

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are recommendatory, subject to review by this court. [80]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1,

Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
is DISMISSED.

The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on official leave.
EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 1890, August 07, 2002 ]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael
G. Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy
to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways
because of politics and respondent's overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had
been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information
gained while their attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every
turn.
Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case
No. 4306-M[1] for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay,"
where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent
had previously helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No. 4726-M,[2] "Narciso Lopez v. Federico
Suntay," in 1970 where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real
contract between the parties likewise involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had
previously helped to administer; (c) Civil Case No. 112764,[3] "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico
Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No.
77-1523, "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same testimony
subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for
violation of PD No. 296[4] for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing
complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that
respondent's possession and examination of the TCT and the blueprint plan of the property
while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the information that there used to
be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that since respondent helped in the
administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared.
Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify
His Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or
intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly
used against complainant when the relationship terminated. Complainant filed
his Comments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July 1978. Thereafter this case was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and
recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.
After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14
October 1982 enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:
The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish
two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of
client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct.

1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case

for false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).

The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976,
before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why
Magno Dinglasan had testified against him in that case, complainant stated that he once
declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record
in the Bureau.
On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977
with the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During
the preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan,
respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to the Ministry of Justice on
appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan.
Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who
was then his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for
P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Respondent's advice was for complainant to disregard the demand
as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount to P50,000.00,
complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised complainant not
to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).
Respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes
malpractice (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the
lawyer of complainant and respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the very
matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan,
in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted with the
interest of his former client.

2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan

in Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on
December 21, 1976 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-
M.
For the same reasons set forth above, respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan
in Civil Case No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting
interests.

3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent
violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship.
 In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the
following functions:
"Witness
"A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in 1964
and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.
"ATTY. AQUINO:
"Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing
Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?
"A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel in
the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He used to
help me manage my fishpond. He is our legal adviser on legal matters. He is our
confidant. We have no secrets between us. He has complete access in our papers (tsn,
May 21, 1981)
Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two
creeks, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the
certificate of title and the blue print plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the
fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang Caluang and on the west by
Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).
In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two
creeks to the authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required
the Public Works to conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6).
In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The
relocation survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond.
Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang had disappeared.
Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 74-193. (Exhibit 6)
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he
gained while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building
of illegal dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the information that there used to be two
creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the administration
of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he
gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer and part
administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of
professional confidence.

4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for
serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez x x x and for himself filing criminal charges
against complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as
lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed by respondent himself against
complainant are the following:
 1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos,
Bulacan;
2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos,
Bulacan;
3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan;
4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila;
and
5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.

While there may be validity to respondent's contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file
a case against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended several
years before, yet under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said that
respondent acted ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of respondent. He is an uncle and
a political benefactor. The parties for whom respondent filed cases against complainant were
former friends or associates of complainant whom respondent met when he was serving as the
lawyer and general adviser of complainant. The cases filed by respondent were about properties
which respondent had something to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant.
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes
commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer
relationship and engaging in unethical conduct x x x x[5]
Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and
Recommendation in view of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor
General; Motion to Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to
Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January 1983 filed by respondent principally accusing
handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted advantage and preference to the
complainant in the investigation of the case.
After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel,
the Court in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to disqualify
Solicitor Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the investigation of this case. However,
no further proceedings were conducted by the OSG until the records of the case together with
other cases were turned over to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-
2001-169 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner finding respondent guilty as charged. The IBP recommended that respondent
Atty. Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for immoral conduct. In so
recommending the Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG in its
Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we
noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this case was
referred to the Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January
2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC.[6]
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well
taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty.
Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which
he had either been previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped
complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil
Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M respondent acted as counsel for estranged business associates
of complainant, namely, Carlos Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of which were
the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer.
On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) official, regarding whose alleged demand for P150,000.00 from
complainant in exchange for the destruction of the latter's record in the BIR, respondent had
previously advised complainant to disregard. Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were
precisely filed against complainant because the latter had previously testified on the alleged
demand made by Dinglasan. Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand
made by Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such
a demand, would carry much weight against complainant considering that he was the latter's
counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition, respondent initiated
the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of P.D. No. 296[7] for the
disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang, previously
traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674 by using information
obtained while he was in possession of the certificate of title and the blueprint plan of the
property.
As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the
attorney-client relation.[8] As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant
failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is
unavailing to help respondent's cause for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David - [9]
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry
of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition
precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance
the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what
they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in
conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney,
lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept
the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him x x x x
Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice x x x x It is founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste x x x x [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April
2001 is adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and
for unethical conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years effective upon the finality hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.