U.S.

Supreme Court

Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

No. 40

Argued November 6-7, 1950

Decided February 26, 1951

340 U.S. 474

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Syllabus

The National Labor Relations Board ordered petitioner to reinstate with back pay an employee found
to have been discharged because he gave certain testimony in another proceeding under the
National Labor Relations Act. The evidence as to the reason for his discharge was conflicting, and
the Board overruled its examiner's findings of fact and his recommendation that the proceedings be
dismissed. In decreeing enforcement, the Court of Appeals held that the Board's findings of fact
were "supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole" within the meaning of
§ 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended in 1947. This holding was based partly on
the view (1) that the 1947 amendments had not broadened the scope of judicial review, and (2) that
the Board's rejection of its examiner's findings of fact was without relevance in determining whether
the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Held:

1. In the light of the legislative history, the standard of proof required under § 10(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, to support a
decision of the Labor Board on judicial review is the same as that to be exacted by courts reviewing
every administrative action subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 340 U. S. 477-487.

2. In amending § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act so as to require that, on judicial review,
the Board's findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence "on the record considered as
a whole," Congress made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board
decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence
opposed to the Board's view. Pp. 340 U. S. 487-488.

3. When read in the light of their legislative history, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, require the courts to assume more responsibility for the
reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have shown in the past.
Pp. 340 U. S. 488-490.

4. Whether, on the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a
question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the courts of appeals. This Court will
intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been
misapprehended or grossly misapplied. P. 340 U. S. 491.

5. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was barred from taking into account the report of the
examiner on questions of fact insofar as that report was rejected by the Board. Pp. 340 U. S. 491-
497.

(a) A trial examiner's findings are not as unassailable as a master's, and may be reversed by the
Board when when not clearly erroneous. P. 340 U. S. 492.

(b) A reviewing court need not give a trial examiner's findings more weight than, in reason and in the
light of judicial experience, they deserve, but they should be accorded the relevance that they
reasonably command in answering the comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting
the Board's order is substantial. Pp. 340 U. S. 496-497.

6. The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals, which is left free to grant or deny enforcement as
it thinks the principles expressed in the opinion, of this Court dictate. P. 340 U. S. 497.

179 F. 2d 749, vacated and remanded.

The Court of Appeals decreed enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board
requiring petitioner to reinstate an employee with back pay and to cease and desist from
discriminating against any employee who files charges or gives testimony under the National Labor
Relations Act. 179 F.2d 749. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 962. Judgment vacated and
cause remanded, p. 340 U. S. 497.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The essential issue raised by this case and its companion, Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co.,
post, 340 U. S. 498, is the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act and the legislation colloquially
known as the Taft-Hartley Act on the duty of Courts of Appeals when called upon to review orders of
the National Labor Relations Board.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted enforcement of an order directing, in the main,
that petitioner reinstate with back pay an employee found to have been discharged because he gave
testimony under the Wagner Act, and cease and desist from discriminating against any employee
who files charges or gives testimony under that Act. The court below, Judge Swan dissenting,
decreed full enforcement of the order. 179 F.2d 749. Because the views of that court regarding the
effect of the new legislation on the relation between the Board and the courts of appeals in the
enforcement of the Board's orders conflicted with those of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
[Footnote 1] we brought both cases here. 339 U.S. 951. The clash of opinion obviously required
settlement by this Court.

Want of certainty in judicial review of Labor Board decisions partly reflects the intractability of any
formula to furnish definiteness of content for all the impalpable factors involved in judicial review.
But, in part, doubts as to the nature of the reviewing power and uncertainties in its application derive
from history, and, to that extent, an elucidation of this history may clear them away.

The Wagner Act provided: "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive." Act of July 5, 1935, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). This Court read
"evidence" to mean "substantial evidence," Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. Labor Board, 301 U.
S. 142, and we said that
"[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Accordingly, it "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. .
. . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."

The very smoothness of the "substantial evidence" formula as the standard for reviewing the
evidentiary validity of the Board's findings established its currency. But the inevitably variant
applications of the standard to conflicting evidence soon brought contrariety of views, and, in due
course, bred criticism. Even though the whole record may have been canvassed in order to
determine whether the evidentiary foundation of a determination by the Board was "substantial," the
phrasing of this Court's process of review readily lent itself to the notion that it was enough that the
evidence supporting the Board's result was "substantial" when considered by itself. It is fair to say
that, by imperceptible steps, regard for the factfinding function of the Board led to the assumption
that the requirements of the Wagner Act were met when the reviewing court could find in the record
evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board's findings. Compare Labor Board
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206; Labor Board v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U. S.
318; and see Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105. This is not to say
that every member of this Court was consciously guided by this view, or that the Court ever explicitly
avowed this practice as doctrine. What matters is that the belief justifiably arose that the Court had
so construed the obligation to review. [Footnote 2]

Criticism of so contracted a reviewing power reinforced dissatisfaction felt in various quarters with
the Board's administration of the Wagner Act in the years preceding the war. The scheme of the Act
was attacked as an inherently unfair fusion of the functions of prosecutor and judge. [Footnote 3]
Accusations of partisan bias were not wanting. [Footnote 4] The "irresponsible admission and
weighing of hearsay, opinion, and emotional speculation in place of factual evidence" was said to be
a "serious menace." [Footnote 5] No doubt some, perhaps even much, of the criticism was baseless
,and some surely was reckless. [Footnote 6] What is here relevant, however, is the climate of
opinion thereby generated, and its effect on Congress. Protests against "shocking injustices"
[Footnote 7] and intimations of judicial "abdication" [Footnote 8] with which some courts granted
enforcement of the Board's order stimulated pressures for legislative relief from alleged
administrative excesses.

The strength of these pressures was reflected in the passage in 1940 of the Walter-Logan Bill. It was
vetoed by President Roosevelt, partly because it imposed unduly rigid limitations on the
administrative process and partly because of the investigation into the actual operation of the
administrative process then being conducted by an experienced committee appointed by the
Attorney General. [Footnote 9] It is worth noting that, despite its aim to tighten control over
administrative determinations of fact, the Walter-Logan Bill contented itself with the conventional
formula that an agency's decision could be set aside if "the findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence." [Footnote 10]

The final report of the Attorney General's Committee was submitted in January, 1941. The majority
concluded that

"[d]issatisfaction with the existing standards as to the scope of judicial review derives largely from
dissatisfaction with the factfinding procedures now employed by the administrative bodies. [Footnote
11]"

Departure from the "substantial evidence" test, it thought, would either create unnecessary
uncertainty or transfer to courts the responsibility for ascertaining and assaying matters the
significance of which lies outside judicial competence. Accordingly, it recommended against
Legislation embodying a general scheme of judicial review. [Footnote 12]

Three members of the Committee registered a dissent. Their view was that the "present system or
lack of system of judicial review" led to inconsistency and uncertainty. They reported that, under a
"prevalent" interpretation of the "substantial evidence" rule,

"if what is called 'substantial evidence' is found anywhere in the record to support conclusions of
fact, the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily the
countervailing evidence may preponderate -- unless, indeed, the stage of arbitrary decision is
reached. Under this interpretation, the courts need to read only one side of the case, and, if they find
any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained, and the record to the contrary is to
be ignored. [Footnote 13]"

Their view led them to recommend that Congress enact principles of review applicable to all
agencies not excepted by unique characteristics. One of these principles was expressed by the
formula that judicial review could extend to "findings, inferences, or conclusions of fact unsupported,
upon the whole record, by substantial evidence." [Footnote 14] So far as the history of this
movement for enlarged review reveals, the phrase "upon the whole record" makes its first
appearance in this recommendation of the minority of the Attorney General's Committee. This
evidence of the close relationship between the phrase and the criticism out of which it arose is
important, for the substance of this formula for judicial review found its way into the statute books
when Congress with unquestioning -- we might even say uncritical -- unanimity enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act. [Footnote 15]

Once is tempted to say "uncritical" because the legislative history of that Act hardly speaks with that
clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to enforce its
true will. On the one hand, the sponsors of the legislation indicated that they were reaffirming the
prevailing "substantial evidence" test. [Footnote 16] But, with equal clarity, they expressed
disapproval of the manner in which the courts were applying their own standard. The committee
reports of both houses refer to the practice of agencies to rely upon "suspicion, surmise,
implications, or plainly incredible evidence," and indicate that courts are to exact higher standards "in
the exercise of their independent judgment," and on consideration of "the whole record." [Footnote
17]

Similar dissatisfaction with too restricted application of the "substantial evidence" test is reflected in
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. [Footnote 18] The bill as reported to the House
provided that the

"findings of the Board as to the facts shall be conclusive unless it is made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court either (1) that the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the
evidence, or (2) that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. [Footnote 19]"

The bill left the House with this provision. Early committee prints in the Senate provided for review by
"weight of the evidence" or "clearly erroneous" standards. [Footnote 20] But, as the Senate
Committee Report relates,

"it was finally decided to conform the statute to the corresponding section of the Administrative
Procedure Act, where the substantial evidence test prevails. In order to clarify any ambiguity in that
statute, however, the committee inserted the words 'questions of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. . . .' [Footnote 21]"
This phraseology was adopted by the Senate. The House conferees agreed. They reported to the
House:

"It is believed that the provisions of the conference agreement relating to the courts' reviewing power
will be adequate to preclude such decisions as those in NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316
U. S. 105, and in the Wilson, Columbia Products, Union Pacific Stages, Hearst, Republic
Aviation, and Le Tourneau, etc. cases, supra, without unduly burdening the courts. [Footnote 22]"

The Senate version became the law.

It is fair to say that, in all this, Congress expressed a mood. And it expressed its mood not merely by
oratory, but by legislation. As legislation, that mood must be respected, even though it can only
serve as a standard for judgment, and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of
applications. Enforcement of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment.
But it is not for us to question that Congress may assume such qualities in the federal judiciary.

From the legislative story we have summarized, two concrete conclusions do emerge. One is the
identity of aim of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act regarding the proof with
which the Labor Board must support a decision. The other is that, now, Congress has left no room
for doubt as to the kind of scrutiny which a court of appeals must give the record before the Board to
satisfy itself that the Board's order rests on adequate proof.

It would be mischievous word-playing to find that the scope of review under the Taft-Hartley Act is
any different from that under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Senate Committee which
reported the review clause of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly indicated that the two standards were to
conform in this regard, and the wording of the two Acts is, for purposes of judicial administration,
identical. And so we hold that the standard of proof specifically required of the Labor Board by the
Taft-Hartley Act is the same as that to be exacted by courts reviewing every administrative action
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.

Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of evidence
supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of evidence which, in and of itself, justified it,
without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences
could be drawn, the new legislation definitively precludes such a theory of review and bars its
practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both statutes that courts
consider the whole record. Committee reports and the adoption in the Administrative Procedure Act
of the minority views of the Attorney General's Committee demonstrate that to enjoin such a duty on
the reviewing court was one of the important purposes of the movement which eventuated in that
enactment.

To be sure, the requirement for canvassing "the whole record" in order to ascertain substantiality
does not furnish a calculus of value by which a reviewing court can assess the evidence. Nor was it
intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped
or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that
field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess, and therefore must respect.
Nor does it mean that, even as to matters not requiring expertise, a court may displace the Board's
choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the court would justifiably have made a
different choice had the matter been before it de novo. Congress has merely made it clear that a
reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find
that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial when viewed in the light that the record in its
entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.
There remains, then, the question whether enactment of these two statutes has altered the scope of
review other than to require that substantiality be determined in the light of all that the record
relevantly presents. A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for
certitude, but cannot assure certainty of application.

Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual
process of judging, or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be too often
repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is
a judiciary of high competence and character, and the constant play of an informed professional
critique upon its work.

Since the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any
form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the
old. There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we
cannot escape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms.

Whatever changes were made by the Administrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts are clearly
within this area where precise definition is impossible. Retention of the familiar "substantial
evidence" terminology indicates that no drastic reversal of attitude was intended.

But a standard leaving an unavoidable margin for individual judgment does not leave the judicial
judgment at large, even though the phrasing of the standard does not wholly fence it in. The
legislative history of these Acts demonstrates a purpose to impose on courts a responsibility which
has not always been recognized. Of course, it is a statute, and not a committee report, which we are
interpreting. But the fair interpretation of a statute if often "the art of proliferating a
purpose," Brooklyn National Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 451, revealed more by the
demonstrable forces that produced it than by its precise phrasing. The adoption in these statutes of
the judicially constructed "substantial evidence" test was a response to pressures for stricter and
more uniform practice, not a reflection of approval of all existing practices.

To find the change so elusive that it cannot be precisely defined does not mean it may be ignored.
We should fail in our duty to effectuate the will of Congress if we denied recognition to expressed
Congressional disapproval of the finality accorded to Labor Board findings by some decisions of this
and lower courts, or even of the atmosphere which may have favored those decisions.

We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act direct that
courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board
decisions than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be influenced by a
feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on
them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That responsibility
is not less real because it is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear substantial
when viewed, on the record as a whole, by courts invested with the authority and enjoying the
prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The Board's findings are entitled to respect, but they must
nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's
decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its
informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both.

From this, it follows that enactment of these statutes does not require every Court of Appeals to alter
its practice. Some -- perhaps a majority -- have always applied the attitude reflected in this
legislation. To explore whether a particular court should or should not alter its practice would only
divert attention from the application of the standard now prescribed to a futile inquiry into the nature
of the test formerly used by a particular court.
Our power to review the correctness of application of the present standard ought seldom to be called
into action.

Whether, on the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a
question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will
intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been
misapprehended or grossly misapplied.

II

Our disagreement with the view of the court below that the scope of review of Labor Board decisions
is unaltered by recent legislation does not, of itself, as we have noted, require reversal of its
decision. The court may have applied a standard of review which satisfies the present Congressional
requirement.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is assailed on two grounds. It is said (1) that the court erred in
holding that it was barred from taking into account the report of the examiner on questions of fact
insofar as that report was rejected by the Board, and (2) that the Board's order was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record, considered as a whole, even apart from the validity of the court's
refusal to consider the rejected portions of the examiner's report.

The latter contention is easily met. It is true that two of the earlier decisions of the court below were
among those disapproved by Congress. [Footnote 23] But this disapproval, we have seen, may well
have been caused by unintended intimations of judicial phrasing. And, in any event, it is clear from
the court's opinion in this case that it, in fact, did consider the "record as a whole," and did not deem
itself merely the judicial echo of the Board's conclusion. The testimony of the company's witnesses
was inconsistent, and there was clear evidence that the complaining employee had been discharged
by an officer who was at one time influenced against him because of his appearance at the Board
hearing. On such a record, we could not say that it would be error to grant enforcement.

The first contention, however, raises serious questions, to which we now turn.

III

The Court of Appeals deemed itself bound by the Board's rejection of the examiner's findings
because the court considered these findings not "as unassailable as a master's." [Footnote 24] 179
F.2d at 752. They are not. Section 10(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that.

"If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the
Board shall state its findings of fact. . . ."

61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C.(Supp. III) § 160(c). The responsibility for decision thus placed on the Board
is wholly inconsistent with the notion that it has power to reverse an examiner's findings only when
they are "clearly erroneous." Such a limitation would make so drastic a departure from prior
administrative practice that explicitness would be required.

The Court of Appeals concluded from this premise

"that, although the Board would be wrong in totally disregarding his findings, it is practically
impossible for a court, upon review of those findings which the Board itself substitutes, to consider
the Board's reversal as a factor in the court's own decision. This we say because we cannot find any
middle ground between doing that and treating such a reversal as error, whenever it would be such,
if done by a judge to a master in equity."

179 F.2d at 753. Much as we respect the logical acumen of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
we do not find ourselves pinioned between the horns of his dilemma.

We are aware that to give the examiner's findings less finality than a master's, and yet entitle them to
consideration in striking the account, is to introduce another and an unruly factor into the judgmatical
process of review. But we ought not to fashion an exclusionary rule merely to reduce the number of
imponderables to be considered by reviewing courts.

The Taft-Hartley Act provides that

"The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."

61 Stat. 148, 29 U.S.C.(Supp. III) § 160(e). Surely an examiner's report is as much a part of the
record as the complaint or the testimony. According to the Administrative Procedure Act, "All
decisions (including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become a part of the record. .
. ." § 8(b), 60 Stat. 242, 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b). We found that this Act's provision for judicial review has
the same meaning as that in the Taft-Hartley Act. The similarity of the two statutes in language and
purpose also requires that the definition of "record" found in the Administrative Procedure Act be
construed to be applicable as well to the term "record" as used in the Taft-Hartley Act.

It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain language of the statutes directs a
reviewing court to determine the substantiality of evidence on the record including the examiner's
report. The conclusion is confirmed by the indications in the legislative history that enhancement of
the status and function of the trial examiner was one of the important purposes of the movement for
administrative reform.

This aim was set forth by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure:

"In general, the relationship upon appeal between the hearing commissioner and the agency ought,
to a considerable extent, to be that of trial court to appellate court. Conclusions, interpretations, law,
and policy should, of course, be open to full review. On the other hand, on matters which the hearing
commissioner, having heard the evidence and seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the
agency should be reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown. [Footnote 25]"

Apparently it was the Committee's opinion that these recommendations should not be obligatory. For
the bill which accompanied the Final Report required only that hearing officers make an initial
decision which would become final in the absence of further agency action, and that agencies which
differed on the facts from their examiners give reasons and record citations supporting their
conclusion. [Footnote 26] This proposal was further moderated by the Administrative Procedure Act.
It permits agencies to use examiners to record testimony, but not to evaluate it, and contains the
rather obscure provision that an agency which reviews an examiner's report has "all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision." [Footnote 27]

But this refusal to make mandatory the recommendations of the Attorney General's Committee
should not be construed as a repudiation of them. Nothing in the statutes suggests that the Labor
Board should not be influenced by the examiner's opportunity to observe the witnesses he hears and
sees and the Board does not. Nothing suggests that reviewing courts should not give to the
examiner's report such probative force as it intrinsically commands. To the contrary, § 11 of the
Administrative Procedure Act contains detailed provisions designed to maintain high standards of
independence and competence in examiners. Section 10(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act
requires that examiners "shall issue . . . a proposed report, together with a recommended order."
Both statutes thus evince a purpose to increase the importance of the role of examiners in the
administrative process. High standards of public administration counsel that we attribute to the Labor
Board's examiners both due regard for the responsibility which Congress imposes on them and the
competence to discharge it. [Footnote 28]

The committee reports also make it clear that the sponsors of the legislation thought the statutes
gave significance to the findings of examiners. Thus, the Senate Committee responsible for the
Administrative Procedure Act explained in its report that examiners' decisions

"would be of consequence, for example, to the extent that material facts in any case depend on the
determination of credibility of witnesses as shown by their demeanor or conduct at the hearing.
[Footnote 29]"

The House Report reflects the same attitude, [Footnote 30] and the Senate Committee Report on
the Taft-Hartley Act likewise indicates regard for the responsibility devolving on the examiner.
[Footnote 31]

We do not require that the examiner's findings be given more weight than, in reason and in the light
of judicial experience, they deserve. The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in any way
when the Board and its examiner disagree. We intend only to recognize that evidence supporting a
conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the
witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he
has reached the same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the
consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends
largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case. To give it this significance does not
seem to us materially more difficult than to heed the other factors which in sum determine whether
evidence is "substantial."

The direction in which the law moves is often a guide for decision of particular cases, and here it
serves to confirm our conclusion. However halting its progress, the trend in litigation is toward a
rational inquiry into truth, in which the tribunal considers everything "logically probative of some
matter requiring to be proved." Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 530; Funk v. United
States, 290 U. S. 371. This Court has refused to accept assumptions of fact which are demonstrably
false, United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, even when agreed to by the parties, Swift
& Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281. Machinery for discovery of evidence has been
strengthened; the boundaries of judicial notice have been slowly but perceptibly enlarged. It would
reverse this process for courts to deny examiners' findings the probative force they would have in the
conduct of affairs outside a courtroom.

We therefore remand the cause to the Court of Appeals. On reconsideration of the record, it should
accord the findings of the trial examiner the relevance that they reasonably command in answering
the comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Board's order is substantial. But
the court need not limit its reexamination of the case to the effect of that report on its decision. We
leave it free to grant or deny enforcement as it thinks the principles expressed in this opinion dictate.

Judgment vacated that cause remanded.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur with parts I and II of this opinion, but,
as to part III, agree with the opinion of the court below, 179 F.2d 749, 753.