PEOPLE VS TOMAQUIN

This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be
considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS: Tomaquin together with Rico and others were having drinking spree. Tomaquin left the group
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A few
minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn. In the kitchen,
they saw Jaquelyn bloodied. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later
found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be appellant’s.

Bgy tanods Julius Yosores and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of
the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime
belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant
was temporarily staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts.
The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of
barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing
and he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet
and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes.

Appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section. After being apprised of his
constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty.
Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him
that he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him
that appellant was ready to give his statement. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken in Cebuano
dialect.

On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and three
other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him.
Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence of barangay captain Atty.
Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s house. He was made to admit committing the
crime because Rico has a family while he is single.

Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked
him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with
his expenses. RTC convicted him of Murder.

ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato
Parawan, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD:
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

1. Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu
City. As barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure
peace and order at all times. In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority
under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty.
Parawan as an independent counsel of appellant.
Considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his
barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant
who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an
independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the
Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

2. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant
counsel. An "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.

3. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the
person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. By the time Atty. Parawan arrived, the investigation had
already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty.
Parawan merely "observed" during the entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the
questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial
confession he was about to execute was being voluntarily given.

4. Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own
testimony that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was brought
to his house by the barangay tanods The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively
safeguarded appellant’s rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the
suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit
having committed it.

5. It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice. It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because
he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts
Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him.
Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write.As between him and Atty.

Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament, Atty. Parawan
should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to appellant’s choice

Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent
counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if
gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

Without appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:

(1) Rico Magdasal’s testimony that:

(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;

(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn’s residence belongs to
appellant; and

(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the
crime, which blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson
Magdasal’s house;

(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza’s testimony that the blood stains on appellant’s
 sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin.

The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.

Tomaquin was acquitted.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased

Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis DELGADO, petitioners
vs.
Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be
divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted
child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and
her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the
first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son,
Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is
disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa,
however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:

1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of
representation?
3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?
RULING:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the
trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at
the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present
authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to
the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,
nieces and nephews.

Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived
her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her,
also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded
from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited
by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per
capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
 Zenaida Tigno vs. Sps. Aquino

G.R. 129416 , November 25,2004

FACTS:

The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale
involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity.

The facts alleged are as follows: Spouses Aquino wanted the enforcement of a deed of sale executed by
Mr. Bustria for a fishpond located in Pangasinan. Following this, a compromise agreement approved by
the CFI of Pangasinan was made. However, on 1986 Mr. Bustria died and was then represented by his
daughter Zenaida Tigno. Zenaida wanted that the right of repurchase be exercised by her through
consignation but the same was denied by the RTC.

Meanwhile Spouese Aquino alleged that the right to repurchase was already sold to them by Mr. Bustria
in 1985. They presented two witnesses Mr. De Francia , who was the witness in the execution of the deed
of sale, and former Judge Carino who notarized the same. Zenaida Tigno objected to the admission of
the deed of sale saying that it was not acknowledged by Bustria, her father, and that it was previously
unknown and was not even presented during the Spouses Aquino’s opposition to her consignation. RTC
ruled for Zenaida saying that Bustria did not acknowledge it nor was it done through the assistance of a
counsel. RTC also said that there were inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses presented by
Spouses Aquino.

The CA issued a different ruling with the RTC. The CA stated that there were no substantial
inconsistencies with the statements of the witnesses De Francia and Judge Carino. Also, that the
absence of acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not make the instrument doubtful.
Even the absence of counsel’s representation did not render the same as void. It was noted that a
notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and
that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not former Judge Carino has the capacity to notarize the alleged document in this
present case

HELD:

The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos,
Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing
 instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat
instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer
certifies that the same was sworn before him.

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in
transacting legal conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private
transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City
Judge" In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.

This Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing
documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in
Circular No. 1-90.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its
enforceability militates against Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove
its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale
as a private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized
documents, as distinguished from private documents.

However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cariño,
would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cariño had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it
would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently
recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then
there is all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of
Sale.

These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author
of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of
the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale.
The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.

Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tigno's right to repurchase was not
extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the
RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC
Decision is warranted.

RULE 108; CASE #8

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

GR No. 196049
June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

 Fujiki was a Japanese national who married respondent in the Philippines.

 The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

 Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the 1st marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.

 Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed (among others) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

 The RTC dismissed the petition. It based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.

 Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

 Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.

(2) W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
(1) YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the
State has an interest in recording.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.

(2) YES. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

LETICIA KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Prosecution: Between 9-10 pm, Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Malana, went to the house of Kummer.
Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
Kummer opened the door and at this point, her son, Johan, shot Mallo twice using a gun. Malana, who
was with Mallo, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he
saw the Kummer leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall
flat on the ground.

Thereafter, the Kummer went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with Johan, she
scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. Kummer and Johan put down the guns
and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about 3-4 meters away from the
house.Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights

The prosecution filed an information for homicide against Kummer and Johan. Both accused were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Defense: Kummer claimed she and her children, were already asleep in the evening when the crime
happened. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a
gun report, and the banging at their door. Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the
NPA prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a
gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise
continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass; another stone another child
of Kummer who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire
it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.

RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Cuntapay
and Malana. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left
hand of Johan and on Kummer’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other witnesses,
led the RTC to find both Kuhan and Johan guilty of the crime charged.

Kummer appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. She contended before the CA that the RTC
erred in its appreciation of the evidence, namely: a) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of
Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct
testimonies and b) in considering the paraffin test results finding the Kummer positive for gunpowder
residue.

The CA rejected the Kummer’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies
between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them
because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable.

Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting her of the
crime of homicide.

Held: No. Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not
affect their credibility.

Inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his
sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his
credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the
crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as
these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith. Nor are such inconsistencies,
and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open
court that they saw the accused shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were
due to the oversight of the administering official in typing the exact details of their narration. It is oft
repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete,
resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is
asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out
not to be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of
affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole
statement to be taken out of context.

As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.

In the present case, it is undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one
of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to,
which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed,
the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case.
Moreover, Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial
court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.We find no reason to break this rule
and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana
and Cuntapay.

Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to
identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the
Kummer, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for
authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to
be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the
chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder
residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of Kummer. As a matter of fact, the petitioner
herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a
match she allegedly lighted. Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.

On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test raised by
Kummer, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted
the report observed the regular procedure. While the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate
the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that Kummer shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that
cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces
are minimal and may be washed off with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.

Akbayan vs Aquino – July 16 2008

FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there
right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves
a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the
policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation
are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent
event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the
disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public
disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present
petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot
and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the
JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears
emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a
type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only
after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public
interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information
from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the
President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada
and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom
of speech and freedom of
exercise of the people power of assembly to petition the government
revolution which overthrew the whole for redress of grievances which only
government. affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy intra constitutional and the
of the new government that resulted resignation of the sitting President that
from it cannot be the subject of judicial it caused and the succession of the
review Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the
proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant
issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render
the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge
and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES 496 SCRA 282(2006)

Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of
Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Judge
Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil
case against the estate of Roberto. For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine
the records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilado‘s counsels was
denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with
authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not
under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge
Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the
record of the Hilado‘s case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely
access.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper

RULING:

The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all
processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place
during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book,
other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data
compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law
or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has
received in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest
for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which
every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the
opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep
the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court
found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of
his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision
being “already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize.”

NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Posted by kaye lee on 8:54 PM
G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions
on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him
to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

versus

MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR.,

GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN
HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO,
Respondents.

G. R. No. 171701

February 8, 2012
FACTS:

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and
herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc,
and Gregorio Araneta III.

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another
persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing
Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the
alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten
wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter
objected on the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.

On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally
offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.

Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-
Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the
PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one
filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria
AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III,
the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did the
documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence are
hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed
to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to
show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of
which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil
Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the
bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them
baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to
show that they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence
relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not
been presented as witnesses.
ISSUE:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY
RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.;
RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA AND
RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO

RULING:

It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be
clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.

The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves.
It is imperative; therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus,
the photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must
be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such documents as
secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.

The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented. However, all
except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the plaintiff
presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even
signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the
original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1)
due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the abovementioned
requirements were complied by the plaintiff.Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’,
and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter, which is
clearly a private document. It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they
would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence
futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein
were concerned.Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to
evidence.

Senate V. Ermita

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed
for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with
the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A
distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel
the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons
stated in Arnault.