GROUP 1

A. Powers of Congress in general

1. Legislative power (Sec)
OPLE V. TORRES, JULY 23, 1998 (delineation of Legislative and executive powers)
FACTS:
On December 12, 1996,A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, entitled "ADOPTION OF A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM” which provides:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized
Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate
with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology
and in computer application designs of their respective systems.
The petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification reference system requires a
legislative act. The issuance of a.o. no. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the republic of the Philippines. Respondents
counter-argued that A.O. NO. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president without
encroaching on the legislative powers of congress;
ISSUE: WON the Implementation of the Administrative order no. 308 is a usurpation of the power of the congress to
legislate.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.” The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes
of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.The executive power is vested in
the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
SEPERATE OPINIONS OF JJ Vitug, Kapunan and Panganiban
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Here, it may be apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario that:
As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled options to
become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and most importantly to this instance, the subject covered by the questioned
administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to
my mind, should make it indispensable and appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the
Philippines, the policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and impermissible
exercise of legislative power by the Executive.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient to establish an
all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country. The subject matter contained in AO 308 is
beyond the powers of the President to regulate without a legislative enactment.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;
The pioneering efforts of the executive to adopt a national computerized identification reference system has met fierce
opposition. It has spun dark predictions of sinister government ploys to tamper with the citizen's right to privacy and
ominous forecasts of a return to authoritarianism. Lost in the uproar, however, is the simple fact that there is nothing in
the whole breadth and lenght of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.

KMU V. DIRECTOR GENERAL, NEDA, APRIL 2006

FACTS:
The petitioners sought for the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420), issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The E.O. reads: “REQUIRING ALL
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR
SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners in
G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government.
ISSUE:
WON the E.O. is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes usurpation of the legislative function.
HELD:
No. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional
power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not
make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as
insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require
legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue
ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all
these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club.
These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not
compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.

Classification & number of Party-List Reps

a. 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list
VETERAN’S FEDERATION V COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives
Petitions for certoriari were led assailing two (2) Comelec Resolutions ordering the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941." Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, averred that the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in the House under the Constitution was
mandatory and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 was unconstitutional, because its strict application
would make it mathematically impossible to ll up the house party-list complement.
ISSUE:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
RULING:
1. It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR
 determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
 additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
 additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party
2. Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
 party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

BANAT V COMELEC
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is
pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet
the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation

ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or
merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

RULING:

1. WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
2. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling.
4. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the
two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number
of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are
two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat
to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the
remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.

(b) Major Political parties may participate in the party-list election

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7941 and some COMELEC Resolutions, approx. 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections. The COMELEC, then, scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether these groups and organizations have continually complied with the
requirements set by R.A. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani Case. Consequently, 39 parties were disqualified either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in BANAT and Bagong Bayani should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
RULING:
The case is remanded to the COMELEC for it to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system,
and to participate in the coming May 13, 2013 elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
I. NEW PARAMETER:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
 sectoral wing that can separately register under the partylist system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE

Clearly, the intent, express wording and party-list structure prescribed in Article VI Section 5 (1) and (2) provides that
the party-list system is not only for sectoral parties, but also for non-sectoral parties. Accordingly, R.A. 7941 does not
require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors” for
this would deprive and exclude ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
However, major political parties can participate only through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
“marginalized and underrepresented” or “lacking in well-defined political constituencies”. The 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list
elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing,
like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition.
(c) Meaning of Marginalized and Underrepresented
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V COMELEC
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMElEC in 2006, but was denied on the ground that it had no
substantial membership base. In 2009, filed for registration again and argued that they represent the LGBT community
which is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity. However, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition on moral grounds,
specifically, that Ang Ladlad tolerated immorality which offends religious beliefs. The COMEELC Chairman added in
upholding the assailed resolution that even assuming that the party has proven its underrepresentation and
marginalization, if failed to show that their expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad has met the requirements set by the Constitution and RA 7941.
RULING:
YES. As ruled, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element
lied on whether a particular organization has complied with the requirements of the Constitution and R.A. 7941. A
cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each of the province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around
the Philippines composed of different LGBT networks.
Topic: Delisting of party-list groups
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
Facts:
1. The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari and in the motion for
reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679
(Delisting of PGBI)
2. Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the
latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
3. Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling
of MINERO v. COMELEC but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the
excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
Issue/s:
WON there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
Holding: Due to the erring action of Comelec in 2010, the Court deemed it exempted for that requirement in
Sec. 6 (8) of RA 7941. However, the Court did not decide on the full qualification of PGBI to the 2013 elections as it is
not within the province of the Court
No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of
RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

Topic: Qualifications of a party-list nominee/representative

ABAYON V. HRET, G.R. NO. 189466, FEBRUARY 11, 2010
Facts:
4. petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat
in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections
 5. Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo claiming that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a
party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
6. petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto
since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a
party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
7. respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction
over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon hence the case at bar
8. Respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against
Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist
rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards

Issue/s:
1. WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) have authority to pass upon the eligibilities of
the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress
Holding: Court dismisses petitions
1. No. Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine
which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives
during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they
sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not
elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has
no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
2. Although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the
challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the
registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here
and has not been argued by the parties. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29

FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated
18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC. Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization On 30
November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner
Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed
Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December
2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter assumed office. Several months
prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central
Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the
agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term. On 5
December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled
him from Ating Koop for disloyalt The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed
that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the
succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House. Ating Koop had
expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption
ISSUES:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the House of Representatives from
his party-list organization.
RULING:
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion
from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list
representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of... jurisdiction,
insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives. Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members
of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and...
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction
over the disqualification case The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the
cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. Principles: he COMELEC En Banc
held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was... the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition In the present case, the Petition for
petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide...
member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona
fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office,
whether elective... or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure This is not merely an error of law but an error
of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of... certiorari;[42] the COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion
issue, as it was outside its authority to do so

HOR: basic requirement for legislative districts (1) apportionment – number of inhabitants, uniform and progressive
ratio [sec. 5(1)]; contiguous, compact and adjacent territories [sec. 5(3)]

MACIAS V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. L-18684, SEPTEMBER 14, 1961

Redistricting statutes; Who can bring action to test vali-dity.—Citizens who are deprived of an election franchise to
which they are entitled under the Constitution by an apportionment act, have sufficient interest to test its validity.

Same; Same; Power of court to review apportionment laws. District apportionment laws are subject to review by the
courts. The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question.
 Same; Same; Basis of apportionment; Preliminary census enumeration.—Apportionment of legislative districts may
legally rest on official census enumeration even if not yet final.

Same; Same; Avoidance of statute; Disproportionment of representation.—Republic Act No. 3040 that gives provinces
with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is declared invalid because it
violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Matias vs. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA
1, No. L-18684 September 14, 1961

FACTS:
1. Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in this country, because they allege that it is unconstitutional and void, for the
following reasons:
a. it was passed by the House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been
furnished the Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage
b. it was approved more than three years after the return of the last census of our population
c. it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
2. Respondents assert that that petitioners have no personality to bring this action; that a duly certified copy of the
law creates the presumption of its having been passed in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution
(distribution of printed bills included); that the Director of the Census submitted an official report on the
population of the Philippines in November, 1960, which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act
complies with the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3040 is unconstitutional and void.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the statute is unconstitutional and void because it infringed the provisions of the
Constitution.
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives "shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants."
The Court held that this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because:
(a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only;
(b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only;
(c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having
been assigned to it;
(d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only;
(e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and
(f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got
two.
These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas
Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2
each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo
with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
 For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that Republic Act 3040 infringed the
provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.
MONTEJO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 118702, MARCH 16, 1995
Constitutional Law; Election Law; COMELEC; The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of
our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution.—The basic powers of
respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in Section 2(c),
Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power
to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled “Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area.”

Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it
itself exercised the power.—Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC “to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.”

Same; Same; Same; Power granted to respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
“apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created.”—Consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to
adjust the number of members (not municipalities) “apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created . . .”

Same; Same; Same; In Macias vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question.—The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: “Within three (3) years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.” In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District of the province of Leyte.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation.
2. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts. Biliran,
located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of
the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959. Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the
sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the
territories comprised therein."
3. The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District
composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,
Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a
total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
4. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province
and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among
others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 violated the principle of equality in the Constitution and
void.
RULING:
Yes.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within
three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it
cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the
province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

TOPIC: Eligibility of parties seeking registration under the party-list systems

MAGDALO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190793, JUNE 19, 2012
Election Law; Electoral Contests; To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC, 620 SCRA 393 (2010).—To join electoral
contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, 620 SCRA 393 (2010): x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes
of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to
qualified registered parties. x x x x x x x x x x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization
or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration.—Under Article
IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also
denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws,
and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering
that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

Same; Same; The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to
register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character.—The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to
register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration
or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580 (2011), is nonetheless analogously
applicable.
FACTS:
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson,
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).Taking
cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALO’s purpose was to
employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means
RULING:
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for
Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument
cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of “public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.” Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to
evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. That the
Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice.
Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and
took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence thereon. The COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that “seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section
61 of B.P. 881, which provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled
to accreditation.” In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly
announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the
administration of former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of
arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the
AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in
the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which
MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government
constituted clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated
the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof
in order to achieve its objectives. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful
means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5)
of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility
of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the
COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals
by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. In finding that MAGDALO
resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment
as to whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the
necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. Accreditation as a political party
is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by law.

c. Basic requirement for legislative districts (1) apportionment – number of inhabitants, uniform and progressive ratio
[Sec. 5(1)]; contiguous, compact and adjacent territories [Sec. 5(3)]
(2) representation – each city with population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one representative
[Sec. 5(3)]

AQUINO V. COMELEC (Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. COMELEC, April 7, 2010)
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.—There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.

Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to
be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.—The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city,
should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district
in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its
population.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 (i.e. only 176,383).

ISSUE:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
RULING:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned
about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
The Court clarified that it does not mean that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. The ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. The
other factors mentioned during the deliberations were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two
Petition is DISMISSED and Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

C. QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (SEC. 3 & 6)

1. Citizenship – natural born citizen
VILANDO v. HRET

Election Law; Election Protests; Citizenship; In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity; The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of a naturalized citizen should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.—Vilando’s argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of
merit. In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he
makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it
would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should be in
accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

Same; Same; Same; Electoral Tribunals; The power of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), no matter how
complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization of a member’s
father in the pursuit of disqualifying said member—to rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the
father which is not permissible.—Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.
The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not
permissible.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting
renunciation of Philippine citizenship—for renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express.—Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did
it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the
holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly,
Limkaichong’s mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The only instance where the Supreme Court may intervene in the exercise of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of
a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.—Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this
Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution
of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. In this case,
there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it
dismissed the quo warranto petition.

FACTS:
Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Olivia
Paras and Renald Vilando, a concerned citizen, filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese
citizen and that her mother lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father.
During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC, after due hearing and few days after the
counting of votes, declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding
their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the
policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed Paras’ petition
arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter
and not the COMELEC.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a
petition for Quo Warranto. Subsequently, the petitioners filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against
Limkaichong before the HRET.
On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives as petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that respondent is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District, Negros Oriental.
Vilando filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the HRET acquired jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines
RULING:
1. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once
a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the
 word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
2. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is
the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption
of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino, absent any evidence to the
contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship
by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding
office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a
naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the
citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a
Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization
were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother
and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in
declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984,
and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973
during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
Furthermore, the obtaining of an Alien Certificate of Registration by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship.
An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained
only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her
personal information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for
foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for
registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration
Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of
registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.
Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where
this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the
decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or
improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET
declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
District, Negros Oriental.

DAVID vs SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Constitutional Law; Senators; Natural-born Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement
that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.”

Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may
still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.—At the
heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can
be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this
controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.
Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation. Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in
discovering the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are situated within the whole document
— context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous
construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual
meaning of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Verba Legis Doctrine; Words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of
verba legis.—To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of
verba legis. The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People:
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the
Constitution, therefore, is the People’s consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: We look
to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Same; Same; The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam
pereat.—Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional
provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components
through the dynamism of these components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a
peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam
pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its
foundational principles to its finest fixings.

Same; Same; Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.”—Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that
has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent
source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was
originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect.
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.

Same; Same; Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable
of multiple, viable meanings.—Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the
text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction
may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.

Same; Same; On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs:
the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.” This definition must be harmonized
with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation
to the factual milieu of this case.—Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need
for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable
reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. On
an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s
actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s
enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu
of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.

Same; Citizenship; The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for
redress of grievance.—Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It is one’s
personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political
rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the
right to petition the government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which
one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the
citizen’s birth.

Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary
implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.—A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as
one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.”
By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), articulates this definition by dichotomy: [O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed
light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are “former
aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court (SC) has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial
evidence in other proceedings.—Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in
reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.
There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings. In criminal proceedings, circumstantial
evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest
standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for
such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Words and Phrases; Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.—“Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.” Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue” Burden
of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a
prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that
which has ostensibly been established against him or her.

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Foundlings; The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at
least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise)
arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.”—The presumption that all
foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born,
unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole
purpose.” As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional
provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the
well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to
respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for requiring natural-born status for
select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative
enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Same; Same; Same; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior
class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.—Concluding that foundlings are not
natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be
of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be
tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior
class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.

Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.’”—The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee against ‘undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.’” Other than the anonymity of their
biological parents, no substantial distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both
entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings’ misfortune in failing to identify the
parents who abandoned them — an inability arising from no fault of their own — cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces
them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the
state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those
who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

Same; Citizenship; Foundlings; Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private
respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts.—Our statutes on
adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without
having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they
are natural-born citizens. Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her
natural-born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was
a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares,
private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts. First, private
respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she
was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration.
Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philip- pines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an office that requires
natural-born citizenship.

Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act
No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”—“Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. Republic Act No.
9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Republic Act No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens
of other countries.”

Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention
and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of
allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who
became citizens of another country before the effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may
exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.—Natural-born Philippine citizens who,
after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship,
although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to
certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On
the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 “reacquire” their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in
conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a
vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites which Natural-born Filipinos who Have Been Naturalized Elsewhere and Wish to Run for
Elective Public Office Must Comply.—Natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective
public office must comply with all of the following requirements: First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects
the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of
the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.

Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act (RA) No.
9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen.—It is incorrect to intimate that private
respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born,
Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect
citizenship. To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in Section
2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance
and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to
citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.—Although Bengson was decided while
Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and
immutability: “all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” In
Bengson’s words, the once naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There may have
been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of
natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of
restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact
may have consequences de facto. Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of
Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to
citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from
naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.

FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she
was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was later adopted and raised by spouses FPJ and Susan Roces.
She took her college degree in the USA. She returns to the Philippines frequently.
On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided to settle in the US with her husband and children and lived there for some time.
She was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was subsequently given a United States
passport.
When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned to support her father's candidacy. After the Elections, she returned
to the United States on July 8, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to
attend to the settling of his estate.
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States and decided to return home in 2005. She came back on
May 24, 2005. On July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines
In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship and derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children were granted. Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan
City on August 31, 2006.
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her United States
Passport. She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not
after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.
On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance
to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States on July 12, 2011.
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections and eventually won.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the Constitution.
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a Senator
HELD: Voting 9-3, the high court ruled in favor of Poe.
From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on citizenship, it was never the intention of the framers
to exclude foundlings from natural-born citizenship status. “Children or people born in a country of unknown parents
are citizens of this nation” and the only reason that there was no specific reference to foundlings in the 1935 provision
was that these cases “are few and far in between.” Evident intent was to adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code
“wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.”
Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed to have
been born on the territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is proved. Although the Philippines is not
a signatory to said convention, its provisions are binding as they form part of the law of the land pursuant to the
incorporation clause. Senator Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Convention remarked “By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized…” By
referring to this rule in international law (which was no other than Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930), what was
effectively created in the Constitution itself, was an exception to the general rule of natural-born citizenship based on
blood descent.
Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines with unknown parentage) were, by birth, accorded natural-born
citizenship by the Constitution. “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”The framers of the Constitution were sufficiently
empowered to create a class of natural-born citizens by legal fiction, as an exception to the jus sanguinis rule. This is
evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on nationality to be determined by
the law of that State) of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, as
required under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225. Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman, Poe executed an
affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship. This was sufficient to qualify her for her appointive position, and later,
her elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not require that her Certificate of Loss of Nationality filed before the U.S.
Embassy be first approved in order that she may qualify for office. Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Poe
still used her U.S. passport after having taken her Oath of Allegiance but not after she has renounced her U.S.
Citizenship.

CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Same; Same; The term “residence” has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions
but also under the 1987 Constitution.—The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of “residence” under the Constitution. The term
“residence” has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. xxx The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word “residence” which regarded
it as having the same meaning as domicile. The term “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
Same; Same; It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile.—Even
assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v.
Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.—It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]) As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On
the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

FACTS:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
  Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by
the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE:
 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
RULING: Yes. He is a natural born citizen.
Ratio:
 The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China.
Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life
and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and
that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.
 After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in
order to acquire his secondary and college education.
 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of
the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a
natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4.Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.
 He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite
of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship.
  SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his
citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s
father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid
to rest
Petitions are dismissed.

Residence
MARCOS VS. COMELEC
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place”
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.”
In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have
a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For political purposes the concepts
of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks of “residence ” in election law, it actually
means only “domicile.”—The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only
“domicile.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It is
the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy regarding the period of residency does not
negate the fact of residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on
a piece of paper.—Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which
required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8—the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This
honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places.—We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his parents.—A minor follows the domicile of
his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only
when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s
averments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an
intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and
positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench,
the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s
domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of “domicile” and “residence.” The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from
the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.—A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s
choice of residence upon marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to
“residence.”—The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife
is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence—she did not lose her
domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She
did not lose her domicile of origin.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family
Code.—On the other hand, the common law concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of
our jurisprudential experi ences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the
term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the intervening years by making the choice of
domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law.—Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring
rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them
does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.”

Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.—The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory
provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdic tion over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’S jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections return and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional one year requirement for residency.
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood"
in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that the office cannot accept the amended certificate because it is filed out of time. Petitioner claimed that her
domicile is Tacloban City to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner complied with the constitutional one-year residency requirement for election purposes
RULING
Yes. The Court stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of
a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. First, minor follows the domicile of his
parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Second, domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1) an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; 2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3.)
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks
the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. Third, when petitioner married the former President Marcos, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium. Lastly, Even assuming for the sake of
argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after
her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile.
Petition affirmed. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC

Same; Domicile; Residence; In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for a district, he must prove that he has established
not just residence but domicile of choice.—We agree with COMELEC’s contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter “must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice.”

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—The
Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which
he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.—Clearly, the place
“where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law
as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community” from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

Same; Same; Same; While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law
for him to qualify.—While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law
for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the
area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same.

Same; Same; Same; The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
in the instant case—sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which a lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.—While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the
condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) “indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence” is not to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful
abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification—sentimental, actual or otherwise—with
the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency
for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.

Same; Same; Same; Domicile of origin is not easily lost—to successfully effect a change of domicile, a person must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.—Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his
domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin
is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner’s
claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Same; Same; Same; Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas.—Finally, petitioner’s submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not
created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.
That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves
in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because
of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with
that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

FACTS
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman. A day after said petition for
disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate and contended that he
had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days. Petitioner testified
and presented in evidence, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, a lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano
dated April 1, 1994. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification against Agapito Aquino and thus
proclaimed eligible to run for office. On the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes.
Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner. COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution proclaiming Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible
and thus disqualified as a candidate. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should
he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent. Hence,
the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner complied with the constitutional one-year residency requirement for election purposes
RULING
No. The place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to
the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac. Moreover, While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or
to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the
short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire new
residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was
effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of
Makati. Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. In the absence of clear and
positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Petition dismissed.

ARNAULT V. NAZARENO, G.R. NO. L-3820,

JULY 18, 1950
FACTS:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison.
In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his two attorneys-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, was paid by the sums of
money, although Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He was not able to pay the necessary amount of money
to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners was canceled.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the
transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, especially Jean L. Arnault.
An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the
Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of the only P20,000 in the two estates,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of
October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine
National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on
said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with
the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the
present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the Senate then approved a resolution that cited
him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for
a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always
continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of
Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years.
The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30,
1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second
Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until
the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session
and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
ISSUE:
Whether the Senate can continue to punish for contempt beyond the adjournment of its legislative session.
RULING:
Yes, Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged
with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to
say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved. The very reason for the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment
or obstruction.
The commitment of resolution has been adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease
exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.

The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is
within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a
witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry.
The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the
questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the
power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he
shall have answered them.
That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative
function involved.
To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be
to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and
appropriate means for its performance.
Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the
session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure,
which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and oppressively
exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life.
But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary
to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights
might thus be transgressed.

Xxxxx xxxx. Xxxx.

Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:

From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the
legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and
not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the
right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative
body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace
to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.

If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it is in
session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of
its successor.

Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and
from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before
us, the members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was committed have not yet completed
their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."

The rule may be the same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single
Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a
term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each Congress,
two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation.

Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:

"From this doctrine it follows, in. my judgment, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the legislative body,
which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session
thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to
self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to
constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the
legislative body against which contempt was committed.

Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six
years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next
Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term
of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on
December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the petitioner was adopted
during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended on May 18, 1950.

Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final
adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The
very reason f or the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation.
To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that
power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. It is but logical to say
that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function
involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its
performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the
session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings
against the witness until the investigation is completed—an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE, G.R. NO. 180643, MARCH 25, 2008 (DECISION);
SEPTEMBER 4, 2008 (RESOLUTION)
Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members, but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a
“continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
“continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However,
in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123.
Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and
proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present
for the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate
of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will,
as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the
start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has
determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of
such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may
easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.

FACTS:
On April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply
of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
In the Petitioner’s comment on the Motion of Reconsideration of theRespondent Committee’s, the Petitioner aver that
the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

RULING: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply
put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them
during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order

Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”)
are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the
duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution
simply out of courtesy.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not
promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper
observance of the Rules.
Congress as a “continuing body”
On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing”, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied.
Case Digest for Neri vs. Senate
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari1 was filed by petitioner Neri assailing the “show cause letter” dated November 22, 2007 and
a subsequent order to cite petitioner in contempt more than a month later, January 30, 2008. Both documents were
filed by the Senate Committees headed by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations otherwise known as the Blue Ribbon Committee.

The antecedent events occurred previous to the issuance of the order and facts that have been culled up during the
investigation are as follows:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) on April 21, 2007 for the purpose of supplying equipment and services of a
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project.

The full consideration amount of US$329,481,290 (Php 16 Billion) is to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China.

In conjunction with the investigation, several resolutions to fill in legislative deficiencies were filed in Procurement
law and executive-diplomatic treatises and agreements.

Simultaneously, this investigation resulted into the proposal of three pending bills in the Senate. Senate Bill No, 1793
was filed to subject treaties or executive agreements involving funding of projects to the scope of RA 9184 or the
Government Procurement Reform Act.

Another bill was filed to impose safeguards in contracting loans classified as Official Development Assistance
(ODA), and finally, a bill requiring concurrence to international and executive agreements.

The Senate Committees initiated the investigation by inviting officials and persons involved in the specified project.
Secretary Romulo L. Neri was one of those invited to the hearings. On three occasions the Petitioner was invited, he
only appeared once.

On another occasion the Respondent Committees invited Jose De Venecia, III who revealed that there were high
officials pushing for the project. The project was originally to be realized manifested on a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) basis but soon, the witness found out it was converted into a government-to-government project. The aforesaid
project involved the Republic of the Philippines and People’s Republic of China and is to be financed by a grant of
loan by the latter.

Petitioner Neri who testified on September 26, 2007 disclosed that Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Commissioner Benjamin Abalos offered him a P200 million bribe to prioritize the project. That particular hearing
lasted eleven hours. Neri, according to his testimony, immediately informed President Arroyo of the attempt him but
he was instructed by her not to accept it.

However, when Neri was probed to elaborate on the matters pertaining to the NBN deal with the President, he refused
to answer the question on the ground of executive privilege.

He refused to answer the following questions:

Whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project.

Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it.
Whether or not she directed him to approve.
Adamant as they could be, the respondent summoned the petitioner once again on November 20, 2007. However,
Executive Secretary Ermita wrote on November 15, 2007 to dispense with Neri’s testimony as this was covered by
executive privilege.

On the appointed date of the inquiry, petitioner did not appear in the proceedings. As a consequence, the Senate
issued a show cause letter demanding that Neri to explain why he failed to appear before them and why he should not
be cited in contempt.

The Petitioner replied that it was not his intention to snub the hearings and that he thought he was going to be asked
the three remaining questions covered by executive privilege.

Moreover, with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, the Petitioner claimed that his non-appearance
was upon order of the President and his conversation with her involved delicate national security and matters
contingent to the impact of high ranking officials embroiled in bribery which probably results to loss of investor
confidence in the country.

The Petitioner also requested that he be furnished with other questions in advance so he may adequately prepare
himself.

When Senate’s inquiry was in recess, Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari berating the show cause letter.

Meanwhile, Respondents found Neri’s explanation unsatisfactory and moved to cite him in contempt and to order the
sergeant-at-arms to arrest and detain him at the Senate until such time he speaks up on the matter. Neri moved for the
reconsideration of the above order. He alleged that he did not display a demeanor worthy of contempt and arrest. He
reiterated that he was willing to accommodate any endeavor to shed light into the issue, provided he be furnished with
questions in advance, a request which respondents did not heed.

On February 5, 2008 the Supreme Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 2(a) enjoining respondents from
implementing their contempt order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance
of the contempt order and (c) requiring respondents to file their comment3.

Petitioner asserts that both the show cause letter and contempt order were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Again, petitioner underscores that any conversation or correspondence
between cabinet members and the President are confidential since discussions involved the impact of exploring
options in making policy decisions.

While Petitioner claims that the parameters have been laid down in Senate vs. Ermita, respondents insist the contrary.
They argue that Neri’s testimony is substantial in the investigation in aid of legislation, that there is no valid
justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege, that there was no abuse in discretion when respondent ordered
the arrest of petitioner and that petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
It was further ventilated by the respondent that the claim of executive privilege in this case will prejudice the right to
public information clause, that the President ensure that he faithfully execute laws, that public office is a public trust,
full public disclosure of all transaction of public interest, due process clause and the principle of separation of powers.

ISSUES:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three questions covered by executive privilege?
Did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order?

DISCUSSION:
The court used Senate vs. Ermita as a sort of a yardstick in deciding this case. Senate makes a distinction between
legislative and oversight powers of Congress quoting Sections 214 and 225 of Article VI of the Constitution.

The Senate describes that Section 21 relates that the power to inquire in aid of legislation is to gather information and
improve lapses in legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power of Congress to call for a question hour as it
exercises its oversight power. The purported power is to ascertain that the executive branch does not arbitrarily
exercise abuse of power.

In circumspect, the above distinctions as the court ruled gives birth to the interpretation of these two provisions. As
respondents invoked Section 22, Article VI Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials. The court
quoted Senate vs. Ermita on this matter.

The following are further elucidated by the court:

That the three questions are covered by executive privilege.

The power to investigate in the light of question hour may be broad but possesses limitations. To be valid it must be
done in accordance to published rules of procedure of either houses and that rights of persons appearing be respected.
That in spite of the revocation of E.O 464, the executive privilege remains to due to its constitutional juncture.
The court makes distinction between the case at bar and the Nixon case. The latter involves a criminal prosecution
and the former a congressional inquiry. The judicial department has to the power to compel persons to unveil
confidential information in the administration of justice while the legislative has not even if it is a search for truth. An
investigation in aid of legislation is not a judicial process to prosecute officials. Therefore, the privilege was properly
invoked.
Petitioner did not act worthy of any contempt as he even subjected himself to an eleven-hour questioning.
The issue on the right to public information is subject to limitation as provided by law.
The Senate failed to furnish petitioner his request of providing him questions in advance and include a publication its
revised rules thus invalidating the contempt order.
The court further ruled that the right of the citizen of information is not equated with Senate’s power to summon
officials or persons to an inquiry, vice versa.
Claim of executive privilege is properly invoked because the formal requisites mandate that it is the head of the
department that initiates it and that it should be done in writing. It should also involve highly confidential information
such as military secrets and diplomatic treatises to qualify for the privilege.
The Senate committed a grave abuse of discretion because besides a valid claim of executive privilege, they curtly
disregarded petitioner’s reasons for abstaining from the inquiry. The responded still went ahead with the contempt
order thus denying the petitioner due process of law.
With regard to the respondent’s allegation that the court abandoned its sacred duty to maintain the doctrine of
separation of powers and check and balances in government, it simply proposed a negotiation as an alternate venue
for settling controversies and avoid the cumbersome process of judicial review. It simply tried to avert a
constitutional crisis looming in the horizon.
Respondent committee should have exercised the same restraint, after all, the petitioner is not even an ordinary
witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government. This is concomitant with the doctrine of
separation of powers and the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of government.
RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Ordered January 30, 2008, citing Romulo L. Neri in
contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.

GARCILLIANO V HRET
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of
the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their
pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.

Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.—Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does not agree. The
absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

FACTS:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Petitioners argue that the Senate cannot be allowed to continue the conduct with the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure. Respondents admitted in their pleadings that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
ISSUE: Whether the Senate can continue with the conduct of the legislative inquiry without publishing their rules of
procedure.
RULING: No. The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with the publication requirement the previous Senate
inquiry in aid of legislation on the “Hello Garci” tapes. “However, the Senate may now call for a new inquiry on the
same following the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October 2008.”

The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the publication of the rules of procedure of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees before it may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations that the
phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.

The Court said that the respondents cannot justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication
requirement by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and that they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. “The absence of any
amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution…The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate,” it said. It added that the respondents’ invocation of the provisions of RA 8792,
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet was incorrect,
stressing that “the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents” but such “does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

GROUP 2

Balag v Senate G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

Facts:

On Sept. 17, 2017, a first year law student of University of Sto. Tomas, died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity.

On Oct 11, 2017, Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, issued a subpoena Ad Testificandum
addressed to petitioner directing him to appear and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry. Another subpoena Ad
Testificandium was issued on Oct 17, 2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the
legislative hearing on Oct. 18, 2017.

On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. In the recourse of the proceedings, at around 11:29 in the morning,
Senator Poe asked the petitioner if he was the President of AJ Fraternity but refused to answer the question and invoked his
right against self-incrimination. He was asked more than twice by Senator Poe and Lacson but still refuse to answer and again
invoked his right against self-incrimination. Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, seconded by Sens Villanueva and
Zubiri.

Issue:

 Won respondent senate committees acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the legislative
inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt
 what is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?
Held:

No. The petition is moot and academic. The court ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution
dated Dec 12, 2017. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the senate’s authority.

The senate is a continuing institution. In the conduct of its day-to-day business, the senate of each congress acts separately and
independently of the senate of the congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the senate during the
expiration of one congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of
the senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that congress.

The court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by
the senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Sec 21 Art VI of the Constitution
states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected
therein.

An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person’s
right to liberty. Thus, the court must strike a balance between the interest of the senate and the rights of persons cited in
contempt during legislative inquiries. The balancing of interest requires that the court take a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. These interests usually consist in
the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental public
interest or policy objectives on the other.

The Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the Senate
during the expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time.

The termination of the Senate's business and proceedings after the expiration of Congress was utilized by the Court in ruling
that the Senate needs to publish its rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress. The pronouncement in Neri was
reiterated in Garcillano v. House of Representatives and Romero II v. Estrada.

The court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. As legislative
inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its
process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range oflegitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate
legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said
legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to
penalize the detained witness.

In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can
continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject
to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.
In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond the
duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to increase the
definite period of imprisonment.

PHILCONSA v. Pedro Jimenez

Same; Republic Act 3836: Increase in emoluments of members of Congress.—Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement
benefits for members of Congress which, in effect, are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of the Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately
available thereunder without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition, in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

Same; Same; Law violates equal protection clause of the constitution.—The features of Republic Act 3836 are discriminatory,
and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.) In the first place, while the said law
grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who art- elective officials, it does not
include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective
officials of the municipalities and chartered cities. Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given
retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are
given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In the third place, all government officers and employees are
given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be
entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an
employee who had been retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth -Act 186, as
amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not
members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws
have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.

Same; Same; Title of law not germane to the subject matter.—Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of
section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits
are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System who have rendered at least twenty years of service
regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand. the
succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not
members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate
to subject matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. No. 186,

FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of
both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase
of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to
retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to
further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No.
3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section
14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity
due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE:

Whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows:
 The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in
the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of
Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

HELD:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of
the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other
emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in
Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments.”

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for
services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation
for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section
14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

People v Jalosjos

Same; The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms.—The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily
addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond
the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

Same; Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests.—Because of
the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest.
He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.

Same; The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.—The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., Concurring Opinion

Public Officers; The continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his
rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.—The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina we held that the trial court’s judgment of
conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of
accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his
conviction.

Same; Accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua is not entitled to the
privilege of parliamentary immunity.—The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and,
proceeding from the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is
not in order.

Same; Doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed
during his previous term.—Accused-appellant’s contention that his reelection constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such
an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v.
Comelec, Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v. Guingona we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. The administrative
liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability.

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.

ISSUE:
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general?

RULING:

No, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The Constitution adheres to a restrictive interpretation of the immunity granted in Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

The appellant argues that is a duty of a member of Congress to attends session as provided for in Section 16, Article VI
of the Constitution. However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

The accused-appellant also cannot rely on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos. The Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Jimenez, et al. v. Cabangbang

[Privilege of speech and debate]

FACTS:

 Respondent Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the Committee
on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several
newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers.
 The letter describes 3 operational plans: (1) Plan No. I is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political
build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in
such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961"; (2) Plan No. II is a "coup
d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the
plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments"; (3) Plan No. III is a modification of
Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which
Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the
officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
 Petitioners Jimenez et al. then filed an action for damages against Cabangbang against Cabangbang alleging
that Cabangbang’s open letter is libelous. Cabangbang moved for the case to be dismissed because he said
that as a member of the lower house, that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the
said letter is not even libelous. Lower court granted the motion of the latter.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication

RULING:
“The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.” (Article VI, Section 15.)

 Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was
an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be
so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
 Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago

Administrative Law; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.—The lady senator belongs to the legal profession
bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law
and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.

Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Public Officers; When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of
Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with
the performance of lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.—Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long
as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection
with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.

Same; Same; Same; It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall.—We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their
own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members
of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.

FACTS:
Out of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
delivered a privilege speech on the Senate floor where she was quoted as saying that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege speech is actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

HELD:
NO, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech as a member of Congress was covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court.

Trillianes v. Castillo-Marigomen

FACTS:
-Senator Trillianes filed Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 to the Senate’s Committee on Accountability of Public Officials
and Investigations to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation the alleged P 1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey
Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the 22-storey Makati City Hall, having average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter and
related anomalies.
-Petitioner alleged that former Vice Mayor Mercado testified on October 8, 2014 in one of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Sessions, how he became instrumental to former VP Binay acquire and expand a 350 ha land in Rosario, Batangas which is
known as Hacienda Binay now fully developed.

-Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as
well as committee hearings, and in reply to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim over the estate, he
expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or
"nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

-Respondent filed an action against Petitioner Trillianes claiming that the allegations against him tarnished his reputation,
caused him sleepless nights, serious anxiety and social humiliation and sought to recover 4 M worth of moral damages, P
500,000.00 as exemplary damages and another P 500,000.00 for attorney’s fees. Respondent claimed that he is a legitimate
businessman primarily in the agricultural sector and because of the defamatory statements release by the petitioner on media,
he was aggrieved because it stained his reputation and affected his business in causing a steep drop in the stock prices of his
publicly listed companies.

-Motion to dismiss was raised by the petitioner on the ground that his statements, having been made in the course of the
performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.

Citing Antero J Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, petitioner argued that the claim of falsity of statements made by a
member of Congress does not destroy the privilege of parliamentary immunity, and the authority to discipline said member lies
in the assembly or the voters and not the courts.

ISSUE(S):

- Whether or not petitioner validly exercised his rights to free speech and freedom of expression and of the press?
- Whether or not his statements are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING:

However, the issue of what parliamentary immunity encompasses, in relation to a lawmaker's

speech or words spoken in debate in Congress, has been addressed as early as 1966 in the case of
Nicanor T. Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang where the Court succinctly held:

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein"-that is to say, in Congress used in this
provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session
or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The same privilege of "speech or debate" was granted under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine
Constitutions, with the latter Charters specifying that the immunity extended to lawmakers'
speeches or debates in any committee of the legislature. This is clear from the "speech or debate"
clauses in the parliamentary immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which
respectively provide:
Section 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Section 9- A Member shall not be questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Assembly or in any committee thereof.

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.

Clearly, settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which the trial and
appellate courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary immunity raised by petitioner.
The Court is, thus, unconvinced that petitioner has presented an "exceptionally compelling reason"
to justify his direct application for a writ of certiorari with this Court.

Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or
debate" privilege.

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as
former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response
to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. With
Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech
or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part
of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the
course of any debate in said fora.

It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or
performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the
legislative process.

In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all con¬ duct relating to the
legislative process. In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or Debate Clause has been
limited to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process - the due functioning of the
process.

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either
House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of
the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of
either House.

It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's
speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the
'"due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews is not
an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of
the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media
interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," 50 outside the ambit of the immunity
conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's
stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private
respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker,
but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

As this Court emphasized in Pobre, "the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members
of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall."

In fine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary non¬accountability to insulate his

statements, uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity,"

All told, for its procedural infirmity and lack of merit, the petition must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent's Orders dated May 19, 2015 and
December 16, 2015 in Civil Case No. R¬QZN-14-10666-CV are affirmed insofar as they are
consistent with this decision.

Adaza v. Pacaña

[I. Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13)]

Constitutional Law; Election Law; A governor who later ran for the Batasan and took his oath can no longer exercise
the functions of governor.—A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people.
As such, a holder thereof “is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose” and “he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office.” It is therefore
of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act as an
elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is
explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Thus, while it may be said that within the purely parliamentary system of government no Incompatibility exists in the
nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility
herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself, In the case at bar, there is no question that
petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as
such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he
cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.

Same; Same; A vice-governor who later ran for the Batasan and lost can continue serving as vice-governor and
subsequently succeed as governor once said office is vacated.—The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that
respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s
election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or
resigned from the vice-governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The
point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan
Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the
various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave
of absence from office.'' Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

FACTS:

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He
took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana,
Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14,
1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by
placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on
July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor
on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to
exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be
the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context
of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously.
2. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such
can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD:

No, Adaza cannot be a member of the Batasan and a governor of the Province.

Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence, Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad.
He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza
further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated
his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s
election to the BP.

This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14,
1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.”
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections
204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

Dante v. Liban v. Richard J. Gordon

Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.—The President does not
appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board
appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch
since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-owned but privately owned.—The
PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign
of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be
a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners,
whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC.

FACTS:

During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC.

Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a
member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution

RULING:

 PNRC is a Private Organization performing Public Functions... the Philippine government does not own the
PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors
 The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC
members are private individuals, including students. Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded,
and privately-run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. In
sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
 government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

Puyat vs De Guzman

Attorneys; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Corporations Act; An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to
follow the Constitutional prohibition not to appear as counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by
buying a nominal amount of share of one of the shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was
contested.—Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the
private respondents His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of
IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have
their respective capable and respected counsel.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact”, that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before
SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead,
to “intervene” on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the case
filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior,
co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been
an indirect “appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body” and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The “intervention” was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually
to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete.
He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was
subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de
Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC
case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Puyat then moved to question the Commissioner’s action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating
Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.

RULING:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though
he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He
bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest – which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
“observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly,
allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter before another office of
government ― renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.―The Court agrees with
petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
“observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the
various phases of project implementation — a matter before another office of government — renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits
are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based
on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As
a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the
Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal the unequal.”
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given
unto them on the sole account of their office.

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional.

"Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations. In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. Recently, or in
July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles)
had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs
for an entire decade.

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP), representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF
and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period. The report showed that
amounts released by some legislators exceeded their allocation; amounts were released for projects outside of
their legislative districts; the total VILP releases exceeded the appropriation in the 2007 to 2009 GAA; significant
amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter’s endorsements and without considering their
mandated functions; implementation of most livelihood projects was undertaken by NGOs instead of implementing
agencies; funds were transferred to NGOs without appropriation law or ordinance; eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted
with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization
of the Funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel is violative of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution
itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress ‘role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.

These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, legislators have been
authorized to participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law.

Petitioners also contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel defies public accountability as it renders Congress
incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives
each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from
fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner as this concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It provides that, “No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office. In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among
others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain
extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another
office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

CONCLUSION OF THE ENTIRE DECISION: The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has
persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific
projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of
budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally
impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine
local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of
non-delegability.

Avelino v. Cuenco

[Officers of each House [Sec. 16 (1)] 1. Senate President]

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Supreme Court has no Jurisdiction over Senate Controversy for Selection
of Presiding Officer.—The subject matter of this quo warranto proceeding—to declare petitioner the rightful
President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent—is not within the juris-diction of the Supreme Court, in view
of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. The selection of
the presiding officer of the Philippine Senate affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

FACTS:
 Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session On the next session day however,
Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together
with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions
being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and
Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the
disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino
just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers.
 Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded
to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his
oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
ISSUES:

Does the court have jurisdiction to hear the petition?

RULING:

Article 6, Section 10, paragraph 1 of the 1935 Constitution:

x-x-x The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker. Each House
shall choose such other officers as may be required. x-x-x

 In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary. The Court should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Santiago v. Guingona

Constitutional Law; Parliamentary Rules; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “Majority” and “Minority,”
Explained; The plain and unambiguous words of Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators, and not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body.—The term “majority”
has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the
subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of
all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader.—In effect,
while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the Constitution, and such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court.—While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is
devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.—Notably, the
Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open
clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, the Supreme Court may still inquire whether an
act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.—While no provision of the Constitution
or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court
may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. This is the
plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power
and the duty not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,”
but likewise “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President.
Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan
comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had
chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader.
2. Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure.

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total
or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes
of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,”
much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind
other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there
are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec
as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter
says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method
of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.”
xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem.
And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the
Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez

2. House of Representatives

a. Speaker

b. Others

Political Law; Speaker of the House of Representatives; The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide
to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is
something within its sole control.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority
vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something
within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that
“[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is
that ‘[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such], the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself,
not by [the] Court.”

Same; Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter
alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’”—Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution
vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These
“legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’
Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives].”
Hence, as a general rule, “[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of Representatives].”
FACTS:

 The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress, he (Suarez) sought the adoption or
anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader". The petition further
claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House
allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote
for him as the Minority Leader.
 On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning
Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority;
and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. 3 Thereafter, the Elections
for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep.
Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no vote,"4 thus, resulting
in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
 Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who garnered the
second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership (Rep. Baguilat) automatically becomes the Minority
Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized
as such. One of the "abstentionists," Representative Abayon, manifested before the Plenary that those who
did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez
as the Minority Leader, who was then recognized by the majority leader Farinas. This was opposed by Rep.
Lagman essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority
Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and
that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of
votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent
members of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's
opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority
Leader.
 Petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the
Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House; and (b) the irregularities
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position.(a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the
Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that
the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader
are supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the
Minority.


ISSUEs:

Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.

RULING:

The petition is without merit.

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control.23 In
the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during
the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.

General Rule: The court has no authority to interfere exclusive realm.

Exception: on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Avelino v. Cuenco

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.

Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.

1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does
not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

People v. Jaloslos

Trillanes v. Pimentel

Same; Congress; Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position—such an aberrant situation not only elevates his status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.—Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests
alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds: x x x
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

FACTS:
 July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials.
 On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the
Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the
fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must
be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail
or on recognizance.
 Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

Kida v. Senate

Quorum [Sec. 16 (2)] SECTION 16. (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.

As long as there is quorum, the Houses of Congress may conduct business and hold session; within a quorum, a vote
of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws; GR: majority of those constituting a quorum sufficient to repeal a
law
FACTS:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections
for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd
Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country. Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions
filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed. The petitioners assailing RA No.
9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective. The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. In these
consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.

Issue #1:

1. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
2. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

Held:

B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article
VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words,
as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to
enact laws or approve acts. In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than
two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had
passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality: Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to
have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired
in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of omniscience. xxx A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or
repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its
own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative
body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the
same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law.
This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent
of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. (Emphasis ours.) Thus,
while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires
on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room
for action and flexibility. Procedure in the passage of bills in Congress [Sec. 26(2), Art. VI]

(1) General Rule: Three readings on separate days; exception

ISSUE #2:

Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when
the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

Arroyo v. De Venecia

FACTS:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240. RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called” sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were
challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report to the House, the
chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also
interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of
the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
2. Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?

DECISION:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in
the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their
remedy in their own department.

Discipline of its members 1987 Constitution

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Osmeña v. Pendatun

Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches

Ruling:
NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation
to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Alejandrino v. Quezon
(NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)

FACTS:
Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, issued a resolution depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for
the Twelfth District, of all the prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from
the first of January 1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de Vera.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

HELD:
Not a Judicial Question.
Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition. The court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition

However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.)
Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an
appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a
power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted
to the Governor-general by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution
has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend
an appointive member of the Legislature.

U.S. v. Pons

1.EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—The courts in

the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to determine whether
the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their duty, to take
notice of the legislative journals.
2.ID.; lD.; ID.; PAROL EVIDENCE.—When the legislative journals show with certainty the- time of
adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and
extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment,

3.OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION.—Where a person takes a direct part in the illegal importation into the
Philippine Islands of a large quantity of opium and profits thereby, a penalty of two year's imprisonment and a. fine of
P1,000 is not excessive.

FACTS:

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25
barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant. And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of
trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act
2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said
law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on
February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a
law on February 28, 1914.

HELD:
No, the SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular.

Morales v Subido

Same; Enrolled bill conclusive upon the courts; Remedy in case of mistake in the printing of bills.—If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive—on which the Supreme Court cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system—the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Same; Where enrolled bill prevails over journal.—ln all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on ,the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the Supreme Court cannot now decide. With respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Section 10 of Police Act of 1996: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds
a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or
any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now Sec. 10): No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered city
shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police
administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police
department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years
shall be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree
course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service
Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such
appointment exceed beyond six months.
Rodrigo Amendment: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for
at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a
bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner
of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to
meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which
Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …”
can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the
approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has
held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and
can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly
into the matter.

HELD:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC
cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To
what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not
now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Astorga v. Villegas
[Legislative Journal vs. Enrolled Bill]

FACTS:
 Background: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was passed on third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. It was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities, which favorably recommended the
approval of the bill with a minor amendment by Senator Roxas. When the bill was discussed on 2nd
Reading in Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino, and such was duly
approved by the body. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of
the Senate as having been acted upon. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill no. 9262 was passed by the Senate with amendments attached that of
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments. House of Representatives signified its approval,
printed copies thereof were certified and attested by Secretary of House of representatives, Speaker of the
House, Secretary of Senate and the Senate President, and the same was signed by the President. The bill is
now Republic Act no. 4065.
 Senator Tolentino issued a press statement saying that the enrolled copy of House Bill no. 9262 signed
into law was the wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. Due to this fact, the Senate president
 and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the
said law.
 Mayor Antonio Villegas issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
 Reacting therefrom, Astorga filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA
4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the
said law was considered to have never been enacted. He argued that the RA is still valid and binding and
that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute; and that the attestation
of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUES:

Was RA 4065 was validly enacted in view of the withdrawal of the signature of the Senate President?

RULING:

 Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's
due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and
issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously, this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than
the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
There is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential.

 The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors,
the journal can be looked upon in this case. The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
Note however that the Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of
the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the Court also declares that
the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth
to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.—Under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the
final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences
thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall
"be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and
is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily
for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for
the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

GROUP 3

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment.—Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716
must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of
a statute had been “smuggled” in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings
of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the “enrolled bill” rule is not absolute, the Supreme Court should decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
“surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared.—No claim is here made that the “enrolled
bill” rule is absolute. In fact in one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the
Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
“surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind
the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government.

FACTS:

The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were introduced in the House
of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the
value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for
approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES
SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116
OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114
OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it
was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES
SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND
236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V,
ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S.
Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and
approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the
affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after
meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with
Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of
Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the
President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994,
Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect,
although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It
would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of
its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.

Arguments: The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of
Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No.
1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law; that S. No. 1630 did not
pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were
done on the same day, March 24, 1994; that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the
Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference
Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these
provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee.

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional

RULING:
1. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee
will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress
and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views
are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House
bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight
months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not
appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on
November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994
of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is
that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992.
Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197
was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

2. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified
S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

3. Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to
give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the
House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a
committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a
version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its part the
Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference
Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study
by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed
of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power
of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.

4. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its
favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was
invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a
statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule. But
where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no
more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a
bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.

Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects
as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes - beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free
 exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive
and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised
and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary

Statutes; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.—The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference
Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress,
whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor.
The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’ ”

FACTS:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006,
an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while
he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section
14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67
gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The petitioners now come to the
Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every
law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No.
9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other
than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing
of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title,
nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to
the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No.
1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was
created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had
its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in
the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and
that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for
signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.

Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that irregularities attended the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the
bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil
that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act
No. 9006, An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing
of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Is Applicable In this Case
 Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the
entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the
House of Representatives catalogued thus:

a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its
session on February 5, 2001;

b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC
on November 29, 2000;

c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies
thereof being furnished the members;

d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not signed by the
Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and
rammed for approval by the House;

e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was instantly made
and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;

f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened on November
23, 2000;

g. The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill submitted
by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with the
publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:

...

However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the
provision that This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;

h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during its
consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16
of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;

i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure; and

j. The disappearance of the Cayetano amendment, which is Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of
Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:

Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president
and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.[50]
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under
the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases[51] reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to
deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal
rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.[52] Whatever doubts there may be as
to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v.
De Venecia,[53]viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

On 1 Subject
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.[33]
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need
not be an abstract or index of the Act.[34]

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles
but also the objectives thereof:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply,
for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.[35]

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.[36]

P. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS (SEC. 17 & 19)

1. Jurisdiction

CASES:

Lazatin v. HRET
Constitutional Law; Election Contests; Jurisdiction; The 1987 Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction of the Comelec under the 1987
Constitution.—That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is
now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate
jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals’ constitutional functions may not be
prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code.—An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders
specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period
within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked
whether the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals’ constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The
Court is of the considered view that it may not.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Powers of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, flows from the general power
granted it by the Constitution.—The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute.
Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of
the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139 [1936]), where the Court, speaking
through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms: x x x [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with
it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal.—Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of
being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative
body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The use of the word
“sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at
162]. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
“intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature” [Id. at 175.] Earlier,
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as “full, clear and complete” [Veloso v.
Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)]
and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission
[Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate
and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan
body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the
Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution
where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional
experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the
COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local
officials.

FACTS:

Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the
HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent’s election protest
would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the
protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent’s protest had been
seasonably filed.

Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he
had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of
Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan,
Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the
assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6,
1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the
proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the
winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the
COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC,
alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns
contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and
Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

On the other hand, in finding that the protest was filed on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:
Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391, No. L-84297 December 8, 1988

Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the
Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with
twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of
these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules,
otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising
from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by
him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the Tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these
Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Italics supplied.]

Thus, ruled the HRET:

On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from November 22,
1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the COME- Lazatin vs. House Electoral
Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391, No. L-84297 December 8, 1988

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD:
The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is
impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district
of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take
cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that
is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Aquino v. COMELEC
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; The electoral tribunal assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives—and, a candidate who has not been proclaimed and
has taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member.—Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot
be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the proclamation of a winning candidate is ministerial, B.P. 881 in
conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned
therein—even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered to continue to hear and decide questions relating to
qualifications of candidates.—While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in
conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein.
Thus, petitioner’s contention that “after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of
the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon
the question of qualification” finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates.

Facts:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District
of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House of
Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that
the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation
as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec.
6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections.
At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives
and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position
in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter
become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and
who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17
of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction
with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's
contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to
qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
 intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the
election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not
result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable
only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the
application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of
B.P. 881. Section 7 states:

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC
Election Law; Election Protests; It is not enough that one’s qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to
be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution.—It is not enough
that one’s qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and
questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper
officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong’s disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of
fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put
their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who
has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to
whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Joint Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized was effectively
suspended when LimKaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13 (c).—His argument
has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply only that part which is
seemingly beneficial to one’s cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously, would just be a hindrance in
advancing one’s stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized was
effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule
18 and Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be implemented for not having
attained its finality.

Same; Same; The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) jurisdiction
over election contests, relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) own jurisdiction begins.—Events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered
its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1,
2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC,
should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held: x x x The Court has invariably
held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
Same; Same; We ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) Rules does not apply to disqualification for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure.—The 1998
HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under
the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be
natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement,
one who assails a member’s citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive
period notwithstanding.

FACTS:
Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival, and some
other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case against
Limkaichong before the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC. Election day came and votes were cast. Results
came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued
a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance
with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing
and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.
Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer
exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated
May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling
of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower house, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated
tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members.
 Reyes v. COMELEC
Same; Electoral Tribunals; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); That the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.―Petitioner is in error when she posits
that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to
petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to
proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was
finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to
decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner’s ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner’s proclamation. The bar
remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14
May 2013.

Facts:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the
amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an
American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis
that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her
oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30,
2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed 20 because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.

Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

Discussion:

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed
such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled
that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 25 wherein the Court, referring to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his
qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns – were transferred to the
HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement
was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed
office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the
COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and
assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:

On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our attention that on
September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed
by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao
del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed
his duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed office, and hence, was
already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon.
Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House
of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or
individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer
any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We
will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of
Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC
En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires
that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing
that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the
ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile
of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so
as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Lico v. COMELEC
Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution endows the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions
on the qualifications of members of Congress.—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET
with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this
case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039
dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC. Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization On
30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees,
with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on
9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating
Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its
nominees. Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalt The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to
the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in
the House. Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation,
graft and corruption
ISSUES:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the House of Representatives from
his party-list organization.

RULING:

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion
from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list
representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of...
jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives.

In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and...
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear
and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. Principles: he
COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives,
considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it
was... the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition In the present
case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from
Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among
others, a bona fide... member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled
that qualifications for public office, whether elective... or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure This
is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of... certiorari;[42] the COMELEC
should not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC

Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections.43 In that case, We
upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the
elections at the time she filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument that the case
fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and took her oath of office before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a
member of the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of which would
officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the
Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three requirements of
proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on grounds of lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency had become final and executory when petitioner elevated it to this Court.44 It should be
mentioned that when petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5
June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013 Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there
was no longer any pending case on the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether
petitioner Lico remains a member of the House of Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a
subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-issue, since the recourse of the
petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and
executory judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance, considering that
she sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that it is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case.45 In
this case, the question on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls
within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list representative.

2. Composition (Sec. 17)

CASES:

Tañada v. Cuenco
FACTS:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista
Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal
on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority
party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the
Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he,
as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political
question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before
the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid.
HELD:
The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide
upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body
from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the
majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may
set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

Constitutional Law; Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.—It seems
quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and “legislative” components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that
said provision “x x x is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or
body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the
constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative
or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.—Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

FACTS: In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest
on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy
and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate
the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring
the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate,
the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty
and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest

Bondoc v. Pineda
Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions.—The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a
non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by
it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

Same; Same; Grounds for removal; Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of membership.—As judges,
the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty
to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ln
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members of the HRET, as
“sole judge” of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for-other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence,
it violated his right to security of tenure.
FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga.
Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the
Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by
the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to
Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to
Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further
prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new
representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by
HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
(SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is
an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without
violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the
legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a
decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving
Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the
tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot
and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should
be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And
1 coming from the minority.

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal
for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party’s candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc
“The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government. it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not
be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
“party disloyalty” short of proof that he has, formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of
tenure.

“x x x in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the ‘sole judge’ of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the
Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also
submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof
should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the
interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal
for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon
all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal,
the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election
contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case
fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from
the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end
of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief
Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio
A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be
stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike
the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from
the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons,
and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of
the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not
be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute
Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives
was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and
void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

3. Time of constitution/organization

4. Independence from the House concerned

CASES:

Bondoc v. Pineda, supra

Angara v. Electoral Commission

FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying,
among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is
on Dec. 9.

Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the
prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his
protest because he filed the protest after December 3.)

Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be
contested after confirmation of the NA. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner then files a protest to
the Supreme Court (SC) questioning EC’s jurisdiction over the case. (Petitioner argues that, EC could only regulate
proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to pass upon fundamental questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of
the constitution)

The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional body which has jurisdiction to try all contested
cases re:elections and said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its jurisdiction. Since EC
acquired jurisdiction over the election protest, the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is not reviewable by the SC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
2. If it does, Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate articles for
each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between
the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve these
conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases and
controversies.

that judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is
the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.

ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is
not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the
ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this
includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is
not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would
undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the
petitioner.

5. Authority to promulgate rules of procedure: exclusive

CASES:

Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra

Lazatin v. HRET

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including
the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the
general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
[At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]

6. Judicial review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals

CASES:

Co v. Electoral Tribunal

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?

In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp.
785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse
of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the
bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET
has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus,
177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite
scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the
Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today
where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its
constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

Lerias v. HRET

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the UPP-KBL for the
position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of
candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Ynigues Lerias"

During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern
Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which had been
questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates who received the two
(2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with. 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes,
respectively.

the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures,
alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass. Lerias appealed the
ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying that the Commission order the provincial board of
canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon.

At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the
Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar
reservation was made by counsel for Mercado.
The Comelec, (Second Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to
complete the canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by them,
respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvas.

On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of precints 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon be ordered
opened and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation of Mercado.

Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an election
protest with respondent HRET. ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed; and by virtue of
the results of revision of the eighty one (81) counter-protested precincts, the Tribunal declares that protestee
Mercado is the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte, by
a plurality of FORTY SIX (46) votes.

DISSENTS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HRET:

J ISAGANI CRUZ: I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the five members representing the
majority party are again voting together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to their party.

REP. CERILLES: Going over all the foregoing facts and circumstances, I honestly fear that the majority decision will
open the Tribunal to a charge of grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the protest and disallowing the admission of
the results of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and 19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, as reflected in the
election returns, and the overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidences introduced, supported by well-settled
jurisprudence. The same grave abuse of discretion may be said of the replacement of the results of the Screening
Committee where protestant Lerias was originally a winner by twenty (20) votes over Mercado on the counter-protest
alone, but which tabulation was reconsidered and ultimately replaced with a revised tabulation which altered the
result, this time with protestee Mercado winning by forty-two (42) votes over Lerias, without any Identification and
ocular review of the ballots of the protestant thus rejected and no proper showing of the grounds for such rejection

ISSUE:

Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion?

HOLDING:

The Court arrived at the conclusion, without any hesitation, reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal (the
majority opinion) in rendering its questioned Decision and Resolution had acted whimsically and arbitrarily
and with very grave abuse of discretion. It is for this reason that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with their
decision.

The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because (1) the
Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on its face" and
said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed
during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass; and (3) the
authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts had not been established.

In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and
most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available,
the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and election
by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election returns cannot be
disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status
as bona fide reports of the results of the voting. Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise
extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously
manufactured or fake. And, conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been
tampered with, who should submit proof of this allegation

Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry,
other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court.
The exceptions are not present here. It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning
at the post-appreciation stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant
Lerias; by departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the tribunal;
by injecting `strange jurisprudence', particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering the figures
that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will of the electorate in the
lone district of Southern Leyte.

Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be returned
to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the original 35,539 votes, Lerias
should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes.
Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would be, (wherein Mercado won
by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J.
Herrera) or by 20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Southern Leyte

Tagolino v. HRET

FACTS:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte
under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of
College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should
be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied
due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division Ruling a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any
qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman,
Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
Lucy Torres-Gomez then filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from Liberal
Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate of her husband Richard wherein the COMELEC En
banc approved such substitution.
COMELEC En Banc's ruling:
• It held that the disqualification does not automatically cancel one’s CoC and the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified.
Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration from the ruling of the CCOMELEC En Banc. Pending the resolution of the
motion, the elections were held and the name of Richard Gomez remained in the Ballots which garnered majority of
the votes. Due to the approved substitution by the COMELEC, votes for Richard were credited in favor of Lucy and
she was proclaimed the Representative of the 5th district of Leyte.

It is petitioner’s submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of private
respondent’s substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is impermissible where the
substituted candidate’s CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other hand,
respondents maintain that Richard’s CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was
only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly substituted by private respondent.

HRET ruling:
• It dismissed -Juntilla’s petition and declared the substitution as valid
• It also said that the COMELEC 1st division’s resolution spoke of disqualification and not the cancellation of the
CoC Juntilla filed for Certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Was there a valid substitution? and as a consequence of such substitution, was Lucy Torres Gomez validly elected as
a representative of the 5th district of Leyte? NO

Whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly substituted by private
respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

HELD:
A valid CoC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate
• Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an officialcandidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified
• Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds.
• As defined Under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents
and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section
78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio
and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes
• Clearly, the law requires that one just have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.
Effect of Sec 68, and Sec 78, on candidate substitution under Sec 77.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s
February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only
"disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of
private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the
cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore
grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse
of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards
the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte
due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without
any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En
Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks only of
"disqualification and not of cancellation of Richard’s CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private
respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its
constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the Court’s disquisition in
Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when reference
to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC
respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the
eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may
have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Member’s qualification while the
Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same
cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. More particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the
right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.61 In this relation, private respondent’s own qualification to run for public office – which was inextricably
linked to her husband’s own qualifications due to her substitution – was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings before the
COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned, the
Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In
this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET’s independence; rather, it merely fulfills
its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.

In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC En
Banc’s flawed findings regarding private respondent’s eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed
from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Q. THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
CASES:

Cunanan v. Tan

FACTS:
Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected
by the Commission of Appointment (six (6) Senators and seven (7) members of the House of Representatives,
purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, rejected said ad interim appointment) prompting the President
to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto to proceeding to the
Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as
to the numbers of members comprising the same.

On March 21, 1962, by the vote of twenty-nine (29) Congressmen affiliated with the Liberal Party and twenty-five (25)
Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, forming what is commonly known as the "Allied Majority,"
declared vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in the Commission of
Appointments and re-elected, as members thereof for said Chamber, its former representatives in said
Commission, except Congressmen Ganzon, Lucman and Lagumbay, in lieu of whom said "Allied Majority"
elected Congressmen Jose Alberto, Reynaldo Honrado and Jose Cojuangco, Jr. although still affiliated with the
Nacionalista Party, these three (3) Congressmen form part of the "Allied Majority". The members of Congress who
took part in the alleged session of the Commission on Appointments on April 3, 1962, and rejected the ad
interim appointment of petitioner herein were:

(a) Six (6) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, namely: Hon. Eulogio Balao, Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco,
Hon. Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Camilo Osias, Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo, Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa;

(b) Four (4) Congressmen affiliated with the same party, to wit: Hon. Eladio T. Balite, Hon. Manuel T. Cases,
Hon. Floro Crisologo, and Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas; and

(c) Three (3) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, but identified with the 'Allied Majority': Hon.
Jose Alberto, Hon. Reynaldo Honrado and Hon. Jose Cojuangco Jr.

ISSUE:
Was the rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment by the aforementioned thirteen (13) members of Congress,
purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, valid or not?

HELD:
The determination of this issue depends upon: (1) the legality of the resolution of the House of Representatives of
March 21, 1962, declaring the seats of its twelve (12) members in the Commission on Appointments vacant; and (2)
the legality of the action of the House of Representatives in reconstituting the membership of the Commission on
Appointments for said House. In view of the conclusion we have reached with respect to the first question, we deem
it unnecessary to pass upon the second question.

With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be resolved in the negative. The Commission on
Appointments is it creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress,
said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but
emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the
Commissioner are purely executive in nature. In order that the members of the Commission could properly
discharge their duties as such, it is essential that their tenure therein be provided with a certain measure of stability to
insure the necessary freedom of action.

One thing, however, is to take these measures owing to changes of permanent character in the representation of the
political parties in the House, and another thing for some members thereof affiliated with a political party to make
common cause in certain matters with members of the House belonging to another political party. In other words, a
shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one
that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a reorganization
of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may have to
be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could
not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each
House of Congress.

We are aware of the statements made on the floor of our Constitutional Convention indicating the opinion of some
officers thereof or delegates thereto that members of the Commission on Appointments were to serve at the pleasure
of the legislature. It should be noted, however, that said statements were made with reference to the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature under our original Constitution. The statements
did not refer and do not necessarily apply to the Commission on Appointments under the present Constitution, as
amended, for we now have a bicameral Congress, both Houses of which are represented in the Commission on
Appointments. If a House of Congress were free, at any time, to declare vacant the position of its members in the
Commission on Appointments, such House could, in effect, paralyze the entire Commission, without the consent of
the other House. Such possibility could not have been countenanced by the Constitutional Convention.

With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress
as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of
Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's
right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner
and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

Coseteng v. Mitra

Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to
Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a
request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on,
added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to
political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as
petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and
the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be
nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support
of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of
the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)

Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in
House representation in CA was based on proportional representation. The composition of the House membership
shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a
rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a
member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party,
its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in
the 12 House seats in CA. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a
political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least
17 congressmen or congresswomen.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and
they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap. There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that
CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their
floor leaders and elected by the House. Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson
in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should
have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on
Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

Guingona v. Gonzales

FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting
and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senators Neptali
Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senators to sit
as members thereof.
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of:
  15 LDP senators,
 5 NPC senators,
 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators,
 and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.

To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the
traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.

The results of such a formula would produce :

 7.5 members for LDP
 2.5 members for NPC
 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD and
 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.

Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that
Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition
compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one
LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 3

. . . 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight coming from the LDP, two coming from
NPC, one coming from the Liberal Party, with the understanding that there are strong reservations
against this proportion of these numbers so that if later on in action in the Supreme Court, if any party
is found to have an excess in representation, and if any party is found to have a deficiency in
representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by this body its additional
representatives.

The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary arrangement and, inspite of the objections of Senator
Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the Commission on Appointments to be organized by the election of its
members, it was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and
one LAKAS-NUCD.

On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of Lakas-National Union of
Christian Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the
respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eight senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto E.
Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground
that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation, and that it is
the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, 4 to combine their fractional
representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the
senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.

Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro the creation of a Commission on Appointments and the
allocation of its membership, as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as
ex-officio Chairman, twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected by each house on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within the session days of the
Congress from their submission of all the members. (Emphasis supplied.)
ISSUE:

1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

2) If said membership of the respondent senators in the Commission is violative of the Constitutional
provision, did the respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing the respondent
Senators?

3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent Senate, acting through the LDP majority,
should a writ of prohibition enjoining, prohibiting and restraining respondent Senators from sitting as
members of and participating in the proceeding of the Commission on Appointments be issued?

HELD:

They involve the interpretation of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission on
Appointments.

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule
on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties
in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such,
the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one
party may have affiliations with the other party.

The election of respondents Senators Tañada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and
when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote
from our decision:

. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their
nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization
meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely
inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the
LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall be elected on the
basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional membership of the political parties represented therein.
To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by
adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will
give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority
political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation;
otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the
balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its
proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any political party who succeeds in
electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the
Commission on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a political party must
have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that
any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. This applies to
the respondent Senator Tañada.

We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:

1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every seat
in the Commission on Appointments.

2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition
with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must
necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the
Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only
while congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such
powers and functions herein conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution,
Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, provides as follows:

Sec. 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall meet at either the session hall of the
Senate or the House of Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as the Commission may
designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum.
Provided, however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from
either house. . . .

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve
(12) members of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be
mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their composition is expressly specified by the
Constitution. Among these are the Supreme Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on
Election, 15 Commission on Audit. 16 They perform their function so long and there is the required quorum, usually a
majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments may perform its functions and transact it s business
even if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

R. MANNER OF THE CONDUCT OF SESSIONS AND VOTING IN CONGRESS

S. SPECIFIC POWERS OF CONGRESS
1. Power to enact statutes

a. Origin of laws (Sec. 24)

CASES:

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra (Read also the other opinions)

Abakada Guro v. Ermita

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;
These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).

G.R. No. 168056

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

G.R. No. 168207

On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%, on
the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of
a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the
no-amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 168463

Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed this petition
for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds:

1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in
violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
 2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass
on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and

3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121,
125,[7] 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates
Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives

Legislative Background
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No.
1950. On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a
committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills. On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the
consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24,
2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.

ISSUE:

Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2)

RULING:
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its
authority by:

1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337;

2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;

3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the
output tax; and

4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in
addition to the value-added tax.

Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.

It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative
body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, [i]f the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to
transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.[19] Thus, Article
VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. Pursuant to
this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each
house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.

Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as follows:
 Sec. 88. Conference Committee. In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.

In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they materially
impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latters appropriate action.

Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

...

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the same
manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.

Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:

Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of
both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The President shall
designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the approval of the
Senate.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement
of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the
members of each House panel, voting separately.

A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled
version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to the
report.

...

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by any
constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or
amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the
legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the
Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of
passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses
creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee
has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it
by Congress.

In the recent case of Farinas vs. The Executive Secretary,[20] the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated and
emphasized its adherence to the enrolled bill doctrine, thus, declining therein petitioners plea for the Court to go behind
the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress creation of two sets of bicameral conference
committees, the lack of records of said committees proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of
both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the
bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No.
9006, or the Fair Election Act.
 The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities
committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills.
Akin to the Farias case,[22] the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference
committee on matters regarding Congress compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most
basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its
members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most
orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference
committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction
of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to
deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that [i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral
Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. [24] To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes
adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to
be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.

Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral
Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill
and the Senate bill. The term settle is synonymous to reconcile and harmonize.[25] To reconcile or harmonize
disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the
House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.

The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether
only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or
both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed
on to consumers, as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income
taxes, percentage, franchise and excise taxes should be amended.

There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was
mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted
on the disagreeing provisions by making the following changes:

1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral
Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest
VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added
tax collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds 1%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006.

2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be
passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of
petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report
any no pass-on provision.

3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the
position of the House by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the
amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus:

(A) Creditable Input Tax. . . .

...

Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which
deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the
fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component
thereof, exceeds one million Pesos (P1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the
capital good is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such
shorter period: . . .

(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the excess shall
be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous
quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED,
 HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be
refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . .

4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax, franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference
committee decided to include such amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be
imposed.

In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing
provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea
or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted by the Senate
is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed,
appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of
Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on
taxpayers.

Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects
of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier
cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado[29] and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[30] the Court recognized the
long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:

. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several
provisions, collectively considered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative
chamber is thus without any basis.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

c. The “one-subject, one-bill” rule [Sec. 26(1)]

Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or delete
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the
no amendment rule (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its
ruling in the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
 Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the
first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.[32] (Emphasis
supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to
the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any
further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house
of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI,
Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of
amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress
is prohibited.

C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on
Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills

Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on corporate
income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following provisions, to wit:

Section 27
Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation
28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House.
They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the
NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the
NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the
House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the
proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section
24 of the Constitution.

The argument does not hold water.

Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:

 Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the
move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said
House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction
by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being
amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a
bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its
own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the
House.
...

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On
the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been touched in the
House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note
of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No.
3555, stated:

One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of
solving the countrys serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be strictly
monitored and controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be easier said than
done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced
budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings
have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a credible package of revenue
 measures that include measures to improve tax administration and control the leakages in
revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:

In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all
acknowledged that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.

In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a
balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem
poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall status
of our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance
given our present conditions.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in
sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax
administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills
were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can
introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the
VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the
shoulders of the consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on
corporation were included is worth quoting:

All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise P64.3 billion in
additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum
products.

However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only P48.7 billion amount is from
the VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab P10.5 billion- will be picked by
corporations.

What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the
consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the
burden of the consumer?

The corporate worlds equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to
35 percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise P10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back,
not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent.

Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency
provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal
medicine will have an expiry date.

For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of
their sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the
tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.

The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business
will be there to share the burden.[35]

As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on provisions in
the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the
government.
 Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the reforms to
the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and
services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be
burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these
sections to soften the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:

However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on
bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.

For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.

And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy
the VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as
diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.

...

What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what
was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT, so
that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of VAT.[36]

The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are necessary for the
implementation of the changes in the VAT system.

To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the
house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its
power to propose those amendments.

CASES:

Lidasan v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
[Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] It came to light later that barrios
Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Provinceof Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del
Sur. Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly
indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from
Cotabato. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

ISSUE:

Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato -to be spared
from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD:
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.
First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the
bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following,
we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is
so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act, is bad.

xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the
purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the
court.7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it
only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be
expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in
writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is
as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
 PHILCONSA v. Jimenez

Same; Same; Title of law not germane to the subject matter.—Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first
paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096,
the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System who have rendered at
least twenty years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth
Act 186. On the other hand. the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress and
to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement
benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate to subject matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. No. 186,

FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to
the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent
the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation”
because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re
election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20)
years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which,
in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their
compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic
Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class
legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of
a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.

The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in thetitle of
the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

Fourth Legal Point — Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in
the act.

Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill.

We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional
provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.

It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the
public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress.
It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House,
testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that in
1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65,
Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
 13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid — P210,000.00.

In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House
of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 — P300,000.00

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 —P1,300,000.00.

In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for
the Senate:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid — P100,000.00.

It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement
Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.

In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House
Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 — P1,200,000.00.

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 — P1,700,000.00.

It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service
regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.

On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement
benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No.
186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected
officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject
of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members.

Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in its
title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the
people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of
being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1,
p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)

With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
 The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied
if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete
index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)

The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably
construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a
practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.
(Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained in Central
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the
Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to
agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as
indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the
Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to
Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional
provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164;5 See also Agcaoili
v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)

In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is
void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution.

Tobias v. Abalos

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said
conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7,
911” voted “no”.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on
February 9, 1994.

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one
bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of
the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675
since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the
law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one
bill" rule has not been complied with.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional
district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not
to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA
496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Tatad v. Secretary

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three
percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15
provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
 They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market”
and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete since they do not
provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated
in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane
to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to
sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not
involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress
expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion
to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March
1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have been defined in
R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant
consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a
downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in
the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the
validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight
by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that
some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be
in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor
cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude
oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to
hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is
bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to
make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of
separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere
agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of
the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the
Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early
deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this
uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations
in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players
belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of
new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the
huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument
that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart
before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream
oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective
new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of
their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it
will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare
prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and
enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.
 Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new
entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers
imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing
on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players.
Text-writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the
successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains
significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which
discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the
lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to
engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing
is anti-competitive is not without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the
law so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and
predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions.]

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported
dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule."
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise
the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed
that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Servic

RULING:

No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows:

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing
each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general object.12

It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect.13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."14

R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for
the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate
service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties.
Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service
practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents,
appraisers, consultants and salespersons.

Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate development
project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed by full-time, registered and licensed real estate
brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the property rights and business prerogatives of real estate
developers which are not all reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already
regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service practitioners.

We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.

The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in the social,
political, economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic
activity and enhancing government income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture
through proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and
will promote the growth of the real estate industry.

We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of
technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards
of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry."
Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions
defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory
scheme to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.

d. Procedure in the passage of bills in Congress [Sec. 26(2), Art. VI]

(1) General Rule: Three readings on separate days; exception

CASES:

Tolentino v. Secretary, supra

 Kida v. Senate

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions
of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including
the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through
three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
[ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
 In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having
to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem
on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

(2) no-amendment rule

CASE: Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra (Read also the resolution dated August 14,
2008)
(3) The Bicameral Conference Committee

CASE: Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra

(4) Vote requirement for passage of bill – majority of those constituting a quorum

CASE: Kida v. Senate, supra

(5) Manner of voting by legislators

e. System of authentication of bills passed by Congress

(1) Before the printed copy of an approved bill is transmitted to the President for his signature, the
Speaker and the Senate President, together with the respective Secretaries of each House,
authenticate it by affixing their respective signatures
(2) The enrolled bill doctrine

CASES:

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Jimenez

Facts:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in
the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as
two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of
Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive
use of end-users.

Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea
and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
“and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea”
and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea
formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.

HELD:
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea”
and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea
formaldehyde”.

Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. The opinions or statements of
any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress
itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the
term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Morales v. Subido

Same; Enrolled bill conclusive upon the courts; Remedy in case of mistake in the printing of bills.—If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive—on which the Supreme Court cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system—the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Same; Where enrolled bill prevails over journal.—ln all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on ,the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the Supreme Court cannot now decide. With respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Section 10 of Police Act of 1996: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds
a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or
any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now Sec. 10): No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered city
shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police
administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police
department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years
shall be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree
course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service
Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such
appointment exceed beyond six months.
Rodrigo Amendment: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for
at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a
bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner
of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to
meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which
Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …”
can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the
approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has
held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and
can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly
into the matter.

HELD:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC
cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To
what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not
now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra, concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Puno – evolution of the enrolled bill doctrine

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules
of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the
end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a
quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended
the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged,is a point of order or a privileged motion. It
is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
 Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the
other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which
affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held:
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio:
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department
itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so.
The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the
repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any
House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due
the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI,
§§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. Theymay be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of
a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only
in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and
in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
“Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate,
or even more just.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch
of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial as emanating from the highest
tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts
which cannot be collaterally attacked.[10] In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that
an act of parliament thus made is the exercise the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it
cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of
parliament; for it is a maxim in law that requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation.[11]
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is
not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of
the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of
the constitutional requirements.[12] Other jurisdiction have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an
enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however,
can be destroyed by clear satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements enacting a law have
been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.[13] Some limit the
use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.[14]
 These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for the
enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark,[15] viz.:
xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration
by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form,
the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence.[16] It is also believed that it will
prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. As
explained in Ex Pacte Wren[17] if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as
shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful
uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law. The
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are
conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

f. Approval of bill into law; veto power of the President (Sec. 27)

(1) The rule of presentment

(2) Presidential veto

(a) Procedure after President vetoes bill
(b) Item/partial veto

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as
follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto,
forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President
for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon,
explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the
law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant
of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief
Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict
construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s
item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body";
phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the
object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power
of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a
"line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of
money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing
Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a
specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise,
it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is
crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be
considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have
several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance
and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed.
Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
"special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile,
with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount
to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination
of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of
money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be
faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable,
or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be
exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations
which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations
Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to
the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In
particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to
account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential
truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218

(c) GR: Prohibition of veto of a condition attached to an item; EXC: if condition is an improper
provision

CASES:

Bengzon v. Drilon

Facts:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust
their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of
those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed
due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their
pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following
manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to
unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for
the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in
the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of
the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme
Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and
retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the
Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire
 line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices
but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by
inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30
days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he
should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.

When is it allowed?

The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.

3 ways how a bill becomes a law.

1. When the President signs it

2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

PHILCONSA v. Enriquez
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.”
And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to
the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision
No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said
Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and
150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court,
(b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of
the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore,
sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of
these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying
such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g.,
R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for
the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly
related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be
vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or
legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative
veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by
the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of
the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much
less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not
the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they
are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper
steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

Group 4

(3) “Legislative veto” and post-enactment congressional oversight

CASE: Abakada Guro v. Purisima

Facts:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335
(Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue:
WON the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers?

Held:
Yes. The Congressional Oversight Committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature
and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee.
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains
a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in
the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as
it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID.

Judicial Review f President’s Veto Power

GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)

FACTS: Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the constitutionality of presidential veto of sec. 55.
Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989
Sec.55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations
disapproved and/or reduced by congress: no item of appropriation recommended by the
president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to art. VII, sec. 22 of the constitution which has
been disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for
other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the
presided in the budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act.
Dec. 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill into
law but vetoed 7 special provisions and sec 55 which is a general provision. The reason of the president in
vetoing such section is because it violates Art 6, Sec 25 (5) of the constitution. Furthermore, sec 55 not only
nullify the constitutional and statutory authority of the president, but also the senate president, speaker of the house,
chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Feb. 1989; congress mentioned in a resolution that the veto by the president of sec. 55 is unconstitutional which
means sec. 55 will be in effect. Apr. 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A
similar provision was vetoed by the president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990. Instead
of sec. 55, such provision was located in sec. 16 of the said bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act,
the “use of savings” appears in sec. 12, separate and apart from sec. 55; whereas in the 1990 appropriations
act, the “use of savings” and the vetoes provision have been comingled in sec. 16 only, with
the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or restriction.
The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:
1. The president’s veto power does not Cover provisions, that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec
55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are
provisions
2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but instead veto the entire bill
3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions
4. The power of augmentation in art. 6, sec. 25 (5) of the constitution has to be provided for by law, which means
the congress has also the power to determine restrictions
The veto power of the president can be found in art. 6, sec. 27, of the constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the president of sec. 55 of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its
counterpart sec. 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill, which are all provisions, is
unconstitutional and without effect.

DECISION: Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is

constitutional.
RATIO: The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto. The same argument also overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is only
limited in its operation to some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in art. 6 sec. 25 (2) of the
constitution.
The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the
executive. The legislative has the affirmative power to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the chief executive must
find his authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the president is constitutional and does not hamper with the
legislative function.
Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or restriction of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in the real
sense of the term, not some matter which is more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or
conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditure. With this, sec. 55 (FY 89) and sec. 16 (FY 90) are held to be
inappropriate conditions. They are general law measures more appropriate for separate legislation.
They do not show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that sec. 55 (FY 89) and
sec. 16 (FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president.

If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may be
overridden by the votes of 2/3 of members of congress as stated in art 6, sec 27 (1) of the constitution.

SEC.
28.

1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL
EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION.
2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS,
AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY IMPOSE,
TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND
OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT.
3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT
THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND
IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS,
CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
TAXATION.
4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE
OF A MAJORIY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) a. Distinctions
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
Facts
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to
Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so
that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.”
Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive
and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent.
Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended
the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issues
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress.

Hel:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the
Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during
question hour.

Question
Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the
1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives
at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the
1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation: The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in
Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
 “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of
the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power
of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view
thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized
by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of
consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited
official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to
know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice
to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of
the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President
or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to
avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section
22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of
either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of
Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed
that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before
the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular
Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most
competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional
investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a
congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet
ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does
not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it
comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is
allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. 83 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference
to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of
department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in
recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in
the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the
following exchange during the deliberations:

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure
of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in
the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system.
That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature
is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a
mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function becomes more imperative

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory
for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation
of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in
dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of
the Chief Justice.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.
Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (1) (Who
exercises power – the Houses themselves or their respective committees?)

In re: Camillo Sabio

FACTS:
Senator Gordon requested Sabio , PCGG Chairman, and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services in pusrsuance to Senate
Resolution No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.

Then invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to exercise the power of inquiry
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the power of legislative inquiry.

RULING:
No. Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 does not limit the power of legislative inquiry. It can be
said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.
The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish.” In which, PCGG belongs.
 Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (3) Purpose in
aid of legislation

Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to
enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its
inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

It was alleged that Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office
and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country
including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned
corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil
case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

Issue: Whether the court cannot inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less
can it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation

Ruling: No. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to
look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other
words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or
39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved.
Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (3) Purpose in
aid of legislation)

Standard Charter Bank vs Senate Committee

G.R. No. 167173
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code
(RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to directly conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, to prevent the incidences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set
an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving
the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee
to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged
speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in
selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future." The mere filing
of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. The intent of
legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only
when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or
the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence
of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities
may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for
criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence,
contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to
determine the liabilities of the offender.
Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (4) Scope

AKBAYAN vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516 (July 16, 2008)

FACTS
Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition
for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Taada III and
Mario Joyo Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral
trade agreements negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA.

The House Committee requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino) to study and
negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA but Usec.
Aquino did not heed the request. Congressman Aguja later requested for the same document, but only as
the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the proposed
agreement has been conducted will it be provided. Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri
and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon for copies of the latest text of the JPEPA.
However, Abon responded that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the documents being
requested.

In its third hearing, the most recent draft of the JPEPA was not pursued because then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested Committee Chairman Teves to hold in abeyance the issuance
of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.

Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government and that the initial drafts were
kept from public view, the present petition was filed.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the JPEPA negotiations are covered by the executive privilege.
2. Whether or not such executive privilege is exempt from the Congress’ power of inquiry.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the diplomatic negotiations i.e. the JPEPA negotiations are recognized as privileged
in this jurisdiction.

In PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is
the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, and the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but
he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be
kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty is approved,
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations.

While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it
bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro
quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to
obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
Anent the second issue, the privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself
finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege.
In this light, respondents failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not
amount to a waives thereof. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential
communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the
other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from
investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. This
qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a
congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

The petition is dismissed.

Neri v. Senate Committee

FACTS:

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by
the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the
other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether
or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (4) Scope
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009
FACTS
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the initations and compulsory processes issued by the
Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development in
connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

Pursuant to Resolution No.537 and 543, Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by
the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to attend a
public hearing at the Senate on August 23, 2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is intended
to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042,
The Migrant Workers Act.

Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing and

testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine
Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations were sent
to the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc. requesting them to attend
the September 4, 2006
Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued
subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero 00 directing him to appear and testify before the Committee
relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of
R-II Builders Inc.

ISSUE
Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice

RULING
NO. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening
issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a
case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so
that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition. Thus, there is no more obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the
continuation of the Committee's investigation challenged in this proceeding.

As stated in Arnault vs Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which
is not infrequently true- recourse must be had to others who possess it.

The court further held that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before
it in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.
21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring
persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearign in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
 Garcillano v. HRET

Facts:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject
of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of
its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the
Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate,
is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested
and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of
its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each.
Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to
continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the
Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators
continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

Balag

The period of detention under

the Senate 's inherent power of
contempt is not indefinite.
The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation
on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to
its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting
inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons
appearing in or affected therein. Under Arnault, however, a witness or
resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be detained indefinitely
due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be
detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime depending on the
desire of the perpetual Senate. Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons
appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right
to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be respected when they are detained for an
indefinite period of time without due process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon

the right of self-preservation and does not extend to the infliction of
punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. 48 Even
arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is
not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to
secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it
is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions
during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to
punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to
be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears
excessive in relation to that purpose. 49 An indefinite and unspecified period
of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any
person's right to liberty.

Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the Senate
and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative inquiries. The
balancing of interest requires that the Court take a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation. These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.51

When it terminates?
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry
under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that
obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the
subject of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject. 52
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the
inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to
penalize the detained witness.

Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate
terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report.
Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the
conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the
consideration of its Report.
The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members.
Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members
who do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the
approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports concurring
in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in
determining whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the
members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a
concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the
majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for the majority position.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions,
shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the
same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of
Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the
Calendar. (emphases supplied)
As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a
Committee Report after the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance
of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it
mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within Report shall then be
approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise,
it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order
of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee
Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval
signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate
whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order
of business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and
the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the
basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the
expiration of one ( 1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and
proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it
is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.
Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its
last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the
imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.
In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period
of imprisonment pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to
it an essential and appropriate means for its performance."53 Also, in view of
the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed
 In re Camilo Sabio

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that
"the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced
the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to
legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged
with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people
and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of
the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other
words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.24
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It
places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead
of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter"
the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for
damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners.

Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and
other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court
stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress – opinions which they can then communicate
to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed
by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.32 As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article
VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II,
Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.

Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec 21 and 22) b. The Power to Inquiry (9) Judicial
review of issues arising from legislative inquiries
De l a Paz V Senate C ommittee on Forei g n Rel ati ons , G. R. N o. 1 848 49 , Febr uar y
13 , 2 00 9

FACTS:
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA.
De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After
the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying
with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed
to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and
his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La
Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to
conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not
have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any
jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as
provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further
claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the
warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee.
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the
Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow
incident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at
bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the
approval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the
Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in
two newspapers of general circulation.
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by
the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).
Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) c. Stages

Guingona Vs Carague

Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by
P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No.
1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget Respondents
contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or amendment of said laws
addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and not this Court.

Issue:
WON PD No. 81, PD No 1177 and PD No 1967 violative of Sec 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution?

Held:
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and
sufficient standards are indicated therein. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a
separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. T
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the
amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or
security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the
law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be
the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major
phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive
Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary
priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by
borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure
levels.
2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom formulatesan appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists
under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967.
 3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of
obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,
the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of
the budget cycle.

4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual

performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work
accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above
shown, petitioners insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue
delegation of legislative power to the executive on the alleged
ground that the appropriations therein are not exact, certain or
definite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution
under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the
Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not
require a definite, certain, exact or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29,
Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these words.
An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement
the same.
 Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) c. Prohibition against riders Sec. 25(2)

GARCIA VS. MATA (85 SCRA 208)

FACTS: Garcia is a reserve officer on active duty of the AFP until his reversion to inactive status on Nov. 1960,
pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain. On June
1955, the date when R.A. No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4
months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the AFP; On July
1956, the date when R.A. 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active
commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the AFP; Petitioner’s reversion
to inactive status on Nov. 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 2334, and such
reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings; From Nov. 1960 up to
the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the
AFP, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the
AFP Chief of Staff, the Sec. of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the
Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. The petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of
a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Sec. of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the
AFP to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the
emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status basing his allegations on
Par 11 of the Special Provisions of the AFP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Par. 11 of the Special Provisions of the AFP is constitutional.

HELD: Par. 11 of the Special Provisions of the AFP provides:

“After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the AFP may be called to a
tour of active duty for more than 2 years during any period of 5 consecutive years: PROVIDED, That
hereafter reserve officers of the AFP on active duty for more than 2 years on the date of the approval of this Act
except those whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the
needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within 1 year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least 10 years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on
active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after
proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer
reverted to inactive status who has at least 5 of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to 1 month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every
year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under
the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of
active duty within 5 years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Sec. of National Defense is
authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Dept. of National
Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification
to accounts payable since July
1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND
PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Sec. of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to
Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.”
The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation
item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the
1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation
item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indeed a non-appropriation
item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the
general appropriation act. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution
of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative
any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject
expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject. if a provision in
the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of
calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and
of no effect.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, Par. 11 of the Special Provisions of the AFP was declared as unconstitutional,
invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords
no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never been passed. Petitioner no longer
having legal basis for such claims, his petition was denied.
 Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) g. The Power of Augmentation Sec. 25 (5)

Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects.
The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP
does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority
to use savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable
HELD:

I.No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

II.No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar
because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III.No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of
the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus,
no cross- border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non- existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although
some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is
without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow
moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by
the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive
is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
 Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) k. Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian purposes Sec. 29(2)

Aglipay v. Ruiz
Facts:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by
the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing.

The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE
OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the
authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in
the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs,
and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized
to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.

Issue:

WON the action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 29, subsection 2, Article VI of the Constitution of
the Philippines?

Held:

No. The action of the respondent is not violative of the provision of Sec 29(2) of Art. VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines.

The court held that the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. Upon
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, the court have come to the conclusion that
there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
 Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) k. Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian purposes Sec. 29(2)

Garces v. Estenzo

FACTS:
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the
acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects.
Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring
places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was
acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos
Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said resolution violates the constitution for appropriating funds for sectarian purposes

RULING:
No. The said resolution does not violate the Constitution.
The law provides “Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public
funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property”
In the case at bar, the wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or
the religious beliefs of the barrio residents.
Hence, the resolution did not violate the Constitution.
 Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) k. Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian purposes Sec. 29(2)

Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City

Facts: Valenciano wrote series of letters to former Chief Justice Renato S. Puno reporteing that the basement of the Hall of
Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of
Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He also complained about the holding of masses
during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice tended to favor Catholic litigants. He also claimed,
among others, that the choir rehearsals disturbed the other employees and that the other employees could no longer
attend to their personal necessities as they cannot go to the lavatories which are located near the basement.

Issue: WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY
SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION.

Ruling: No it did not violate the Constitution.

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium."
Thus, the word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose.” "Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular
use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular
demand."
The words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is the use of public money or
property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the
appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is
available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a
political assemblage.
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of supporting
the Roman Catholics. Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful
contrary to the claim of Valenciano.
Power of Appropriation (Sec 25 and 29) m. Pork Barrel System

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs Secretary of Budget and Management

G.R. No. 164987

FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic
Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political,
economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul
against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds
for their chosen projects; the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority
to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not
be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case
2) Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

RULING:
1) A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court. LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here,
the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is
established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses
issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over
the petition.

2) The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity
accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear
and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law]
based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.” The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
 Power of Taxation (Sec. 28) c. Tax Exemption (1) to religious, charitable, and educational institutions Sec.28 (3)

Liadoc Vs CIR

FACTS:

Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction
of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
The respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges,
interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof, invoking
the constitutional exemption from taxation of religious institutions. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals on November 2,
1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at the time of the donation, he
was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of
Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the
gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a
clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed donee's gift tax on the
P10,000.00 donated for the construction of the Victorias Parish Church.

RULING
There being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein
must be denied.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages
or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra
distinguished from excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was
not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting
provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court,
the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption
from all kinds of taxes.
In other words, the Supreme Court sustained the BIR, holding that the tax imposed was an
excise tax, a tax levied not upon the church itself but upon the parish priest for the exercise
by him of the privilege of receiving the donation. The taxes covered by the constitutional exemption are real
estate taxes or ad valorem taxes imposed on the property itself.

Disposition
The decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby affirmed insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified,
in the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein
substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without special, pronouncement as
to costs.
Power of Taxation (Sec. 28) c. Tax Exemption (1) to religious, charitable, and educational institutions Sec.28 (3)

Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104

FACTS

Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted
on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner
alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the
Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution
and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULINGS
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution.
Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is
to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements.
The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are
poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even
if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties
as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was
implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must
be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are
exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
Power to grant emergency powers to the president Sec23(2)

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of
a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA canceled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding
the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known
anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased
to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional
for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those
of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen
argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by
virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

PP 1017:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The
President whenever it becomes necessary, may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress rebellion and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article
12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of PP 1017 is unconstitutional because it arrogated

legislative power to the President?
HELD: The provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Power to grant emergency powers to the president Sec23(2)

Araneta v. Dinglasan
Facts:
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive
Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal.
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the
petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their
case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671)
has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and
it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention.
For the purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for
granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis
should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.

Act No. 671 in full is as follows:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the
purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the
various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We
test a rule by its results.

Issue:
WON CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

Held:
Yes. CA 671 is inoperative.
The court held that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special
session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9,
Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of
the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions
surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, the court are of the opinion that the
"state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the
impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent
total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National
Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with
which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its
attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National
Assembly been in a position to operate.
The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to
mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint
Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
Power to grant emergency powers to the president Sec23(2)

Rodriguez Vs Gella
Fact:
On August 26, 1949 to be exact, the court had already passed upon the status of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, 1941, "declaring a state of total
emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five members held that the Act
ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946, according to Chief Justice
Moran. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No.
192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949)
the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were
therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects.
petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10,
1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works,
and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines
makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the
resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of
the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1."
The President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become
a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress
formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. The President, in returning to
the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any emergency
resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an impending emergency that
may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to the
fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of democracy and
freedom and for the preservation of our Republic.

Issue:
WON the EO is valid?

Held:
No. The court held that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that
the emergency powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that
the Bill had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, for lack of necessary majority, to
declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative. The emergency powers delegated to the President
had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as
having no legal anchorage.
 If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none
can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly
what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the
power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations. The
specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as
he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
maintain and enforce its authority."