JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, v. BENJAMIN A. SILAYRO, his aunt, and the hospitalization of his mother.

his aunt, and the hospitalization of his mother. He also averred that he had asked his co-
employee Joedito Gasendo to write his answers to the ROL test because at the time when
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the the examination was due, he already needed to leave to see his father-in-law, who was
Decision,[1] dated 8 February 2006, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. suffering from cancer and confined in a hospital in Manila.[9]
81983, reversing the Decision[2] dated 7 May 2003 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000880-99. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Respondent was sent a new Memorandum dated 20 October 1998 for his delayed
Decision, adjudged the dismissal of respondent Benjamin Silayro by petitioner Jansen submission of process reports due on 14 October 1998.[10]
Pharmaceutica as illegal for being an excessive and unwarranted penalty. The appellate
court determined that the suspension of the respondent for five months without salary as just Respondent was issued another Memo also dated 20 October 1998 regarding the
penalty. discrepancies between the number of product samples recorded in his Daily/Weekly
Coverage Report (DCR) and the number of product samples found in his possession during
Petitioner is the division of Johnson & Johnson Philippines Inc. engaged in the sale and the 14 October 1998 audit.[11] The actual number of sample products found in respondents
manufacture of pharmaceutical products. In 1989, petitioner employed respondent as possession exceeded the number of sample products he reported to petitioner.
Territory/Medical Representative. During his employment, respondent received from
petitioner several awards and citations for the years 1990 to 1997, such as Territory Respondent explained, through a Response Memo dated 24 October 1998, that he failed to
Representative Award, Quota Buster Award, Sipag Award, Safety Drivers Award, Ring Club count the quantity of samples when they were placed in his custody. Thus, he failed to take
Award, and a Nomination as one of the Ten Outstanding Philippine Salesmen.[3] On the dark note of the excess samples from previous months. He, likewise, admitted to committing errors
side, however, respondent was also investigated for, and in some cases found guilty of, in posting the samples that he distributed to some doctors during the months of August and
several administrative charges. September 1998.[12]

Petitioner alleged that in 1994, respondent was found guilty of granting unauthorized On 20 November 1998, petitioner issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action finding respondent
premium/free goods to and unauthorized pull-outs from customers.[4] Petitioner failed to guilty of the following offenses (1) delayed submission of process reports, for which he was
attach records to support its allegation and to explain the nature of and the circumstance subjected to a one-day suspension without pay, effective 24 November 1998;[13] and (2)
surrounding these infractions. Respondent, for his part, admitted to have been guilty of cheating in his ROL test, for which he was subjected again to a one-day suspension.[14]
granting unauthorized premium/free goods, but vehemently denied violating the rule on, or
having been charged with, unauthorized pull-outs from customers.[5] On the same date, petitioner likewise issued a Notice of Preventive Suspension against
respondent for Dishonesty in Accomplishing Other Accountable Documents in connection
The respondent was also investigated for dishonesty in connection with the Rewards of with the discrepancy between the quantities of sample products in respondents report and the
Learning (ROL) test. The ROL test is a one-page take-home examination, with two questions petitioners audit for the September 1998 cycle. In addition, the Notice directed the respondent
to be answered by an enumeration of the standards of performance by which territory to surrender to the petitioner the car, promotional materials, and all other accountabilities on
representatives are rated as well as the sales competencies expected of territory or before 25 November 1998. It was also stated therein that since this was respondents third
representatives.[6] It was discovered that respondents answers were written in the offense for the year, he could be dismissed under Section 9.5.5(c) of petitioners Code of
handwriting of a co-employee, Joedito Gasendo. Petitioners management then sent Conduct.[15]
respondent a Memo dated 27 July 1998 requiring an explanation for the incident.[7]
Before 25 November 1998 or the date given by petitioner for respondent to surrender all his
Soon thereafter, petitioner sent a subsequent Memo dated 20 August 1998 to respondent accountabilities, a Memorandum dated 24 November 1998 was issued to respondent for the
requiring the latter to explain his delay in submitting process reports.[8] following alleged infractions: (1) Failure to turn over company vehicles assigned after the
receipt of instruction to that effect from superiors, and (2) Refusing or neglecting to obey
On 8 September 1998, respondent submitted a written explanation to the petitioner stating Company management orders to perform work without justifiable reason.[16]
that the delay in the submission of reports was caused by the deaths of his grandmother and
Respondent wrote a letter dated 26 November 1998 addressed to the petitioner explaining On 14 January 1999, respondent filed a Complaint[25] against petitioner and its officers,
that he failed to surrender his accountabilities because he thought that this was tantamount to Rafael Besa, Rueben Cauton, Victor Lapid, and Raymond Bernardo before the Sub-Regional
an admission that the charges against him were true and, thus, could result in his termination Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Iloilo City for (a) Unfair Labor Practice; (b) Illegal Dismissal;
from the job.[17] (c) Reimbursement of operating and representation expenses under expense reports for
October and November 1998; (d) Nonpayment of salary, bonuses and other earned benefits
An administrative investigation of the respondents case was held on 3 December 1998. for December 1998 like rice allocation, free goods allocation, etc.; and (e) Damages and
Respondent was accompanied by union representative Lyndon Lim. The parties discussed attorneys fees.
matters concerning the discrepancy in respondents report and petitioners audit on the
number of product samples in respondents custody in September 1998. They were also able In a Decision dated 31 August 1999, the Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent committed
to clarify among themselves respondents failure to return his accountabilities and, as a infractions which breached company rules, and which were sufficient grounds for dismissal.
consequence, respondent promised to surrender the same. They further agreed that another However, the Labor Arbiter found the penalty of dismissal to be too harsh considering the
administrative hearing will be set, but no further hearings were held.[18] respondents circumstances and ordered his reinstatement without payment of back
wages.[26] The dispositive portion of the Decision states that:
In line with his promise to surrender his accountabilities, respondent wrote a letter, dated 9
December 1998, asking his superiors where he should return his accountabilities.[19] Union WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered ordering respondents firm to
representative Dominic Regoro also made requests, on behalf of respondent, for instructions, reinstate complainant to his former or equivalent position without backwages.
to whom petitioners District Supervisor Raymond Bernardo replied via electronic mail on 16
December 1998. According to Bernardo, he was still in the process of making arrangements All other claims are hereby dismissed.[27]
with Ruben Cauton, petitioners National Sales Manager, in connection with the return of
respondents accountabilities.[20] Respondent maintained that he did not receive any On appeal, the NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by declaring that
instructions from petitioner. reinstatement was improper where respondent was dismissed for just and authorized
causes.[28] In a Decision dated 7 May 2003, it pronounced that:
In a letter dated 28 December 1998, petitioner terminated the services of respondent.[21]
Petitioner found respondent guilty of dishonesty in accomplishing the report on the number of WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
product samples in his possession and failing to return the company vehicle and his other decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deleting the award of
accountabilities in violation of Sections 9.2.9 and 9.2.4 of the Code of Conduct.[22] Petitioner reinstatement.[29]
also found respondent to be a habitual offender whose previous offenses included: (1)
Granting unauthorized premium/free goods to customer in 1994; (2) Unauthorized pull-out of Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court
stocks from customer in 1994; (3) Delay in submission of reports despite oral admonition and of Appeals. In reversing the Decision of the NLRC, the appellate court pronounced that the
written reprimand in 1998; and (4) Dishonesty in accomplishing other accountable documents causes were insufficient for the dismissal of respondent since respondents acts were not
or instruments (in connection with the ROL test) in 1998. motivated by dishonesty, but were caused by mere inadvertence.Thus, it concluded that the
offenses committed by respondent merited only a penalty of suspension for five months
Even after respondents termination from employment, there was still contact between without pay. The appellate court also noted that petitioner committed some lapses in its
petitioner and respondent regarding the latters accountabilities still in his compliance with procedural due process. It further took into account the successive deaths
possession.Sometime in early 1999, in a telephone conversation, respondent informed and sickness in respondents family.[30] The dispositivepart of the decision reads:
petitioner that he will return his accountabilities only upon demand from the proper
governmental agency.[23] A demand letter dated 3 February 1999 was sent to respondent by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Thus, the Decision and
petitioner ordering the return of the company car, promotional materials, samples, a slide Resolution respectively dated 7 May 2003 and 14 October 2003 are hereby SET
projector, product manuals, product monographs, and training binders.[24] ASIDE.Accordingly, Judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring petitioners dismissal to be illegal; concur: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor
Code; and, (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend
b) Reinstating petitioner to the same or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights himself.[33]
and other privileges;
In this case, the Court must re-examine the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, as well
c) Ordering the payment of backwages (inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their as the contrary findings of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter. While it is a recognized principle that
monetary equivalent), computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence
actual reinstatement; Provided that, from such computed amount of backwages, a deduction adduced during trial, this rule allows for exceptions.[34] One of these exceptions covers
of five (5) months (sic) salary be made to serve as penalty; and instances when the findings of fact of the trial court, or in this case of the quasi-judicial
agencies concerned, are conflicting or contradictory with those of the Court of Appeals.[35]
d) If reinstatement is no longer feasible, ordering the payment of separation pay
comprising of one month salary per year of service computed from date of employment up to In the termination letter dated 28 December 1998, respondent was dismissed on the ground
finality of this decision, in addition to the award of backwages. that he committed the following offenses: (1) dishonesty in accomplishing the report on the
number of product samples in his possession; and (2) his failure to return the company
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Labor Ariter a quo for the proper computation vehicle and other accountabilities in violation of Sections 9.2.9 and 9.2.4 of the Code of
of the foregoing.[31] Conduct. In addition to these offenses, petitioner took into account that the petitioner
committed the following infractions in the past: (1) granting unauthorized premium/free goods
Hence, this Petition, wherein the following issues were raised: in 1994; (2) unauthorized pull-outs from customers in 1995; (3) cheating during the ROL
I exam in 1998; and (4) three infractions of delayed process reports in 1998.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
UNIFORM FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER. Initially, the Court must determine whether the respondent violated the Code of Conduct with
II his dishonesty in accomplishing his report on product samples and/or failure to return the
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FOR HIS FAILURE TO TRUTHFULLY company vehicle and other such accountabilities. The records of this case negate a finding of
ACCOMPLISH REPORTS, DELIBERATE AND REPEATED FAILURE TO SUBMIT such culpability on the part of the respondent.
REQUIRED REPORTS AND HIS DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF HIS SUPERIORS ORDER
TO SURRENDER HIS ACCOUNTABILITIES TANTAMOUNT TO DISHONESTY, GROSS Petitioner failed to present evidence that respondent was guilty of dishonesty in
AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY, WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE OF COMPANY POLICY, accomplishing the DCR, wherein he was supposed to indicate the number of product
AND BREACH OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM BY THE COMPANY samples in his possession for August and September 1998. Petitioner merely relied on the
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE WAS LEGAL, VALID AND CARRIED fact that the number of product samples the respondent reported was incorrect, and the
OUT WITH DUE PROCESS number of product samples later found in his possession exceeded that which he reported.
III Respondent admitted that when the product samples had arrived, he failed to check if the
WHETHER OR NOT THE TOTALITY OF INFRACTIONS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT number of product samples indicated in the DCR corresponded to the number actually
FURTHER MERITED HIS TERMINATION FROM THE COMPANYS EMPLOY delivered and that he made mistakes in posting the product samples distributed during the
IV period in question.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS ANY BASIS FOR CLAIMING AN AWARD
OF REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES.[32] In termination cases, the burden of proof rests with the employer to show that the dismissal is
for just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not
This petition is without merit. justified and therefore was illegal.[36] Dishonesty is a serious charge, which the employer
The main question in this case is whether or not sufficient grounds existed for the dismissal must adequately prove, especially when it is the basis for termination.
of the respondent. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must
In this case, petitioner had not been able to identify an act of dishonesty, misappropriation, or instructions for the surrender of his accountabilities was unfounded since the respondent was
any illicit act, which the respondent may have committed in connection with the erroneously still waiting for said instructions when he was dismissed.
reported product samples. While respondent was admittedly negligent in filling out his August
and September 1998 DCR, his errors alone are insufficient evidence of a dishonest purpose. Moreover, petitioner failed to observe procedural due process in connection with the
Since fraud implies willfulness or wrongful intent, the innocent non-disclosure of or aforementioned charge. Section 2(d) of Rule 1 of The Implementing Rules of Book VI states
inadvertent errors in declaring facts by the employee to the employer will not constitute a just that:
cause for the dismissal of the employee.[37] In addition, the subsequent acts of respondent For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
belie a design to misappropriate product samples. So as to escape any liability, respondent Code:
could have easily just submitted for audit only the number of product samples which he
reported. Instead, respondent brought all the product samples in his custody during the audit (i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
and, afterwards, honestly admitted to his negligence. Negligence is defined as the failure to termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a
similar situation.[38] To this Court, respondent did not commit any willful violation, rather he (ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
merely failed to exercise the standard care required of a territory representative to carefully assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present
count the number of product samples delivered to him in August and September 1998. his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

In the Memorandum dated 20 November 1998, petitioner ordered respondent to return the (iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
company vehicle and all other accountabilities by 25 November 1998. Petitioner issued its consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
first notice on 24 November 1998, even before respondent was obligated to return his termination. (Emphases supplied.)
accountabilities. Hence, respondent could not yet have committed any offense when
petitioner issued the first notice. Confused by petitioners arbitrary action, respondent did not
return his accountabilities, but immediately explained in a letter dated 26 November 1998 his From the aforecited provision, it is implicit that these requirements afford the employee an
reasons for failing to return his accountabilities on 25 November 1998 as previously ordered opportunity to explain his side, respond to the charge, present his or her evidence and rebut
by the petitioner. the evidence presented against him or her.

During the company hearing held on 3 December 1998, respondent offered to return his The superficial compliance with two notices and a hearing in this case cannot be considered
accountabilities in accordance with the instructions to be given by the petitioner. In a letter valid where these notices were issued and the hearing made before an offense was even
dated 9 December 1998 addressed to the petitioner, respondent reiterated his request for committed. The first notice, issued on 24 November 1998, was premature since respondent
instructions on the return of his accountabilities. There is no showing that petitioner replied to was obliged to return his accountabilities only on 25 November 1998. As respondents
respondents letter. The letter written by petitioners District Supervisor Raymond Bernardo to preventive suspension began on 25 November 1998, he was still performing his duties as
union representative Dominic Regoro sent through electronic mail on 16 December 1998 still territory representative the day before, which required the use of the company car and other
provided no definite instructions to the respondent for the return of his accountabilities. This is company equipment. During the administrative hearing on 3 December 1998, both parties
the last communication between the parties on the matter until petitioner wrongfully dismissed clarified the confusion caused by the petitioners premature notice and agreed that respondent
the respondent on 28 December 1998 for deliberately refusing to surrender his would surrender his accountabilities as soon as the petitioner gave its instructions. Since
accountabilities, among other grounds. The petitioner does not refer in its pleadings to any petitioners ostensible compliance with the procedural requirements of notice and hearing took
instance after the company hearing was held and before the respondent was dismissed place before an offense was even committed, respondent was robbed of his rights to explain
wherein it had finally instructed the respondent as to how he may turn over his his side, to present his evidence and rebut what was presented against him, rights ensured
accountabilities. Per petitioners pleadings, belated demands for the surrender of respondents by the proper observance of procedural due process.
accountabilities were made in January and February 1999, after respondent had already Of all the past offenses that were attributed to the respondent, he contests having committed
been dismissed. Clearly, the charge against respondent of insubordination to the petitioners the infraction involving the unauthorized pull-outs from customers, allegedly made in 1994.
Again, the records show that petitioner did not provide any proof to support said charge. It Petitioners inability to keep up with his deadlines and his carelessness with his report on
must be emphasized at this point that the onus probandi to prove the lawfulness of the product samples during a difficult time in his life are in no way comparable to the
dismissal rests with the employer,[39] and in light of petitioners failure to discharge the same, transgressions in the cases cited by petitioner involving other territory representatives Chua
the alleged offense cannot be given any credence by this Court.As for the three remaining v. National Labor Relations Commission[41] and Gustilo v. Wyeth Philippines.[42] In the
violations, it is unquestioned that respondent had committed and had already been punished Chua case, it was not a mere case of delay in the submission of reports and the occasional
for them. mistakes in the DCR, but an established pattern of inattention in the submission and
accomplishing of his reports. The employee therein did not even submit some of the DCRs,
While a penalty may no longer be imposed on offenses for which respondent has already while other DCRs were belatedly submitted in batches covering two to three months.Doctors
been punished, these offenses, among other offenses, may still be used as justification for an call cards lacked either the corresponding dates or the signatures of the doctors concerned.
employees dismissal. Hence, this Court must now take into consideration all the offenses that In the Gustillo case, the employee falsified his application form, a gasoline receipt, a report of
respondent committed during his employment and decide whether these infractions, taken his trade outlet calls, and misused his leaves. Evidently, the employee in this case
together, constitute a valid cause for dismissal. misappropriated company resources by making claims for falsified expenses and making
personal calls in lieu of trade outlet calls. In this case, respondent had not defrauded the
Undoubtedly, respondent was negligent in reporting the number of product samples in his petitioner of its property.
custody for August and September 1998. He also committed three other offenses in the past.
First, he was found guilty of and penalized for granting unauthorized free goods in 1994. The gravest charge that the respondent faced was cheating in his ROL test. Although he
Secondly, he incurred delays in submitting his process reports for August, September and avers that he formulated the answers himself and that he merely allowed his co-employee
October 1998, for which charge he was punished with one-day suspension. Lastly, he Joedito Gasendo to write down his answers for him, this Court finds this excuse to be very
cheated in an ROL test in July 1998 for which he was punished with another one-day flimsy. The ROL test consists of one page and two straightforward questions, which can be
suspension. answered by more or less ten sentences. Respondent could have spared the few minutes it
would take to write the examination. If he had lacked the time due to a family emergency, a
Respondents offense of granting unauthorized free goods was vaguely discussed. Petitioner request for an extension would have been the more reasonable and honest alternative.
did not offer any evidence in this connection; it was given credence only because of
respondents admission of the same. What acts constituted this offense and the Despite the disapproving stance taken by this Court against dishonesty, there have been
circumstances surrounding it were not explained. However, the records show that in the instances when this Court found the ultimate penalty of dismissal excessive, even for cases
same year it was committed, in 1994, petitioner still gave respondent two awards: which bear the stigma of deceit.
membership to the Wild Boar Society and the Five-Year Service Award.[40] Absent any
explanation which would give this offense substantial weight and importance, it can only be In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
presumed that petitioner did not consider the offense as sufficiently momentous to disqualify Commission,[43] an employee intervened in the anomalous connection of four telephone
respondent from receiving an award or to even just issue the respondent a warning that a lines. It was, likewise, established in Manila Electric Company v. National Labor Relations
subsequent offense would result in the termination of his employment. Commission,[44] that the employee was involved in the illegal installation of a power line. In
both cases, the violations were clearly prejudicial to the economic activity of his employer.
The rest of the infractions imputed to the respondent were committed during the time he was Finally, in National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino,[45] a school teacher tampered
undergoing serious family problems. His inability to comply with the deadlines for his process with the grades of her students, an act which was prejudicial to the schools reputation.
reports and his lack of care in accounting for the product samples in his custody are Notably, the Court stopped short of dismissing these employees for offenses more serious
understandably the result of his preoccupation with very serious problems. Added to the than the present case.
pressure brought about by the numerous charges he found himself facing, his errors and In this case, the ROL test is a take-home examination intended to check a territory
negligence should be viewed in a more compassionate light. representatives understanding of information already contained in their Sales Career Manual,
wherein the examinees are even instructed to refer to their manuals. The improper taking of
this test, while it puts into question the examinees moral character, does not result in any
potential loss of property or damage to the reputation of the employer. Nor does respondents Respondents violations of petitioners Code of Conduct, even if taken as a whole, would not
previous performance show lack of knowledge required in his sales career. Additionally, the fall under the just causes of termination provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.[50]
dishonesty practiced by the employee did not involve company property that was placed in They are mere blunders, which may be corrected. Petitioner failed to point out even a
his custody. Furthermore, the gravity of this offense is substantially diminished by the fact that potential danger that respondent would misappropriate or improperly dispose of company
petitioner itself had thought it unimportant enough to merit only a one-day suspension. The property placed in his custody. It had not shown that during his employment, respondent took
respondents ten years of commendable performance cannot be cancelled out by a single a willfully defiant attitude against it. It also failed to show a pattern of negligence which would
mistake made during a difficult period of his life, a mistake that did not pose a potential indicate that respondent is incapable of performing his responsibilities. At any other time
danger to his employer. during his employment, respondent had shown himself a commendable worker.
The special circumstances of this case -- respondents family crises, the duration of his
employment, and the quality of his work during the previous years -- must necessarily Nonetheless, the infractions committed by the respondent, while disproportionate to a penalty
influence the penalty to be meted out to the respondent. It would be a cruel disregard of the of dismissal, will not be overlooked. The suspension of five months without pay, imposed by
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to impose the penalty of dismissal, without the Court of Appeals, would serve as a sufficient and just punishment for his violations of the
giving due consideration to the ill fortune that may befall a normally excellent employee. companys Code of Conduct.

In National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino,[46] special consideration was given to IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
the fact that the respondent therein had been in the employ of the petitioners therein for 10 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81983, promulgated on 8 February 2006, is
years and that she was a recipient of numerous academic excellence awards and recognized AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
by her students and some of her peers in the profession as a competent teacher. The Court,
in other cases, has repeatedly ruled that in determining the penalty to be imposed on an AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO), represented by its
erring employee, his or her length of service must be taken into account.[47] In Brew Master Manager ROMEO O. DAGANI,
International, Inc., v. National Federation of Labor Unions,[48] the emotional, psychological, V . ANGELITA BALEN and SPOUSES HERCULES and RHEA LARIOSA,
spiritual and physical stress and strain undergone by the employee during a family crisis were G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009
regarded as special circumstances which precluded his dismissal from service, despite his On appeal is the February 21, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
prolonged absence from work. The Court explains the circumspection it exercises when faced No. 66153, affirming the December 2, 1999 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
with the imposition of the extremely severe penalty of dismissal thus: Butuan City, Branch 2, as well as its subsequent Resolution,[3] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The employers prerogative to discipline its employee must be exercised without abuse of Petitioner Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) is a duly organized and
discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding. While registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in the provinceof Agusan
an employer has the inherent right to discipline its employees, we have always held that this del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-
right must always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose should be atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing
commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of its infraction. The employer Angelita Balens (Balens) residence. Balens father, Miguel, protested the installation with the
should bear in mind that, in the exercise of such right, what is at stake is not the employees District Engineers Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on deaf ears.
position but her livelihood as well. The law regards the workers with compassion. Even where On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa (Lariosa) and Celestino Exclamado (Exclamado)
a worker has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive may suffice, whatever missteps were electrocuted while removing the television antenna (TV antenna) from Balens
may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. This is not residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their
only the laws concern for workingman. There is, in addition, his or her family to consider. electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows upon those dependent on the wage- degree burns.
earner.[49] Balen and Lariosa (respondents) then lodged a complaint[4] for damages against ANECO
with the RTC of Butuan City.
ANECO filed its answer[5] denying the material averments in the complaint, and raising lack On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared that the proximate cause of the
of cause of action as a defense. It posited that the complaint did not allege any wrongful act accident could not have been the act or omission of respondents, who were not negligent in
on the part of ANECO, and that respondents acted with gross negligence and evident bad taking down the antenna. The proximate cause of the injury sustained by respondents was
faith. ANECO, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. ANECOs negligence in installing its main distribution line over Balens residence. ANECO
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision,[6] disposing that: should have exercised caution, care and prudence in installing a high-voltage line over a
populated area, or it should have sought an unpopulated area for the said line to traverse.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondents] and against [ANECO], The CA further noted that ANECO failed to put a precautionary sign for installation of wires
directing, ordaining and ordering over 600 volts, which is required by the Philippine Electrical Code.[8]
a) That [ANECO] pay [respondent] Angelita E. Balen the sum of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PHP100,000.00) and [respondent] Hercules A. Lariosa the sum of Seventy Thousand The CA disposed, thus:
Pesos (PHP70,000.00) as reimbursement of their expenses for hospitalization, medicines, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
doctors professional fees, transportation and miscellaneous expenses;
SO ORDERED.[9]
b) That [ANECO] pay [respondent] Angelita E. Balen the sum of Seventy Two Thousand
Pesos (PHP72,000.00) for loss of income for three (3) years; ANECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on May 26, 2006.[10]
Hence, this appeal.
c) That [ANECO] pay [respondent] Angelita E. Balen the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos Indisputably, Exclamado died and respondents sustained injuries from being electrocuted by
(PHP15,000.00) and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PHP15,000.00) to [respondent] ANECOs high-tension wire. These facts are borne out by the records and conceded by the
Hercules A. Lariosa as moral damages, or a total of Thirty Thousand Pesos (PHP30,000.00); parties.

ANECO, however, denied liability, arguing that the mere presence of the high-tension wires
d) That [ANECO] pay [respondents] Angelita E. Balen and Hercules A. Lariosa Two over Balens residence did not cause respondents injuries. The proximate cause of the
Thousand Pesos (PHP2,000.00) each or a total of Four Thousand Pesos (PHP4,000.00) as accident, it claims, was respondents negligence in removing the TV antenna and in allowing
exemplary damages; the pole to touch the high-tension wires. The findings of the RTC, it argues, patently run
counter to the facts clearly established by the records. ANECO, thus, contends that the CA
e) That [ANECO] pay [respondents] Angelita E. Balen and Hercules A. Lariosa Eight committed reversible error in sustaining the findings of the RTC.
Thousand Pesos (PHP8,000.00) each or a total of Sixteen Thousand Pesos [(PHP The argument lacks merit.
16,000.00)] as attorneys fees and the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (PHP2,000.00) each or a Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
total of Four Thousand Pesos (PHP4,000.00) for expense of litigation; person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
by reason of which such other person suffers injury. The test to determine the existence of
f) That [ANECO] pay the costs of this suit; negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in the
g) The dismissal of [ANECOs] counterclaim; [and] performance of the alleged negligent act use reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
h) That the amount of Thirteen Thousand Pesos (PHP13,000.00) given by ANECO to existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
[respondent] Angelita E. Balen and acknowledged by the latter to have been received (pre- judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
trial order, record[s,] pp. 36-37) must be deducted from the herein judgment debt. blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that norm.[11]
SO ORDERED.[7]
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent is a factual issue that this Court cannot
pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an
ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions.[12] The unanimity of the CA legally responsible. Otherwise, the legal duty is entirely defeated. Accordingly, the
and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that ANECOs negligence was the proximate generalization may be formulated that all particular consequences, that is, consequences
cause of the injuries sustained by respondents bars us from supplanting their findings and which occur in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of
substituting them with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the review of the his misconduct are legally caused by his breach of duty x x x.
appellate courts alleged errors of law. We are not required to weigh all over again the factual
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[13] ANECO has not shown that it is Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it
entitled to be excepted from this rule. It has not sufficiently demonstrated any special complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing
circumstances to justify a factual review. the subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALENs house, still a potential risk existed that
people would get electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated.
That ANECOs negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by respondents
was aptly discussed by the CA, which we quote: Above conclusion is further strengthened by the verity that MIGUEL BALEN had complained
about the installation of said line, but ANECO did not do anything about it. Moreover, there is
The evidence extant in the record shows that the house of MIGUEL BALEN already existed scant evidence showing that [respondents] knew beforehand that the lines installed by
before the high voltage wires were installed by ANECO above it. ANECO had to follow the ANECO were live wires.
minimum clearance requirement of 3,050 under Part II of the Philippine Electrical Code for
the installation of its main distribution lines above the roofs of buildings or houses. Although Otherwise stated, the proximate cause of the electrocution of [respondents] was ANECOs
ANECO followed said clearance requirement, the installed lines were high voltage, consisting installation of its main distribution line of high voltage over the house of MIGUEL BALEN,
of open wires, i.e., not covered with insulators, like rubber, and charged with 13, 200 without which the accident would not have occurred.
volts.Knowing that it was installing a main distribution line of high voltage over a populated
area, ANECO should have practiced caution, care and prudence by installing insulated wires, xxxx
or else found an unpopulated area for the said line to traverse. The court a quo correctly x x x the taking down by [respondents] of the antenna in MIGUEL BALENs house would not
observed that ANECO failed to show any compelling reason for the installation of the have caused their electrocution were it not for the negligence of ANECO in installing live
questioned wires over MIGUEL BALENs house. That the clearance requirements for the wires over the roof of the said house.[14]
installation of said line were met by ANECO does not suffice to exonerate it from liability.
Besides, there is scarcity of evidence in the records showing that ANECO put up the Clearly, ANECOs act of leaving unprotected and uninsulated the main distribution line over
precautionary sign: WARNING-HIGH VOLTAGE-KEEP OUT at or near the house of MIGUEL Balens residence was the proximate cause of the incident which claimed Exclamados life and
BALEN as required by the Philippine Electrical Code for installation of wires over 600 volts. injured respondents Balen and Lariosa. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
Contrary to its stance, it is in fact ANECO which provided the proximate cause of the injuries cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.[15]
of [respondents].
ANECOs contention that the accident happened only eleven (11) years after the installation
One of the tests for determining the existence of proximate cause is the foreseeability test, of the high-voltage wire cannot serve to absolve or mitigate ANECOs liability.As we held in
viz.: Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[16]

x x x Where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendants [A]s an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the
misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the fundamental towns of Benguet province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its
test of the law of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep
in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of of its facilities. It is clear to us then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risk which unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop line and the service
made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be held entrance conductor, which connection was only eight (8) feet from the ground level, in
violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. BENECO's contention that the accident happened rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet,
only on January 14, 1985, around seven (7) years after the open wire was found existing in the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
1978, far from mitigating its culpability, betrays its gross neglect in performing its duty to the continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
public. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
evidence on record, clearly point to ANECOs negligence as the proximate cause of the with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the
damages suffered by respondents Balen and Lariosa. No adequate reason has been given accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the
to overturn this factual conclusion. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries
the RTC. the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66153 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass
AMADO PICART, v. FRANK SMITH, JR., over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated
to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things
the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from
the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed. going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by
rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses,
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.
that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, negligent in the eye of the law.
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have
He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the
which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the contributory
of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a present and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the
consequences. defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the
is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously
opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries
against the threatened harm. (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred
negligence of the other party. pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to
perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other
negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be
received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed recoverable. So ordered.
wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a Separate Opinions
laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's MALCOLM, J., concurring:
yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this case. I do Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to
so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and
particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo
negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged
reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. Respondents sought to recover actual
negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to damages for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in the sum of
avoid the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and
when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his litigation expenses.
part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition In their Answer,[5] petitioners denied respondents allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a
and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22,
Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.) 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-
type jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and
CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger
BENIGNO VALDEZ, v. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to
ARNEL RAMOS, and move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS, alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle,
GR. No. 175172 which he very well knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of
September 29, 2009 action against petitioners.
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision dated April 25, 2006 of the Court of During trial on the merits, respondents presented three witnesses: Alfredo Gamera, Dr. Emilio
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2006, denying Joven and Elvira Ramos.
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, dated February 14, Alfredo Gamera testified that at about 10:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he and his wife were
2000, holding petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for damages incurred due to a seated at the waiting shed along the national highway in Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur, waiting
vehicular accident, which resulted in the death of Arnulfo Ramos. for a ride to the town proper of Candon. He saw a motorcycle, driven by Police Officer 3
(PO3) Baltazar de Peralta, coming from the interior part of Tablac and proceeding south
The facts are as follows: toward the town proper. He also saw a southbound passenger jeep, driven by Benigno
Valdez, that wanted to overtake the motorcycle of PO3 De Peralta. As it tried to overtake the
On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children, namely, John Arnel motorcycle, the passenger jeep encroached on the lane of the northbound owner-type jeep
Ramos and Khristine Camille Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint[2] for driven by Arnulfo Ramos, which resulted in the collision. Gamera stated that the point of
damages under Article 2176[3] of the Civil Code against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, impact was on the lane of the vehicle of Arnulfo Ramos. Thereafter, the passenger jeep
Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira screeched to a halt at the fence of the Funtanilla family. The owner-type jeep was destroyed
Ramos and father of her two children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995 and the windshield was broken.[6]
at the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara
was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved Gamera testified that he was about 100 meters from the place where the vehicular accident
in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator occurred. The speed of the passenger jeep was about 70 kilometers per hour, while that of
and as the administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the Spouses Achevara. the owner-type jeep was about 30 kilometers per hour.[7]

In their Complaint,[4] respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno On cross-examination, it was found that Gamera went to the Police Station in Candon, Ilocos
Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway in Barangay Sur to execute his sworn statement only on May 30, 1992, one month after the incident and
after respondent Elvira Ramos talked to him. Moreover, at the preliminary investigation,
Gamera did not mention in his sworn statement that his wife was present during the incident, After the collision, PO3 De Peralta assisted the owner-type jeeps driver, who fell to the
which fact was admitted by respondents counsel. Further, at that time, Gamera was working ground, and helped load him into a tricycle that would take him to the hospital. Then he went
as a jueteng collector at the same joint where the deceased Arnulfo Ramos was also to the driver of the passenger jeep and asked him what happened. The driver remarked,
employed, and he had known Ramos for five years.[8] Even if you do not like to meet an accident, if that is what happened, you cannot do anything.
Thereafter, PO3 De Peralta proceeded on his way southward. He reported the incident at the
Dr. Emilio Joven, a surgeon of the Lorma Medical Center, San Fernando, La Union, testified Police Station of Candon, Ilocos Sur.[15]
that Arnulfo Ramos was admitted at the Lorma Hospital at about 12:50 p.m.on April 22, 1995.
The latter sustained external injuries, mostly on the left side of the body, which could have PO3 De Peralta testified that the accident happened on a straight part of the highway, but
been caused by a vehicular accident. The CT scan result of Arnulfo Ramos showed blood there were many holes on the eastern lane. He stated that nothing impeded his view of the
clots inside the brain, scattered small hemorrhagic contusions, and swelling and blood clots incident.[16]
on the base of the brain, which internal injuries caused his death.[9] The immediate cause of
death was acute cranio-cerebral injury.[10] PO3 De Peralta also testified that he had known respondents witness, Alfredo Gamera, who
was his barangay mate for 20 years. He declared that he never saw Gamera at the waiting
Respondent Elvira Ramos testified on the damages she incurred due to the vehicular shed or at the scene of the incident on the morning of April 22, 1995.[17]
accident, which resulted in the death of her husband. She spent P33,513.00 for
hospitalization and P30,000.00 for the funeral. She prayed for the award of lost earnings, Investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez of the Candon Police Station testified that at about 11:00
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees and other costs of a.m. of April 22, 1995, he received a report of the vehicular accident that occurred at the
litigation.[11] national highway in Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur, which was three kilometers from the police
station. He proceeded to the site with some companions. He saw a passenger jeep
She also testified that the owner-type jeep was registered in the name of Matilde Tacad[12] of positioned diagonally on the western shoulder of the road facing southwest, while an owner-
Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur.[13] type jeep was on the right lane. The driver of the owner-type jeep was seriously injured and
was brought to the hospital.[18]
Petitioners presented six witnesses, namely, PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, Special Police Officer SPO2 Valdez testified that the owner-type jeeps right tire was detached, and its left front
2 (SPO2) Marvin Valdez, Herminigildo Pagaduan, Benigno Valdez, Emilia Achevara and portion was damaged, while the passenger jeeps left tire was detached, and its left side
Alfredo Achevara. portion was damaged.[19]
Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that at 7:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he was at the house of
PO3 Baltazar de Peralta stated that he was assigned to Santiago, Ilocos Sur. He testified that Barangay Captain Victorino Gacusan of San Antonio, Candon, Ilocos Sur.Gacusan was then
at about 9:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he was on board his motorcycle at the waiting shed the overall monitor of the jueteng joint operation in Candon, Ilocos Sur. Pagaduan and
erected on the eastern side of the national highway in Tablac, Ilocos Sur. He was about to go Gacusan had earlier agreed to attend the wake of an army captain at Tamorong, Candon,
southward, but waited a while to let a southbound passenger jeep pass by. Then he followed Ilocos Sur that morning. While Pagaduan was waiting for Barangay Captain Gacusan, the
behind the passenger jeep. latter made a phone call requesting for a vehicle to take them to Tamorong. Not long after, a
When the passenger jeep was about 75 meters away from him on the western lane of the yellow owner-type jeep arrived, which was driven by Arnulfo Ramos, an employee of the
national highway, PO3 De Peralta spotted an owner-type jeep coming from the south on the jueteng joint. All of them rode the jeep with Plate No. ACG 713. Barangay Captain Gacusan
eastern lane of the road. He observed that the owner-type jeep was running in a zigzag was on the drivers seat, Pagaduan sat beside Gacusan, while Arnulfo Ramos and the others
manner as it went over the many holes on the road. It did not slacken speed, causing the sat on the rear seat.[20]
jeeps front wheels to wiggle, before it bumped the passenger jeep coming from the north. The Pagaduan further testified that the group headed west to Tamorong via Darapidap. When
collision occurred on the lane of the passenger jeep, about two feet away from the center line they reached a bridge, Barangay Captain Gacusan tried to increase the speed of the jeep,
of the road, causing the owner-type jeep to turn around and return to its former position, with but it suddenly wiggled. Gacusan stopped the jeep, and they all alighted from it. Gacusan told
its right wheel removed; while the passenger jeep veered to the right lane.[14] Arnulfo Ramos to have the mechanical defect repaired at the auto shop.Hence, they did not
proceed to Tamorong, but returned to the house of Gacusan by tricycle. The next day, he sound system in Santiago, Ilocos Sur for their fiesta. He told Valdez to avoid an accident,
heard from Gacusan that the jeep they had used in their aborted trip to Tamorong met an bring his license and avoid being hot-tempered.[28]
accident.[21]
On February 14, 2000, the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, rendered a Decision in
On cross-examination, Pagaduan testified that it was defense counsel Atty. Tudayan who Civil Case No. 1431-N in favor of respondents.
requested him to testify, because Atty. Tudayan had heard him discuss the incident with The trial court found that the testimony of respondents witness, Alfredo Gamera, was
some jueteng employees.[22] controverted by the testimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the finding of police
investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez. Gamera testified that the vehicular accident occurred
Petitioner Benigno Valdez testified that on April 22, 1995, he was driving the passenger jeep because the passenger jeep tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 Baltazar de
of his aunt, Crescencia Achevara, on the national highway in Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos.
heading south, while the owner-type jeep of Arnulfo Ramos was heading north. Valdez stated Gameras testimony was, however, refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the
that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner, when its right passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the
front wheel got detached and the owner-type jeep bumped the left side of his passenger jeep. passenger jeep. Hence, the trial court concluded that the passenger jeep did not encroach on
Valdez swerved the passenger jeep to the western edge of the road to avoid a collision, but the lane of the owner-type jeep on the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the
to no avail, as it bumped a post. He passed out. When he regained consciousness, he saw motorcycle.
the driver of the owner-type jeep being rescued.[23]
Valdez surrendered himself to the Police Station in Candon, Ilocos Sur. He informed the Moreover, Gamera testified that the collision occurred on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and
police that his vehicle was bumped by the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos, and he one of the wheels of the owner-type jeep was detached, so that it stayed immobile at the
showed his drivers license to the police.[24] place of collision, about two meters east from the center line of the national highway.
Valdez branded as false the testimony of respondents witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the incident, found both vehicles on the
former tried to overtake the motorcycle of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the western lane of the national highway. Thus, the trial court stated that it was undeniable that
lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Valdez testified that before the the collision took place on the western lane of the national highway, which was the passenger
vehicular accident, he saw a policeman following him, but there was a tricycle between them. jeeps lane.
He denied that he was driving fast and stated that his speed at that time registered only 20 on
the speedometer.[25] The trial court held that, as contended by respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance was
Petitioner Alfredo Achevara testified that Crescencia Achevara was his wife, while Benigno applicable to this case. It cited Picart v. Smith,[29] which applied the said doctrine, thus,
Valdez was the nephew of his wife. He and his wife owned the passenger jeep with Plate No. where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the
DKK-995 that was involved in the vehicular accident. Valdez had been the driver of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
vehicle since 1992, although he drove it only during daytime.[26] impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
Alfredo Achevara declared that before they employed Benigno Valdez to drive the passenger
jeep, the former exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting, training and The trial court held that the driver of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez, having seen the
supervising the latter.[27] They required Valdez to show them his professional drivers license, risk exhibited by the wiggling of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep, causing it to run in a
and investigated his personal background and training/experience as a driver. For his zigzag manner, should have parked his vehicle on the right shoulder of the road so that the
apprenticeship, they required him to drive from Metro Manila to Tagaytay City, and then back mishap could have been prevented. Since he ignored to take this reasonable precaution, the
to Metro Manila for a day. omission and/or breach of this duty on his part was the constitutive legal cause of the
Achevara stated that he knew Benigno Valdez since 1988. As their driver since 1992, Valdez mishap.[30]
never committed any traffic violation. On April 22, 1995, he handed the key of the jeep to The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clear chance, as applied to this case, implied a
Valdez at about 7:30 a.m. at their barangay in Padaoil, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur to fetch the contributory negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of the mechanical
defect of his vehicle.
Further, the trial court held that the evidence of the Spouses Achevara failed to show that Hence, the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez filed this petition.
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of
their passenger jeep.[31] The main issue is whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads: as a result of the vehicular accident.
Petitioners contend that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to this case,
because the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the late Arnulfo Ramos in
WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the knowingly driving the defective owner-type jeep. When the front wheel of the owner-type jeep
defendants, the latter to account for and to pay jointly and solidarily to the plaintiffs, because was removed, the said jeep suddenly encroached on the western lane and bumped the left
of the contributory negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, the reduced amount side of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Considering that the interval between
itemized as follows to wit: the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only
1) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - part of the total receipted expenses at the a matter of seconds, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Pantranco
hospitals; North Express Inc. v. Besa[35] held that the doctrine of last clear chance can never apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
2) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) - for funeral expenses; avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
3) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) - for moral damages;
Petitioners assert that Arnulfo Ramos negligence in driving the owner-type jeep − despite
4) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) - for exemplary damages; knowledge of its mechanical defect, and his failure to have it repaired first before driving, to
prevent damage to life and property − did not only constitute contributory negligence. Ramos
5) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) - for attorney's fees, and negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the accident, which resulted in his
untimely demise. Benigno Valdez should not be made to suffer the unlawful and negligent
6) Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) - for actual and other costs of litigation.[32] acts of Ramos. Since forseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence, Valdez could not
have foreseen that an accident might happen due to the mechanical defect in the vehicle of
The Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez appealed the trial courts Decision to the Court of Ramos. It was Ramos alone who fully knew and could foresee that an accident was likely to
Appeals. occur if he drove his defective jeep, which indeed happened. Hence, the proximate cause of
the vehicular accident was the negligence of Ramos in driving a mechanically defective
In a Decision dated April 25, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the vehicle.
Decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads: In short, petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos own negligence in knowingly driving a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed mechanically defective vehicle was the immediate and proximate cause of his death, and that
February 14, 2000 Decision of the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
1431-N, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that in addition to other awards made by
the trial court, defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the Petitioners arguments are meritorious.
plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo Ramos and
the moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court are hereby REDUCED to The Court notes that respondents version of the vehicular accident was rebutted by
P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, while the awards made by the trial court for petitioners. The testimony of respondents witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the vehicular
exemplary damages and for actual and other costs of litigation are hereby DELETED.[33] accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez tried to overtake
the motorcycle driven by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-
The motion for reconsideration of the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez was denied for type jeep, which resulted in the collision, was refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who
lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[34] dated October 23, 2006. testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one
following behind the passenger jeep. Hence, the trial court correctly concluded that the On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for
passenger jeep did not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep on the left side of the knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that
road to allegedly overtake the motorcycle. he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for
driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired.
of its wheels was detached and stayed immobile at the place of collision, about two meters Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to drive on the highway the
east the center line of the national highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on the opposite lane and bumped the
the incident, found both vehicles on the western lane of the national highway. The owner-type passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or
jeep was diagonally positioned on the right, western lane; while the passenger jeep was on diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.[37] It
the western shoulder of the road, diagonally facing southwest. The trial court, therefore, evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
correctly held that it was undeniable that the collision took place on the western lane of the them.[38]
national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the
owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep. The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when
Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its
It must be pointed out that Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that in the early morning of April mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road
22, 1995, he and Barangay Captain Gacusan, along with Arnulfo Ramos, aborted their trip to upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos − perhaps because it still kept to its lane and
Tamorong, Candon, Ilocos Sur, using the same owner-type jeep because it was wiggling. Valdez did not know the extent of its mechanical defect. However, when the owner-type jeep
Ramos was advised to have the mechanical defect repaired. Yet, later in the morning, Ramos encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered
was driving the owner-type jeep on the national highway in Candon. Benigno Valdez testified the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this
that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner when its right front point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was
wheel got detached, and the owner-type jeep suddenly bumped the passenger jeep he was Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep
driving, hitting the left side of the passenger jeep opposite his seat. Although Valdez swerved towards the right shoulder of the road.
the passenger jeep to the western edge of the road, it was still hit by the owner-type jeep.
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have antecedent negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that impending harm and failed to do so − is made liable for all the consequences of the accident,
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.[39] However, the doctrine does not apply
class of risks.[36] where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.[40]
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it
travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said
ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when theowner-type
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type
southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle
Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven
reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger
proximately caused injury to another. jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he
no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.Although the records are bereft of
evidence showing the exact distance between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been near enough, because the towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong
passenger jeep driven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
clear chance does not apply to this case. had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her
rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car,
and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.[41] windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She
was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of
her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic
caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for
Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code. defendants from the car insurance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary
CV No. 67027, dated April 25, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2006, are hereby damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
ALEXANDER towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of
G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996 A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
RICHARD LI, petitioner, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid
vs. colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents. it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was
poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane
from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness
Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked
of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless
Appeals below: or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the
sustained in a vehicular accident. sketch of the three cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on,
1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. and did not notice if there was an early warning device; there was a street light at the corner
FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. "things was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00
can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car of
and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was
from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by zigzagging", although there were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of
the front right portion of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the the plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care, causing its
right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from under defendant's
defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant car and was able to say "hurting words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was
was under the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, under the influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June
1991). 17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the
trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander
for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the
the following amounts: amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs,
as a result of her severed left leg; attorney's fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiff's defendants' counterclaims.3
Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate
P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00, a month for unrealized held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this decision; Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages; him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; Valenzuela.
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent
6. Costs. court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral
for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard damages awarded by the trial court.4
Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial
denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are factual findings of
Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in
"ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early morning hours of June 24,
properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."1 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings
the center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
prove that the car was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.5
of the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed that: In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just
was not corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven at a
"very fast" speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial court's acceptance of
added that he was standing in front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the the testimony of said eyewitness.
scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was
of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant's peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident
car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would
with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's corroborated
incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances
parallel and very near the sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was proven in the course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph.
close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-serving" when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the)
asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim plaintiff's car". He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to
personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony to no avail as the road was slippery.9
the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater weight. One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently
As the court emphasized: self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript, We are not applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
prepared to set aside the trial court's reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like
defendant's assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the
motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross- road if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a more
examination and no attempt was made to question .his competence or the accuracy of his than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work,
statement that defendant was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he gave to the provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11
police investigator after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have
compelling basis for disregarding his testimony. been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out by an examination of as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.12 Either factor
the testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident was across the street where working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since
his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a
did not state that the accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with
ownership of the Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the approval by respondent court):
name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police immediately after the
1991). Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on incident, he said that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. lancer right in front of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he
Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. was driving very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he
45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991). was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a drizzle, not a plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on, thereby
heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge of her
accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's car.
testimony that it was no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he
1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain saw the plaintiff's car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this
why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it
Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of
after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he
inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony that would impair the essential integrity of his was running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the
wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance. event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is contrary to circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will
what he told the police immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
he did not actually step on his brakes but simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for
on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it. a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff which was It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the
properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would
swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire.
white paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the
lane going towards Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.13 situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there were
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by
Lancer, the next question for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she
of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car."20 In fact,
points out, is a no parking zone. respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This
conform for his own protection.14 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.22
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably
was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree. dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard
who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15 the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals,16 an an undue risk of harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may of care required by the circumstances.
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.17 The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis
wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show
means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively
rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser and
collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19 Keaton emphasize:
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the [U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the
sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that
amount to negligence.26 of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
accident was clearly of his own making. employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we
denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that: are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in connection with for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
official matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon which respondent
outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teacher's
night of the accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the supervision of students during an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the
company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company car was partly required provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally
by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a "benefit", encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside or outside school premises.
apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his position. Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His
of their respective duties, the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family
relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that
own negligence and not on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
18). Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or employer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the actual the circumstances of employment.
performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of the employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve
employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes any act done by him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The
an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a
employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act "indispensable to practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
the business and beneficial to their employer" (at p. 645). representatives.
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that since defendant It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with
Li was authorized by the company to use the company car "either officially or socially or even courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the
bring it home", he can be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer company itself or are subject to various plans through which employees eventually acquire
or on the occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as their vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank
of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article to purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be
2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was caused able to purchase on their own.
by their employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point of
is no evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned and
furtherance of the company's business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. The maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
therefore fail.27 car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised
rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family, allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of
be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally
good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively. liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of accident.
using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in the example of Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent
the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related to court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the
the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award
- for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of
or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car the opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to
serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all P800,000,00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the resulting
hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her
only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of
business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
capably and responsibly. These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to
testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the biological
require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting
company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its women. In other words, the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it
clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her
car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of
before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
former with a convenient mode of travel. The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain,
he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body.
which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount
really came from his officemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are
his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical
sales and other work related strategies. pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are of the opinion In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a
that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of
and nature of the injury - physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of
Li's grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven
accident. by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and
with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the
Separate Opinions accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to
VITUG, J., concurring: the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man
Pursuant to Article 21801 of the Civil Code that acknowledges responsibility under a who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
relationship of patria potestas, a person may be held accountable not only for his own direct parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting
culpable act or negligence but also for those of others albeit predicated on his own supposed the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was
failure to exercise due care in his supervisory authority and functions. In the case of an damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck
employer, that vicarious liability attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later
relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question to ask should be whether, at Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.2
employer or, independently, in that of his own. While an employer incurs no liability when an An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of
employee's conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment,2 a minor deviation the above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set
from the assigned task of an employee, however, does not affect the liability of an employer.3 for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988 of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner, resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest
vs. on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
respondents. The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the
Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner. prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a
The Solicitor General for respondents. motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
FERNAN, C.J.: reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the
Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months and crime of homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the
one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in
to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary
convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Court of Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:
below. I
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on her
towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's
to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death statement to the police 8 stating::
of a pedestrian. And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa
II sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple siya naman biglangpagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng
Imprudence. magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
III The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner,
sum of P12,000.00.4 we find that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who
We reverse. in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had
a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of
duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so self-preservation.
constitutes negligence. 5 Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who legal limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the force to the case at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if connection with the incident under consideration.
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own release of the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.
negligence." 6 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil
Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide. indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said: G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should vs.
not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,
or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the respondents.
time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7 G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH
the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action vs.
presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,
ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to respondents.
herself and to others. Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous
to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed
vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently, a
Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the
Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60)
Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral "footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide — seven (7) "footsteps" from the center
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. line to the inner edge of the side walk on both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about three
accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused (3) feet high.
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo truck
McKee. was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its
McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the northern end of the
petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks
children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks
the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo truck which figured in the produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck,
mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident. however, produced no skid marks.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on- As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were
collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were
Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners
Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00
the Ford Escort. for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as
Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for
one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00
Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the
were seated at the car's back seat. serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization
cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee,
Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical expenses: P3,400
away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center,
side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the total award
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to
the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Property" was filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5 Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate
was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6)
Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and prision correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the
P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, private respondents first filed a heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the
motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the
to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to
consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same court, indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of
which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day,
Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the court — where the two (2) civil cases were
approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane pending — a manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16
going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12
applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages
award of damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of and attorney's fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation. WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases. against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and
motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
3751, which private respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00.
subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for consolidation, 10 which The actual damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing for lack of
Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case proof to that effect (sic). 18
No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then presided A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980
over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751. Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third
Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12
and offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil
12 Cases Division.
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg.
Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang
Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in its
Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits. 14 Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied
in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben
Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate
dispositive portion of which reads: court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and another one respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was
is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows: further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having
For the death of Jose Koh: exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
P 50,000.00 as moral damages employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the following findings of
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity fact:
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1) In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979) appeal is posited in the fourth assigned error as follows:
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M) IV
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED
For the death of Kim Koh McKee: HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT
P 50,000.00 as moral damages SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M) Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1) A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1) side of the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee: to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid
P 25,000.00 as moral damages hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E) driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and Q Did the truck slow down?
D-2) A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1) Q What happened after that?
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee: A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is
P 25,000.00 as moral damages (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
G-1) xxx xxx xxx
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3) Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F) reduce its speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1,"
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM) how did you know (sic)?
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee: A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our
P 10,000.00 as moral damages right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1) these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1) Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another circumstances:
P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478. 1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck
No pronouncement as to costs. stopped only when it had already collided with the car:
SO ORDERED. 26 xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx Since the skid marks were found under the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck,
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness because he was one of the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck were caused by the truck's
the first to arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an
injured passengers to the hospital. endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away,
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he
passenger of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street. abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the same.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course of events people For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on
usually take the side of the person with whom they are associated at the time of the accident, the part of the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the supervision over him.
because, as a general rule, they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Appellees did not allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a
Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several persons within the family in the selection and supervision of their employees in their answers. They did not even
same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962). adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of selection and programs of supervision.
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. If
witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car earlier or at a very
police authorities about the mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when
trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit. a collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his was not riveted to the road in front of him.
truck at a safe distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply proven, but the items must
contention of appellants was completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees be reduced. 28
in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record. According to the Table A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently
of Contents submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants- filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3
appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he stopped was April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto
an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and damages. the trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away: denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984.30
ATTY. SOTTO: Hence, this petition.
Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
is straight and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you I
first saw that car only about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time? . . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY
xxx xxx xxx REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE
A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away. "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S
ATTY. SOTTO: ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE
before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief) ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped only RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY
because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN
as revealed in Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to THE EVIDENCE.
avoid a collision on a bridge. II
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh . . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT
to return to his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING
found skid marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19- AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN
20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding.
THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on
ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED. the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to
III consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may have
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A then believed, and understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or ruling of
MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this
TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER. been farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall
IV proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation.
DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard
THESE CASES. against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work
V of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants, 36
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no
ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective orientation,
AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER. anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court held that the
VI present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final
WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang
HONORABLE COURT. guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than
VII this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice
DAMAGES. 31 J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment on the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil
the petition. 32 After the said Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their . . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33,
Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with. permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
and counter-arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately
in order. and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the
quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a
Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate
civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right
action . . . . side of the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid
case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck
parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.
damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents' liability could only be Q Did the truck slow down?
subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been Q What happened after that?
conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents. 41 A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is
And now to the merits of the petition. (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is impact (sic), sir. 46
whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh's entry
evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions. into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal greater peril — death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be negligent.
raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate
these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42 Court, 47 thus:
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and . . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary,
conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. 43 The same is true where the Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of
appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures, speculations and the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
surmises 44 or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley on Torts,
facts. 45 Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound
exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its rule, (W)e held:
challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
of facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court's as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and
decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact. caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not,
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamiliasof the Roman
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this law. . . .
presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an . . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
(2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is
by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee: a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge? Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it
case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and head-on.
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed
such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private respondents' claim that
emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act there was an error in the translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is based on
brought about by his own negligence." 49 mere conjecture.
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted
Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of
Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence. Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as: xxx xxx xxx
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. reduce its speed before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the did you know?
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
might probably result therefrom. 50 Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened?
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn.
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the 28, April 19, 1979)
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the xxx xxx xxx
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck
car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the ever stopped?
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car and it was already
back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55
which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper
continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause
apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 of the resulting accident.
meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application
pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents
consequences thereof.56 are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held: damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, xxx xxx xxx
the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered any business or industry.
in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, xxx xxx xxx
4th Ed., 1986, p. 165). The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in supervision of employees. 60 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos.
the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled: The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed
Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise: Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must, however, be
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent
claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the McKee.
prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber Costs against private respondents.
and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause G.R. No. 156034 October 1, 2003
of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C & A construction, inc.,
plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra]. respondent.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court are the June
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be 14, 2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed the
raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 95-75565, and petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees.16 Granting that
its November 7, 2002 resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master
National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area Mariner.17
in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.4 The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows – (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was
over to NHA. negligent; (2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
Japan5 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila6 in about eight (8) hours.7 At approximately quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable
but could not enter the area because it was already congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power not, then he is guilty of negligence.18
barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent
his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as
Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.9 He 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in
succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was Japan19 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours.21This, notwithstanding, he
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.10 The damage did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at
caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.11 the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision
Manila, Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take
claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.12 immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge
On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was dismissed. The trial court ruled that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than
that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction.22 He cannot claim that he waited
to avoid the accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the
the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise.
It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was
held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring", not very cloudy23 and there was no weather disturbance yet.24
which is an act of God.13 When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
aside.14 It found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the would have observed in the same situation.25Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have
North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port
damages. where they docked was very near North Harbor.26 Even if the latter was already congested,
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in he would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.
waiting until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
vessel could have sought shelter.15 It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.27 So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondent’s failure to allege in its
Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,31 it was held that it is not
Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its
Jusep.1awphi1.nét Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of
liable for the negligent act of his employee. Thus – negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.32
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages awarded by the trial court, we find no
xxxxxxxxx reason to alter the same. The interest imposed should, however, be modified. In Eastern
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,33 it was held that the rate of interest on obligations
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum. If the
any business or industry. purchase price can be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
xxxxxxxxx six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned finality of the decision. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.34
arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the respondent shall earn 6% interest per
families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 28 until it is fully satisfied.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.1awphi1.nét The
the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty. June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc., damages in the
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed, amount of P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED with the
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the MODIFICATION that the award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees annum from October 3, 1995, until finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on
chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise the principal and interest (or any part thereof) until full payment.
due diligence in supervising its employees.
In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the SO ORDERED.
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
the rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court stressed that once
negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he observed the
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated
rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly
implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner
should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.