MAURICIO N. CACHOLA, SR., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPS.

FEDERICO BRIONES and TRINIDAD

ENCINAS, G.R. No. 97822, May 7, 1992

FACTS:
On July 30, 1973, the respondent spouses Federico Briones and Trinidad Encinas, as the registered
owners of the above-named property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 72398 mortgaged the
same to Benjamin Ocampo as a security for a loan of P15,000.00. For failure of the spouses to pay the
loan, Ocampo caused the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the subsequent sale of the property
at public auction. Ocampo being the highest bidder, purchased the property at the auction. A certificate
of sale was executed in his favor.
The respondents were able to exercise their right of redemption within the one-year period from
the auction sale by paying P19,876.80 plus accrued interests and taxes. This was made possible through a
loan of P40,000.00 obtained from petitioner, the late Mauricio Cachola and his co-defendant in Civil Case
No. Q- 45163 for annulment of deed of sale, Angelina Alfaras. This second loan was evidenced by a
promissory note executed by the spouses Briones duly signed by them dated March 11, 1975, but
subscribed before a notary public on March 13, 1975.
The loan was also evidenced by a "Kasunduan" (Records, pp. 244-245) between the petitioners,
on the one hand, and the respondent spouses, on the other signed on March 13, 1975 containing the
same stipulation for payment. The Kasunduan recognized the full ownership by the respondents. There
was also a stipulation that after the properties shall have been redeemed from Ocampo, the title should
be placed in the hands of Cachola for the purpose of securing the loan.
Hence, another real estate mortgage was entered into by virtue of the Kasunduan over the same
house and lot in favor of petitioner Cachola. TCT No. 72398 was placed under the custody of Angelina
Alfaras on behalf of the petitioner. The respondent spouses failed to pay any amount within the stipulated
six month period and even afterwards. On January 30, 1976, petitioner executed a Release of Mortgage.
On November 9, 1981, the subject property was conveyed by Cachola to his son Ebenezer Cachola
by way of donation inter vivos. The transfer by donation was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City so that TCT No. 216104 of Mauricio Cachola was canceled and a new one, TCT No. 339434 in
the name of Ebenezer Cachola was issued. On June 10, 1985, the respondents filed the instant case, Civil
Case No. Q-45163 against the petitioner and Angelina Alfaras before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 76 again for: annulment of the deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT No. 216104
of the petitioner and annulment of the unlawful detainer judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract involving the real property in this case is one of sale
or an equitable mortgage.

HELD:
The Court holds that even assuming that the consideration was below standard, it was not unusually
inadequate during that time. Besides, inadequacy of the price does not by itself support the conclusion
that the property was not at all sold to the petitioner or that the contract was a loan. Inadequacy is not
sufficient to set aside a sale unless it is purely shocking to the conscience (Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, 174
SCRA 330 [1989]; and Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612 [1990]).
An equitable mortgage is "one which although it lacks some formality, form of words or other
requisites prescribed by a statute, show(s) the intention of the parties to charge a real property as security
for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law." (Vda. de Zulueta v. Octaviano, 121 SCRA
314 [1983], quoting Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes. and R.C. Puno) The plain terms of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of January 30, 1976 (Exhibit "E" for the plaintiffs-petitioners) and the circumstances of the
case do not suggest an unequivocal intention to make the property answerable for the P40,000.00 debt
after the lapse of the six-month period from March 13, 1975 to September 13, 1975 within which the
respondent spouses were expected to pay their obligation. There was nothing to show an agreement that
the parties recognized the continued ownership of the spouses Briones.
The words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the desire of the spouses to transfer
the property by way of sale to the petitioner. No other meaning could be given to the terms and
stipulations of the contract but their literal meaning. (Article 1370, New Civil Code). The contract was
proper in form. It was properly executed and signed by each of the spouses and by Cachola on its second
page as well as on the left hand margin of every page. It was acknowledged by a notary public.

BARANDA V. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
Facts:
This case involves two cases (G.R. No. 64432 and G.R. No. 6204) over the same parcel of land
known as Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by OCT No. 6406. This is the subject of the dispute
between petitioner Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, and respondents Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao. OCT No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of the
petitioner. However, the respondents refused to honor it on the ground that they also have a TCT
numbered T-25772 over the same lot. The court resolved that TCT No. T-25772 was acquired fraudulently,
and declared it null and void. It held the validity of Title No. T-106098 to which, the court also ordered the
writ of possession to the petitioners be carried out. However, a notice of lis pendens on account of or by
reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and
annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This prompted the petitioners to file
for a new petition directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in
the new certificates of titles issued.

Issues:
1. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the
court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
2. Whether the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens
Certificate of Title.

Ruling:
1. No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that private respondents herein, in filing Civil
Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as
well as G.R. No. 64432. Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. SC have once
held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled
while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it
under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does
not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant.
2. No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section
117 of this Decree. The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds
did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over the subject parcel of land.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13,
1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was
elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
grant the application.
Issue:
Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
Held:
YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. The
Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous
and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only
for application. There is no alternative.

Republic vs Taustumban
GR no. 173210 April 24, 2009

FACTS:
Tuastumban filed a petition for reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 7129, Flr-133, Talisay
Minglanilla Estate under Patent No. 43619 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo, with area of
approximately 3,633 square meters. The OCT which was in the possession of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu was allegedly either lost or destroyed during World War II. Respondent anchored her
petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 26 which provides that an original certificate
of title may be reconstituted from an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued.
According to the Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Cebu City, Lot No. 7129 was granted to the heirs of Sofia Lazo via Patent No. 43619 issued on 21 July 1938.
Respondent claims she bought the property from the said owners who are also her relatives, as evidenced
by an Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale.
She claims that since the time of purchase, she has been occupying and possessing the land and
paying the realty taxes thereon. Respondent prayed for reconstitution of the title covering the property
since the title, supposedly on file and under the custody of the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province, had
either been lost or destroyed during World War II as certified by said office. Cebu City Prosecutor,
representing the Office of the Solicitor General, did not present any evidence against respondent. On 11
December 2000, the RTC ordered to reconstitute the lost Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No.
7129, Flr-133, Talisay-Minglanilla Estate, in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo based on Patent No.
43619 issued on 21 July 1938.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC judgment. The
appellate court held that no proper reconstitution can be done since respondent did not utilize the
sources of reconstitution provided under Sec. 2of R.A. No. 26 in the order therein stated, merely
presenting as it did a Certification from the CENRO that a patent had been issued over Lot No. 7129 in
the name of the heirs of Sofia Lazo. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the
Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision of 23 June 2006 reversed itself and held that respondent has
substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution under RA 26.

ISSUE:
Whether the documents presented by respondent constitute sufficient basis for
the reconstitution of title to Lot No. 7129.

HELD:
No. Respondent’s evidence is inadequate. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have,
after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been
when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.
Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of RA 26. Respondent however
failed to present an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued. She relied on the CENRO certification which is however not the
authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent required by law. The certification plainly states
only that Lot No. 7129 is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo. It is not even a copy of the
decree of registration or patent itself but a mere certification of the issuance of such patent.