ADILLE vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-44546 (157 SCRA 455)
January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married twice. Her child in
the first marriage was petitioner Rustico Adile and her children in the second marriage were
respondents Emetria Asejo et al.
During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sold the property in pacto de retro with a three-year repurchase
period.
Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.
During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by himself alone at his own
expense, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the
only heir and child of his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name
alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and accounting claiming that
Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the property, and thus, he cannot
claim exclusive ownership of the entire property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor
HELD:
No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.
Although Rustico Adille redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses did not
make him the owner of all of it.
Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event,
he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his
exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents
being the beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.
DE LIMA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-46296 (201 SCRA 641)
SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
FACTS:
Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale
on installments from the government. After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers and a
sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima, and
Vicente Delima. A new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an affidavit
of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property excluding the
other heirs. He declared the lot to be of his own and paid for its taxes. On February 29, 1968, the
surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an
action for reconveyance and partition of property and for the annulment of the certificate of title
issued plus damages against their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also later included as party
defendant for his refusal to help in the action.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and void and
declaring Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be owners
of the property, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth of the whole. The respondents,
Heirs of Galileo Delima, appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision in their
favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that the other brothers and sisters have already waived their
rights to the property being that it was Galileo alone that paid for the balance of the purchase
price and the realty taxes for the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided
by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shared in the disputed property?
HELD:
Yes, Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: “No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized
the co-ownership.” By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was
holding the property in representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an
administrator who took care of the property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the
property to his co-owners.
However this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute
and exclusive ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptability of the
action for partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over
the property. In order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and (3) that the evidence thereon
should be clear and conclusive.
Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the
cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, he thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-
owners over their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run. Since an action
for reconveyance
IGNACIO vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-10722 (33 Phil. 576)
February 18, 1916
FACTS:
Crispulo Martinez, the deceased husband of Dolores Arce Ignacio and father of the minor Arsenio
Martinez, was a brother of Felisa Martinez and uncle of Juan Martinez, the defendants. The
plaintiff's ward and the defendants were the owners in equal parts of the undivided real estate
described in the complaint. Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the guardian of her minor son, instituted this
action for the purpose of having the property divided real estate described in the complaint. Dolores
Arce Ignacio, as the guardian of her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of having the
property divided and the one-third part belonging to the minor turned over to her. Judgment was
also asked against the defendant, Felisa Martinez, for one-third of the value of the products of the
land during the time the latter had been in the exclusive possession of the same. The defendant,
Felisa Martinez, alleged that she and her deceased husband bought Crispulo Martinez' interest in
the property in question in 1908. Judgment was entered by the court below in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint, and the defendant, Felisa Martinez, appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was repudiation of inheritance in this case. [YES]
HELD:
That an adult heir may sell, assign or mortgage his undivided interest in the estate of his deceased
parents, although he himself has legal heirs, there can be no question. (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14
Phil. Rep., 528.) So, therefore, our inquiry is limited to the question relating to the validity of
appellants' Exhibit No. 2 and the legal effect resulting therefrom. This exhibit reads as follows:
I, Crispulo Martinez y Alejandrino, a native and resident of the
municipality of Calapan, Mindoro, P. I., do hereby declare:
(1) That the real and personal property, and the cattle which are listed under
my name in the land-assessment roll, form the estate left by my deceased parents
Leoncio Martinez and Magdalena Alejandrino, and consequently, are now our
common property and belong to me and my sister Felisa (by our way rights) and to
my nephew Juan Martinez (by right of representation).
(2) That the total value of the said property constituting our inheritance, or
the assessed value of the same amounts to (P2,700) two thousand, seven hundred
pesos, Philippine currency, which, divided into three equal parts, makes the share
of each one (900) nine hundred pesos.
(3) That, by my being in Manila pursuing a course of studying in secondary
instruction and law during the five years immediately preceding the execution of
this document, I have spent the sum of (P2,500) two thousand, five hundred pesos,
which was paid by the married couple Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, the said
sum having been spent by me in the following manner:
Course of 1902 to 1903 (10 months), P450.00
monthly board and lodging at P45
Course of 1903 to 19104 (10 months), 450.00
monthly board and lodging at P45
Course of 1904 to 1905, whole year, at 600.00
P50
Course of 1905 to 1906, whole year, at 600.00
P50
1908 (8 months) at P50 400.00
2,500.00
(4) That in consideration of these expenses, I hereby set forth that I
renounce totally the share that may belong to me, after the partition of the said
property, and I assign the said share to the aforementioned married couple Luciano
Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to their lawful heirs.
All this I do freely and voluntarily, and affix my signature hereto in the
presence of the witnesses who sign at the end hereof, in Calapan, this 30th day of
August, 1908.
CRISPULO MARTINEZ
Witnesses:
DOMINGO ACEDERA.
SANTIAGO MENDOZA.
This document, after having been signed on the date stated, was duly ratified a notary public on
December 22, 1908. Crispulo Martinez died on September 18, 1911. It is claimed by the plaintiff
that Exhibit No. 2 was signed and ratified by Crispulo Martinez without consideration at the time
when he was living with is sister, Felisa Martinez, separate from his wife and son on account of
bad feeling then existing between them, and that on the very day that that date, he requested his
wife, in the presence of Felisa to send for a person to make his will, as he wished to annul Exhibit
No. 2, and that Felisa then stated to him that it was not necessary for him to make his will for that
purpose as she had already destroyed the document. It is further claimed that even admitting all
else, Exhibit No. 2 does not have the legal effect of vesting title in the defendant Felisa and her
deceased husband because, "in view of the terms of this document it has the legal force of a
repudiation of inheritance." The trial court found for the plaintiff on the questions of fact and held
with her upon the question of law. Both are before us for review.
Exhibit No. 2 is a contract executed with all the formalities of the law between Crispulo Martinez
on the one side and Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez on the other. As such, it can only be
annulled for the same reasons as any other contract of like character. Felisa Martinez, the only one
now living of the contracting parties, took charge of all the property in question in September,
1908. Although her husband was living at the time, he was so ill that he was unable to attend to
any business whatever, having died a few weeks thereafter. Notwithstanding the fact that Crispulo
Martinez did not die until 1911, he had nothing to do with administration of this property, nor did
he declare the same for the purposes of taxation, nor receive any of the products, as he had done
from the time of his father's death in 1899 up to the execution of the document in 1908. The
property remained in the peaceable possession of Felisa Martinez from the date of the execution
of Exhibit No. 2 until the commencement of this action, a period of nearly six years. The only
testimony in the record which tends to show that the document was executed by Crispulo Martinez,
on account of the trouble then existing between him and his wife, and without consideration, is
that of the plaintiff, Dolores Arce Ignacio, with reference to the alleged conversation which took
place between herself and her deceased husband, a few hours before he died, and Felisa Martinez,
and the fact that Crispulo Martinez was living at the time separate from his wife and boy on account
of the trouble which he had had with his wife. On the other hand, the defendant, Felisa Martinez,
presented the duly executed and ratified document, showing the liquidation of the accounts with
the deceased Crispulo Martinez. Her own testimony, explaining in detail the entire transaction,
shows the peaceable possession of all the property for the time which we have indicated, receipt
of the products, and the tax declarations made by her. The deceased Crispulo Martinez, being a
lawyer by profession, knew what he was doing when he signed and ratified Exhibit No. 2, and
knew the legal effects which that document produced. The trial court in declaring that Exhibit No.
2 was of no value, based its decision largely upon the fact, as the court said, that Felisa Martinez
did not categorically deny the conversation above mentioned. Felisa Martinez' whole defense in
the court below and in this court is and in this court is an absolute denial of that conversation. In
making its findings of fact, we think the lower court failed to give due weight to the notarial
document and the other documentary evidence presented. This important fact takes the case out of
the general ruled laid down by this court to the effect that the findings of fact made by a trial court
will not be reversed where the same is based upon contradictory testimony of witnesses. For these
reasons we must reverse the court below upon the questions of fact and hold that Exhibit No. 2
was duly executed for a valuable consideration.
The trial court was of the opinion that the execution of the above quoted document was an attempt
"to repudiate an inheritance" and that the document does not produce this effect because it does
not meet the requirements of article 1008 of the Civil Code. In support of this holding the court
relied upon the language used in the fourth paragraph. Crispulo Martinez stated therein that "in
consideration of these expense, I hereby set forth that I renounce totally the share that may belong
to me and assign the said share to Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to their lawful heirs."
Under the Civil Code, repudiation of the inheritance is an act entirely voluntary and free, made
without consideration. An heir cannot renounce his inheritance in favor of a designated heir or
heirs, or any other persons. (The substitute referred to in paragraph 3 of article 1912 is the person
designated by the testator.) Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his inheritance so as to relieve
himself of all liability after he had accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an inventory,
and had received the products therefrom as such heir. Acts of mere conservation or professional
administration do not constitute an acceptance of the inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking possession of the property, exercising act of
dominion over it, and receiving products therefrom for a period of more than eight years, accepted
the inheritance without the benefit of an inventory. He "renounced" his interest in favor of designed
persons, one of whom was not an heir of his deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration.
The word" renounce," used in paragraph 4 of the document does not, under the terms of the
document, constitute must be considered together. Words, phrases or clauses cannot be segregated
and given a meaning which is contrary to the terms of the entire document. "The whole contract
must be interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its true meaning." (Barretto vs. Santa
Marina, 26 Phil. Rep., 200.)
It having been clearly shown that Crispulo Martinez owed, on the 30th day of August, 1908,
Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez the sum of P2,500, money loaned him while he was in school,
and he being of mature age, Exhibit No. 2 was, in truth and in law, an assignment by Crispulo of
his interest in the property in question to Felisa Martinez and her husband in payment of his debt.
This act is authorized by article 1175 of the Civil Code.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed,
without costs in this instance.
HEIRS OF MANINGDING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121157 (276 SCRA 601)
July 31, 1997
FACTS:
This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda
claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.
The Buazons aver that:
1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias.
2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-owned the
lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership of the
sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself… and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding
renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon.
3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland
to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced
by deeds of sale.
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by
Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition
of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.
The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in
equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an
Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its
due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It
concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of
each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed
itself by declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements.
However, it ruled that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription
HELD:
Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised
are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of
ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by
virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who
personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the
parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly
and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never
ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and
in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly
executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He
likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all
others.
As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986
to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for
which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their
shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse
before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.
Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986
when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of
the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed
the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already
passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
MARIATEGUI vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 57062 (205 SCRA 337)
Jan. 24, 1992
FACTS:
This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died
without a will.
During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a
second marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a third marriage. The third
wife also preceded Lupo in death.
The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he
acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot
of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a
complaint with the lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they
were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said that
the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition
of natural children.
The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case
was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their
legitimacy as children.
CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot
HELD:
The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised
only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
Existence of the Marriage
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based
on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that “when his father was still
living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a
Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its
validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.”
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact.
Filiation
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto’s birth
certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which
tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the
two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
Prescription of Action for Partition
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285
for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not
run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.
Petition dismissed.
