Laurel vs.

Garcia transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated. the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit does not apply.
that the principle of lex situs applies.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
Issues and Held: the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not
tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated. reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary
The answer is in the affirmative. merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who
can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo
cannot be alienated.
FACTS:
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., operates a sawmill. However, the land
The answer is in the affirmative. upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person.
On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no machinery used by it. Some of the machines were placed and mounted
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an company and the owner of the land there appeared the following
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, provision:
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the

1
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements 5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended
and buildings introduced and erected by the lessee shall pass to the by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any
exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly
pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; also, in the event adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
the lessee should leave or abandon the land leased before the time
herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings shall likewise pass Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last
to the ownership of the lessor as though the time agreed upon had mentioned paragraph.
expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are
not included in the improvements which will pass to the lessor on the While not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels
expiration or abandonment of the land leased. by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the
property the character determined by the parties.
In another action, wherein Davao Saw Mill was the defendant, a
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by
the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the owner of any building or land for use in connection therewith, but
the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the
sheriff. latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment
Davao Saw Mill has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as of the lease.
personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third
persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
original mortgages. when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not
when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only
ISSUE: a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

Whether or not the machinery in dispute is a personal property. “Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenements for the industrial or works that they may carry on in
RULING: any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works.”
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According
to the Code, real property consists of — Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing of
soil; machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having
only a temporary right.
xxx xxx xxx

2
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority july 2002 XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority nov 2003
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Facts:
Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of
be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari. percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
ISSUE: Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA “to
Whether or not the transfer is valid. reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to
develop, improve, acquire, x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of
HELD: lands.” On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
of alienable land of the public domain. On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of Project. On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309,
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable islands known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern
natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. On April 25,
joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of corporations.
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the

3
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
Amended JVA. corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s July 9, domain.
2002 decision which declared the amended JVA null and void ab initio
were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the Issue:
Court as follows:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are reversed.
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these Held:
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to No.Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the
Constitution and existing laws. instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the
longer needed for public service. The government can make such Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus,
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the
kind of alienable land of the public domain. subject of the Amended JVA.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of PEA cannot claim that it is “similarly situated” as the Bases Conversion
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire

4
these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec.
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
private lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b)
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites,
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and other.
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is
Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
Facts:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite when at the time of the application, the land is already classified as
which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and impediatur sentencia.
continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his the right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the
great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.
the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son of The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
one sold by the Velazco. property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982. need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then
Republic v Hebierto. there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
Issue: The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
Held:

5
It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The
of men and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to CA, on the other hand, reversed the decision. It held that Valdez failed
acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription. to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion they had given Fabella the right to occupy the premises or that they
when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and had tolerated the possession of the same, which is a requirement in
only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there unlawful detainer cases.
is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be
such. Issue:
Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and case for unlawful detainer.
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired
through prescription. Held:
Applying to the case at bar: No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer.
Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was
1948. No other substantive evidence was presented. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession which
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The improper remedy.
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is substantiate the claim of Valdez that they permitted or tolerated the
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. occupation of the property by Fabella. The complaint contained only
bare allegations that Fabella without any color of title whatsoever
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals occupied the land by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving Valdez the possession thereof. Nothing had been said on
Facts: how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession
Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties.
house without any color of title whatsoever. Valdez orally asked
Fabella several times to vacate the property but the latter stubbornly The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from
refused. the start and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and then built a
The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to house thereon without the permission and consent of Valdez and
the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella. before them, their mother.

6
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the particular case, where thepetitioner came to own the property as the
owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon.
is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as ISSUE
one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Whether said conditions have lost any sound basis in that while the
subject parcel of land was originally aresidential lot, the classification of
There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and the property had been changed to that of commercial.
when dispossession started. There was also no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of Valdez to allege the key HELD
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the NO.
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause The conditions are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land
for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over Registration Order No. R-3under the subject "Rules and Regulations
the case. Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate,"approved
November 15, 1951 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
De Gallego vs. Land Authority Resources. Said conditions, having been imposed pursuant to an
Administrative Order which has the force and effect of the law, are
FACTS therefore binding upon any person who acquires title to the same, it
The petitioner herein, a registered owner of a parcel of land situated in appearing that said Conditions are annotated asencumbrances on the
the province of Rizal, seeks thecancellation of certain conditions back of the Certificate of Title of the land. Moreover, said Conditions
involving the conveyance of said land in question which was said to are not contrary tolaw, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these
have been acquired by the Government for residential purposes with Conditions had been imposed in order to implement moreeffectively
the principal objective of distributing the sameto the landless and the main purpose of the constitutional provision which is to break up
thereby allow more people to have their own homes. Petitioner insists landed estates into reasonably small portions and to discourage the
that the primary intention of the restriction against transfers or concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few
conveyances of the property except to the landless and except by individuals,(Republic vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New
hereditary succession in order to insure that more people shall own Constitution of 1973 provided a modification of theoriginal provision in
residential homes, has been lost by thetransformation of the property the 1935 Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may authorize,
from residential to commercial since the landless who may want to upon payment of justcompensation, the expropriation of private lands
establishtheir residential homes can no longer afford to pay the to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
commercial price of this commercial property and thussaid restriction deserving citizens.Therefore, it was only proper for the Court to hold
should be eliminated to allow the aforementioned property to the subject Conditions to remain as they were
contribute to the economicdevelopment of the country.Petitioner, wife
of former Ambassador Manuel Gallego, was not a landless individual,
nor was shelandless at the time when the said property was acquired
by her, the fact being that the restriction refers only to voluntary
conveyances and did not comprehend sales by public auction, as in the