SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117734. February 22, 2001.]

VICENTE G. DIVINA , petitioner, vs . HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

VILMA GAJO-SY , respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated October 27, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03068 reversing and setting aside the judgment dated
July 7, 1979 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-147.
STcaDI

The facts of this case are as follows:

Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa.
On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion is particularly described as:
"A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon,
Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and
bounded on the North by Lot #1464 — Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 — Gloria
Fajardo: on the East, by Lot # 1446 — Silverio Garcia: on the South, by Lot #1891
— Antonio Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 — Federico Faronas and Lot
#1890 — Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts are the visible signs of
boundary. It has no permanent improvement thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of
Antonio Berosa. Declared under Tax No . 13038, valued at P760.00 for the current
year in the name of ANTONIO BEROSA" 2

On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos.
In the deed of sale to Gamos, the lot was more particularly described as:
"A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon,
Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and
bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 — Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 — Gloria F.
Estonante: on the East, by Lot #1464 — Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot #1466 — Felix
Arimado; on the South, by Lot #1898 — Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot
#1890 — Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 — Antonio Escobedo. Concrete
cements posts are the visible signs of boundary. No permanent improvements
thereon. Covered by Lot #1893 of Teotimo E . Berosa, and declared under Tax No .
13039, valued at P760.00 for the present year in the name of TEOTIMO E.
BEROSA." 3
On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary
owner of Lot 1893, a 20 ,687 sq. m. parcel of land identi ed as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It
adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax
Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the
property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration
No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos' name.

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 The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961
for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq.
m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.
On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated
property was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for
rice planting and 5.9347 were thickets.
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein
petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. It is described as follows:
"A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon,
Philippines, having an area of 54,818 square meters and bounded on the N., by
Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot 1887 (Jaime Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of
Zacarias Espadilla); on the (Illegible), by Lot 1466; on the SE, by Lot 1893-A; on
the S., by Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892 (Antonio
Escobedo) and Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro
Fajardo); all of Gubat Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot 1893-B, a
portion of Lot 1893, Cad 308-D ". 4
On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and ve (5) days after
November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the
consolidated property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An
undated "Subdivision PLAN" of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without
Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot
1893-B.
On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma
Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. The land was particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under Tax
Declaration No. 12927 in the name of Jose P. Gamos, covered by Lots No. 1466
and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area of 100,034 sq. m., more or less . . .
." 5

On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509.
On August 28, 1972, she led an application for registration of title to the property
at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO
Record No. 42920. The application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II
of the said court "to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner
of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021". DcITaC

The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of
private respondent's title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.
On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the nal decree of registration petitioner led
before the same court a Petition for Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that
he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by
Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings
on Lot 1893 due to private respondent's failure to give him notice and post any notice in
the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the
owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the
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 same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long
become final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal
notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.
The trial court, in its Decision 6 dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review
was timely led. It also ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known
claimant in her application for registration constituted "deliberate misrepresentation that
the lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it was. Private respondent,
according to the trial court, should have included in her application at least "the person of
petitioner's cousin, Elena Domalaon" who had, before respondent led her application for
registration, made known to the latter's sister her apprehension of "their land" being
included in respondent's application for registration. This misrepresentation, according to
the court, amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496. 7 The trial
court in its decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case
and revoking the order for the issuance of a Decree;

(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of

the land applied for containing an area of 54,818 square meters which is
described in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of Judgment; and

(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion

applied for which is outside the limits of the portion herein awarded to the
petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and

(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting

therein the area not contested and which is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma
Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to
whom the land registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed to proceed after
he shall have adduced such other evidence as are appropriate in land registration
cases.
SO ORDERED. 8

Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court before the Court of
Appeals. It averred that the trial court erred (1) in declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a
portion of Lot 1893, in ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to
proceed with registration after adducing evidence as are appropriate; (2) in declaring
respondent-appellant guilty of "actual fraud" in the land registration case; (3) in taking
cognizance of the petition for review of judgment, setting aside the decision dated June
29, 1975, and revoking the order of the issuance of the nal decree in the land registration
case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for review of judgment with cost. 9
The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey
plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known
claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by
the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted with bigaho. A fortiori, there
was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension or
claim of "at least" petitioner-appellee's cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in the
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 application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration
proceeding.

There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the

part of respondent-appellee.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the registration of
the property in the name of respondent-appellee, We nd it unnecessary to
discuss the rest of the assigned errors. Su ce it to state that Lot 1893 bought by
Teotimo Berosa which he sold to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to
respondent-appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such a manner as
to put its identity beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot was determined
after a resurvey/relocation was conducted for Gamos in 1961 the result of which
is re ected in the Plan approved by the Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what
really de nes a piece of land is not the area but the boundaries therein laid down
(Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Edition, p. 213); that the "Lot
1893-B" sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of any tax declaration
covering it, unlike the different deeds of sale covering Lot 1893, thereby raising
the presumption that "Lot 1893-B" was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos
to respondent-appellant; and that the "subdivision" of Lot 1893 into Lots A and B,
caused to be made by petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B to have been the
"Lot 1893-B" subject of the January 19, 1967 Deed of Sale in his favor which was
registered on November 28, 1968, appears to have been made in 1977, ten years
from the date of said deed of sale, a con rmation that there was no such "Lot
1893-B" subject of his purchase in 1967; and in any event, as the subdivision
survey prepared for petitioner-appellee was not approved by the Bureau of Lands,
it is not of much value (vide Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).
DTCSHA

In ne, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of the judgment rendered in the land registration case in respondent-
appellant's favor are present. The present appeal is thus meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and set aside

and another rendered DISMISSING petitioner-appellee's petition at the court a quo.
10

Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the reversal of the Court of
Appeals of the trial court decision. In substance, he raises the primary issue of whether or
not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private
respondent's part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for
registration of the contested land, such that it was error for the trial court to declare
private respondent owner of the disputed land.
Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of judgment, we have
repeatedly said that the adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become
nal and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then nal decree.
As long as the nal decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised
had not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside the decision or decree or
adjudicate the land to another party. 1 1 In the present case, a certi cation was issued by
the Land Registration Commission that no nal decree of registration had yet been issued
and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it restrained the Commission
from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling of the one year period has not even began.
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 Thus, the trial court did not err when it entertained the petition.
Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and appellate courts found
that petitioner's name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant
nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on
whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private
respondent's part when it failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and
include their names in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but
the appellate court disagreed.
Section 15 of P.D. 1529 1 2 is explicit in requiring that in the application for
registration of land titles, the application "shall also state the full names and addresses of
all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it
shall state the extent of the search made to nd them ." As early as Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of
knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not su cient but "what
search has been made to nd them is necessary." The trial court was correct when it took
notice that respondent's sister Lydia Gajo-Añonuevo admitted that she had a conversation
with petitioner's cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latter's apprehension that their land may
have been included in respondent's application for registration of the disputed land. 1 3
Respondent's omission of this material information prevented petitioner from having his
day in court. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion with
jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which
bene t is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 1 4 Such omission can not but be
deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review
of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act.
Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot
1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to
Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records,
petitioner's name would not be found on the said survey plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioner's claim is
clearly meritorious. SHIcDT

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case
No. N-147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 21-32.

2. Id. at 21-22; Record, p. 17.
3. Id. at 22 only.
4. Id. at 23-24.
5. Id. at 24 only.
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 6. Id. at 36-44.
7. Sec. 38. If the Court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as
stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the
land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section.
It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within one year after the entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term
of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall
be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of
appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title
issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any
person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Section 3, Act 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630).
[Emphasis ours.]

8. Rollo, p. 44.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Rollo, pp. 29-32.
11. Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority, 287 SCRA 333, 341 (1998) citing Gomez vs.
Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503 (1988); Republic vs. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, 178
SCRA 692, 699 (1989) citing Afalla and Pinaroc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622 (1934); Capio
vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113 (1953).
12. SEC. 15. Form and contents. — The application for land registration shall be in writing,
signed by the applicant or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before
any officer authorized to administer oaths for the province or city where the application
was actually signed. If there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed
and sworn to by and in behalf of each. The application shall contain a description of the
land shall state the citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether single or
married, and, if married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if the marriage has been
legally dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall also state the
full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining
owners, if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find
them.
13. Rollo, pp. 40-41.
14. Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil 248 (1954); Laboyen vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 68 Phil
376 (1939); and Palanca vs. American Food Manufacturing Co., 24 SCRA 819, 827
(1968).

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 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175578. August 11, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . ZENAIDA GUINTO-

ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA
GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO,
JR., PACITA R. GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R.
GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO , respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the O ce of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30, 2006
Decision 1 and the November 20, 2006 Resolution, 2 both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the July 10, 2003
judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-
0036, one for original registration of title, whereas the assailed Resolution denied
reconsideration. TcIaHC

The facts follow.

On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana 4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora
Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto
R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, led with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 an Application for Registration of Title 5 over two
pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Piñas City. These lands, identi ed as Lot
No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-
D , 6 measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively. 7
Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired
them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-
Guinto (Lucia) — Zenaida's parents — who, in turn, had acquired the property under a
1969 document denominated as "Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa
Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan." Under this document, Sergio and Lucia
Guinto acquired for a consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor
Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with
Luisa, had derived the same from Romualdo Guinto. 8 Respondents also alleged that
until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in
the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name
for purposes of real estate taxation. 9
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint
of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D, 1 0 as well as copies of the technical descriptions of
each lot, 1 1 a certi cation from the geodetic engineer 1 2 and the pertinent tax
declarations, 1 3 together with the receipts of payment therefor. 1 4 Expressly, they
averred that the property's original tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to
the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in connection with the
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 proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128 — a previous registration case involving the
subject property which, however, had been dismissed without prejudice. 1 5
The trial court found the application to be su cient in form and substance;
hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication and
notification requirements of the law. 1 6
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the O ce of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of
the public domain; that neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been
in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and su cient evidence of bona
fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of owner. 1 7
At the hearing, Zenaida identi ed her herein co-respondents to be her siblings,
nephews and nieces. She likewise identi ed the adjoining lot owners named in the
application and the supporting documents attached to the application as well. She
testi ed that the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of her family sometime
between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-
000040-D and in the geodetic engineer's technical description of the lots. She implied
that they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded
to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Piñas RTC in connection with the
proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without
objection from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the
technical description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence. 1 8
Furthermore, Zenaida — 61 years old at the time of her testimony — declared that
she has known that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5 years old
and from her earliest recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the
subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She implied that aside from her
predecessors there were other persons, caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land
and who had lived until sometime between 1980 and 1990. She remembered her
grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but the same had already
been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an adobe fence around the
perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and
concrete after an inundation caused by the ood. 1 9 She claimed that she and her
father, Sergio, had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the
tax declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following
identification, were forthwith marked in evidence. 2 0
Zenaida's claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land
was corroborated by Jose na Luna (Jose na), one of the adjoining lot owners.
Jose na, then 73 years old, strongly declared that the subject lots were owned by
Zenaida's parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the age of
understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance where a third party
had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there was anyone residing in
the property and whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was
no one residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa
hut. 2 1 cCSDTI

At the close of Jose na's testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto. 2 2 After weighing the evidence, the
trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision denying the application for
registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish with certainty the
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 identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure to submit to the court the
original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It
likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful
possession in the concept of owner has not been proved by the evidence as Zenaida's
and Jose na's respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the possession of
respondents' predecessors. 2 3 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title is
hereby DENIED.
ORDERED. 2 4

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006,
issued the assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED. 2 5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 2 6 Hence, it led the instant
petition which attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court's July
10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order to establish
the exact identity of the property. While respondents admitted that the original tracing
cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of the LRA as a
consequence of their rst attempt to have the property registered, petitioner, invoking
Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines , 2 7 believes that respondents, on that score
alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original
copy of the plan, because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and
presented it in court. 2 8
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan
submitted by respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the aforementioned Del
Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible and
unreadable, does not even bear the certi cation of the Lands Management Bureau. 2 9
Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents' claim of prior possession. It notes that there is
no clear and convincing evidence that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4
and 5 for 30 years. 3 0
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioner's arguments
are mere reiterative theses on the issues that have already been addressed by the Court
of Appeals in the assailed Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters
raised which have not yet been previously passed upon. Accordingly, they prayed that
the petition be denied. 3 1
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration
Decree of 1978, materially provides: DHITCc

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 Section 17. What and where to le. — The application for land registration
shall be led with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land
is situated. The applicant shall le, together with the application, all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by
the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and
all annexes.

The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original

registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or duplicate
copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved survey plan of the land
sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it provides a reference on
the exact identity of the property. This begs the question in the instant case: Does the
blueprint copy of the survey plan su ce for compliance with the requirement? In not so
many cases, 3 2 it was held that the non-submission, for any reason, of the original
tracing cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, since the same is mandatory in
original registration of title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner,
the Court ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing
cloth plan is a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by
which to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that
case was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming
because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously transmitted by the clerk of
court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicant's obligation to retrieve the plan
himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of
the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that
it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for
registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan
to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This
claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from
the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. . . . 3 3

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford
certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure
that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands
to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the
original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidence —
such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical
description of the property — which may likewise substantially and with as much
certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 3 4 and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the
Philippines 3 5 and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla , 3 6 that while the best evidence
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 to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan
issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and other
evidence could also provide su cient identi cation. Pertinently, the Court in
Hubilla,citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory
requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with
this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original
tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also
provide su cient identi cation to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes. . . . 3 7

In the case at bar, we nd that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-
007601-000040-D, together with the technical description of the property, operates as
substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot
Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown to have been duly
executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas), attached to the application and
subsequently identi ed, marked, and offered in evidence, shows that it proceeded
o cially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the approval of
Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the
property was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources O ce
of the DENR. 3 8 This, compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot
Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and veri ed also by Roxas, 3 9 should substantially supply as
it did the means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained. DEICaA

Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
respondents were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529.
Also telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there was no
objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the blueprint of
Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-informed of the
present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint
copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. "J") and not the original tracing cloth
plan thereof was submitted to the court a quo since they had previously
submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration Authority.
However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the original
tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-
appellee question[ed] this de ciency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the
plan (Exh. "J") was offered in evidence, the oppositor-appellee did not raise any
objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land Registration [Authority] and
the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the original
tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. "J") are one and the same,
free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this
regard . . ., the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J"), together with its technical
descriptions (Exhs. "K" and "L"), is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance
with the requirements of law. 4 0

We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only
were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that
they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and
their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the property openly,
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 continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona de claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. 4 1 We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14 (1) 4 2 P.D. No. 1529, the
applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona de
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 4 3 He must prove that for at least 30
years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba 4 4 well explains
possession and occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere ction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property . 4 5

Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we nd that indeed respondents

have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona de claim of
ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents' possession through their
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject
property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaida's father, Sergio, jointly with
a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). 4 6 Yet, it also can be safely inferred that Sergio and
Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax declaration
shows that it offsets a previous tax number. 4 7 The property was again declared in
1979, 4 8 1985 4 9 and 1994 5 0 by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo. SHaATC

Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not
been for the fact that, as certi ed by the O ce of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the
relevant portions of the tax records on le with it had been burned when the assessor's
o ce was razed by re in 1997. 5 1 Of equal relevance is the fact that with these tax
assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents' receipts for tax
expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are likewise eshed out in
the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named
owners of the property with Zenaida being identi ed as the one who delivered the
payment in the 1994 receipts. 5 2
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaida's
testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts
exercised by respondents' predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence,
yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had already demonstrated an
unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they show that they had excluded all
others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax
declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of owner. These
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 documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and all
other parties who may be in con ict with his interest. More importantly, it signi es an
unfeigned intention to contribute to government revenues — an act that strengthens
one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 5 3
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
concept of owner — open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individual — itself makes their right
thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, * Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.

Nachura per raffle dated August 9, 2010.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Arturo D.
Brion (now a member of this Court) and Mariflor Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp.
40-49.

2. Rollo, pp. 50-51.

3. The decision was signed by Judge Joselito Vibandor; records, pp. 556-561.
4. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana was duly constituted as attorney-in-fact of and by herein co-
respondents under a Special Power of Attorney dated January 30, 2002, with specific
power to apply for registration of title; id. at 47-48.

5. Records, pp. 1-4.

6. Id. at 473.
7. Id. at 474-475.
8. Id. at 477-478.
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 11-12.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 479-485.

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 14. Id. at 487-497.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Orders dated April 10, 2002 and June 3, 2002; id. at 15-16, 58-59.
17. Records, pp. 135-138.
18. TSN, February 5, 2003, p. 4.
19. Id. at 16-25, 35.
20. Id. at 12-17, 27-33.
21. TSN, March 17, 2003, pp. 6-7, 12-13.
22. Records, p. 498.
23. Rollo, pp. 84-89.
24. Id. at 89.
25. Id. at 50-51.
26. CA rollo, pp. 141-142.
27. 432 Phil. 824 (2002).
28. Rollo, pp. 19-21.
29. Id. at 24-25.
30. Id. at 28-30.
31. Id. at 111-113.
32. Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 27; Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246 March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65663, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 604;
Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
33. Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 27, at 834.
34. G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988, 167 SCRA 150, 154, citing Republic of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 20 (1986) and Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 568 (1980).
35. 483 Phil. 81, 91 (2004).
36. 491 Phil. 371 (2005).

37. Id. at 373.

38. See Exhibit "J," records, p. 473.
39. See Exhibits "K" and "L," id. at 474-475.
40. Rollo, p. 47.
41. Id. at 28-29.
42. Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
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 Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
43. See Republic of the Philippines v. Cayetano L. Serrano, et al., G.R. No. 183063, February
24, 2010.
44. 471 Phil. 607 (2004).
45. Id. at 620. (Emphasis supplied).
46. Exhibit "O," records, p. 479.

47. Exhibit "O-1," id. at 479 (the back page of the 1937 Tax Declaration).
48. Exhibits "O-2" and "O-3," id. at 480-481.
49. Exhibits "O-4" and "O-5," id. at 482-483.
50. Exhibits "O-6" and "O-7," id. at 484-485.
51. Exhibit "P," id. at 486.

52. Exhibits "Q" to "Q-11," id. at 487-497.

53. See Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61 (2002); Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 367 Phil. 597 (1999); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 674 (1996); Heirs
of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109312, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 368;
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107903, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 218; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 38.

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 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . JEREMIAS AND DAVID

HERBIETO , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, 1 which a rmed the Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, 2 granting the
application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David,
who led with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they
purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1 9 7 6 . 3 Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
respondent David; 4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; 5

(c) Certi cations by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certi cates for the Subject
Lots; 6

(d) Certi cations by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; 7
(e) Certi cations by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
O ce (CENRO) of the DENR on its nding that the Subject Lots are
alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063, dated 25 June 1963; 8
(f) Certi ed True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in
1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No.
8423, also issued in 1994; 9 and TEHDIA

(g) Deed of De nite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio

Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for
P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
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 David. 1 0

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) led an

Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and
did not constitute competent and su cient evidence of bona de acquisition of the
Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation. 1 1
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 1 2 All owners of
the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 1 3 A
copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject
Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where
the Subject Lots were located. 1 4 Finally, the Notice was also published in the O cial
Gazette on 02 August 1999 1 5 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999. 1 6
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special
Default, 1 7 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the
Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of
Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC
after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration
and con rmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring
its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, nal and executory, and directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots. 1 8
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the
Court of Appeals. 1 9 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002,
affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classi ed as within the alienable and disposable zone since
June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code,
respectively provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of
prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith."
2005cdtai

As testi ed to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already

acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since
1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is
undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely
since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession
can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classi ed as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of
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 the appellant does not hold water. CTacSE

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as

shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article
1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration,
as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in
any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of
appellees should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the
subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject
parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years
already when they led the instant application for registration of title to the land
in 1998. As such, this court nds no reason to disturb the nding of the court a
quo. 2 0
The Republic led the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept
of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession
of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance
with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classi ed as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certi cation. It also alleges
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol , 2 1 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as
it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from
12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial con rmation of
imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal in rmity as the subject of
the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that
the application for registration of title to land shall be led by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may le a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an
application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of
land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-
owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to
proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since
the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing rst the issue of jurisdiction, this Court nds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration led by the
respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.

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 A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.
Respondents led a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking
the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. CSEHcT

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the

respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and
hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 2 2 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance
with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute
which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the
MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree 2 3 recognizes and expressly allows the following
situations: (1) the ling of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are
co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered; 2 4 and (2) the ling of a single
application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located
within the same province. 2 5 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the
present situation wherein two applicants led a single application for two parcels of land,
but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then
this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34
of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar
as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration
and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient."
Considering every application for land registration led in strict accordance with the
Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration led by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder
of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have led separate
applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction
of the court to hear and proceed with the case. 2 6 They are not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof. 2 7 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action
and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in
case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance
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 of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been
corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable,
however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration
was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call
the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action
and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested
with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration. ASDTEa

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, 2 8 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be

acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service
of notice. 2 9
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given
Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be
made in the following manner:
1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the O cial Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
O cial Gazette shall be su cient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at
a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted. CEDHTa

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the O cial Gazette shall be
su cient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still a rms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 3 0 that publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly con rm and
register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including
publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative,
and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason
behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation, thus —
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 It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication
in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality
that the O cial Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on
03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
O cial Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and o cially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only
on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in
The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due
process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim
and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the
claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be
in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact,
the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration
and con rmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its
Judgment of 21 December 1999 nal and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator
to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been
issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject
Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title
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 to public land. TAEDcS

Respondents' application led with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for
their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the
Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents
had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 3 2
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certi cation, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28
per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certi ed under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga
Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29,
1992." 3 3 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classi ed as alienable
and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; 3 4 and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 3 5
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber
and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. 3 6 It
explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 3 7

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public

Land Act because there are speci c requirements and application procedure for every
mode. 3 8 Since respondents herein led their application before the MTC, 3 9 then it can
be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial con rmation or legalization of
their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial con rmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares, 4 0 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads —
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
con rmation of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
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 have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the ling of the applications for
con rmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certi cate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
TIAEac

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
entitled to judicial con rmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classi ed as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land
had been classi ed as alienable and disposable, the rules on con rmation of imperfect
title shall not apply thereto. 4 1 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The con rmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to
own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they led their application, have acquired
title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to
Article 1137, both of the Civil Code. 4 2
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already
exists a title which is con rmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 4 3 As established by this Court in the
preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired
title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clari ed herein that even though respondents may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their
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 application for judicial con rmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the
Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads —
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of
this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First
Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and
that a certi cate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. 4 4

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real
rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act speci cally governs
lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered
a special law 4 5 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the
special law prevails — Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4 6
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED.
The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents'
application for registration is DISMISSED. EAIcCS

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., is out of the country.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices B.A.
Adefuin-De La Cruz and Mariano C. Del Castillo concurring, Rollo, pp. 52-58.
2. Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Records, pp. 100-108.
3. Records, pp. 1-6.
4. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
5. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
6. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
7. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
8. Ibid., pp. 15-18.
9. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
10. Ibid., p. 21.
11. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
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 12. Order, dated 29 April 1999, penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Ibid., p. 41.
13. Ibid., p. 59.
14. Ibid., p. 52.
15. Ibid., p. 58.
16. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
17. Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Ibid., 62-65.
18. Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Records, p. 109.
19. CA Rollo, pp. 20-38.
20. Supra, note 1, pp. 57-58.
21. G.R. No. 132963, 10 September 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
22. G.R. No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370, 438, also quoted and/or reiterated
in subsequent cases of Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-
54094, 30 August 1982, 116 SCRA 261, 271; Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-55771, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 273, 309; Register of Deeds
of Malabon, G.R. No. 88623, 05 February 1990, 181 SCRA 788, 791; Allama v. Republic,
G.R. No. 88226, 26 February 1992, 206 SCRA 600, 605.

23. Presidential Decree No. 1529.

24. Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree provides that, "Where the land is owned
in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly."
25. Section 18 of the Property Registration Decree reads —
SEC. 18. Application covering two or more parcels. — An application may include
two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided they are situated
within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an application to be
amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a severance of the application.

26. Katipunan v. Zandueta, 60 Phil 220 (1934).

27. Significant provisions of the Rules of Court are quoted below —
RULE 2, SEC. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. — Misjoinder of causes of action is
not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of
a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
RULE 3, SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of action. Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately.
28. Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree.
29. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113549, 05 July 1996, 258 SCRA 223, 236.
30. G.R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 276.
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 31. Ibid., p. 286.
32. TSN, 24 September 1999, p. 28.
33. Records, pp. 15, 17.
34. Padilla v. Reyes, 60 Phil 967, 969 (1934).
35. Lee Hong Hok v. David, G.R. No. L-30389, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 379.
36. Section 2.
37. Section 11.
38. Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, 22 October 2004, p. 11.
39. Section 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, allows the inferior courts (i.e., Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), duly assigned by
the Supreme Court, to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases covering
lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots with values not
exceeding P100,000. Decisions of the inferior courts in such cases shall be appealable in
the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court issued Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A, dated 15 November 1995, authorizing
the inferior courts to hear and decide the cadastral or land registration cases as provided
for by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
40. Section 47 of the Public Land Act, as amended.

41. Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476; Vallarta v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74957, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 679; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 480.
42. The complete text of these provisions are reproduced below, for reference —

ART. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith.
43. Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 850, 858 (1919).
44. Now the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.
45. This Court is not unaware that there are decisions by this Court declaring the Public
Land Act as a general law [Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106673, 09 May 2001,
357 SCRA 608, 616; Oliva v. Lamadrid, 128 Phil 770, 775 (1967)]. These cases, however,
involve the Public Land Act in relation to statutes other than the Civil Code. The
pronouncement made in the present Petition is particular to the nature of the Public
Land Act vis-à-vis the Civil Code.
46. Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil 224 (1919).

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 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172102. July 2, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . HANOVER WORLWIDE

TRADING CORPORATION , respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 1 dated May 6, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077, which af rmed the August 7, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG.
CASE NO. N-281. Petitioner also assails the CA Resolution 2 dated March 30, 2006,
denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation led an
application for Registration of Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New)
under Vs-072219-000396, situated in Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, containing an
area of One Hundred Three Thousand Three Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters,
more or less, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The application stated that Hanover is the owner in fee
simple of Lot No. 4488, its title thereto having been obtained through purchase
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Veri cation Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the
approved Technical Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of
Hanover's President and General Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the
President and General Manager of Hanover in favor of the latter; 5) a Geodetic
Engineer's Certi cate attesting that the property was surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7)
a tax clearance; 8) a Municipal Assessor's Certi cation stating, among others, the
assessed value and market value of the property; and 9) a CENRO Certi cation on the
alienability and disposability of the property. TDESCa

Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application. The
Republic contended, among others, that neither Hanover nor its predecessors-in-
interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax
declarations and receipts of tax payments attached to or alleged in the application do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for; Hanover is a private corporation disquali ed under the Constitution to hold
alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels of land applied for are portions of the
public domain belonging to the Republic and are not subject to private appropriation.
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the
presentation of its evidence. The Republic was represented in the proceedings by
of cers from the Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Department of
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 Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision 3 approving Hanover's
application for registration of the subject lot. It held that from the documentary and
oral evidence presented by Hanover, the trial court was convinced that Hanover and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, continuous, notorious and peaceful
possession, in the concept of an owner, of the land applied for registration of title, and
that it had registrable title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
On appeal by the State, the judgment of the RTC was af rmed by the CA via the
presently assailed Decision and Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I

THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL

HEARING OF THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF.

II

DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE

THE "WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE" EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE
TITLE THROUGH ADVERSE OCCUPATION. 4

Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. It avers
that the RTC set the initial hearing of the case on September 25, 1995 in an Order dated
June 13, 1995. Petitioner contends, however, that, pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529,
the initial hearing of the case must be not earlier than forty- ve (45) days and not later
than ninety (90) days from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing. Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the initial hearing should
have been set not earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days from June 13, 1995) and not later
than September 11, 1995 (90 days from June 13, 1995). Unfortunately, the initial
hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14)
days later than the prescribed period. cDCIHT

Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible

evidence in the form of speci c facts indicating the nature and duration of the
occupation of its predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has been in
possession of the subject lot under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The petition is meritorious.
As to the rst assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner's
contention that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It is true that in land
registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional
requirements. In the instant case, though, there is no dispute that respondent complied
with the requirements of the law for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set
forth under Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the
setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land registration court and not the
applicant. Citing Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., 5 this Court held in Republic v. San
Lorenzo Development Corporation 6 that:

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 The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court.
After an applicant has led his application, the law requires the issuance of a
court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court
document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the
notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This
involves a process to which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. . .
.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court
acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such
of cial in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters
within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party
if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither
responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.

Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more important than
the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of suf cient notice of the
registration proceedings via publication. . . . ITESAc

In the instant case, there is no dispute that suf cient notice of the registration
proceedings via publication was duly made.
Moreover, petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely faulted
if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 25, 1995 was outside the 90-day
period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that
respondent substantially complied with the requirement relating to the registration of
the subject land.
Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court nds that the RTC did not commit
any error in giving due course to respondent's application for registration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the more
important issue that respondent failed to present suf cient evidence to prove that it or
its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property for the
period required by law.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier . 7
Likewise, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of
P.D. 1073, states:
Section 48.The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
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 Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for
con rmation of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona de
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier ,
immediately preceding the ling of the application for con rmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. 8HDITCS

As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30
years or more is not suf cient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January
25, 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by
the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12,
1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529. 9
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for registration
of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona de claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites involve
delving into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court, except for certain
recognized exceptions, 1 0 to wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible ;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;

(8) When the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of

specific evidence on which they are based ;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and CacEID

(10) When the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
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 supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 1 1

The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that there is
neither nding nor discussion by both the trial and appellate courts which would
support their conclusion that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the disputed parcel
of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its
predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanover's President and General Manager testi ed only
with respect to his claim that he was the former owner of the subject property and that
he acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the
payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor
of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved by the
Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanover's possession of the property started in
1990. 1 2
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that
its predecessor's possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period or
duration required by law. The earliest date of the Tax Declarations presented in
evidence by respondent is 1965, the others being 1973, 1980, 1992 and 1993.
Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why the realty taxes due on the
subject property were only paid starting in 1965. While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. 1 3 In the
present case, the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to the presumption
that respondent's predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or possession of the
subject lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law. 1 4
Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the pieces of evidence presented by respondent
do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" proof necessary in cases of this
nature.
Lastly, the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot had
been declared alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary. HEDSIc

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State. 1 5 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 1 6
In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject
property, Hanover submitted a Certi cation issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Of ces (CENRO) attesting that "lot 4488, CAD-545-D, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square
meters, more or less, situated at Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu" was found to be within
"Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classi cation project no. 28, per map 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu." However, this certification is not sufficient.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 1 7 this Court held that it is not enough for the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Of ces (PENRO) or CENRO to certify
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 that a land is alienable and disposable, thus:
. . . The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classi cation and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per veri cation through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classi cation approved by the DENR Secretary and certi ed
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the of cial records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable . . . . 1 8

In the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO
Certi cation was not con rmed as only the President and General Manager of
respondent corporation identi ed said Certi cation submitted by the latter. It is settled
that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not
constitute proof of the facts stated therein. 1 9 In the present case, Hanover's President
and General Manager, who identi ed the CENRO Certi cation, is a private individual. He
was not the one who prepared the Certi cation. The government of cial who issued the
Certi cation was not presented before the RTC so that he could have testi ed
regarding its contents. Hence, the RTC should not have accepted the contents of the
Certi cation as proof of the facts stated therein. The contents of the Certi cation are
hearsay, because Hanover's President and General Manager was incompetent to testify
on the truth of the contents of such Certi cation. Even if the subject Certi cation is
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. 2 0
Moreover, the CENRO is not the of cial repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public
lands. 2 1 Thus, the CENRO Certi cation should have been accompanied by an of cial
publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable. HcTIDC

Respondent, however, failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The May 6, 2005 Decision and March
30, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077 and the August 7,
1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Land
Registration Case No. N-281 are SET ASIDE . Respondent Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation's application for registration of Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D
(New), under Vs-072219-000396, Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, is DENIED .
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Bersamin, * Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,

per Raffle dated June 9, 2010.
1.Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon
and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47.
2.Rollo, p. 48.
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 3.Id. at 125-131.

4.Id. at 23.
5.G.R. No. 146527, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 247.
6.G.R. No. 170724, January 29, 2007, 513 SCRA 294, 300-301.
7.Emphasis supplied.
8.Emphasis supplied.

9.Republic v. Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 423, 433.
10.Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, 548 SCRA 160, 166.
11.Manila Electric Company v. Vda. de Santiago, G.R. No. 170482, September 4, 2009, 598
SCRA 315, 321-322. (Emphasis supplied.)
12.See TSN, February 3, 1997, pp. 2-8.
13.Spouses Melchor and Saturnina Alde v. Ronald B. Bernal, et al., G.R. No. 169336, March 18,
2010.
14.Ong v. Republic, supra note 10, at 168.
15.Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 486.

16.Id.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 489.
19.Id. at 491.
20.Id.

21.Id. at 490.

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 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005.]

HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR. , petitioners, vs . HON. ALFREDO R.

ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA
CITY , respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO , J : p

The Case
This is a petition for review 1 to reverse the Decision 2 dated 29 November 2000 of
the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate court
a rmed the Resolution 3 dated 21 May 1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority
("LRA") in Consulta No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion
is not registrable.
The Facts
Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. ("Ozaeta") led an application
for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 ("land
registration court"), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887
("LRC No. N-18887"). The land registration court issued an order of general default and
hearings on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted
the application. The decision became nal and executory, and the land registration court
issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. 4
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October
1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa
Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao. 5
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and
Presentacion L. Psinakis ("petitioners"), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., led a motion 6 in LRC
No. N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that
the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale 7 over the lots
executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez,
Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 ("PD 1529"), 8 petitioners also
prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-
interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings. 9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August 1998. 1 0
The pertinent entries 1 1 in the Decrees read:
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 This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May,
1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaña, this 3rd day of July,
1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
Quezon City, this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred
and ninety-seven at 8:01 a.m. HIACEa

(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration

Entered in the "Registration Book" for Marikina, pursuant to

the provisions of section 39 of PD No. 1529, on the 18th day of
August nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, at 1:16 p.m.
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds (Emphasis added)

Petitioners led another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos.
N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certi cate of Title ("OCT") Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R.
Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed o ce on 8 July
1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña issued the Order of 3 July 1998. 1 2
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to
recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the
inconsistencies in the dates in a letter 1 3 dated 1 December 1998. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Quezon City

1 December 1998

Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon

Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City

Sir:

This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-
18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz, and
Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.

Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were

prepared on October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court dated May 31,
1966 and the order for issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993. Said decrees
were forwarded to the O ce of the Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic]
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 released therefrom on August 13, 1998. Consequently, said decrees were signed
sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and de nitely not on October 20, 1997
as what is re ected thereon because the undersigned Administrator assumed
o ce only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was
not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is
therefore hereby clari ed that Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually
issued sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997.

Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the
motion for the issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the
properties involved having been sold to him by the applicants, is still pending with
the court, it is informed that no copy of said motion nor of the order directing this
Office to comment thereon appears on file in the records of the case. Hence, these
matters could not have been taken into consideration in the issuance of the
decrees. Had the Administration been apprised of these incidents, perhaps the
issuance of the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has
resolved the same.

As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that

since the certi cates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have already
been issued and released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now beyond
our authority to recall them unless duly authorized by the court.

We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in

your letter.

Very truly yours,

(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
Administrator

On 25 November 1998, petitioners led with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City
an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604 on the ground that petitioners have led with the land registration court a motion to
declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. 1 4 Petitioners attached to the application a
copy of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs. CASaEc

In a letter 1 5 dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied
the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
15 December 1998

Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon

2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
Pasig City
Sir:

This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis

Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the
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 name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE.
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the
name[s] of the parties, the court where the action is pending, the date the action
was instituted and a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to determine if the person
named in the title is impleaded.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition
or compaint [sic] upon which this office will base its action, is DENIED.
If you do not agree with our ndings, you can, without withdrawing the
documents you submitted, elevate the matter en consulta ve (5) days from
receipt hereof to the O ce of the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, East
Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.

Very
truly
yours,
(signed)
EDGAR
D.
SANTOS
Register
of
Deeds

On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the
denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In its resolution 1 6 dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question for
resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare
void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis
pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to le a notice
of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners' standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared that
petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case.
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on
Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have led a motion to lift the
order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read:
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted,
petitioners cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said land
registration case by merely ling a motion after a judgment has been rendered.
Such being the case, a notice of lis pendens on the basis of the motion led by
petitioners cannot be admitted for registration. To rule otherwise would preempt
the judgment of the Court in so far as the personalities of the movants as
oppositors in the land registration case is concerned.

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 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so
holds that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
SO ORDERED. 1 7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Undaunted, petitioners led before the appellate court a petition for review of the
LRA's decision. Petitioners led the petition on the ground of manifest error and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No.
2879 that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable. caHIAS

The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court
reiterated the LRA's ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to le a
notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to le a
motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES
ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS
FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS , and

2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE

DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO.
N-18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE
GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT. 1 8

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings led by
petitioners, public respondents and the O ce of the Solicitor General cite "more or less
the same provisions of the laws as applicable in support of their respective contentions
but differ . . . only with respect to their interpretation thereof." 1 9 With this observation in
mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and of PD
1529.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title or
the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
a rmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the o ce of the registry
of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency
of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of
the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of ling such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties
designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only

upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the
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 party who caused it to be recorded.

Section 76 of PD 1529 states:

SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. — No action to recover possession
of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or
for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment,
and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon
registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and
the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certi cate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall
have been filed and registered. CcHDSA

Notice of Lis Pendens

Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. 2 0
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract
on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the
pending litigation. 2 1
The ling of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the nal judgment to
prevent the defeat of the nal judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a
purchaser, bona de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the ling of a notice of lis pendens
does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist. 2 2
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the certi cate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the
property owner's undertakings not annotated in the transfer certi cate of title. 2 3 Thus, we
have consistently held that —
The notice of lis pendens . . . is ordinarily recorded without the intervention
of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action,
an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and
may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be nally determined
and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court
having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal . . . is
not contingent on the existence of a nal judgment in the action, and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof. 2 4

A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or
possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. 2 5 The
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 litigation must directly involve a speci c property which is necessarily affected by the
judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 2 6 enumerated
the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.

On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;

b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;

c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.
27

As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a

statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is
pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a
reference to the number of the certi cate of title of the land, an adequate description of
the land affected and its registered owner.
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because "the
application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this o ce will base
its action." 2 8 In consulta to the LRA, petitioners pointed out that they have complied with
the requirements for the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the ling by
the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certi cates of Title
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending
which is "the registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City." The
date of the ling of the motion is shown on the motion itself wherein the receipt
of said motion by the land registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly
stamped;

7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certi cates of Title Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 are clearly indicated in the notice;

7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice

of Lis Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4
of the Motion attached to the Notice;
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 7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604
null and void, dated November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal will base its action is attached as Annex "A" of the Notice of Lis
Pendens. (Emphasis in the original) 2 9
Petitioners' enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the
requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-
18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD
1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens. AECcTS

Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they led a motion in LRC No.
N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against
Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses. Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496,
as amended by Act No. 3322, which states that ". . . in all cases of registration procured by
fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such
fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title . . . ."

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose

property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name.
Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for
reconveyance is led as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the
land registration court. 3 0 Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has
not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certi cate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court.
The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and
preserve the claim of the real owner. 3 1
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
In its comment, 3 2 the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of
default includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners' failure to move to lift the default order
did not give them standing in the case. As long as the court does not lift the order of
general default, petitioners have no legal standing to le the motion to declare void the
decrees of registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. — If no person appears and answers
within the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason
to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant
to present evidence. By the description in the notice "To All Whom It May
Concern", all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the
default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer led, a default
order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.

Petitioners' justi cation for ling a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as
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 opposed to ling a motion to lift the order of general default, rests on two related
assumptions. First, with the ling of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due course to
the motion by the land registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal
standing in the registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into
the shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants sold the property
to him. As successors-in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are not
strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of Section 22 of
PD 1529 to Section 29 of Act 496 3 3 and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals. 3 4
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. — After
the ling of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration,
the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part,
in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent
instruments together with the subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands
in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties,
shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in
the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments. ADCIca

The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:

SECTION 29. After the ling of the application and before the issuance
of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration O ce, the land
therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be
recorded in the o ce of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the
decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The
interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First
Instance instead of presenting them to the o ce of the Register of Deeds,
together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application, and the court, after notice to the parties shall order such land
registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the
decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom
the property has been conveyed by said instruments. . . .

Mendoza v. Court of Appeals 3 5 explains the procedure in cases of conveyance of

the land subject of a registration proceeding by an instrument executed between the time
of filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has
been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the
"person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may
thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only
requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by
the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation
with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case . . .
. 36

Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land registration
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 court. However, this position is in con ict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have the
decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-
in-interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners' grave error in
procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May
1966 and issued a certi cate of nality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners led their motion
to consider the deed of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners led their
motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certi cates of title declared void on 25
November 1998. Petitioners led both motions long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887
became nal and executory. Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom they
base their claim presented the Deed of Sale before the land registration court while the
action was pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion
led by petitioners is insu cient to give them standing in the land registration
proceedings for purposes of ling an application of a notice of lis pendens. However, we
disagree with the LRA and the appellate court's observation that petitioners need to le a
motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default
should be led before entry of nal judgment. The land registration court granted the
application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certi cate of nality on 8
March 1991. Petitioners led their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners led a
motion to lift the order of general default, the order of default could not be set aside
because the motion was filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v . Go Fay, 3 7 this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the
party defaulted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his
loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be
entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the
court, unless he les a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided
in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included
by the default order. Those who did not le an answer should be considered as
having lost their standing in court from that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173
SCRA 12) except when they le a motion to set aside the order [of] default on the
grounds mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v . Fay , 80
Phil. 166). EIaDHS

In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of
general default was deemed to have been issued based on the presumption of
regularity in judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March
1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the order of
general default was lifted. Records disclosed that without rst ling a motion to
lift the order of general default, petitioners led a motion to declare as null and
void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court,
petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed
movants whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by
the court considering that the order of default has not been lifted. 3 8

One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested

parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to
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 the land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order
of general default is required. It is only in the latter case that the doctrine pronounced in
Serrano v. Palacio, 3 9 as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is applicable:
. . . [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they led a motion
to intervene in the . . . land registration case for the proper procedure would have
been for them to ask rst for the lifting of the order of general default, and then, if
lifted, to le an opposition to the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for, and not the determination of any right not
connected with the registration (Estiva vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).

Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By ling their motion to have
the decrees and the corresponding certi cates of title declared void, they took the role
of oppositors to the application for land registration.
The appellate court stated that "in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of
petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the
part of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could not." 4 0 Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing
act between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding 4 1 and the strict requirements for a notice of lis
pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners have not complied with the
requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring.

3. Penned by Hon. Alfredo R. Enriquez, Administrator of the Land Registration Authority.

4. Rollo, p. 28.
5. Ibid., pp. 35, 50, 54; CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.
6. Rollo, pp. 42-45.
7. Ibid., pp. 46-47. See also Rollo, pp. 52, 56, 234-235. The pertinent portion of the Deed of
Absolute Sale states that Sandoval and Ozaeta warrant the "fil[ing] of the corresponding
motion or manifestation in Land Reg. Case No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., Applicants, in order
that the original certificates of title over the said property will issue directly in the name
of EUGENIO LOPEZ, his heirs, administrators, or assigns." However, Ozaeta later learned
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 that their counsel, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, never filed the appropriate motion.

8. Property Registration Decree.

9. Rollo, p. 58.
10. Ibid., pp. 50-57.
11. Ibid., pp. 50, 54. OCT No. O-1604 was issued by the National Land Titles and Deeds
Administration at 8:02 a.m.

12. Ibid., pp. 58-60. See also CA Rollo, pp. 42-48.

13. CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.
14. Rollo, pp. 64-65.
15. Ibid., p. 66.
16. Ibid., pp. 73-75.
17. Ibid., p. 75.
18. See ibid., p. 14.
19. Ibid., p. 36.
20. See 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens §1 (1948).
21. Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, 383 Phil. 729 (2000) citing Nataño, et al.
v. Esteban, et al., 124 Phil. 1067 (1966), Bisaya Land Trans. Co., Inc. v. Cuenco, 131 Phil.
627 (1968), and Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69303,
23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 253.

22. See Po Lam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116220, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 86
citing Somes v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 Phil. 432 (1935).
23. See Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21 citing Pino v. CA, G.R.
No. 94114, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 434, Dino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95921, 2
September 1992, 213 SCRA 422.

24. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60323, 17 April
1990, 184 SCRA 325 citing Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No.
L-69303, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 253 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, 15
September 1987, 154 SCRA 1.

25. Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21.

26. Supra note 24.
27. AMADO D. AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 301 (1994).

28. Rollo, p. 66.

29. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
30. See Casillan v. Espartero, et al., 95 Phil. 799 (1954).
31. See Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., 92 Phil. 826 (1953);
NARCISO PEÑA, NARCISO PEÑA, JR., AND NESTOR N. PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND
TITLES AND DEEDS 132-134 (1994).
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 32. Rollo, pp. 87-91.
33. The Land Registration Act.

34. No. L-36637, 14 July 1978, 84 SCRA 67.

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. 80 Phil. 166 (1948).
38. Rollo, p. 89.
39. No. 15645-R, 31 August 1955, 52 O.G. 260.
40. Rollo, p. 40.
41. Section 6 of Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

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 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125154. September 28, 2001.]

DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP,

FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO
SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF CORAZON
SANTIAGO , petitioners, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA-
TAMISIN GONZALES , respondents.

Jose F. Manacop for petitioners.

Leopoldo P. dela Rosa and Tabalingcos & Associates Law O ces for private
respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners led an application for land registration of a parcel of land in Los

Baños. The trial court subsequently issued an order of general default against the
whole world except the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent led a motion to set
aside the order of general default, claiming that she failed to timely le her opposition
because the application was led by petitioners in bad faith, surreptitiously and without
notice to her. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals set aside the order of general default.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily when it set
aside the trial court's order of general default without factual basis. Since the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to
make nding of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect su cient for the
court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case involved.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; ARBITRARILY SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT ORDER

WITHOUT BASIS IS ERRONEOUS; CASE AT BAR. — The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set
aside the trial court's order of general default without factual basis save for its own gut
feeling, ipse dixit. . . . In respondent's motion to set aside order of general default, she
alleged that petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property,
but did not give her personal notice of the ling of the application. She learned about the
application by accident. In the petition for certiorari she led with the Court of Appeals,
respondent alleged that petitioners led the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and
without notice to her. The Court of Appeals did not make a nding on this. Hence, we nd
that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general default in the Land
Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a speci c nding of fraud, accident or
excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the application.
2. ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS; REMAND OF CASE TO
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PROPER. — We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to
remand the case to the Court of Appeals for it to make ndings of fact constituting fraud,
accident or excusable neglect su cient for the court to lift the order of general default in
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 the land registration case involved.

DECISION

PARDO , J : p

The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
setting aside the orders 2 of the trial court that denied petitioners' motion to set aside the
order of general default 3 in an application for registration of a parcel of land, consisting of
one thousand, one hundred seventy six (1,176), situated in barrio Batong Malake,
municipality of Los Baños, province of Laguna. 4 EaIcAS

The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 5 are as follows:
"On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Mañacop,
Felicisima Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and
the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago
(petitioners herein) led with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an
application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling purposes).
"On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application for registration.

"On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued "an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines . . . ."

"On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales led with the
trial court an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default" alleging,
inter alia, in her a davit that she "is claiming the land in question subject of this
petition as an owner . . ." which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.
"On October 12, 1995, respondent led with the trial court a reply to the
opposition interposed by the petitioners and, at the same time, led an "Urgent
Motion" praying for the suspension of the proceedings.

"On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the rst assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted, as follows:

'WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as

the motion to suspend the proceedings led by the movant through
counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit.'
"On October 20, 1995, petitioners led with the trial court a "Motion to
Strike Out Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding."

"On November 21, 1995 respondent led with the trial court a "motion for
reconsideration" of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of general
default, which motion petitioners opposed.

"On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
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 'WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration, dated November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for lack of
merit.'

"On December 13, 1995, respondent led with the Court of Appeals 6 a
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge "acted capriciously and
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise of his
discretion" in issuing the two aforementioned orders." 7

On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial
court's orders dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting
aside the trial court's order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land
Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to respondent. 8
Hence, this appeal. 9
The Issue
The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
court's order of general default in the land registration case involved without making a
speci c nding of fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its view
that substantial justice and speedy determination of the controversy would be better
attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to
establish a case of ownership in herself.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial court's
order of general default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit. 1 0
Respondent's failure to le timely opposition to the application for land registration
because she missed reading the publication of the notice in the O cial Gazette 1 1 or in the
newspaper "Malaya" issue of August 8, 1994, 1 2 in itself may not be considered excusable
negligence.
In respondent's motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that
petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did not
give her personal notice of the ling of the application. She learned about the application
by accident. In the petition for certiorari she led with the Court of Appeals, respondent
alleged that petitioners led the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice
to her. 1 3 The Court of Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we nd that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general
default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a speci c nding of
fraud, accident or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the
application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for it to make ndings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect
su cient for the court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case
involved.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39239.
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 Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings with
instructions to determine whether there exists facts warranting the lifting of the order of
general default in LRC Case No. 88-94-C of the trial court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. In CA-G.R. SP No. 39239, promulgated on April 2, 1998, Mabutas, Jr., J., ponente,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Valdez, Jr., JJ., concurring. Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 135-138.
2. Petition, Annexes "G" and "I", CA Rollo, pp. 52, 57.

3. In LRC Case No. 88-94-C; Petition, Annex "B", CA Rollo, p. 33.

4. Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-30. See Application for land registration, RTC Record, pp. 1-12.

5. With editorial changes.

6. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39239, Petition, CA Rollo, pp. 2-20.
7. Court of Appeals Decision, Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 135-138, at pp. 136-137.

8. Ibid.
9. Filed on June 27, 1996, Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-30. On October 19, 1998, we gave due
course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 191-192).
10. George Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000.
11. Certificate of Publication, Exh. "D", Folder of Exhs., Vol. II, p. 3.
12. Affidavit of Publication, Exh. "C", Original Record, p. 23.
13. Petition for Certiorari, CA Rollo, pp. 2-18, at p. 11.

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