FACTS:

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular
accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. Petitioners alleged that they had observed
and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence and that it was the victim’s own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to
the subject incident.

RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However, Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents damages due to negligence.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed.

HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED

The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm the
conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right
tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily
prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that
passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case
could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of
carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable
to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil
Code.

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with the
SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and
ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the LRTA,
the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and
Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held
the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for
compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by
virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's
death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also
blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have
stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying
passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then
contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence
or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in
conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent,
would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.
British Airways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 12th Division, First International Trading and General
Services
G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993
 Nocon, J.

FACTS:
 First International Trading and General Services Co. – duly licensed domestic recruitment and
placement agency; it received a telex message from its principal ROLACO Engineering and Contracting
Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract workers in behalf of said principal
 ROLACO paid to the Jeddah branch of petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for 93 contract
workers with specific instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981
 March 1981: First International was informed by British Airways that ROLACO had forwarded 93 prepaid
tickets; First International instructed its travel agent, ADB Travel and Tours. Inc., to book the 93
workers with petitioner but the latter failed to fly said workers, thereby compelling private respondent
to borrow money in the amount of P304,416.00 in order to purchase airline tickets from the other
airlines for the 93 workers it had recruited who must leave immediately since the visas of said workers
are valid only for 45 days and the Bureau of Employment Services mandates that contract workers must
be sent to the job site within a period of 30 days
 June 1981: First International was again informed by British Airways that it had received a prepaid
ticket advice from its Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract workers; First International
instructed its travel agent to book the 27 contract workers with the petitioner but the latter was only
able to book and confirm 16 seats on its June 9, 1981 flight; on the date of the scheduled flight only 9
workers were able to board said flight while the remaining 7 workers were rebooked to June 30, 1981
which bookings were again cancelled by the petitioner without any prior notice to either private
respondent or the workers; thereafter, the 7 workers were rebooked to the July 4,1981 flight of
petitioner with 6 more workers booked for said flight; but the confirmed bookings of the 13 workers
were again cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981
 First International paid the travel tax of the said workers as required by British Airways but when the
receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latter informed First International that it can only
confirm the seats of the 12 workers on its July 7, 1981 flight; but the confirmed seats of said workers
were again cancelled without any prior notice either to First International or said workers; the 12
workers were finally able to leave for Jeddah after First International had bought tickets from the other
airlines
 July 1981: First International sent a letter to petitioner demanding compensation for the damages in the
amount of P350,000.00 it had incurred by the latter’s repeated failure to transport its contract workers
despite confirmed bookings and payment of the corresponding travel taxes
 British Airways’ narration:
 it received a telex message from Jeddah advising that ROLACO had prepaid the airfares of 100 persons
to transport First International’s contract workers from Manila to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981;
however, due to the unavailability of space and limited time, it had to return to its sponsor in Jeddah
the prepaid ticket advice consequently not even one of the alleged 93 contract workers were booked in
any of its flights
 June 1981: British Airways received another prepaid ticket advice to transport 16 contract workers of
First International to Jeddah but the travel agent of First International booked only 10 contract workers
for British Airways’ June 9, 1981 flight; however, only 9 contract workers boarded the scheduled flight
with 1 passenger not showing up as evidenced by the Philippine Airlines’ passenger manifest
 First International’s travel agent booked seats for 5 contract workers on British Airways’ July 4, 1981
flight but said travel agent cancelled the booking of 2 passengers while the other 3 passengers did not
show up on said flight
 July 1981: the travel agent of First International booked 7 more contract workers in addition to the
previous 5 contract workers who were not able to board the July 4, 1981 flight with British Airways’ July
7, 1981 flight which was accepted by British Airways subject to reconfirmation
 July 1981: British Airways’ computer system broke down which resulted to its failure to get a
reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing the automatic cancellation of the bookings of First
International’s 12 contract workers; the computer system of the petitioner was reinstalled the next day
and immediately British Airways tried to reinstate the bookings of the 12 workers with either Gulf Air or
Saudi Arabia Airlines but both airlines replied that no seat was available on that date and had to place
the 12 workers on the wait list; said information was duly relayed to the First International and the 12
workers before the scheduled flight

ISSUE: WON British Airways is liable

HELD: Yes. Its repeated failures to transport First International’s workers in its flight despite confirmed
booking of said workers clearly constitutes breach of contract and bad faith on its part.
 two aspects of contract of common carriage of passengers:
 a. contract to carry at some future time –consensual and is necessarily perfected by mere consent
 b. contract of carriage or of common carriage itself –real contract for not until the carrier is actually
used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation of a carrier
 contract to carry was involved in the case; its elements are consent, consideration and object certain
 CONSENT: British Airways consent to the contract was manifested by its acceptance of the PTA or
prepaid ticket advice that ROLACO has prepaid the airfares of the First International’s contract workers
advising the appellant that it must transport the contract workers on or before the end of March, 1981
and the other batch in June, 1981
 CONSIDERATION: the fare paid for the passengers by the principal of First International
 OBJECT CERTAIN: the transport of the passengers from the place of departure to the place of
destination
 First International has fully complied with the obligation, namely, the payment of the fare and its
willingness for its contract workers to leave for their place of destination.
On the other hand, British Airways was remiss in its obligation to transport the contract workers on their
flight despite confirmation and bookings made by First International’s travelling agent. British Airways
should have refused acceptance of the PTA from by First International’s principal or to at least inform by
First International that it could not accommodate the contract workers