1. DE LIMA VS.

GUERRERO

FACTS
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on
the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP).
DOJ consolidated four cases involving the Secretary of the Department of Justice
De Lima and proceeded to conduct preliminary investigation. De Lima, through
her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the
Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and
the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion") , arguing that the Sandiganbayan has
the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her.
During the DOJ Panel hearing, petitioner manifested her decision not to submit her
counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her motion. The DOJ Panel, however,
ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all
pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved for
but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel. This prompted the petitioner to
file a petition for prohibition and certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ
Panel before CA.
However, in the absence of a restraining order by the latter; the DOJ Panel
proceeded with its Joint Resolution. Infromations were filed against petitioner De
Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. One of the
informations charged the petitioner with violation of Section 5 in relation to
Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 and was
raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. De Lima file a motion to
quash the information arguing mainly that the RTC lacks jurisdiction, DOJ Panel
lacks authority to file the Information and the Information charges more than one
offense. But the respondent judge, after finding probable cause, issued a warrant of
arrest containing no recommendation for bail and ordered the the petitioner be
committed to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
De Lima repaired directly to the Supreme Court a petition, praying for the
following reliefs:
a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23
February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and
the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;
b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge
from conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is
resolved with finality;
 c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the
proceedings; and
d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to
the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201
7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and
freedom.26

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the respondents,

interposed its Comment to the petition and argued that the petition should be
dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the
hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive
grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense
charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional
and procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the
issuance of the assailed orders and warrant.
Further, OSG filed a Manifestation claiming that petitioner falsified
the jurats appearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer
for injunctive relief. Accordingly, De Lima did not appear and swear before the
notary public, contrary to the allegations in the jurats.
In compliance with an Order of this Court, De Lima filed the Affidavit of
Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo to shed light on the allegations of falsity
in her jurats.
The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17,
2017. Hence, this case.

ISSUES

PROCEDURAL:
A. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the
Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before
the trial court renders the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
 Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ Panel.

SUBSTANTIVE:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction
over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed
Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding
probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

HELD

PROCEDURAL

A. Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts.

Supreme Court held that this matter should have first been brought before the
appellate court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual
matters.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the
actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction
over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created to
ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner. Exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are
summarized in the following grounds:
When genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately;
a. When the case involves transcendental importance;
b. When the case is novel;
c. When the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
d. When time is of the essence;
e. When the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
f. When there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law;
 g. When the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice;
h. When the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the
appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions can sufficiently establish the present

case to be excused from the hierarchy of court.

Petitioner alleged that her case sparked national and international interest
because she is a senator of the Republic. The President’s declaration of fight
against illegal drugs and corruption spiked cases brought before the courts
involving drugs and public officers. To this ends, De Lima questioned the
respondent judge’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the petitioner alleged that the
rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as her case involves pure
questions of law, particularly alleging that the respondent judge erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to her arrest.

The Supreme Court did not agree and held that the present case does not
involve a pure question of law. The question on whether or not probable cause
exists for the issuance of warrant for her arrest is a question of fact as it is
determined from the review of the allegations in the information, the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended
to the information. Hence, the Court uphold on the application of the rule and not
the exceptions.

B. The present petition is premature.

Supreme Court held that petitioner’s prayer, to quote “until and unless the
Motion to Quash is resolved with finality” is an admission that the RTC has yet to
decide on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC’s authority to rule on
the said motion.

Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires

the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can
exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue."

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of
controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are
involved." The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts through
avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed
may never transpire."

Thus, due to its prematurity the Court cannot take cognizance of the petition
simply because there is no controversy to resolve as there is no final judgement or
order of the lower court to review, revise, modify or affirm. The present petition is
immediately dismissible for lack of jurisdiction to review a non-existent court
action.

C. The petition violated forum shopping.

Forum Shopping exists when the following requisites are present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in
both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

All these requisites are present in this case. The presence of the first
requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal case for
violation of RA 9165, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the
Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the same
criminal case still pending before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and
the Motion to Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are
essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the
Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically,
the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. She essentially prays for the
same thing in both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification
of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, the present
petition violated forum shopping.

SUBSTANTIVE
A. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.
 Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information filed
against her, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against
her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but
with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade
31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is
a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try
the case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately
related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. In fact, respondents point out that
the history of the laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that
its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption,
plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
The Supreme Court is not persuaded. Granting without conceding that the
information contains averments which constitute the elements of Direct Bribery or
that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case, possibly bribery and
violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the
information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be
amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the
acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan was
specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to
try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials.
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not
transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position
classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as
committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment
of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and
prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.
Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-
ranking public officers in relation to their office. Section 90, RA 9165 is the
special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165
committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the
RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the
violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

B. Respondent judge did not abuse her discretion in finding probable

cause to render the petitioner’s arrest.
 The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing an Order finding probable cause to arrest the
petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first resolved the
pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no
probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.
Supreme Court did not agree and held that in the present case, the
respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before
issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence
to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -
“(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.”
It is therefore clear that had the respondent judge waited longer and first
attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a
possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the
provisions of the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed
and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner
enters her plea.
Contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle
requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack
of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order even before
resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash.
For purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
the guilt of the accused. She is given wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. A finding of
probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

2. NOPA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

FACTS
Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as
Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid in full, but was only able to
receive a partial delivery of them Molasses because of a disagreement as to the
quality of the products being delivered. More than six years after NOPA filed its
answer, NOPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of
Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately
concealed in his complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to
estimate the value of the unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of
the proper docket fees. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA dismissed petition
for certiorari ruling that there was no substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements because petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records and failure to attach the necessary documents on its pleadings as
required by Section 1,Rule 65, Rules in Civil Procedure.

ISSUE
Whether or not CA committed error when it ruled that there was no
substantial compliance with the procedural requirements when petitioner failed to
allege in its verification that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to attach the
necessary documents on its pleadings as required by section 1, rule 65 of the 1997
rules of civil procedure?

HELD
No. Clearly, the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule
7 was in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party
cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the
pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under
oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
 A pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is merely based on the party’s
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court
to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion,
refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying
NOPA’s motion for reconsideration with attached amended petition for certiorari.
As ruled in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, decisions of a trial court which "lie
in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal
at law or in equity. Where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting
the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in appellate
proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the statute; but it would be a
monstrous travesty of justice to declare that where the exercise of
discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the substantial legal
rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a clear
and affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its
exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper
exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the
ruling is based. In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial
judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-
fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be
reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a wilful, arbitrary,
capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which
should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the
demands of equity and justice.

3. UNITED PARAGON MINING CORP.VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
Private respondent Cesario F. Ermita was a regular employee working as a
foreman of petitioner United Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC). Cesario
received a termination signed by UPMCs Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano M.
Daniel, informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective
30 after his receipt of the letter. The termination was on account of Cesarios
violation of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee, it
being alleged therein that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, a
certain Jerry Romero, as well as for unlawfully possessing a deadly weapon, a
bolo, again in violation of company rules.
 As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance
machinery as mandated under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Having failed
to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary
arbitration. Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered a decision in favour of Cesario,
stating that although the procedural requirements in the termination of an employee
had been complied with, the termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was
arrived at through gross misapprehension of facts. The Arbitrator ordered the
immediate reinstatement of Cesario with the payment of his back wages.

UPMC filed a motion for reconsideration, Voluntary Arbitrator denied it.

UPMC then, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel, elevated the
case to the CA but the same was denied. It ruled that the verification in the petition
is ineffective and insufficient because it was merely signed by the company's
Personnel Superintendent without alleging or showing that he is authorized for the
said purpose and that the verification was based on knowledge and information;
hence, the present case.

ISSUES
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in its decision.

HELD
No. Supreme Court held that the CA did not commit a reversible error in its
decision.
Petitioner argued that there was no necessity for a board resolution
authorizing its Personnel Superintendent to file in its behalf the certiorari petition
because said petition arose out of the labor dispute filed against it and its Personnel
Superintendent, Feliciano M. Daniel. It is argued that in Cesarios complaint for
illegal dismissal, Daniel was made a co-respondent of the corporation. Upon this
premise, UPMC argues that Daniel has all the right to answer the complaint and to
appeal an unfavorable judgment therein.

The Supreme Court was not convinced. Accordingly, the power of a

corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with its board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like
the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by the corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the
board of directors.
 In the present case, the petition was filed by Daniel in behalf of UPMC
without an enabling resolution of the latter’s board of directors. This rendered the
petition fatally defective, inclusive of the verification and the certification of non-
forum shopping executed by Daniel himself. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show
cause to justify its non-compliance with the rules. Instead, it persisted on the thesis
that board resolution to authorize Personnel Superintended is not necessary to the
sign verification and certification against forum shopping. Therefore, the CA’s
decision is affirmed.
,
4. PAJUYO VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra) executed

a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to
live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and
orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the
premises on Pajuyos demand. Years after, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need
of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City. In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid
title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is
covered by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that
from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate
with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. Guevarra appealed to the RTC but
the latter affirmed the MTC decision.
Upon receiving the RTC’s decision, Guevarra had only until December 14,
1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with
the CA, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for extension). Guevarra
theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law. The Receiving Clerk of the
Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13 December 1996 or one day
before the right to appeal expired. The Supreme Court issued a resolution referring
the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent jurisdiction
over the case. The case presented no special and important matter for the Supreme
Court to take cognizance of at the first instance.CA granted the motion for
extension conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion and issued its
decision reversing the RTC decision. Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration
pointed out that the CA should have dismissed Guevarra’s petition for review
because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarras counsel and not
Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping; hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether The Court Of Appeals Erred Or Abused Its Authority And
Discretion Tantamount To Lack Of Jurisdiction:
A. In granting, instead of denying, Private Respondents Motion for an
Extension of thirty days to file petition for review at the time when there
was no more period to extend as the decision of the Regional Trial Court
had already become final and executory.
B. In giving due course, instead of dismissing, private respondents Petition
for Review even though the certification against forum-shopping was
signed only by counsel instead of by petitioner himself.
C. In ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in
fact a commodatum, instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the
Metropolitan Trial Court and in holding that the ejectment case filed
against defendant-appellant is without legal and factual basis.
D. In reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that the parties are in pari
delicto being both squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested
parcel of land.

HELD

A. Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day before the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.
The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of
the motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for
extension. It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of
execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or
pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing
stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing.
Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC
decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this Court on 13
December 1996, the date stamped by this Courts Receiving Clerk on the motion
for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day
before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.
 B. The petitioner is estopped from assailing the non-compliance of the
Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals attention to this defect at the early
stage of the proceedings. It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in Guevarras
favour. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue too late in the proceedings.
A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives
an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the
court. Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and
conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the courts
jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.
A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different
from the party’s failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-
forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification
of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal
and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that
what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
sign the verification.
In this case, Pajuyo failed to discuss Guevarras failure to sign the
certification against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarras counsel
signing the verification, claiming that the counsels verification is insufficient since
it is based only on mere information. Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the
issue on the certificate against forum shopping was merely an afterthought.

C. The Kasunduan entered into by the parties is a contract of lease, not

commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time
and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another
feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a
certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until
after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for
which the commodatum is constituted. .
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to
Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require
Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition.
The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from
a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of
a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance
as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of
permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenants withholding of
the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of
Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad
faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would
still be an implied promise to vacate.

D. The principle of pari delicto is not applicable to ejectment cases.

In Drilon v. Gaurana, Supreme Court held that the basic policy behind the
summary actions for ejectment case is to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to
those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property,
resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the court
to assert their claims.
To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly
invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from
possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the
knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then
stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all
cost.
Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not divest the Courts of
Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession.
In an ejectment proceeding, the only question that the courts must resolve is
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises. It does not even matter if
a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into
public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the
proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property
allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.

5. VICAR INTERNATIONAL VS FEB LEASING (BPI LEASING CORP.)

FACTS
These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a
corporation engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy
equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back"
provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold
to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same time,
leased them back. For the total loan of ₱30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid
FEB an aggregate amount of ₱19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.
Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of
about ₱22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63)
subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300 square meters
in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional collateral. As a
consequence, the auction sale produced ₱17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should
have been applied to its loans.
In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several
Orders pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject
equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court (RTC)
quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latter’s Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated
September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.
On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the
subject equipment. CA dismissed the petition for failure to attach a duly executed
verification and certification against forum shopping.

ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

HELD
Yes. CA erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

In Bernardo v. NLRC, theSupreme Court held that while the requirement as

to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements
must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping.
Guided by the above pronouncements, the Supreme Court deemed it proper
and justifiable to grant the Petition. Clearly, petitioners did not deliberately ignore
SC Circular 28-91. In fact, a "Verification/Certification," stating the information
required under the Circular, was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before
the CA. Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of
Lim’s authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its
behalf. The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied
the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing
Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification
against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the
Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that
it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the
Secretary’s Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.
The Supreme Court stressed that technical rules of procedure should be used
to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a
laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment
of justice.