Just in: I cannot meet you on Thursday (Nov. 15) because I will be attending a training.

I will just meet you on

Nov. 22, and read the following: (1) RULES 66, 67 and 68;

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(2) Terena vs Hon De Sagun GR#152131 April 29, 2009;

DECISION
BRION, J.:

The petitioner Floraida Terana (petitioner) asks us to reverse and set aside, through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari,[1] the September 7, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its subsequent
Resolution[3] denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

THE FACTS

The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu,
Batangas, which he leased to the petitioner.[4] Sometime in 1996, the petitioner demolished the leased house
and erected a new one in its place.[5] The respondent alleged that this was done without his consent.[6] The
Contract of Lease[7]defining the respective rights and obligations of the parties contained the following
provisions, which the petitioner allegedly violated:

3. That the lessee obligated herself with the Lessor by virtue of this Lease, to do
the following, to wit:

a) xxx
b) To keep the leased property in such repair and condition as it was in the
commencement of the Lease with the exception of portions or parts which
may be impaired due to reasonable wear and tear;
c) xxx
d) Not to make any alterations in the Leased property without the knowledge
and consent of the Lessor; x x x

The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished house to her sister, who built a house
adjacent to the respondents property.[8] When the respondent discovered what the petitioner did, he
immediately confronted her and advised her to vacate the premises.[9] She refused. On February 3, 1997, the
respondent sent a letter demanding the petitioner to vacate the leased property.[10] Despite this letter of
demand, which the petitioner received on February 10,[11] she still refused to vacate the said property.

The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer[12] against the petitioner on April 16, 1997 on the
ground of the petitioners violation of the terms of the Contract of Lease.[13] The respondent prayed for the
petitioners ejectment of the leased property, and for the award of P70,000.00, representing the cost of the
materials from the demolished house, attorneys fees, and costs.[14]

The presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Hon. Herminia Lucas, inhibited
from the case on the ground that she is related to the respondent.[15]

The petitioner denied allegations of the complaint in her Sagot.[16] She claimed that she demolished the old
building and built a new one with the knowledge and consent of the respondent; that the original house was old
and was on the verge of collapsing;[17] that without the timely repairs made by the petitioner, the houses
collapse would have caused the death of the petitioner and her family. The petitioner prayed for the court to: 1)
dismiss the ejectment case against her; and 2) award in her favor: a) P100,000.00 as moral damages,
b) P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the expenses incurred in building the new house, c) P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and d) P10,000.00 as costs incurred in relation to the suit.[18]
The trial court called for a preliminary conference under Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
(RSP) and Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and required the parties to file their position papers and
affidavits of their witnesses after they failed to reach an amicable settlement.[19] Instead of filing their position
papers, both parties moved for an extension of time to file the necessary pleadings. The trial court denied both
motions on the ground that the RSP and the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the
filing of a motion for extension of time.[20]
The MTC framed the issues in the case as follows:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the contract of lease when the old house was
demolished and a new house was constructed by the defendant; and

2. Whether or not defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for her expenses in the construction
of the new house.[21]
 THE MTCS DECISION[22]

The MTC rendered its decision on November 5, 1997[23] despite the parties failure to timely file their respective
position papers.[24] The decision stated that: according to the parties Contract of Lease, the consent of the
respondent must be obtained before any alteration or repair could be done on the leased property; that the
petitioner failed to produce any evidence that the respondent had given her prior permission to demolish the
leased house and construct a new one; that even in her answer, she failed to give specific details about the
consent given to her; that in demolishing the old structure and constructing the new one, the petitioner violated
the Contract of Lease; that this violation of the terms of the lease was a ground for judicial ejectment under
Article 1673(3) of the Civil Code; and that since the demolition and construction of the new house was without
the consent of the respondent, there was no basis to order the respondent to reimburse the petitioner.

The MTC thus ruled:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

Antonio B. Simuangco and against the defendant Aida Terana as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Aida Terana and all persons claiming right under her to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject house to the plaintiff;

2. Ordering the said defendant to pay the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as Attorneys fees; and

3. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Unaware that a decision had already been rendered, the petitioner filed a letter
entitled Kahilingan, to which she attached her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses.[27] The
[26]

submission was essentially a motion for reconsideration of the denial of motion for extension of time.
On November 6, 1977, the MTC denied the petitioners Kahilingan as follows:

Defendant Aida Teranias KAHILINGAN dated November 5, 1997 is DENIED for being
moot and academic on account of the decision on the merits rendered by this court
dated November 4, 1997 relative to the instant case.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 1997. [29] The records of the case were
ordered elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 439.

THE RTCS DECISION[30]

The RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC on February 26, 1998. The RTC ruled
that: 1) the ruling of the MTC was supported by the facts on record; 2) although the respondent failed to
submit his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses, the MTC correctly rendered its decision on the
basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, as well as the evidence on record; 3) the petitioner failed to
show enough reason to reverse the MTCs decision. The court further declared that its decision was immediately
executory, without prejudice to any appeal the parties may take.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial on March 3, 1998.[31] The
petitioner argued that the appealed MTC decision was not supported by any evidence, and that the respondent
failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint and to discharge the burden of proving these allegations
after the petitioner denied them in her Sagot. In effect, the petitioner argued that the allegations of the
complaint should not have been the sole basis for the judgment since she filed an answer and denied the
allegations in the complaint; the RTC should have also appreciated her position paper and the affidavit of her
witnesses that, although filed late, were nevertheless not expunged from the records.

In her motion for a new trial, the petitioner argued that her failure to submit her position paper and the
affidavits of her witnesses within the 10-day period was due to excusable negligence. She explained that she
incurred delay because of the distance of some of her witnesses residence. The petitioner alleged that she had
a good and meritorious claim against the respondent, and that aside from her position paper and the affidavits
of her witnesses, she would adduce receipts and other pieces of documentary evidence to establish the costs
incurred in the demolition of the old house and the construction of the new one.
 On April 28, 1998, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration, and thus reversed its February 26,
1998 judgment, as well as the November 5, 1997 decision of the MTC. It noted that: 1) the MTC rendered its
decision before the petitioner was able to file her position paper and the affidavit of her witnesses; 2) the rule
on the timeliness of filing pleadings may be relaxed on equitable considerations; and 3) the denial of the
petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or new trial will result to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, believing that
it was equitable to relax the rules on the timeliness of the filing of pleadings, the RTC remanded the case to the
MTC for further proceedings, after giving the respondent the opportunity to submit his position paper and the
affidavits of his witnesses. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, on considerations of equity and substantial justice, and in the light of

Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of this Court dated February 26, 1998,
as well as the Decision dated November 4, 1997 of the Lower Court in Civil Case No. 1305, are
hereby both set aside. The lower court to which the records were heretofore remanded is
hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings in this case, after giving the plaintiff-appellee an
opportunity to file his position paper and affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10, Rule
70, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Underscoring supplied.]

SO ORDERED.

On May 9, 1998, the petitioner challenged the order of remand through another motion for
reconsideration.[32] The petitioner argued that since the original action for unlawful detainer had already been
elevated from the MTC to the RTC, the RSP no longer governed the disposal of the case. Before the RTC, the
applicable rule is the Rules of Court, particularly Section 6 of Rule 37, which reads:

Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. If a new trial is granted in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, the original judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the
action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, in
so far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new
trial without retaking the same.

Thus, the RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of remanding the case to the MTC. The
petitioner further argued that a remand to the court a quo may only be ordered under Section 8, Rule 40[33] of
the Rules of Court.

The RTC denied the motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole point of the reversal of the
decision. First, the reversal was made in the interest of substantial justice and the RTC hewed more to the spirit
that vivifieth than to the letter that killeth,[34] and that a lawsuit is best resolved on its full merits, unfettered by
the stringent technicalities of procedure. The RTC further emphasized that a remand is not prohibited under the
Rules of Court and that Section 6 of Rule 135 allows it:

Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules.

Second, Rule 40 governs appeals from the MTC to the RTC. Nowhere in Rule 40 is there a provision similar to
Section 6 of Rule 37.

Third, Section 6 of Rule 37 contemplates a motion for new trial and for reconsideration filed before a trial
court a quo. The RTC in this case was acting as an appellate court; the petitioners motion for new trial and
reconsideration was directed against the appellate judgment of the RTC, not the original judgment of the trial
court.

Fourth, after Republic Act No. 6031 mandated municipal trial courts to record their proceedings, a trial de
novo at the appellate level may no longer be conducted. The appellate courts may instead review the evidence
and records transmitted to it by the trial court. Since the petitioner is asking the court to review the records of
the MTC, inclusive of her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, it is also important to give the
respondent an opportunity to file his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses before the MTC renders a
judgment. It is the MTC or the trial court that has the jurisdiction to do that.

THE CASE DECISION

 The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on September 7, 2001.[35] The CA noted that the
RTCs order of remand was not just based on equity and substantial justice, but was also based on law,
specifically Section 6 of Rule 135. Thus, the CA ruled that the RTC did not err in remanding the case to the MTC
and ordering the conduct of further proceedings after giving the respondent an opportunity to present his
position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. This ruling did not satisfy petitioner, giving way to the present
petition.

THE PETITION

Before this Court, the petitioner alleges: 1) that the respondent made a request for the petitioner to
vacate the subject property because his nearest of kin needed it; 2) that she was only going to vacate the
premises if she were reimbursed the actual cost incurred in building the said house;[36] 3) that the case be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin, including memoranda and
briefs submitted by the parties, instead of being remanded to the MTC.

In his Comment[37] and Memorandum,[38] the respondent joins the petitioners prayer for a ruling based
on the records instead of remanding the case to the MTC. He prays that, as the MTC ruled, the petitioner be
ordered to vacate the leased property, and that the petitioners claim for reimbursement be denied. The
respondent argues that the MTC correctly ruled on the basis of the parties pleadings, the stipulation of facts
during the preliminary conference, and the records of the proceedings.

ISSUES

The petitioner submits the following as the issue to be decided:

[W]hether under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court
of Appeals, may order the case remanded to the MTC after the plaintiff, herein respondent, failed
to submit evidence in support of his complaint because his Position Paper, affidavit of witnesses
and evidence, were not submitted on time and the extension of time to file the same was denied
because it is prohibited under the Rules on Summary Procedure.[39]

which we break down into the following sub-issues: 1) whether a remand is proper; 2) whether the Court
should appreciate the petitioners position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses; and 3) whether the
complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed.

THE COURTS RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

Remand Not Necessary

We find that a remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer necessary, given the pleadings and
submissions filed, and the records of the proceedings below. A remand would delay the overdue resolution of
this case (originally filed with the MTC on April 16, 1997), and would run counter to the spirit and intent of the
RSP.[40]

Petitioners Position Paper and the Affidavits of Her

Witnesses Cannot Be Admitted

Should the Court admit the petitioners position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses attached to
her Kahilingan?

The intent and terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that the petitioner sees. By its
express terms, the purpose of the RSP is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.[41] To achieve this objective, the RSP
expressly prohibit certain motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion for extension of
time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot
be allowed, we believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we
would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty
Development Corporation v. Florentino,[42] albeit on the issue of late filing of an answer in a summary
proceeding, we stated that [t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief
that the rules seek to redress.

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the essence and
purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his
property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and inexpensive
means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property.[43] This fulfills the need to
resolve the ejectment case quickly. Thus, we cannot reward the petitioners late filing of her position paper and
the affidavits of her witnesses by admitting them now.

The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a
judgment on the ejectment complaint. Section 10 of the RSP states:

Section 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during
the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said
order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit
or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment.

Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided for by the Rules; it was correct to
render a judgment, as the MTC did, after one party failed to file their position paper and supporting affidavits.

That a position paper is not indispensable to the courts authority to render judgment is further evident
from what the RSP provides regarding a preliminary conference: on the basis of the pleadings and the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need for further
proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the
order.[44] Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for the submission of position papers. In
such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint,
answer, and the record of the preliminary conference.

Unlawful detainer

The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential requisites:

1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;

2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the
right to possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the
premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.[45]

Requisites 1, 4, and 5 have been duly established. The presence of the Contract of Lease is undisputed;
the letter of demand was sent on February 3, 1997, and received by the petitioner on February 10, 1997; and
the action was filed on April 16, 1997, well within the one-year period from the letter of demand. For our
determination is whether the petitioners right to possess the subject property may be terminated by virtue of
her violation of the terms of the contract. If we answer in the affirmative, her continued detention of the
property is illegal.

Section 1673(3) of the Civil Code answers this question by providing that the lessor may terminate the
lease contract for violation of any of the conditions or terms agreed upon,[46] and may judicially eject the
lessee.[47] One of the stipulated terms of the parties Contract of Lease, as narrated above, is that no alterations
may be made on the leased property without the knowledge and consent of the lessor. The issue in this case is
beyond the fact of alteration since it is not disputed that the petitioner demolished the house under lease and
built a new one. The crucial issue is whether the demolition was with or without the knowledge and consent of
the respondent.

The petitioner contends that the Court should not give credence to the respondents claim that he neither had
knowledge of nor gave his consent to her acts. She argued that the respondent had the burden of proving this
allegation with positive evidence after she frontally denied it in her answer. Since the respondent failed to
discharge this burden, she argues that she no longer needed to prove her defense that the demolition and
construction were done with the respondents knowledge and consent.[48]

The petitioners contention is misplaced.

First, the material allegations in a complaint must be specifically denied by the defendant in his answer. Section
10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:

A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which
he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder.
Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the
effect of a denial.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the complaint
which are not specifically denied, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A
denial made without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon in support of the denial, even when
to do so is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.[49]

The petitioners denial in her answer consists of the following:

1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan

ang mga isinasakdal ng nagsasakdal;

2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang nasasakdal;

3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at

kapahintulutan ng nagsasakdal at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang bahay ng
nagsasakdal sa pamamagitan ng pagpapagawa ng nasasakdal; xxx[50]

We do not find this denial to be specific as the petitioner failed to set forth the substance of the matters in
which she relied upon to support her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that consent was given; how and
why, she did not say. If indeed consent were given, it would have been easy to fill in the details. She could
have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed the respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him
a letter. She could have stated his response, and how it was conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could
have stated when the consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo, the petitioner is
deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.

Second, both parties failed to present evidence other than the allegations in their pleadings. Thus, the court
may weigh the parties allegations against each other. The petitioner presented a general denial, while the
respondent set forth an affirmative assertion. This Court has time and again said that a general denial cannot
be given more weight than an affirmative assertion.[51]

Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are

limited to rentals or reasonable compensation for the use
of the property

This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by both parties. Both parties seek
damages other than rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the property, which are the only forms of
damages that may be recovered in an unlawful detainer case.[52] Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the trial court to order the award of an amount representing arrears of rent or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises if it finds that the allegations of the complaint are
true.[53]

The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case was explained
in Araos v. Court of Appeals,[54] wherein the Court held that:

The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage
that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he
may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with the action for
ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer
is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically
enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on
joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. [Underscoring supplied.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-48534 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons claiming
right under her are ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent
ANTONIO SIMUANGCO. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

x--------------------------------------------------x
(3) Roberts vs Papio GR#166714 Feb 9, 2007;

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69034 which reversed and set aside the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
150, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 01-431. The RTC ruling had affirmed with modification the Decision[3] of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, Makati City in Civil Case No. 66847. The petition likewise assails the
Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.

The Antecedents

The spouses Martin and Lucina Papio were the owners of a 274-square-meter residential lot located
in Makati (now Makati City) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-44980.[4] In order to secure
a P59,000.00 loan from the Amparo Investments Corporation, they executed a real estate mortgage on the
property. Upon Papios failure to pay the loan, the corporation filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage.

Since the couple needed money to redeem the property and to prevent the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property on April 13, 1982 in favor of Martin
Papios cousin, Amelia Roberts. Of the P85,000.00 purchase price, P59,000.00 was paid to the Amparo
Investments Corporation, while the P26,000.00 difference was retained by the spouses.[5] As soon as the
spouses had settled their obligation, the corporation returned the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-44980, which
was then delivered to Amelia Roberts.

Thereafter, the parties (Amelia Roberts as lessor and Martin Papio as lessee) executed a two-year
contract of lease dated April 15, 1982, effective May 1, 1982. The contract was subject to renewal or extension
for a like period at the option of the lessor, the lessee waiving thereby the benefits of an implied new lease. The
lessee was obliged to pay monthly rentals of P800.00 to be deposited in the lessors account at the Bank of
America, Makati City branch.[6]

On July 6, 1982, TCT No. S-44980 was cancelled, and TCT No. 114478 was issued in the name of
Amelia Roberts as owner.[7]

Martin Papio paid the rentals from May 1, 1982 to May 1, 1984, and thereafter, for another year.[8] He
then failed to pay rentals, but he and his family nevertheless remained in possession of the property for a
period of almost thirteen (13) years.
 In a letter dated June 3, 1998, Amelia Roberts, through counsel, reminded Papio that he failed to pay
the monthly rental of P2,500.00 from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997, and P10,000.00 from January 1,
1998 to May 31, 1998; thus, his total liability was P410,000.00. She demanded that Papio vacate the property
within 15 days from receipt of the letter in case he failed to settle the amount.[9] Because he refused to pay,
Papio received another letter from Roberts on April 22, 1999, demanding, for the last time, that he and his
family vacate the property.[10] Again, Papio refused to leave the premises.

On June 28, 1999, Amelia Roberts, through her attorney-in-fact, Matilde Aguilar, filed a Complaint[11] for
unlawful detainer and damages against Martin Papio before the MeTC, Branch 64, Makati City. She alleged the
following in her complaint:

Sometime in 1982 she purchased from defendant a 274-sq-m residential house and lot situated at No.
1046 Teresa St., Brgy. Valenzuela, Makati City.[12] Upon Papios pleas to continue staying in the property, they
executed a two-year lease contract[13] which commenced on May 1, 1982. The monthly rental was P800.00.
Thereafter, TCT No. 114478[14] was issued in her favor and she paid all the realty taxes due on the property.
When the term of the lease expired, she still allowed Papio and his family to continue leasing the
property. However, he took advantage of her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and
refused to pay despite repeated demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letter[15] through counsel requiring
Papio to pay rentals from January 1986 up to May 1998 and to vacate the leased property. The accumulated
arrears in rental are as follows: (a) P360,000.00 from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997 at P2,500.00 per
month; and (b) P50,000.00, from January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998 at P10,000.00 per month.[16] She came to
the Philippines but all efforts at an amicable settlement proved futile. Thus, in April 1999, she sent the final
demand letter to defendant directing him and his family to pay and immediately vacate the leased premises.[17]

Roberts appended to her complaint copies of the April 13, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale, the April 15,
1982 Contract of Lease, and TCT No. 114478.

In his Answer with counterclaim, Papio alleged the following:

He executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of lease. Roberts, his cousin who
is a resident of California, United States of America (USA), arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the
property. Believing that she had made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property, he
accepted. She then remitted P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after which the mortgagee cancelled
the real estate mortgage. However, he was alarmed when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the
property prepared (for P83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also demanded that
the defendant turn over the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then
believed that if he signed the deed of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He
asked her to allow him to redeem or reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount. [18] When
Roberts agreed, Papio signed the deed of absolute sale.

Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property
for P250,000.00. In July 1985, since Roberts was by then already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized
representative, Perlita Ventura, the amount of P150,000.00 as partial payment for the property.[19] On June 16,
1986, she again remitted P100,000.00, through Ventura. Both payments were evidenced by receipts signed
by Ventura.[20] Roberts then declared that she would execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the title to
the property. However, Ventura had apparently misappropriated P39,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 that she
had received; Roberts then demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of
absolute sale. Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the failure of her
authorized representative to remit the full amount of P250,000.00. Despite Papios demands, Roberts refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale. Accordingly, defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to demand
payment of rental and eject him from the property.

Papio appended to his Answer the following: (1) the letter dated July 18, 1986 of Perlita Ventura to the
plaintiff wherein the former admitted having used the money of the plaintiff to defray the plane fares of Perlitas
parents to the USA, and pleaded that she be allowed to repay the amount within one year; (b) the letter of
Eugene Roberts (plaintiffs husband) to Perlita Ventura dated July 25, 1986 where he accused Ventura of
stealing the money of plaintiff Amelia (thus preventing the latter from paying her loan on her house and effect
the cancellation of the mortgage), and demanded that she deposit the balance;[21] and (c) plaintiffs letter to
defendant Papio dated July 25, 1986 requesting the latter to convince Ventura to remit the balance
of P39,000.00 so that the plaintiff could transfer the title of the property to the defendant.[22]

Papio asserted that the letters of Roberts and her husband are in themselves admissions or declarations
against interest, hence, admissible to prove that he had reacquired the property although the title was still in
her possession.

In her Affidavit and Position Paper,[23] Roberts averred that she had paid the real estate taxes on the
property after she had purchased it; Papios initial right to occupy the property was terminated when the original
lease period expired; and his continued possession was only by mere tolerance. She further alleged that the
Deed of Sale states on its face that the conveyance of the property was absolute and unconditional. She also
claimed that any right to repurchase the property must appear in a public document pursuant to Article 1358,
Paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of the Phililppines.[24] Since no such document exists, defendants supposed real
interest over the property could not be enforced without violating the Statute of Frauds.[25] She stressed that
her Torrens title to the property was an absolute and indefeasible evidence of her ownership of the property
which is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.

Roberts admitted that she demanded P39,000.00 from the defendant in her letter dated July 25,
1986. However, she averred that the amount represented his back rentals on the property.[26] She declared that
she neither authorized Ventura to sell the property nor to receive the purchase price therefor. She merely
authorized her to receive the rentals from defendant and to deposit them in her account. She did not know
that Ventura had received P250,000.00 from Papio in July 1985 and on June 16, 1986, and had signed receipts
therefor. It was only on February 11, 1998 that she became aware of the receipts when she received defendant
Papios letter to which were appended the said receipts. She and her husband offered to sell the property to the
defendant in 1984 for US$15,000.00 on a take it or leave it basis when they arrived in the Philippines in May
1984.[27]However, defendant refused to accept the offer. The spouses then offered to sell the property anew
on December 20, 1997, for P670,000.00 inclusive of back rentals.[28]However, defendant offered to settle his
account with the spouses.[29] Again, the offer came on January 11, 1998, but it was rejected. The defendant
insisted that he had already purchased the property in July 1985 for P250,000.00.

Roberts insisted that Papios claim of the right to repurchase the property, as well as his claim of
payment therefor, is belied by his own letter in which he offered to settle plaintiffs claim for back rentals. Even
assuming that the purchase price of the property had been paid through Ventura, Papio did not adduce any
proof to show that Ventura had been authorized to sell the property or to accept any payment thereon. Any
payment to Ventura could have no binding effect on her since she was not privy to the transaction; if at all,
such agreement would be binding only on Papio and Ventura.

She further alleged that defendants own inaction belies his claim of ownership over the property: first,
he failed to cause any notice or annotation to be made on the Register of Deeds copy of TCT No. 114478 in
order to protect his supposed adverse claim; second, he did not institute any action against Roberts to compel
the execution of the necessary deed of transfer of title in his favor; and third, the defense of ownership over the
property was raised only after Roberts demanded him to vacate the property.

Based solely on the parties pleadings, the MeTC rendered its January 18, 2001 Decision[30] in favor of
Roberts. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding this case for the plaintiff, the defendant is hereby ordered
to:

1. Vacate the leased premises known as 1046 Teresa St., Valenzuela, Makati City;

2. Pay plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrual for the period January 1, 1996 to December 13, 1997 at
the rate equivalent to Php2,500.00 per month and thereafter, Php10,000.00 from January 1998 until he
actually vacates the premises;

3. Pay the plaintiff attorneys fees as Php20,000.00; and

4. Pay the costs

SO ORDERED.[31]

The MeTC held that Roberts merely tolerated the stay of Papio in the property after the expiration of the
contract of lease on May 1, 1984; hence, she had a cause of action against him since the only elements in an
unlawful detainer action are the fact of lease and the expiration of its term. The defendant as tenant cannot
controvert the title of the plaintiff or assert any right adverse thereto or set up any inconsistent right to change
the existing relation between them. The plaintiff need not prove her ownership over the property inasmuch as
evidence of ownership can be admitted only for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession, and the amount of damages arising from the detention.

The court further ruled that Papio made no denials as to the existence and authenticity of Roberts title
to the property. It declared that the certificate of title is indefeasible in favor of the person whose name appears
therein and incontrovertible upon the expiration of the one-year period from the date of issue, and that
a Torrens title, which enjoys a strong
presumption of regularity and validity, is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to
therein.

As to Papios claim that the transfer of the property was one with right of repurchase, the MeTC held it
to be bereft of merit since the Deed of Sale is termed as absolute and unconditional. The court ruled that the
right to repurchase is not a right granted to the seller by the buyer in a subsequent instrument but rather, a
right reserved in the same contract of sale. Once the deed of absolute sale is executed, the seller can no longer
reserve the right to repurchase; any right thereafter granted in a separate document cannot be a right of
repurchase but some other right.

As to the receipts of payment signed by Ventura, the court gave credence to Robertss declaration in her
Affidavit that she authorized Ventura only to collect rentals from Papio, and not to receive the repurchase
price. Papios letter of January 31, 1998, which called her attention to the fact that she had been sending people
without written authority to collect money since 1985, bolstered the courts finding that the payment, if at all
intended for the supposed repurchase, never redounded to the benefit of the spouses Roberts.

Papio appealed the decision to the RTC, alleging the following:

I.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT
OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

II.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHICH ESTABLISHED THAT A REPURCHASE
TRANSACTION EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES ONLY THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WITHHELD
THE EXECUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE AND THE TRANSFER OF TITLE OF THE
SAME IN DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS NAME.
III.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE LETTERS OF
PLAINTIFF-[APPELLEE] AND OF HER HUSBAND ADDRESSED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND
HIS WIFE ARE IN THEMSELVES ADMISSION AND/OR DECLARATION OF THE FACT THAT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD DULY PAID PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OF THE PURCHASE AMOUNT
COVERING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
IV.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT
OUTRIGHT CONSIDERING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WHO IS [AN] AMERICAN CITIZEN AND
RESIDENT THEREIN HAD NOT APPEARED IN COURT ONCE, NEITHER WAS HER ALLEGED
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MATILDE AGUILAR NOR [DID] THE LATTER EVER [FURNISH] THE LOWER
COURT A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING HER TO APPEAR IN COURT IN BEHALF
OF HER PRINCIPAL.[32]

Papio maintained that Roberts had no cause of action for eviction because she had already ceded her
right thereto when she allowed him to redeem and reacquire the property upon payment of P250,000.00
to Ventura, her duly authorized representative. He also contended that Robertss claim that the authority
of Ventura is limited only to the collection of the rentals and not of the purchase price was a mere afterthought,
since her appended Affidavit was executed sometime in October 1999 when the proceedings in the MeTC had
already started.

On March 26, 2001, Roberts filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.[33] The court granted the
motion in an Order[34] dated June 19, 2001. Subsequently, a Writ of Execution[35] pending appeal was issued
on September 28, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Sheriff Melvin M. Alidon enforced the writ and placed Roberts in
possession of the property.

Meanwhile, Papio filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati City, for specific performance with damages
against Roberts. Papio, as plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a contract of sale with pacto de retro with
Roberts, and prayed that the latter be ordered to execute a Deed of Sale over `the property in his favor and
transfer the title over the property to and in his name. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851.

On October 24, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision of the
MeTC. The fallo of the decision reads:[36]

Being in accordance with law and the circumstances attendant to the instant case, the
court finds merit in plaintiff-appellees claim. Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January
18, 2001 is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.[37]
 Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration.[38] In an Order[39] dated February 26,
2002, the court denied the motion of Papio but modified its decision declaring that the computation of the
accrued rentals should commence from January 1986, not January 1996. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January 18, 2001 is hereby affirmed with modification that
defendant pay plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrued for the period January 1, 1986 to December [31,
1997] per month and thereafter and P10,000.00 [per month] from January 1998 to October 28, 2001 when
defendant-appellant actually vacated the subject leased premises.

SO ORDERED.[40]

On February 28, 2002, Papio filed a petition for review[41] in the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in not
finding that he had reacquired the property from Roberts for P250,000.00, but the latter refused to execute a
deed of absolute sale and transfer the title in his favor. He insisted that the MeTC and the RTC erred in giving
credence to petitioners claim that she did not authorize Ventura to receive his payments for the purchase price
of the property, citing Roberts letter dated July 25, 1986 and the letter of
Eugene Roberts to Ventura of even date. He also averred that the MeTC and the RTC erred in not considering
his documentary evidence in deciding the case.

On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition. The appellate court set aside the
decision of the RTC and ordered the RTC to dismiss the complaint. The decretal portion of the
Decision[42] reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered: (1) rendering an initial determination that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 13, 1982 is in fact an equitable mortgage under Article 1603 of the New Civil Code; and (2)
resolving therefore that petitioner Martin B. Papio is entitled to possession of the property
subject of this action; (3) But such determination of ownership and equitable mortgage are not
clothed with finality and will not constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits
with respect to the issue of ownership and such judgment shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found
in the case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.
All other counterclaims for damages are hereby dismissed. Cost against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.[43]

According to the appellate court, although the MeTC and RTC were correct in holding that the MeTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer, they erred in ignoring Papios defense of equitable
mortgage, and in not finding that the transaction covered by the deed of absolute sale by and between the
parties was one of equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code. The appellate court ruled that
Papio retained the ownership of the property and its peaceful possession; hence, the MeTC should have
dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. 01-851 relative to his claim of
ownership over the property.

Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the following grounds:

I. Petitioner did not allege in his Answer the defense of equitable mortgage; hence, the lower
courts [should] not have discussed the same;

II. Even assuming that Petitioner alleged the defense of equitable mortgage, the MeTC could not
have ruled upon the said defense,

III. The M[e]TC and the RTC were not remiss in the exercise of their jurisdiction.[44]

The CA denied the motion.

In this petition for review, Amelia Salvador-Roberts, as petitioner, avers that:

 I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE M[e]TC AN(D) THE RTC WERE REMISS IN THE EXERCISE OF
THAT JURISDICTION ACQUIRED BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL PETITIONERS
DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN

REQUIRING THE M[e]TC AND RTC TO RULE ON A DEFENSE WHICH WAS NEVER AVAILED OF BY
RESPONDENT.[45]

Petitioner argues that respondent is barred from raising the issue of equitable mortgage because his
defense in the MeTC and RTC was that he had repurchased the property from the petitioner; by such
representation, he had impliedly admitted the existence and validity of the deed of absolute sale whereby
ownership of the property was transferred to petitioner but reverted to him upon the exercise of said right. The
respondent even filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, which is now pending in the RTC of
Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851 entitled Martin B. Papio vs. Amelia Salvador-Roberts. In that
case, respondent claimed that his transaction with the petitioner was a sale with pacto de retro. Petitioner posits
that Article 1602 of the Civil Code applies only when the
defendant specifically alleges this defense. Consequently, the appellate court was proscribed from finding that
petitioner and respondent had entered into an equitable mortgage under the deed of absolute sale.

Petitioner further avers that respondent was ably represented by counsel and was aware of the
difference between a pacto de retro sale and an equitable mortgage; thus, he could not have been mistaken in
declaring that he repurchased the property from her.

As to whether a sale is in fact an equitable mortgage, petitioner claims that the issue should be properly
addressed and resolved by the RTC in an action to enforce ownership, not in an ejectment case before the
MeTC where the main issue involved is possession de facto. According to her, the obvious import of the CA
Decision is that, in resolving an ejectment case, the lower court must pass upon the issue of ownership (in this
case, by applying the presumptions under Art. 1602) which, in effect, would use the same yardstick as though it
is the main action. The procedure will not only promote multiplicity of suits but also place the new owner in the
absurd position of having to first seek the declaration of ownership before filing an ejectment suit.

Respondent counters that the defense of equitable mortgage need not be particularly stated to apprise
petitioner of the nature and character of the repurchase agreement. He contends that he had amply discussed
in his pleadings before the trial and appellate courts all the surrounding circumstances of the case, such as the
relative situation of the parties at the time; their attitude, acts, conduct, and declarations; and the negotiations
between them that led to the repurchase agreement. Thus, he argues that the CA correctly ruled that the
contract was one of equitable mortgage. He insists that petitioner allowed him to redeem and reacquire the
property, and accepted his full payment of the property through Ventura, the authorized representative, as
shown by the signed receipts.

The threshold issues are the following: (1) whether the MeTC had jurisdiction in an action for unlawful
detainer to resolve the issue of who between petitioner and respondent is the owner of the property and
entitled to the de facto possession thereof; (2) whether the transaction entered into between the parties under
the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Contract of Lease is an equitable mortgage over the property; and (3)
whether the petitioner is entitled to the material or de facto possession of the property.

The Ruling of the Court

On the first issue, the CA ruling (which upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC to resolve the issue of who
between petitioner or respondent is the lawful owner of the property, and is thus entitled to the material or de
facto possession thereof) is correct. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment
would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.[46]

The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property of the
defendant.[47] The MeTC is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply because the
defendant asserts ownership over the property.

The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or de facto possession of the
property. Even if the defendant claims
juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim that his transaction with the plaintiff
relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage, or that he had repurchased the property from the
plaintiff, the MeTC may still delve into and take cognizance of the case and make an initial or provisional
determination of who between the plaintiff and the defendant is the owner and, in the process, resolve the
issue of who is entitled to the possession. The MeTC, in unlawful detainer case, decides the question of
ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the issue of possession.[48] The resolution of the
MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of
ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with
finality, in this case, Civil Case No. 01-851 which respondent filed before the RTC.

The ruling of the CA, that the contract between petitioner and respondent was an equitable mortgage,
is incorrect. The fact of the matter is that the respondent intransigently alleged in his answer, and even in his
affidavit and position paper, that petitioner had granted him the right to redeem or repurchase the property at
any time and for a reasonable amount; and that, he had, in fact, repurchased the property in July 1985
for P250,000.00 which he remitted to petitioner through an authorized representative who signed receipts
therefor; he had reacquired ownership and juridical possession of the property after his repurchase thereof in
1985; and consequently, petitioner was obliged to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in his
favor.

Notably, respondent alleged that, as stated in his letter to petitioner, he was given the right to reacquire
the property in 1982 within two years upon the payment of P53,000.00, plus petitioners airfare for her trip to
the Philippines from the USA and back; petitioner promised to sign the deed
of absolute sale. He even filed a complaint against the petitioner in the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851,
for specific performance with damages to compel petitioner to execute the said deed of absolute sale over the
property presumably on the strength of Articles 1357 and 1358 of the New Civil Code. Certainly then, his claim
that petitioner had given him the right to repurchase the property is antithetical to an equitable mortgage.

An equitable mortgage is one that, although lacking in some formality, form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to change a real property as
security for a debt and contain nothing impossible or contrary to law.[49] A contract between the parties is an
equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present: (a) the parties entered into a contract denominated
as a contract of sale; and (b) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.[50] The decisive
factor is the intention of the parties.

In an equitable mortgage, the mortgagor retains ownership over the property but subject to foreclosure
and sale at public auction upon failure of the mortgagor to pay his obligation.[51] In contrast, in a pacto de
retro sale, ownership of the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro subject only to the
right of the vendor a retro to repurchase the property upon compliance with legal requirements for the
repurchase. The failure of the vendor a retro to exercise the right to repurchase within the agreed time vests
upon the vendee a retro, by operation of law, absolute title over the property.[52]

One repurchases only what one has previously sold. The right to repurchase presupposes a valid
contract of sale between the same parties.[53] By insisting that he had repurchased the property, respondent
thereby
admitted that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and petitioner on April 13, 1982 was, in fact and in
law, a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage; hence, he had acquired ownership over the
property based on said deed. Respondent is, thus, estopped from asserting that the contract under the deed of
absolute sale is an equitable mortgage unless there is allegation and evidence of palpable mistake on the part of
respondent;[54] or a fraud on the part of petitioner. Respondent made no such allegation in his pleadings and
affidavit. On the contrary, he maintained that petitioner had sold the property to him in July 1985 and
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price thereof except the amount of P39,000.00 retained by Perlita
Ventura. Respondent is thus bound by his admission of petitioners ownership of the property and is barred from
claiming otherwise.[55]

Respondents admission that petitioner acquired ownership over the property under the April 13, 1982
deed of absolute sale is buttressed by his admission in the Contract of Lease dated April 15, 1982 that petitioner
was the owner of the property, and that he had paid the rentals for the duration of the contract of lease and
even until 1985 upon its extension. Respondent was obliged to prove his defense that petitioner had given him
the right to repurchase, and that petitioner obliged herself to resell the property for P250,000.00 when they
executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale.

We have carefully reviewed the case and find that respondent failed to adduce competent and credible
evidence to prove his claim.

As gleaned from the April 13, 1982 deed, the right of respondent to repurchase the property is not
incorporated therein. The contract is one of absolute sale and not one with right to repurchase. The law states
that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[56] When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt
as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its
plain import.[57] The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Neither
abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they
did not make themselves, or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation to assume simply or
merely to avoid seeming hardships.[58] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the
contracting parties know their scope and effects.[59] As the Court held in Villarica, et al. v. Court of Appeals:[60]
 The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but
is a right reserved by the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once
the instrument of absolute sale is executed, the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase, and any
right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but
some other right like the option to buy in the instant case.[61]

In Ramos v. Icasiano,[62] we also held that an agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when
made after the sale because when the sale is made without such agreement the purchaser acquires the thing
sold absolutely; and, if he afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into
by the purchaser as absolute owner. An option to buy or a promise to sell is different and distinct from the right
of repurchase that must be reserved by means of stipulations to that effect in the contract of sale.[63]

There is no evidence on record that, on or before July 1985, petitioner agreed to sell her property to the
respondent for P250,000.00. Neither is there any documentary evidence showing that Ventura was authorized
to offer for sale or sell the property for and in behalf of petitioner for P250,000.00, or to receive the said
amount from respondent as purchase price of the property. The rule is that when a sale of a piece of land or
any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall
be void[64] and cannot produce any legal effect as to transfer the property from its lawful owner.[65] Being
inexistent and void from the very beginning, said contract cannot be ratified.[66] Any contract entered into
by Ventura for and in behalf of petitioner relative to the sale of the property is void and cannot be ratified by
the latter. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone.[67]

Respondent also failed to prove that the negotiations between him and petitioner has culminated in his
offer to buy the property for P250,000.00, and that they later on agreed to the sale of the property for the same
amount. He likewise failed to prove that he purchased and reacquired the property in July 1985. The evidence
on record shows that petitioner had offered to sell the property for US$15,000 on a take it or leave it basis in
May 1984 upon the expiration of the Contract of Lease[68] an offer that was rejected by respondentwhich is why
on December 30, 1997, petitioner and her husband offered again to sell the property to respondent
for P670,000.00 inclusive of back rentals and the purchase price of the property under the April 13, 1982 Deed
of absolute Sale.[69] The offer was again rejected by respondent. The final offer appears to have been made
on January 11, 1998[70] but again, like the previous negotiations, no contract was perfected between the parties.

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service.[71] Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, there is no
contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Contracts are perfected by mere consent manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[72]Once perfected, they bind the contracting
parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the form of law between the parties which must be complied
with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.[73]

There was no contract of sale entered into by the parties based on the Receipts dated July 1985
and June 16, 1986, signed by Perlita Ventura and the letter of petitioner to respondent dated July 25, 1986.

By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and
deliver a determinate thing and the other, to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.[74] The
absence of any of the essential elements will negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. As the Court
ruled in Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo:[75]

A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell

personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties.Price is an
essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price
can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the
contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.[76]

A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. When there
is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other, there is no contract. [77] When the contract of
sale is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation
between the parties.[78]
 Respondents reliance on petitioners letter to him dated July 25, 1986 is misplaced. The letter reads in
full:

7-25-86

Dear Martin & Ising,

Enclosed for your information is the letter written by my husband to Perlita. I hope that
you will be able to convince your cousin that its to her best interest to deposit the balance of
your payment to me of P39,000.00 in my bank acct. per our agreement and send me my bank
book right away so that we can transfer the title of the property.

Regards,

Amie [79]

We have carefully considered the letter of Perlita Ventura, dated July 18, 1986, and the letter of Eugene
Roberts, dated July 25, 1986, where Ventura admitted having used the money of petitioner amounting
to P39,000.00 without the latters knowledge for the plane fare of Venturas parents. Ventura promised to refund
the amount of P39,000.00, inclusive of interests, within one year.[80] Eugene Roberts berated Ventura and called
her a thief for stealing his and petitioners money and that of respondents wife, Ising, who allegedly told
petitioner that she, Ising, loaned the money to her parents for their plane fare to the USA. Neither Ventura nor
Eugene Roberts declared in their letters that Venturahad used the P250,000.00 which respondent gave to her.

Petitioner in her letter to respondent did not admit, either expressly or impliedly, having received P211,000.00
from Ventura. Moreover, in her letter to petitioner, only a week earlier, or on July 18, 1986, Ventura admitted
having spent the P39,000.00 and pleaded that she be allowed to refund the amount within one (1) year,
including interests.

Naririto ang total ng pera mo sa bankbook mo, P55,000.00 pati na yong deposit na sarili mo at
bale ang nagalaw ko diyan ay P39,000.00. Huwag kang mag-alala ibabalik ko rin sa iyo sa loob ng isang
taon pati interest.

Ate Per[81]

It is incredible that Ventura was able to remit to petitioner P211,000.00 before July 25, 1986 when only a week
earlier, she was pleading to petitioner for a period of one year within which to refund the P39,000.00 to
petitioner.

It would have bolstered his cause if respondent had submitted an affidavit of Ventura stating that she
had remitted P211,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 she received from respondent in July 1985 and June 20,
1986.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
affirmed with modification by the Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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(4) Benguet Corp vs Cordilla GR#155343 Sept 2, 2005;

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Resolution[1] dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72150 and the Decision[2] dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch VIII, in Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698, and thus reinstate the Decision[3] dated
December 21, 2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, Benguet in Civil Case No. 314.

Petitioner Benguet Corporation owns Pilo mineral claim covering several hectares of land in Virac, Itogon,
Benguet. It planted pine trees in compliance with the directive of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and built roads, buildings and security gates in the covered area. Sometime in September
1997, petitioner discovered that representatives of respondent Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. (CCMI)
bulldozed and leveled the grounds within its Pilo mineral claim in preparation for the construction of a school.
Despite petitioners demands to cease, respondents continued with the construction activities.

Petitioner filed a complaint[4] for forcible entry against respondents in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Itogon, Benguet. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners prior possession of the land since August 10, 1964, vis--
vis CCMIs possession which began only in 1994. The court ordered respondents to vacate the premises, restore
complete possession to the petitioner, and pay the cost. [5]

On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the MTC and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. It found that the complaint did not state the means of dispossession and did not constitute an
action for forcible entry.[6]

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to
attach (a) the board resolution authorizing the affiant to file the complaint, and (b) the certified copies of other
pleadings and documents pertinent and relevant thereto.[7]

Petitioner now comes before us alleging that

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
a) in denying due course the petition (sic);
b) in not considering the issues raised in the petition which are actually based on facts not
controverted but even stipulated by the parties;
c) in not disposing the issues which are not even factual but legal issues based on duly
established facts at the trial court.[8]

Simply stated, we are asked to resolve the following issues: (1) Is petitioners failure to attach the board
resolution and the copies of other pleadings an excusable mistake? (2) Does the complaint state a cause of
action? and (3) If it does, who should have possession?

On the first issue, petitioner claims to have substantially complied with the rules, and pleads for the liberal
construction, as a matter of substantive justice. It averred that affiant Marcelo A. Bolao was authorized by the
board but copies of the board resolution were in its Makati Office while its counsel was based in Baguio City. It
maintains that the attached complaint and decisions of the MTC and RTC were sufficient since the petition
before the Court of Appeals was limited to pure questions of law. It posits that the complaint itself is the best
evidence to determine whether the allegations therein sufficiently state a cause of action.

This Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional.[9] Such requirement is a condition affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this
requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or
a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[10] Further, the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.[11] Considering that later on Mr. Bolaos
authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was ratified[12] by the board, there is no
circumvention of these objectives.
On the necessity of other pleadings and documents, Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires
attachments if these would support the allegations of the petition. We note that the facts alleged in the petition
filed before the Court of Appeals were the same facts found in the decisions of the MTC and RTC. Accordingly,
we find no compelling need to attach other portions of the records. Besides, the appellate court can always
refer to the records transmitted[13] by the clerk of the trial court if it wanted to verify the allegations.

The Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and liberality[14] to promote its objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are used
to help secure and not override substantial justice. Thus, the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical
ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.[15] No such result happened here.

Anent the second issue, which goes to the merits of the instant controversy, petitioner asserts that it
specifically alleged the acts constituting forcible entry and it points to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint as
well as to the annexed photographs. For its part, the respondent defends the ruling of the RTC that petitioner
failed to state sufficiently a cause of action in the complaint before the MTC.

The pertinent portion of the complaint reads:

...
 3. The plaintiff is the owner as well as lawful and peaceful possessor of a parcel of land covered
by PILO Mineral Claim shown in the approved plan hereto attached as Annex A hereof.

4. Sometime in the later part of September 1997, plaintiffs caretaker noticed an ongoing
bulldozing and ground leveling activities within Pilo Mineral Claim. His investigation
revealed that the illegal activity was being undertaken by individual defendants who were
supervising the heavy equipment owned by one Pio Wasit. When confronted, said defendant
represented themselves to be representatives of defendant Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc.
To this effect, hereto attached.

5. The defendants were warned of their unlawful entry in the above-described property of the
plaintiff but defendants refused to stop to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff herein. In
fact, in the process of forcible entry in the property, the defendants destroyed young and full
grown pine trees alike which your plaintiff had been protecting and spending considerable
amount therefor.

6. The unlawful activities by the defendants and their refusal to stop despite demand prompted
plaintiff to send them demand letter dated October 1, 1997, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex G, but in spite of the receipt of said letter, the defendants ignored it and continued
in their activities dispossessing plaintiff of its peaceful possession over the property. In fact,
the defendants even proceeded in laying the foundation of the construction of a building as
shown in the photographs hereto attached as Annex H.[16]

In actions for forcible entry, it may be stressed, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth.[17] If the alleged dispossession did not
occur by any of these means, the proper recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action
to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.[18]

Nothing in the complaint before the MTC would show how the entry was effected nor how dispossession
took place. The complaint merely stated that petitioners caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and leveling
activities. The allegations that these activities were illegal and that respondents entry was unlawful are not
statements of bare facts but conclusions of law. The complaint should have specified what made the activities
illegal and the entry unlawful.[19] Without these ultimate facts, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. In view of the foregoing, the RTC properly reversed the MTCs decision and then dismissed the complaint
of petitioner for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court would not and did not commit a reversible
error in sustaining in effect the RTCs decision of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72150 and the Decision dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch VIII, in Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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(5) Valdez Jr vs CA GR#132424 May 4, 2006;

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R.
Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision[1] and 30 January
1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January
1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in
toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio
and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabellabefore the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:
 2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated
as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which
[they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales
Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex A and the xerox copy of the
Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex B;

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by
building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession
thereof;

4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully
surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused
to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case
amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in
favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the
proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex C;

7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex D;

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender

the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
torture and moral erosion; x x x[2]

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior
physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private
respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to
vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorneys fees.

Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision
dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March
1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they
had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private
respondents possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the
allegations in petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of
prior material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:

An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for
ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material possession is
mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither
does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show that
they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been]
extinguished.

xxx
 In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which
the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal
thereof is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision dated 08
January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,and
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.[3]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.[4]

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration[5]:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A

CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER
THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.

Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.

In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer
having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in
question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the
formers tolerance or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied
promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.

The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real
property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accionreivindicatoria.[6]

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico).[7] In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.[8] The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from
the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.[9]

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court.[10] Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.[11] The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.[12] It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.[13] In other words, if at the time of the
filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.[14]

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.[15] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be
an improper remedy.[16] As explained in Sarona v. Villegas[17]:
 But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not
doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court
under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First.Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for
in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief
in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make
a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set
in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary
in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action.[18] (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder
is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is
unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.[19] The complaint must show
enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.[20]

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court.[21] Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[22] petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case
against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which
was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the
issue on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled[23]:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No.
C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their
mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases
of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start
of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action
fails.The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and
not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy
the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners
and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession
by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court
of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible
entry x xx.
 And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,[24] petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject
property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of
the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action
for unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the
beginning of the possession. x x x

xxxx

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact
that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of
action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or tolerance
must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.[25]

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners
the possession thereof. Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to
allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.[26] Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case.[27]It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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(6) Manalang vs CA GR#156995 Jan 12, 2015;

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
required by the RTC. There is no trial de nova of the case.

The Case

The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68419,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 49, in Guagua, Pampanga, and
reinstated the judgment rendered on August 31, 2000 by the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga dismissing their
complaint for unlawful detainer and the respondents’ counterclaim. They also hereby assail the resolution
promulgated on January 24, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.2
 Antecedents

Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang
and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua
Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by
approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235 covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and verification
survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot
No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands
Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed the result on
the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful
possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21,
1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case No. 3309), and the casewas assigned to Branch 2 of that court.3

On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of jurisdiction based onits
finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria.4 It stated that the complaint did not aver any contract, whether express or implied, between the
petitioners and the respondents that qualified the case as one for unlawful detainer; and that there was also no
showing that the respondents were in possession of the disputed area by the mere tolerance of the petitioners
due to the latter having become aware of the encroachment only after the relocation survey held in 1997.

On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for further
proceedings,5holding that because there was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and the
action was brought within one year from such withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which
was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was not a boundary dispute that could be resolved in
an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it involved a sizeable area of property and not a mere transferring of
boundary.6

Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack ofmerit through
the decision rendered on August 31, 2000,8 ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence showing that the respondents had encroached on their property and had been occupying and
possessing property outside the metes and bounds described in Bienvenido Bacani’s OCT No. N-216701; that
the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the respondents’ right of possession; and that the respondent’s
counterclaim for damages should also be dismissed, there being no showing that the complaint had been filed in
gross and evident bad faith.9

Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.

At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting Chief of the
Survey Section of the CENR- DENR.

On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision
of August 31, 2000, observing that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners’ property based on the
court-ordered relocation survey, the reports by Engr. Limpin, and his testimony;11 that the respondents could
not rely on their OCT No. N-216701, considering that although their title covered only 481 squaremeters, the
relocation survey revealed that they had occupied also 560 square meters of the petitioners’ Lot No.
4236;12 that the petitioners did not substantiate their claims for reasonable compensation, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses; and that, nevertheless, after it had been established that the respondents had encroached
upon and used a portion of the petitioners’ property, the latter were entitled to ₱1,000.00/month as reasonable
compensation from the filing of the complaint up to time that the respondents actually vacated the encroached
property, plus ₱20,000.00 attorney’s fees.13

The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for its lack of merit.14

The respondents appealed.

On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,15 viz:

WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decisions of the MTC of
Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC,by ordering the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" upon motion of the petitioners and over the objection of the respondents, and making a
determination of whether there was an encroachment based on such survey and testimony of the surveyor, had
acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial,
which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed that the relocation and
verification survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the surveyor had himself admitted that he could not determine
which of the three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-blown trial.

The CA held that considering that the petitioners’ complaint for unlawful detainer did not set forth when and
how the respondents had entered the land in question and constructed their houses thereon, jurisdiction did not
vest in the MTC totry and decide the case; that the complaint, if at all, made out a case for either accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either of which fell within the original jurisdiction of the RTC; and that the
RTC’s reliance on Benitez v. Court of Appeals16 and Calubayan v. Ferrer17 was misplaced, because the controlling
ruling was that in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,18 in which the complaint was markedly similar to that filed in
the case.

The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for its lack of merit in the resolution of
January 24, 2003.19

Issues

Hence, this appeal.

The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in anejectment
case because it was not absolutely confined to the records of the trial in resolving the appeal; that the
respondents were estopped from assailing the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC because
they had actively participated in the survey and had even cross-examined Engr. Limpin, the surveyor tasked to
conduct the survey;20that Engr. Limpin’s testimony must be given credence, honoring the well-entrenched
principle of regularity in the performance of official functions;21 that the RTC did not conduct a trial de novoby
ordering the relocation and verification surveyand hearing the testimony of the surveyor; that the desirability of
the relocation and verification survey had always been part of the proceedings even before the case was
appealed to the RTC;22 that, in any case, the peculiar events that transpired justified the RTC’s order to conduct
a relocation and verification survey;23 that the case, because it involved encroachment into another’s property,
qualified as an ejectment case that was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the respondents were
barred by laches for never questioning the RTC’s February 11, 1999 ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.24

In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC as immaterial,
because (a) it could not vest a right of possession or ownership; (b) the petitioners were mere claimants, not
the owners of the property; (c) the petitioner had never been in possession of the area in question; and (d)
cadastral surveys were not reliable. Hence, they maintain that whether or not the relocation and verification
survey was considered would not alter the outcome of the case.25

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial
de novo.26 In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides:

Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — x x x.

xxxx

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to
its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal
based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin. Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint. Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of
the petitioners’ complaint follow:
 2. Plaintiffs are co-owners ofland known as Lot no. 4236 of the Guagua cadastre. Plaintiffs inherited the
said parcel of residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang who is the absolute owner of the said
property and the same is declared for taxation purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No.
07014906, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A";

3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made Annex ‘B") and it
consists of 914 square meters;

4. Adjacent to plaintiff’s [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the Guagua Cadastre and covered by approved
plan As-03-00533 (copy made Annex "C") which is being claimed by defendants and is the subject
matter of Cadastral Case No. N-229 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Branch 53 where a decision
(copy made Annex "D") was rendered by said court on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said lot
in favor of defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The said decision is now final and executory …

5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and verification survey of cadastral Not No.
4236 of the Guagua Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining lots, particularly Lot No. 4235
being claimed by defendants;

6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly licensed Geodetic
Engineer per plan (copy made Annex "F") revealed that defendants had encroached an area of 405
square meters of the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the houses of the
said defendants have been erected in said encroached portion;

7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a complaint before
the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against defendants regarding the encroached
portion. A preliminary relocation survey was conducted by the Lands Management Sector of the DENR
and it was found that indeed, defendants encroached into the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. This
finding was confirmed by the approved plan Ap-03-004154;

8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiff, the Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga issued a certification to file action (copy
made Annex "G’) dated March 4, 1997 to enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate action in court;

9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs senta formal demand letter (copy made Annex ‘H") to defendants to
vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the said encroached portion;

10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return cards attached to the letter, defendants
failed and refused to vacate the encroached portion and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiffs;

11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00 from defendants for
the illegal use and occupation of their property by defendants;

12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable
compensation to plaintiffs, the latter were constrained to engage the services of counsel for ₱30,00.00
plus ₱1,000.00 per appearance and incur litigation expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00.27

Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary
action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in
the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under
which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming
unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the
plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.

Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was
correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the
complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action.28 To be clear,
unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.29 To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the
land of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer.30 However, the allegations of the
petitioners' complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their
property by the respondents; or how the respondents' entry had been effected, or how and when the
dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents' "illegal use
and occupation" of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer.

Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondents had encroached on the petitioners' property was also warranted. In contrast, the only basis for the
RTC's decision was the result of the relocation and verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that
basis should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned. Under the circumstances, the reinstatement of the
ruling of the MTC by the CA was in accord with the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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(7) Santos vs Sps Ayon GR#137013 May 6, 2005;

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution[2] dated December 11, 1998 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon,
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and
108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein
parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed
respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the
building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish
and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But they
refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building.
The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying
petitioners property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the
same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their
successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and
peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.

Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in
the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent
months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorneys fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in
Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.[4] The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that
respondents occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the
same, he has the right to eject them through court action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its Decision
dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners proper
remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:

In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent
bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used
by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondents bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that
petitioners possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have
tolerated petitioners possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of
action is the nature of petitioners possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the
complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been occupying a portion of the above properties
of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff. Nowhere is it alleged that his
predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners possession of the premises. x x x.

Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion
publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED.[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated
December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE
GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.

II

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that
petitioners complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property
before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents occupancy of the
portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became
illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even
before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the
property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings
filed by the defendant.[6] This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.[7] All actions
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.[8] The said courts are not divested of
jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated
property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership.[9]
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
reads:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case
for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation
thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose
possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff,
but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.[10]
Petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of
the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures
and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by
virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;

5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants
to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the
PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the
portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City
for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reached
the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a Certification To File Action dated March 27, 1996 was
issued x x x;

x x x.[11] (underscoring ours)

Verily, petitioners allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error
in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing
the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy
on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer
springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within
one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals[13] is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31,
1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

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(8) ATO vs CA GR#173616 June 25, 2014;

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the
Court of Appeals' Resolution1 dated March 29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603. The Resolution dated March 29, 2006 granted the application for temporary restraining order (TRO) of
Bernie G. Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite Miaque's
alleged continued failure and refusal to make current the supersedeas bond and to pay to the A TO the rental
and concession privilege fees.

The proceedings on the main case of ejectment

MTCC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 01 (38)

In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 01 (38). The ATO sought the following,
among others:

(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and peacefully return to the ATO possession of:

(a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;

(b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Airport Terminal; and

(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage
Service within the Iloilo Airport; and

(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO the amount of not less than ₱1,296,103.10,
representing unpaid space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October 15, 2000 plus interest
and additional rental and fees which may be proven during the trial.3

The MTCC subsequently rendered a Decision4 dated May 27, 2002 the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be unlawfully detaining the following premises and
orders [him], his men and privies to:

a. vacate the 800[-]square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport.
[Miaque] is further ordered to pay [the ATO] the rental and concessionaire privilege fee[s] accruing from
November 1986 to October 2000, totaling ₱460,060.70, plus differential billings from January 1990 to
July 1993 for ₱4,652.60 and interest charges from January 2000 to October 2000 for ₱2,678.38 or a
total amount of ₱467,397.68 as of October 2000, less the payments made by [Miaque] under Official
Receipt No. 4317842 dated December 1998, and the monthly current lease/concession privilege fee from
November 2000 until [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises;

(b) vacate the 310[-]square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal Building which was
reduced to a total of 183 square meters in 1998 (51.56 square meters inside the pre-departure area and
126.72 square meters outside the pre-departure area). [Miaque] is also ordered to pay [the ATO]
rentals/concessionaire’s privilege fee[s] from January 16, 1992 to October 15, 2000 in the total amount
of ₱719,708.43 and from October 16, 2000, to pay the current monthly lease/concessionaire privilege
fees until [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises; and

(c) vacate the area occupied or used by [Miaque] incident to his operation of the Porterage Service
within the Iloilo Airport. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay Tender Offer Fee due from March 1992 to
October 2000 in the total amount of ₱108,997.07. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay the current
monthly concession privilege fee from October 2000 until such time that [Miaque] shall have vacated the
premises.

Costs against [Miaque].5

RTC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 02-27292

Miaque appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
27292. The RTC, in its Decision6 dated June 7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaque’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.7 Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 Miaque questioned the RTC
Decision in the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, on
September 25, 2003. In a Decision8 dated April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the RTC Decision. Miaque moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated January 5,
2006.9

Supreme Court: G.R. No. 171099

Miaque brought the case to this Court in a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 171099. In a
Resolution10 dated February 22, 2006, the petition was denied as no reversible error in the Court of Appeals
Decision was sufficiently shown. The motion for reconsideration of Miaque was denied with finality.11

The proceedings on execution

As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court of Appeals issued on February 27, 2004 a temporary
restraining order (TRO) effective for a period of 60 days and required Miaque to post a bond in the amount of
₱100,000.00.12After the lapse of the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent motion for the execution of the RTC Decision
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This was opposed by Miaque.13

In an Order14 dated August 2, 2004, the RTC granted the ATO’s motion:

Wherefore, in view of the above consideration, the court finds merit [i]n the reasons given in the motion of [the
ATO] and hereby Grants the issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that the judgment of this
Court being immediately executory in cases of this nature, let a writ of execution shall issue, ordering the sheriff
of this Court to effect its Decision dated June 7, 2003, affirming the Decision of the MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.

Furnish copies of this order to the Asst. Solicitor Almira Tomampos of the Office of the Solicitor General and
Atty. Rex Rico, counsel for [Miaque].15

Miaque sought reconsideration of the above Order but the RTC denied the motion in an Order16 dated August
13, 2004. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution dated August 16, 2004.17

However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution18 dated August 18, 2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the respective
Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of
Miaque’s petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion for execution of the
RTC Decision. In its motion, the ATO pointed out that the supersedeas bond filed by Miaque had lapsed and
was not renewed and that the rental and concessionaire privilege fees have not been paid at all in violation of
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.19 Miaque again opposed the ATO’s urgent motion for execution,20 while
the ATO filed a supplemental urgent motion for execution stating that Miaque’s appeal in the Court of Appeals
had been dismissed.21

In an Order22 dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted the ATO’s urgent motion for execution and issued a Writ of
Execution23 dated June 2, 2005. On the basis of the said writ, a notice to vacate was given to Miaque.24 On June
3, 2005, Miaque filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 1, 2005, with prayer to set aside the
writ of execution and notice to vacate.25 At the same time, he filed a motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 praying
that the Court of Appeals order the RTC judge and the concerned sheriffs to desist from implementing the writ
of execution.26 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution27 dated June 14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs
to desist from executing the Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is still pending.
However, on June 15, 2005, before the concerned sheriffs received a copy of the Resolution dated June 14,
2005, the said sheriffs implemented the writ of execution and delivered the possession of the following premises
to the ATO:

(a) the Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal Building in the reduced area of 183 square
meters; and

(b) the area which Miaque occupied or used incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the
Iloilo Airport.

The sheriffs who implemented the writ then filed a return of service28 and issued reports of partial delivery of
possession.29 However, Miaque subsequently regained possession of the said premises on the strength of the
Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated June 14, 2005.30

On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution dated January 5, 2006 denying Miaque’s
motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed with the
RTC a motion for the revival of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005.31 This was
opposed by Miaque.32 After the RTC heard the parties, it issued an Order33 dated March 20, 2006 granting the
ATO’s motion and revived the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque filed a motion
for reconsideration but the RTC denied it.34

A new case in the Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603

On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition35 for certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed the
RTC’s Order dated March 20, 2006. He prayed, among others, that the implementation of the writs of execution
be enjoined. It is here where the Court of Appeals issued the Resolutions being challenged in this case, namely,
the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO effective for 60 days, and Resolution dated May 30, 2006
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of execution dated August 16,
2004 and June2, 2005. In particular, the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 reads: Before us for resolution is
[Miaque]’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that would restrain the respondent
judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso, Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric George S. Luntao and
all other persons acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the orders issued by the respondent judge on
March 20, 2006 and March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of execution issued pursuant thereto, while the
petition in the case at bench is still pending with us.

After examining judiciously the record in this case, together with the submissions and contentions of the parties,
we have come up with a finding and so hold that there is a sufficient showing by [Miaque] that the grounds for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enumerated in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court exist. We find that [Miaque] has a right in esse to be protected and the acts against which the injunction
is sought to be directed are violative of said right. To our mind, [Miaque] appears to have a clear legal right to
hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected
therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court
of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 on April 29, 2005. Under the
attendant circumstances, it appears that the respondent judge orthe RTC in Iloilo City has no jurisdiction to
order the issuance of such writ of execution because we gave due course to the petition for review filed with us
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and, in fact, rendered a decision on the merit in said case, thereby divesting the RTC
in Iloilo City of jurisdiction over the case as provided for in the third paragraph of Section 8(a) of Rule 42of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court. In City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, as cited in Mocles vs.
Maravilla, 239 SCRA 188, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"The rule is that, if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the RTC and the decision of the
latter itself is elevated to the CA whose decision thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through
the RTC to the metropolitan trial court for execution."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby ordered or
caused to be issued by us enjoining the respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso, Winston T. Eguia,
Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric George S. Luntao and all other persons acting for and in their behalves, from
enforcing the orders issued by the respondent judge on March 20, 2006 and March 24, 2006, including the
writ[s] of execution issued pursuant thereto, while the petition in the case at bench is still pending with us.

This is subject to the petitioner’s putting up of a bond in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS(₱100,000.00) to the effect that he will pay to the respondent ATO all damages which said office may
sustain by reason of the injunctive writ if we should finally decide that [Miaque] is not entitled thereto.36

The present petition

The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction through the Order dated March
29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 30,2006, respectively. According to the ATO, the Court of Appeals
ignored the government’s right under the law, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and equity to the possession as
well as to the payment of rental and concession privilege fees which, at the time of the filing of this petition,
already amounted to ₱2 Million. Such right had already been decided with finality by this Court, which affirmed
the Decision dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, but the Court of Appeals has
repeatedly thwarted it. The RTC acted properly and pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when
it issued the writs of execution.37 Moreover, the ATO asserts that a TRO cannot restrain an accomplished fact,
as the RTC’s writ of execution dated June 1, 2005 had already been partially implemented.38

The ATO also argues that, by his admission that the issues in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603 are exactly the same, Miaque has committed forum shopping. In this connection, the ATO points out
that, in his opposition to the ATO’s motion for additional period of time to file its comment on Miaque’s petition
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, Miaque pointed out the similarity of the core issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, to wit:

b) The legal issues raised by the petition [in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603] are very simple and not
complicated. In fact, the threshold issue, i.e., whether or not respondent court (RTC) has jurisdiction to
issue the writ of execution after the appeal over its decision had been perfected and the petition for
review [in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439] given due course, is exactly the same one earlier raised by [the ATO
itself in its] "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Resolution dated June 14, 2005, in CA G.R. No. 79439,
 entitled "Bernie G. Miaque vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez and Air Transportation Office (ATO)", (same parties
in this proceeding), then pending before the 20th Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.

Hence, all that [the ATO has] to do is simply to reiterate [its] said arguments, the law and jurisprudence [it has]
earlier invoked and, if [it wishes], add some more arguments, laws or jurisprudence thereto. Such an exercise
would definitely not require a sixty (60) day period. A ten (10) day period is more than sufficient.39

The ATO further contends that the subject premises form part of a public utility infrastructure and, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1818, the issuance of a TRO against a public utility infrastructure is prohibited.40

The ATO adds that Miaque’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603 introduces a new matter which is
the alleged novation of the MTCC Decision when he deposited the amount of ₱319,900.00 to the Land Bank of
the Philippines account of the ATO in February 2006. At any rate, the ATO asserts that its tenacity in pursuing
the execution of the judgment against Miaque belies its consent to the alleged novation.41

For his part, Miaque argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to dismiss a petition still pending with the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the ATO cannot properly pray that this Court dismiss CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. According to
Miaque, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited only to the determination of whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in issuing a TRO and, subsequently, a preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603. In this connection, Miaque insists that the Court of Appeals acted well within its jurisdiction in the
issuance of both the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO and the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. As this Court has effectively affirmed the
MTCC Decision, then it is the MTCC and not the RTC which should have directed the execution of the MTCC
Decision. Moreover, the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June
1, 2005 because the said court already lost its jurisdiction when Miaque filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
on September 25, 2003, which appeal was given due course.42

Miaque also asserts that the ATO’s claim that the RTC’s writ of execution had been partially implemented is not
true and that he is in possession of the entire subject premises when the Court of Appeals issued the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction being challenged in this case.

Finally, Miaque alleges that no writ may be issued to enforce the MTCC Decision as the said decision had
already been novated by his deposit of ₱319,000.00 to the ATO’s account with the Land Bank of the Philippines
in February 2006.43

This Court, in a Resolution44 dated August 14, 2006, issued a TRO enjoining the Court of Appeals, Miaque, and
his agents and representatives from implementing the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.

The Court’s ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective
for 60 days, is moot as its effectivity had already lapsed.

Cutting through the tangled web of issues presented by the contending parties, the basic question in this
petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 which granted petitioner’s application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.

Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on
appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant
shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis
supplied.)

This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule
70 shall be deemed repealed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court which respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and
support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall
be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order
suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the
security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.

xxxx

Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.–

(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful
fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.

The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment or
final order unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall provide otherwise. (Emphases supplied.)

The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an
ejectment case appealed to it:

(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom; and

(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by
the RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified.

The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is emphasized by the fact that no
resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent or stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment.45 The
significance of this may be better appreciated by comparing Section 21 of Rule 70 with its precursor, Section 10,
Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court which provided:

Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – Where defendant appeals from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of
possession, shall not be stayed unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred
to in section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided.

Under the old provision, the procedure on appeal from the RTC’s judgment to the Court of Appeals was, with
the exception of the need for a supersedeas bond which was not applicable, virtually the same as the procedure
on appeal of the MTC’s judgment to the RTC. Thus, in the contemplated recourse to the Court of Appeals, the
defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could also prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by making
the periodic deposit of rentals during the pendency of the appeal and thereby correspondingly prevent
restitution of the premises to the plaintiff who had already twice vindicated his claim to the property in the two
lower courts. On the other hand, under the amendatory procedure introduced by the present Section 21 of Rule
70, the judgment of the RTC shall be immediately executory and can accordingly be enforced forthwith. It shall
not be stayed by the mere continuing deposit of monthly rentals by the dispossess or during the pendency of
the case in the Court of Appeals or this Court, although such execution of the judgment shall be without
prejudice to that appeal taking its due course. This reiterates Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure which replaced the appellate procedure in, and repealed, the former Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964
Rules of Court.46 Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab47 states:

Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a periodic deposit of monthly
rentals during the pendency of the appeal thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the
premises in the meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that the judgment of
the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced
despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by
mandamus.49 Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case
is unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue
a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.50 The rationale of immediate execution
of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor.51 Nevertheless, it should be
stressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should circumstances so require.52

The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom – reinforces
the first.1âwphi1 The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon
motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s
judgment is not discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 2. Discretionary execution. –

(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court
may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. – A several, separate or partial judgment may be
executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.

Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, which rendered the judgment sought to be executed,
still has jurisdiction over the case as the period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in possession of either the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of the motion for execution.
It is part of the trial court’s residual powers, or those powers which it retains after losing jurisdiction over the
case as a result of the perfection of the appeal.53 As a rule, the judgment of the RTC, rendered in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, being sought to be executed in a discretionary execution is stayed by the appeal to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, execution of
the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of the
RTC.54 It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court on judgments not stayed by appeal. In this connection, it is not covered by the general rule, that the
judgment of the RTC is stayed by appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, but constitutes an exception to the said rule. In connection with the second characteristic of the RTC
judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between discretionary
execution and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court of Appeals is
that the former may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the appeal
while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again,
in the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances
so require.55 City of Naga v. Hon. Asuncion56 explains:

This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid immediate
execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may x x x appeal said judgment to the Court of Appeals and
therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, as held in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, even if RTC
judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.
(Citation omitted.)

To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which
judgment is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction that will restrain or enjoin the execution of the RTC’s judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the
Court of Appeals should constantly be aware that the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the
sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with great caution.57

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and
existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case
before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within
the conditions for its issuance, the ancillarywrit must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse
of discretion.58
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the
property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means
that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in
possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to
hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected
therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court
of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439." Unfortunately, in its Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in Miaque’s favor, the Court of Appeals did not
state the source or basis of Miaque’s "clear legal right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is fatal.

In Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,59 this Court stated that, in granting or dismissing an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, the court must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence
and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for
injunctive relief. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by one who seeks an injunctive
writ, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the right of one
who seeks an in junctive writ is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.

The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has
no jurisdiction to order the issuance of [the] writ of execution" because, when it gave due course to the petition
for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards
both (1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that
such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken there from. It ignores the nature of the RTC’s
function to issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and not discretionary.

The RTC was validly exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it
issued the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2,2005. While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79439 enjoined the execution of the RTC’s judgment during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the
RTC revived the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005 in its Order dated March 20, 2006,
after the Court of Appeals denied Miaque’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79439. Indeed, the said writs of execution need not even be revived because they continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is within five years from entry of
judgment, pursuant to Section 14,60 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 661 of the same Rule.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.62 In
this case, the Court of Appeals issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting Miaque’s prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and other relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as
well as this Court’s pronouncements in Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc.63 and Nisce.64 Thus, the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-
SP No. 01603.

This Court notes that the controversy between the parties in this case has been unduly protracted, considering
that the decisions of the MTCC, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court in favor of the ATO and against
Miaque on the ejectment case are already final and executory. The Court of Appeals should therefore proceed
expeditiously in resolving CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of
Appeals is directed to conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without delay.

SO ORDERED.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(9) Amagan vs Marayag GR#138377 Feb 28, 2000;

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial
court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of
petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 9,
1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50472,[1] which disposed as follows:

"It is plain to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the Order of the
Respondent, dated November 26, 1996 granting Private Respondents Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal and denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [of] its said Order. This Court
did not enjoin the Respondent Court from resolving Petitioners appeal from the Decision of the
Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court, on its merits.

"Petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1632 filed [at] the
Regional Trial Court does not abate the proceeding in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG) before the
Respondent Court (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; Felicidad Javier,
et al., versus Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, II, et al., 237 SCRA 565.

"In sum, then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in accord with case law and
issued in the exercise of its sound discretion.

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby
dismissed. No cost.

"SO ORDERED."[2]

Also challenged by petitioners is the April 22, 1999 CA Resolution[3] denying their Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"x x x. On June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners
for 'unlawful detainer' with the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court in Silang, Cavite. On September 27,
1996, the trial court promulgated a Decision in favor of the private respondent and against the
petitioners, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds for the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter as follows:

1.......To vacate the property of plaintiff located at San Vicente, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 420 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13023
and remove their house constructed thereon;

2.......To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P10,000.00 starting from
June 1, 1996 until the subject premises are fully vacated, as reasonable compensation
for their continued unlawful use and occupation of the same and another amount of
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and

3.......To pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.'

"The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said Decision, which appeal
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1671. On November 26, 1996, the private respondent filed
a 'Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' with the Respondent Court which, on November 26,
1996, issued an Order granting said motion, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'As prayed for by the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and finding the grounds
alleged in their 'Motion for Immediate Exec(u)tion' to be impressed with merit, the
same is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, let a writ of execution pending appeal be issued in this case.'

 "The Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration' [of] said Order, was denied by the Respondent
Court per its Order dated February 21, 1997.

"In the interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint against private
respondent in the Regional Trial Court for 'Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages,' entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al. versus Teodorico Marayag, Civil Case No. 1682
(TG).'

"The petitioners filed, a 'Petition for Certiorari,' in the Court of Appeals, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, dated April 28, 1997, against the respondents for the nullification of the aforesaid
Orders of the Respondent Court, dated November 26, 1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil Case
No. 1671, granting private respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration' respectively, which Petition
was entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al., versus Regional Trial Court, et al., CA-G.R. [SP No.
43611].' This Court issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining
order which expired on June 25, 1997.

"On July 7, 1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 1671
(TG), an 'Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Direct Sheriff To Make a Report And/Or Implement Writ of
Execution and Declare the Case Submitted for Decision' with the parties submitting to the
Respondent Court their respective 'Memorandum on Appeal.' The next day, July 18, 1997, this
Court promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a Decision in favor of the petitioners and against
the respondents therein the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the

Order dated February 21, 1997, allowing execution pending appeal is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.'

On July 11, 1997, the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private respondent's Omnibus
Motion,' supra. The private respondent likewise filed a Petition for Review'with the Supreme
Court, from the Decision of this Court in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying
private respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration' but the Supreme Court, per its Resolution dated
November 12, 1997, issued a Resolution denying private respondents['] 'Petition for Review.' The
Resolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.

"On December 12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case
No. TG-1671, a 'Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion' praying that the Respondent Court resolve
the case and promulgate its Decision on the merits. However, the petitioners filed an Opposition
to private respondent's motion, contending that the proceedings before the Respondent Court,
in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG), be suspended pending decision, on the merits, of the Regional Trial
Court, in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title, Reconveyance with Damages). On April 3, 1998,
the Respondent Court issued its Order granting private respondent's motion, declaring that the
Court, under its Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], merely nullified its Order granting execution
pending appeal but did not enjoin the Respondent Court from hearing and resolving Civil Case
No. 16[7]1 on the merits. The petitioners filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the aforesaid
Order of the Respondent Court but the latter issued an Order dated December 14, 1998 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, in this language:

'Anent the Motion for Reconsideration, movants anchored their arguments that this
Court should restrain itself from further proceeding with the appealed case because of
the decision, resolution of the Court of Appeals, and resolution of the Supreme Court.
It is worthy to note that [what] was brought up with the higher Courts was the Order
of the Court allowing the execution pending appeal, the said Order was reversed and
set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however, there was no permanent injunction that
has been issued for this Court to stop from further proceeding with the case. The said
motion is, therefore, DENIED for lack of merit.'"

The facts of this case may be simply summarized as follows. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the
ejectment suit filed by respondent against herein petitioners. While an appeal was pending before the RTC,
respondent filed a Motion for immediate execution of the MCTC judgment, which was granted. However, the
Court of Appeals[4] later reversed the RTC Order granting the execution pending appeal, a reversal that was
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, petitioners also filed before the RTC a new action for
quieting of title involving the same property.

Petitioners thence claimed that the proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be suspended pending final
judgment in the quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the negative.
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two short paragraphs that its earlier Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611
enjoined only the execution of the judgment pending appeal. Without discussing petitioners' plea for an
exception, it curtly applied the jurisprudential principle that an action for quieting of title would not abate an
ejectment suit.

Hence, this Petition.[5]

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted for the consideration of the Court the following issues:

"I.......Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 (Annex I), as affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, called off and
restrained the proceedings in this case;

II. Whether or not the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 should be referred to
its body and text.

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision having been based on Vda. de Legaspi vs. Avendano x
x x, is now final and executory as it was upheld by the Supreme Court in toto.

IV. Whether or not Lao vs. Court of Appeals [x x x] is applicable to the present case, and

V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass judgment on the exceptional nature
of the present case."[6]

In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case justify the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings on appeal before the RTC, pending the resolution of the action for quieting of title.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession
of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held
that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their
hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession."[7] In these cases, the issue is pure physical
or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case
in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues
presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there
resolved."[8]

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such
exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of
legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in
order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.
It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical
possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that
the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the
courts."[9]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception to the general rule. In Salinas v.
Navarro,[10] the Court explained that "the exception to the rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong
reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue
in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule.
In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have meant demolition
of the premises, a factor not present in this petition."

After a close reading of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, however, we hold that equitable
considerations impel an exception to the general rule. In its earlier July 8, 1997 Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SP
which has long become final, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the
following factual findings which are binding on herein parties:

"Admittedly, petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case did not file a supersedeas
bond. Neither have they been depositing the compensation for their use and occupation of the property
in question as determined by the trial court. Ordinarily, these circumstances would justify an execution
pending appeal. However, there are circumstances attendant to this case which would render immediate
execution injudicious and inequitable.

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory
that petitioners possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his
demand letter dated April 13, 1996 (Annex D), petitioners categorically denied having any agreement
with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J. P.
Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In other words, it is not merely physical possession but
ownership as well that is involved in this case.

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in
this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the
possession of the premises in question.

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal
of the petitioners house [from] the lot in question.

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay enequitable, to allow demolition of petitioner's house prior
to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.[11]

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of
the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and
not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a
matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said
exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision[12] would cause the respondent to go through the whole
gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the
litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated
contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the
quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment
case.

The Suspension of Proceedings Even During Appeal

One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances should so require, the proceedings in
the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found." This statement is unequivocally
clear; it includes even the appellate stage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Cavite is DIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671 until Civil Case No. 1682 is
concluded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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(10) Benedicto vs CA GR#157604 Oct 19, 2005;

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the Resolution,[1] dated March 21,
2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 736 square meters
located in Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with private respondent
Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000. Under the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The
contract also stipulated that the rent would be P7,000 monthly.

Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence, conformably with paragraph 6 of their
contract, to wit:

6. the Lessee may introduce any improvements and additions on the land, and at the
termination of the lease, he may remove the same, except the fence surrounding and enclosing
the property, the cost of which shall be equally divided into twenty-four (24) months and the
amount thereof be deducted from the rent until the same shall have been completely set-off.[2]

On November 13, 2000, Chua paid Benedicto P28,000 representing deposit for one month and advance
rent for three months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter
after a fruitless amicable settlement at the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful detainer and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 26881, with the Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn, Chua filed
with the same court a petition for consignation docketed as Civil Case No. 26911.

The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said case falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. It ordered
Romeo G. Chua and all persons acting for and under him or on his behalf, (1) to immediately vacate or
surrender possession of the leased premises to therein plaintiff; (2) to pay plaintiff P19,500, covering the period
from March 15, 2001 to August 14, 2001, and thereafter, the additional or further amount of P4,500 only per
month until said premises was vacated and until the P2,500 monthly credit in favor of the defendant was
exhausted reckoned from February 15, 2001 to January 14, 2003 whichever comes first; and (3) to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P10,000 as attorneys fee and P5,000 for costs and other expenses.[3]

Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43. In its Decision,[4] dated August
30, 2002, the RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case for consignation, for lack of tender of
payment and prior notice; ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto;
ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Bacolod to turn over to Benedicto P46,500
and P18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts; ordered Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing
the remaining value of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the perimeter hollow block fence,
and deliver to Chua P4,672.64 deposited by the latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities in the excess
of the rental of the property as computed by the Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the P10,000,
attorneys fees and P5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied all other claims and counterclaims
of the parties.[5]

On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-11643, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43
issued a Writ of Execution.[6]
 However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order on December 23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43, from enforcing its
Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643.

Upon receipt of the said TRO, Presiding Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador replied in a letter
dated January 2, 2003 as follows:

Pertinent to your telegram dated December 23, 2002 received by the undersigned on the
same date, please be informed that returns were made by Mr. Leoncio Yongque, Jr., Deputy
Sheriff of this branch, on the partial execution of the Courts Decision dated August 30, 2002 in
the aforementioned case. Attached for your ready reference are the following annexes:

A Sheriffs return dated December 5, 2002;

B Sheriffs return dated December 16, 2002;

C Sheriffs return dated December 23, 2002.

Also attached is the undersigneds Memorandum to the branch sheriff enjoining him from
fully implementing the Writ of Execution dated November 22, 2002.

[Concomitant] to your resolution granting defendants application for a Temporary

Restraining Order, there being no complete execution of the assailed decision, undersigned
undertakes that no further execution shall be implemented until further order from your court.[7]

On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order[8] on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and
academic.

In his Comment[9] to the said Manifestation and Motion, Chua replied that the writ of execution issued
by the RTC had not been fully implemented because his properties and the improvements were still within the
subject premises.

The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion, in its assailed Resolution of March 21,
2003, as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, let the writ of preliminary injunction be issued in this
case upon the posting of a P100,000.00 injunction bond restraining the respondents from
prohibiting the petitioner from entering the subject premises and/or from conducting business
thereon just like before the controversy between the parties had arisen. For this purpose,
respondent is hereby ordered to remove anything that was placed to block the display room of
the petitioner and to remove the padlock and to open the gate so that petitioner may resume his
usual business in the premises, all pending resolution of the instant petition for review.

...

SO ORDERED.[10]

Clearly, the sole issue in this case is: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite
the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases?

Herein petitioner Benedicto contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing a preliminary injunction even if it was not prayed for. Granting arguendo that said provisional remedy
was prayed for, Benedicto insists preliminary injunction does not lie as judgments of the RTC against the
defendant in ejectment suits are immediately executory even pending appeal. Benedicto also argues that the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in effect, disposed of the main case without trial. Benedicto
further points out that the act sought to be enjoined by the preliminary injunction was already fait accompli.

For his part, Chua counters that the present petition cannot be resorted to without a prior motion for
reconsideration to allow public respondent Court of Appeals to correct the error imputed to it. He also maintains
that there was only partial delivery of possession to Benedicto; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had not
yet become fait accompli. Finally, Chua stresses that despite the executory character of the RTC judgment
against the defendant in ejectment cases, injunctive relief may still be granted.

We find petitioners arguments without sufficient basis.

 First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not prayed for as long as the requisites therefor
are present. More so if it is prayed for. Second, contrary to petitioners contention, the questioned writ of
preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case without trial. The writ merely suspended the execution
of the RTC judgment pending appeal. It bears stressing that the main case, subject of the petition for review, is
still yet to be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is evident from Judge Pagapong-Agraviadors
letter[11] that the impugned judgment is not yet fully executed. Thus, the acts sought to be enjoined by the
assailed writ of preliminary injunction are not yet fait accompli.

Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer states:
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied
with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to
immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.[12] It is our opinion
that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.

In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,[13] we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v.

Avendao[14] that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found.
We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance
of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in
which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in
the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor
of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to
have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover
possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.[15]

Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary
injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and
that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right.[16]

In this case, we note that the petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues
meriting serious consideration. Chuas putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be
violated if the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the
RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the
main controversy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution, dated
March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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(11) Hilario vs Salvador GR#160384 April 29, 2005;

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution[2]denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said decision.

The Antecedents
 On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent
Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:

2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land
designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was
[adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still
single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of
the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;

4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that
he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;

5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of
Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as
ANNEX B;

6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer
shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;

7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a
lawyer.[3]

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the
defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made
to pay plaintiffs:

a. actual damages, as follows:

a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting
to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at P1,500.00
each schedule;

a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;

b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine;
and

c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.[4]

The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.[5] He averred that

(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-
matter of this action;

both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this
case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint
and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as
provided by law.

In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed
value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. [6]

The petitioners opposed the motion.[7] They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since
the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square
meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof
is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and the proper
time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value.
 On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action
was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.[9] Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no
cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the
spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention[10] making common cause
with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.[11]
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the
property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.[12]
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:

Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and

Dismissing defendants counterclaim.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the
CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for
want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice
to its refilling in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of
real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court
denied.[16] Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED
ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN
TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[17]

The Ruling of the Court

The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the
plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property,
exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to
respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question
in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for damages
exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
 It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff
and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.[18] The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to
the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was
an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof.
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as
owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand,
an accion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the
property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the
private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and
refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent
vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect.
Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the
assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the
fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable
value.[20] The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to
sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed
value of the property subject of the complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot
thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners
action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that
the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce
in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in
1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC,
and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession
of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed
value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value
exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to
the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B.
The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is
absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the
amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit
B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.[24]

It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[25]
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of
damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the
demand for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. This Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph
2 thereof states that

2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section
19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which
states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned
items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action involving title to, or possession
of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The
said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession
of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including
the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

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(12) Quinagoran vs CA GR#155179 Aug 24, 2007;

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution[2] dated
August 28, 2002, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual antecedents.

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz (respondents), filed on October 27, 1994
a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages
against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch XI of Tuao, Cagayan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 240-T.[3]They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing
13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz;[4] that in the
mid-70s, petitioner started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by
tolerance of respondents; that in 1993, they asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct
a commercial building on the property; that petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they
suffered damages for their failure to use the same.[5] Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and surrender
of the disputed 400 sq m, more or less, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is
vacated, attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, costs of suit and other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable.[6]

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include
all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not
exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property
has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than
the said amount.[7]

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11, 1999, thus:

The Court finds the said motion to be without merit. The present action on the basis of the
allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of action publicciana (sic) and jurisdiction over
said action lies with the Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value of the property. This is so
because in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from the
defendant the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the possession of which is Only
due to Tolerance (sic) of herein plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.[8]

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC.[9]

Petitioner then went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders
of the RTC.[10]

On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's action and
affirming in toto the RTC.[11] Pertinent portions of said Decision, read:

At the onset, we find that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented
by Senen dela Cruz adequately set forth the jurisdictional requirements for a case to be
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. The Complaint is captioned recovery of portion of
registered land and it contains the following allegations:
7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted
owner of the adjoining lot, the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was
only due to the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;

8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the
subject house for the purpose of constructing a commercial building and which herein
defendant refused and in fact now claims ownership of the portion in which said
house stands;

9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence
made but which landed on deaf ears;

10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that
the subject house is occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the
north-west portion thereof, as per the approved survey plan in the records of the
Bureau of Lands.

xxxx

It is settled that when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. In the latter instances, jurisdiction
pertains to the Regional Trial Court.

As another legal recourse from a simple ejectment case governed by the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure, an accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
when dispossession has lasted more than one year or when dispossession was effected by means
 other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Where there is no allegation that
there was denial of possession through any of the methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, or where there is no lease contract between the parties, the proper remedy is the
plenary action of recovery of possession. Necessarily, the action falls within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Thus, we find that the private respondents [heirs of dela Cruz] availed of
the proper remedy when they filed the action before the court a quo.

Undoubtedly, the respondent court therefore did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction in denying Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss and the
Motion for Reconsideration, thereof, because it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant
case.

xxxx

It would not be amiss to point out that the nature of the action and jurisdiction of courts are
determined by the allegations in the complaint. As correctly held by the Regional Trial Court, the
present action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature
of action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court regardless
of the value of the property. Therefore, we completely agree with the court a quo's conclusion
that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz, is in the
nature of an accion publiciana and hence it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the action, regardless of the assessed value of the property subject of present controversy.[12]
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of merit.[13]

Petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review claiming that under R.A. No. 7691 the
jurisdiction of the MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) was
expanded to include exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions when the assessed value of the property
does not exceed P20,000.00outside Metro Manila and P50,000.00 within Metro Manila.[14] He likewise avers that
it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property
involved.[15] In this case, the complaint does not allege that the assessed value of the land in question is more
than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the assessed value of the
property. Respondents therefore failed to allege that the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.[16] The tax
declaration covering Lot No. 1807 owned by respondents and where the herein disputed property is purportedly
part -- a copy of which petitioner submitted to the CA -- also shows that the value of the property is
only P551.00.[17] Petitioner then prays that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside and that
the complaint of herein respondents before the trial court be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.[18]

Respondents contend that: the petition is without factual and legal bases, and the contested decision of the CA
is entirely in accordance with law;[19] nowhere in the body of their complaint before the RTC does it state that
the assessed value of the property is below P20,000.00;[20] the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss
before the RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value
of an adjacent property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation; [21] the tax
declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of
which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be given credence
as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.00 for the entire property.[22]
The question posed in the present petition is not complicated, i.e., does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases
of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?

The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accionpubliciana lies with the regional trial
courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be
made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691[23] which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[24] and which was already in effect[25] when
respondents filed their complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994,[26] expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
xxxx
 SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of , real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.(Emphasis supplied)

The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court.[27]
In Atuel v. Valdez[28] the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
x xx possession of real property. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila,
the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property.[29]

That settled, the next point of contention is whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the
property involved. Petitioner maintains that there should be such an allegation, while respondents claim the
opposite.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action.[30] This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff
and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.[31]

In this case, the complaint denominated as Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Damages, reads:

1. That plaintiffs are the only direct and legitimate heirs of the late Juan dela Cruz, who died
intestate on February 3, 1977, and are all residents of Centro, Piat, Cagayan;
xxxx
4. That plaintiffs inherited from x x x Juan dela Cruz x x x a certain parcel of land x x x containing
an area of 13,111 square meters.
5. That sometime in the mid-1960's, a house was erected on the north-west portion of
the aforedescribed lot x x x.
xxxx

7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted owner of the
adjoining lot, the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was only due to the tolerance of
herein plaintiffs;

8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the subject house for
the purpose of constructing a commercial building and which herein defendant refused and in fact
now claims ownership of the portion in which said house stands;

9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence made but which
landed on deaf ears;

10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject
house is occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the north-west portion thereof, as
per the approved survey plan in the records of the Bureau of Lands.[32]

Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore
no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondents.[33] Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot
be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's
action.[34] The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.[35]

Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.[36] Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject
matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[37]

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject
property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are
null and void,[38] and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.[39]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals's Decision in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27,
2002 and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Courts Orders dated November 11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings therein are
declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 240-T is dismissed without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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(12) Supapo vs Sps De Jesus GR#198356 April 20, 2015;

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo
Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision3 and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de
Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents),
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.

The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City,
described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax
declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.7

The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made
sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the
subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses
de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one.9

The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing
the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10

The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and
MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each
accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject
premises.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted
Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted
to the dismissal of the criminal case.15

On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.16

Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the
writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC
also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.

The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the
quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that
with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.18 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The
orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in
Criminal Case No. C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby
permanently ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.

SO ORDERED.

The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20

After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and
argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion
publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior
judgment.

The MeTC Ruling23

The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments
advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial.
The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.

From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.24

The RTC Ruling25

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.26

In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's jurisdiction over an action
involving title to or possession of land is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an
exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls
within MeTC's jurisdiction.

The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses
Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year
prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate
was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed is
counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file action was issued on
November 25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than
ten (10) years thereafter.

Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.29

The CA Ruling30

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before
the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to
us through the present petition.

The Petition

In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:

(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila;
and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the Torrens
system.

The Respondents' Case33

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by
prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.

Issues

The issues for resolution are:

I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and (3)
the complaint is not barred by res judicata.

Accion Publiciana and the Jurisdiction of the MeTC

Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.34

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but
they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.35

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.36

Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only do
so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.

Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court
has the jurisdiction to hear the case.

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is plenary.38

RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.

Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x
x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.41

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:

[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property
involved?

The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial
courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must
be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside
Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of
the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is
filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro
Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.

Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of
Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.

The cause of action has not prescribed

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.

They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

xxxx

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008
or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The
respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the
complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.

Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property, and
assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to
recover possession because of laches.

On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten (10)
years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is
imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.

We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.

At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the
existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.47

In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The
respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject
lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their possession.48

Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal basis.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless
when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496
[now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The most
essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.54

In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all.56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we still
rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a
duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.

A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-
vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the
respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore
that we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.

By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely
recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of
land registration.

We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be
unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land
transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58

With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must
adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue;
especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.

Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to
exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the
appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action
publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.

With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession of the subject
lot is not barred by prescription.

The action is not barred by prior judgment

As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They contend that the decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the action publiciana.

To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the RTC's
issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction
under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the
respondents' conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law under
which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from the crime had also been
erased.

The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62

"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action.63

The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.

Res judicata is not present in this case.

While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties
and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for
the recovery of the subject property.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by
and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.

Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under
the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses
Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its
possession.

Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis.

The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action provided
that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.65

Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.66

As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law
and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still
does not apply because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents
(accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is
whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject
property.

For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.

Final Note

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the
parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination
of the issue of ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(13) Suarez vs Emboy GR#187944 March 12, 2014;

DECISION
REYES, J.:

For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May
5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by
Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in
Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez
(Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents

At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot)
of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a
part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos
Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9

Lot No. TCT No. Heirs

1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena Padilla, married
to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios), married to Oscar
Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and (4) Moreno Padilla
(Moreno), married to Teresita Curso (Teresita)
1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents claim
that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her
share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same
from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the
subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to
comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12

Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a
demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that
Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However,
the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and
uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of
partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a
complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective
portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful
detainer, the origin of the instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios,
Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents
to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession
of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16

The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents were
ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon.
They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17

In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling.18

The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.

The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several
decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the
notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for
nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that "even if one is the
owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."21 The
respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action
anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real
property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with
that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the
disposition of the issue of possession.

The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the complaint
for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the
respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in
Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a
certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too,
was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following
year after its supposed execution.

The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had
never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the
respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old wooden
chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an "Agreement,"23 dated February 23,
1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The
document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a
collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be
fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over
the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to file an
action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother,
who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the
subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the
respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date
of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.

In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would be
irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No.
1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event
that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.

The Ruling of the CA

On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo
and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section,
a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.

The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of
Appeals,:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible
entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession
de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to
continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the
other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer
which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.

A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor
unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was
legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon. It was
also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to
vacate the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the respondents]
were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the
respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have
been occupying the land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s]
predecessors tolerated [the respondents’] possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak
of, whether express or implied, between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her
predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful
detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert
that [the respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s]
predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note that
[Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of
[Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he later seek[s] to recover.
This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.

Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is
truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible
entry.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:

For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in
possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although
admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence
does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by
the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is
properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that
Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s
relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is
not necessary.27Instead, what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested
of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.

In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.

In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:

Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of
action for unlawful detainer.

II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for
the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.

Carmencita’s Allegations

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente,
who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were
occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property.
The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the
possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer.

Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack28 and the issue of
ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of
ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the
same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs.29

Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of
a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a
property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are
bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32

The Respondents’Arguments

In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful
detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how
possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the
respondents possessed "the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily
vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr.
v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.

In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably
linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is
already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.

Our Disquisition

The instant petition lacks merit.

Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the
case at bar.

"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he
must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the
conditions necessary for such action to prosper."37

In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession
of real property, viz:

(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from
the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land,
in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases
is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the
filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:

(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter’s right of possession;

(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege
and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the
respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly
formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the
subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became
deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new
registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of
the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades, they
have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant
on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the
face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44

As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A
can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.

In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case
in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues
presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such
exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and
the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is
more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether
involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the
effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior
possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and
without resorting to the courts."
 xxxx

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of
the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and
not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a
matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said
exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut
of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since
1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as
the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best
temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated
contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the
quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment
case.45 (Citations omitted)

The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that
petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand
letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or
written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente,
Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this
case.["]

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the
resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.["]

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the
petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the
determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands."46 (Citation omitted)

We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed
hereunder.

Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been
in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the
defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as
parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been standing in
the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the
exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's complaint for unlawful
detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had
not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment
proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The
respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the
resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject
lot is likewise presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
(14) Tabujara vs Judge Asdala AM No.RTJ-08-2126 Jan 20, 2009;

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III (complainant), by Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated June 8, 2006 which was sworn to on
June 9, 2006 and received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on June 13, 2006, charged Judge
Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
with gross ignorance of the law and procedure, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, graft and corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and culpable violation of the Constitution.

Complainant was a party to the following cases which were originally raffled to different branches but which
were ordered consolidated and assigned to Branch 86 presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having
involved the same parties (complainant and his wife), related issues and reliefs prayed for: (1) Civil Case No. Q-
06-57760,[2] for Violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, filed
by complainants wife against him praying for, among others, the issuance of Temporary Protection Order
(TPO), (2) Civil Case No. 06-57857,[3] filed by complainant against his wife for declaration of nullity of marriage,
and (3) Civil Case No. Q-06-57984,[4] petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by complainants wife against him
involving their son Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara (habeas corpus case).

The habeas corpus case was raffled to Branch 102 which issued on May 23, 2006 a Writ[5] directing Deputy
Sheriff Victor Amarillas to take and have the body of . CARLOS IIGO R. TABUJARA before this Court on 25 May
2006, at 10:00 A.M. and [to] summon the respondent-[herein complainant] to appear then and there to show
cause why he should not be dealt with in accordance with law.[6] (Capitalization and underscoring in the original)

During the hearing on May 25, 2006 of the habeas corpus case before Branch 102, on complainants information
that there were two pending cases before Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay, Branch 102 directed the
consolidation of said habeas corpus case with the other cases pending before Branch 86.

After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus case, Branch 86 Presiding Judge Bay issued on May 31,
2006 an Order[7] reading:

After considering the records of the three (3) cases consolidated before this Court, this Court
resolves as follows:

1. the child Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under the custody of the
respondent Ernesto Tabujara III until the Court shall have resolved the issue of
custody of said child. This is necessary to protect the child from emotional and
psychological violence due to the misunderstanding now existing between his
parents.
2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with Prayer for Temporary Protection
Order is GRANTED. The Temporary Protection Order dated April 19, 2006 is hereby
extended until the prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. The respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to bring the child Carlos
Iigo Tabujara to this Court during the hearing of these cases on July 14,
2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

x x x x[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the same date (May 31, 2006) of the issuance by Judge Bay of the above-quoted Order, complainants wife
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent
Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006).[9] The motion contained no notice of
hearing and no copy was furnished herein complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via registered
mail. Also on May 31, 2006, respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 87, the pairing Judge of Branch 86 presided
by Judge Bay who had filed a Leave of Absence effective the following day or on June 1, 2006, acted on the
motion of complainants wife and amended Judge Bays May 31, 2006 order by advancing the production of the
parties child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006.[10] The decretal portion of respondents May 31, 2006 Order
reads:

WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons acting for and in his behalf
and under his direction is hereby directed to produce the person of minor Carlos I[]igo R.
Tabujara before the Session Hall, Branch 87, located at 114, Hall of Justice, Quezon City on
 June 1, 2006 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. Failing which, the more coercive process of a
Bench Warrant will be issued against said respondent, without prejudice to a declaration of
contempt which may be due under the obtaining circumstances.[11] (Underscoring supplied)

Alleging that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was issued with undue haste and without notice to complainant,
and that respondent violated the rule against interference with courts of co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction,
complainant filed on June 1, 2006 a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.[12]

On June 1, 2006, complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled date (by respondent) for him to
produce the minor child, declared him

. . . in contempt of Court for defying the order directing the production of the minor, in which
case, a bench warrant is hereby ordered against respondent, who is likewise ordered
imprisoned until such time that he is willing to appear and comply with the order of this Court
directing the production of the minor. Until further notice.[13] (Underscoring supplied)
On June 2, 2006, the appellate court issued a Resolution[14] in complainants petition for Certiorari granting a
Temporary Restraining Order and ordering complainants wife to submit a Comment on the petition. On even
date, in view of the contempt order and bench warrant issued by respondent on June 1, 2006, complainant filed
before the appellate court an urgent ex-parte motion to set aside respondents June 1, 2006 Order and bench
warrant.[15] The appellate court granted the motion by June 7, 2006 Resolution.[16]

Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when respondent issued her May 31, 2006
Order, Judge Bay was not yet on official leave as it was yet to start the following day, June 1, 2006; that as a
judge of a co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, respondent could not amend, revise, modify or disturb the
orders of the other courts;[17] and that respondent violated Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court[18] on
litigated motions which Rule calls for the setting of such motions for hearing and the service of copy thereof
upon the opposing party at least three days before the scheduled hearing.

Complainant adds that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was issued after the opposing counsel personally met
and conferred with respondent in her chambers without the presence of his (complainants) counsel; and that
after issuing the Order, respondent personally summoned via telephone complainants counsel to her chambers
where she personally furnished him a copy of the Order in the presence of opposing counsel.[19]
Then Court Administrator Christopher Lock, by Ist Indorsement dated July 3, 2006,[20] directed respondent
to comment on the Complaint-Affidavit within ten days from notice.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) synthesized respondents 22-page Comment dated August 2,
2006,[21] the salient portions of which follow:

xxxx

In acting on the subject cases as pairing judge of Branch 86, respondent judge argued that
she did not violate the basic rule against interference between courts of concurrent or co-
equal jurisdiction. When respondent judge ordered the production of the minor child during
the hearing set on 01 June 2006, the regular presiding judge of Branch 86 was no longer in
his office as he already left the building as per information of Branch Clerk of Court Buenaluz.
Hence, as pairing judge, she has the authority to act on the said urgent motion and to issue
the bench warrant.

xxxx
Respondent denied her alleged close personal relationship with Atty. Carmina Abbas, counsel
of record of complainants wife. When Atty. Abbas appeared during the hearing on 01 June
2006, it was the second time that she saw her; the first time was sometime two years ago
during the IBP meeting in Makati City. She claimed that she did not know either Atty. Abas or
the complainants wife. She only came to know them when the case was referred to her for
action.

With respect to her alleged failure to require complainant to show cause and answer the
contempt charge against him, respondent explained that the record of the habeas corpus case
shows that complainant was given several opportunities to comply with the Writ to bring the
minor child. Per record, the 1st refusal to comply was during the hearing on 25 May
2006 when complainant claimed lack of material time to fetch the child from Tagaytay
highlands. Then, the 2nd and 3rd refusal[s] to comply were during the hearings on 26 May
2006 and 01 June 2006, respectively.
 Respondent likewise denied personally calling complainants counsel and informing her about
the motion and the hearing on 01 June 2006. As to the reason for Atty. Ambrosios unexpected
arrival at the respondents sala and as to how she learned about the motion is unknown to her.
She claimed that the sending of notice to party litigants and/or their counsel is not her
concern or duty but that of the Branch Clerk of Court.

Respondent noted that the Petition for Certiorari which complainant filed in the Court of
Appeals impleaded her in the capacity of Presiding Judge of Branch 87. Hence, complainant
misled the Court of Appeals in making it appear that she issued the questioned order in her
capacity as the regular judge of Branch 87.

Respondent only came to know of the TRO when the bench warrant was already
disseminated to the proper government authorities. It was thus incumbent upon the
complainant to submit himself to the court and ask that the bench warrant be set aside or
recalled because of the TRO.

. . . . Complainants detention at the office of the Executive Judge Natividad was of his own
making.

x x x x[22] (Underscoring supplied)

After noting the following record of administrative charges against respondent:[23]

Docket No. Complainant Charge/ Penalty Date of

Violation Decision/
Resolution
1. RTJ-06- Edano, Gross Insubordination Dismissal from the 26 July 2007
1974 Carmen P. And Gross Misconduct Service withoutprejudice
2. 05-10- OCAs Report Undue Delay in The Fine of 11 July 2006
618 RTC Disposition of Cases P11,000.00Pesos with
Warning
3. RTC-05- Manansala, Gross Misconduct Fine of 10 May 2005
1916 Melencio III P. P40,000.00Pesos with
stern Warning
4. RTJ-00- Bownman, Grave Abuse of Fine of 06 March 2000
1546 (98- James et al., Discretion P2,000.00 Pesos
628-RTJ)
5. RTJ-99- Dumlao, Partiality Admonished 08 February
1428 Florentino, Jr., 1999

(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied),

the OCA came up with the following evaluation of the Complaint:
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent Judge had indeed acted on the three (3)
consolidated cases: (1) without the legal authority as pairing judge of
Branch 86 considering that the regular presiding judge thereat was still sitting as such when
she issued the order of 31 May 2006; (2) in violation of the basic rule on procedural due
process when she resolved ex-parte the motion of the complainants wife; and . . . in citing
complainant in contempt of court and issuing the bench warrant without requiring the
complainant to file his comment on said ex-parte motion and explain the reason for his failure
to appear and bring the minor child during the hearing on 01 June 2006.

xxxx

It must be noted that the motion of complainants wife was an ordinary motion which
required the application of ordinary rules and was not itself the application of writ under Rule
102.

xxxx

Clear it is from the foregoing that respondents basis in disregarding the rule under Section 4
of Rule 15 is not valid. While respondent may be justified in immediately setting the hearing of
the said urgent ex-parte motion, she should not have resolved it without first requiring
the complainant to file his comment. Although the appearance of the complainant during
the hearing may be waived, he has the right to be heard insofar as the said motion is
concerned through the filing of his comment thereon.
 Respondent Judges blunder was compounded when she immediately cited complainant in
contempt of court and issued the bench warrant without requiring the latter to explain the
reason for his non-appearance and non-compliance with a standing order. Under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, complainants alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the punishment
for which requires that a respondent should be first asked to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.

There is one more act equally serious in nature. As correctly claimed by the
complainant, respondent indeed took cognizance of the consolidated cases without
proper authority. Respondent cannot reason out that she acted in her capacity as pairing
judge. It is clear from the records that her authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 started only
on 01 June 2006 when Judge Bays leave of absence commenced. Judge Bay was still sitting
as the regular judge of Branch 86 as evidenced by the issuance of his order on 31 May
2006. Respondents explanation that Judge Bay was no longer in the premises in the afternoon
of 31 May 2006, so that she could act on the subject ex-parte motion is clearly unacceptable.
xxx

Under Section 8 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10, the
penalty of gross ignorance of the procedure and gross misconduct is dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled
and with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporation
x x x x [24] (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As reflected above, respondent having been earlier dismissed from the service, the OCA recommended that
respondent should be fined in the sum of P40,000.00 pesos, the maximum penalty of fine under Section 11(3)
under Rule 140, as amended.

By Resolution of June 30, 2008,[25] this Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter.

The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA well-taken.
As found by the Court of Appeals, respondent gravely abused her discretion when she acted on the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial
Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006).[26] That Judge Bay may have left the court premises in the
afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her acting on even date on motion of complainants wife, as her
authority as pairing judge commenced only the following day, June 1, 2006, when Judge Bays leave of absence
started; Nor did respondents opinion on the urgency of the case justify her sacrificing law and settled
jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.[27]
Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt and not
direct contempt.[28] Indirect or constructive contempt is committed outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.[29]

For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he

should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court.[30] In Lim v. Domagas[31] where the therein judge declared the therein complainant guilty of
contempt and ordered his arrest for failure to bring three minors before the court without the benefit of a
hearing, the Court faulted the therein judge not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross ignorance
of the law.

Because, again as reflected above, respondent was, in Edao v. Asdala, dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled, [32] she should, as
recommended by the OCA, be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos, the highest amount of fine
imposable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross ignorance of law and procedure. She having been
earlier dismissed from the service, she is FINED the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos to be deducted
from the Eighty Thousand (P80,000) Pesos which this Court withheld pursuant to its January 15,
2008 Resolution in Edao v. Asdala.
SO ORDERED.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(15)Tokio vs Valdez GR#150107 Jan 28, 2008;

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals dated September 13,
2001 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic
corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except
Antonio B. Lapid, one of Tokio Marines consultants.

Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit
Management Contract entered into between them on August 16, 1977.

On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms
of the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his commissions, and bonuses.
Respondent prayed for the following reliefs: a) actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and the
corresponding interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00; c) exemplary damages amounting
to P10,000,000.00; d) attorneys fees corresponding to 30% of the said amounts; and e) costs of the suit.

Eventually, respondent filed with the trial court an Urgent Ex Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As
Indigent Plaintiff.

On October 28, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:

The Court hereby allows the plaintiff to litigate as pauper there being sufficient showing that he
is an indigent. He does not own any real property in the City of Manila or elsewhere.
The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to accept the complaint for filing without payment
of filing fees computed as SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
AND EIGHTY-THREE CENTAVOS (P615,672.83) which amount, however, shall constitute a lien
upon any judgment to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint.

On December 17, 1998, respondent manifested before the trial court that he filed various criminal complaints
against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

On January 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order[2] denying petitioners motions to dismiss. They then filed
motions for reconsideration, but they were likewise denied.

On March 12, 1999, petitioners filed their Answer Ad Cautelam in Civil Case No. 98-91356.

On May 24, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated January 20,
1999 denying their motions to dismiss, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.

On October 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.

Then on December 7, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition
Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case
And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence. It appears that
respondent was already 75 years old and sickly.
On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to cite respondent in contempt of
court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. Petitioners alleged therein that in filing with the appellate court an
urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent violated the preliminary injunction issued by the said court.

Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.

On December 14, 1999, the deposition of respondent was taken by Atty. Alberto A. Aguja, a Notary
Public for Manila. On the same date, he filed with the Court of Appeals respondents deposition.

On September 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No.
52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 dismissing the petitions and lifting and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued, thus:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the consolidated petitions filed by the petitioners are hereby
DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary injunction dated October 18, 1999 issued by this Court
enjoining further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35 is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in denying their motion to dismiss respondents
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 for nonpayment of docket fees; (2) for not finding that respondent
engaged in forum shopping; and (3) in not declaring that he is guilty of contempt of court.

On the first issue, it is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee.[3] As we held in Magaspi v. Ramolete,[4] the correct docket fees must be paid before
courts can act on a petition or complaint. The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien
on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in
Section 19, Rule 141,[5] of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE
GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT
DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL
PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF
MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he
and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is properly a person who
is an indigent although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support
aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment.[6] The term immediate
family includes those members of the same household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does
not include those who are living apart from the particular household of which the individual is a member.[7]

In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondents ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective
since it was not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his
family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall
execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all members of the litigants immediate family must
likewise execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Petitioners next argue that respondents ex parte motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to show his
indigent status.[8] Suffice it to state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of factual determination.[9] Thus,
petitioners cannot now ask us to review the evidence anew.

Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that respondent committed forum shopping when he failed to report to
the trial court that he filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City.

Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals[10] describes forum shopping as the act of a litigant who repetitively
availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other courtto increase his chances of obtaining
a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. Differently put, it is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.[11]

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[12]

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirement shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Respondents Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the

complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 reads:

FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING (ESTAFA) under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b)
and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS under Art. 172,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati Prosecutors Office, criminal
case for violation of the Insurance Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati
Prosecutors Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance Code Commission;
 that to the best of his knowledge no such other action is pending in the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing certification is a substantial compliance with
Section 5 of Rule 7. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent manifested before the trial court
on December 16, 1998 that he actually filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City.

On the final issue, petitioners claim that the deposition of respondent taken on December 14,
1999 violated the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on October 15, 1999. Such act, petitioners assert, is
tantamount to indirect contempt of court.

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or
their witnesses during litigation.[13] Succinctly, it is the despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of
the court.[14] Rule 71 provides for two forms of contumacious acts direct and indirect.

Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.[15] It is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court
not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.

Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following
requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. [16] Records
show that these requirements were complied with.

The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579, dismissed the charge for indirect contempt, holding
that respondents deposition was done in good faith, thus:

It should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of private respondents

deposition last December 14, 1999 was the use by the petitioners of the June 09 and 28, 1999
depositions when at that time no orders were issued by Us enjoining any proceedings below.
The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously objected to by
the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created when the private
respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to
 clarify such misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14,
1999 deposition was taken.

We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking
of respondents deposition is not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered
by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have always
abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their contempt powers sparingly.

In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No.
52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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(16) Judge Espanol vs Atty Formoso GR#150949 June 21, 2007;

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated September 12, 2001 and
Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of
land consisting of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued
in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they
were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses
Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163
was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite a
complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00.Impleaded as defendants were spouses
Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are
spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Espaol, petitioner, issued an Order
stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty.
Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons)
filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of
direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of
Dasmarias, Cavite.

Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:

From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant case is
a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations,
through the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former
counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic
Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand, and some officials and employees
of the government agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified
titles, on the other. Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt,
the Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.
 Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger
thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification
charges be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus,
let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a
copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme Court. Manila.

Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc.,
respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are
declared and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious
documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed before
this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents
who should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.

Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462
allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been
derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C.
Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby
cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for
its implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessors Office
of the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious
instruments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,
whereas, the private defendants counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise
dismissed. However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful
course(s) of action in the interest of justice.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she stumbled
upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,
presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.[2] Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judges Decision declaring
that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in the municipal
jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of
arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same
is hereby GRANTED. Respondent judges July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein
petitioners in direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the
Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13, 2001,
which the respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge
Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of
title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a
hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution
of November 15, 2001.

Hence, this petition.

The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt
of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
The early case of In re Jones[3] defined contempt of court as some act or conduct which tends to interfere with
the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the
dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court
and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same. It has also been described as a defiance of the authority,
justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation.[4] Simply put, it is
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.[5]

The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but divisions
of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the
sovereign.[6] This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In this
jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt on
the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial
institution.[7] Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement
of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration of justice.[8]

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,[9] this Court characterized direct contempt as one done in the presence of or so
near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. It is a contumacious act done facie
curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing.[10] In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in
direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without

authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.[11]

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it
constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper
conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
VI,[12] we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not
apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the
accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished
only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by
himself and counsel.[13] Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.[14] Thus, the modes of
procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those
adapted to criminal prosecutions.[15] Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents
are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice
to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,[16] we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate
that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof,
concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when Sharcons
filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty
of direct contempt of court.

Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ
of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after
posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a
person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his
liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.[17]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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(17) Digital Telecom vs Cantos GR#180200 Nov 25, 2013;

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is of the utmost importance x x x that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered
with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of
collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the
public."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the July 24, 2007 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 29009 which affirmed the July 7, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XI, Balayan,
Batangas in Civil Case No. 4051 dismissing petitioner Digital Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc.’s (petitioner)
Petition for Indirect Contempt/Prohibition against respondent Jessie E. Cantos (respondent) as Provincial
Treasurer of Batangas. Also assailed is the October 11, 2007 CA Resolution5 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 7678,6 petitioner was granted a legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines on February 17, 1994.

Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayor’s Permit to operate and provide telecommunications service in Balayan,
Batangas, petitioner was informed by then Mayor Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. that its business operation would be
restrained should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes on or before October 5, 1998. And as petitioner
failed to pay, the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas, Mr. Francisco P. Martinez,
issued on October 6, 1998 a Cease and Desist Order enjoining petitioner from further operating its business.

Petitioner thus promptly filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order before the RTC of Balayan,
Batangas against the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3514 and raffled to Branch IX of said court.

In a Decision7 dated July 15, 1999, Branch IX ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the issuance of the
Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis. It held that the enjoinment of petitioner’s business operation is
not one of the remedies available to enforce collection of real property taxes under existing laws. The RTC also
ruled that petitioner is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in connection with the
operation of its franchise. In arriving at such conclusion, the RTC relied on Section 5 of RA 7678, which provides
that:

Sec. 5. Tax Provisions. - The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and
personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be
required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee shall pay to the Bureau of Internal Revenue each year,
within thirty (30) days after the audit and approval of the accounts, a franchise tax as may be prescribed by law
of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by
the grantee; provided, that the grantee shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is
amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto.

The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or
his duly authorized representative in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall
be subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

and construed the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" in the first sentence as limiting petitioner’s exemption
from paying real property tax only to properties used in furtherance of its legislative franchise to provide
telecommunications services.

The dispositive portion of Branch IX’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Cease and Desist Order dated October 6, 1998 is hereby declared null and void for lack of
legal basis. The Court further declares that real properties of plaintiff [Digital] Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (DIGITEL) which are used in the operation of its franchise are exempt from the payment of real property
taxes, but those not used in connection thereto are subject to aforesaid taxes.

SO ORDERED.8

The then Mayor attempted to set aside the above Decision by filing a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. But
his efforts were in vain as the CA outrightly dismissed the Petition.9 The dismissal became final and executory as
shown in an Entry of Judgment dated February 2, 2000.10

In June 2002, respondent, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas, issued seven
Warrants of Levy11 certifying that several real properties of petitioner situated in the Municipalities of Ibaan, San
Juan, Sto. Tomas, Cuenca, Nasugbu, Balayan, and Lemery, all in the Province of Batangas, are delinquent in the
payment of real property taxes. Hence, the properties would be advertised and sold at public auction within 30
days from petitioner’s receipt of the warrants.

On July 1, 2002, petitioner wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy and to refrain from
proceeding with the public sale of its property located in Balayan, Batangas.12 It invoked the final Decision in
Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing petitioner’s exemption from the payment of real property tax which it claimed to
be binding upon respondent. But since the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition
for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)13 on July 5, 2002. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4051.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

For his defense, respondent averred that he cannot be held liable for contempt or for having disobeyed the
Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 since the same relates to an action in personam and, therefore, binds only the
parties impleaded therein and their successors in interest.14 He also asserted that petitioner’s claim for tax
exemption could not be collaterally presented and resolved in a contempt proceeding and that petitioner should
have resorted instead to the remedies provided under the Local Government Code (LGC) in order to prevent the
public sale of its delinquent properties.

On July 25, 2002, the RTC granted15 petitioner’s prayer for TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that when
said TRO was served upon him, he had already effected the public auction of petitioner’s real properties.16 Thus,
petitioner filed a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion17 to recall and nullify the auction sale and to order
respondent and his counsel to explain why they should not be held in contempt for their blatant defiance of the
TRO. It also thereafter asserted that respondent is bound by the final Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514
under the principle of res judicata.18 It maintained that respondent has a shared interest with the defendants in
Civil Case No. 3514 in that they are all interested in the levy, imposition and collection of real property tax and
that the Province of Batangas, including respondent, is estopped from denying privity because of the Province’s
active participation in both proceedings by virtue of the representation of the same counsel. Petitioner likewise
contended that the declaration in Civil Case No. 3514 that it is exempt from real property tax for properties used
in the operation of its franchise is considered in rem and binds the property itself.

On August 14, 2002, the RTC issued an Order19 denying petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. It held that the issuance of the writ prayed for had already become moot and academic
since the public auction sale sought to be enjoined was already consummated. It further noted that the writ as
a provisional remedy is unavailing to petitioner’s case as it should have availed of the remedy provided under
Section 260 of the LGC in order to stop the scheduled auction sale, that is, to pay the delinquent tax and
interest due thereon under protest.

Petitioner filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Null and Void the Sale Conducted on
July 25, 200220 which was, however, denied in an Order21 dated September 3, 2002. When petitioner elevated
the denial to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari,22 the same was dismissed in a Resolution23 dated November 18,
2002.

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,24 the RTC rendered its Decision25 dated
July 7, 2003 dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case
No. 4051). The RTC ruled that since respondent was not a party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to
render obedience to the Decision therein. Furthermore, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil
Case No. 3514 and Civil Case No. 4051, the former being an action in personam, the Decision in said case binds
only the parties impleaded therein and their successors in interest, which do not include the respondent. The
said court refused to rule on petitioner’s claim for exemption from payment of realty taxes ratiocinating that any
case pertaining thereto should be filed directly with the local government unit concerned.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.26

As petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration27 was denied by the RTC in a Resolution28 dated September 17, 2004,
it appealed to the CA.29

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In a Decision30 dated July 24, 2007, the CA found no merit in the appeal. First, it noted that the dismissal of the
case for indirect contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal from which an appeal is not allowed. In any
case, respondent’s act of issuing the warrants of levy did not constitute indirect contempt in Civil Case No. 3514
since the final Decision issued in said case was not directed against him but to the Mayor and the Chief of the
Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas. The CA also concurred with the trial court’s ruling that
petitioner’s claim for tax exemption could not be presented and resolved in an indirect contempt case and
opined that the correct remedy is for petitioner to file an independent action for annulment of sale against the
Province of Batangas and there invoke its exemption from real property taxes.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated July 7, 2003 and the Resolution dated
September 17, 2004, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas in Civil Case No. 4051
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.31

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated October 11, 2007.

Issues

Petitioner, thence, filed this Petition on the following grounds:

(a) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Civil Case No. 4051 is simply a case for indirect
contempt so much [so] that its dismissal by the lower court would amount to acquittal from which an appeal
would not lie;

(b) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent, not being a party to Civil Case No. 3514,
cannot be held in contempt for refusing to abide by the decision there[in];

(c) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of Digitel for real property tax exemption
cannot be presented and resolved in the indirect contempt case; and

(d) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the "proper remedy is for Digitel to file an independent
action for annulment of sale against the Province of Batangas, invoking its exemption from payment of real
property taxes.34

Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that an appeal will not lie since the RTC Decision essentially
amounts to respondent’s acquittal. It posits that the CA can still take cognizance of the appeal since the same is
also a Petition for Prohibition. It is well within the authority of the said court to rule on the claim for tax
exemption like in the case of The City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.35 wherein
the claim for realty tax exemption of another telecommunications company, Bayantel, was resolved through a
Petition for Prohibition. Petitioner likewise insists that respondent cannot defy the final ruling in Civil Case No.
3514 and also the pronouncement of this Court in Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of
Pangasinan36 that petitioner is exempted from paying real property tax. Also, in consonance with said rulings,
the sale by public auction of petitioner’s properties is void ab initio, the same having been made under a
mistaken premise that petitioner’s properties are not exempt from realty taxes. Thus, an independent action to
annul the sale of the properties, contrary to the CA’s intimation, is not the proper remedy. Petitioner therefore
prays for the nullification and setting aside of the auction sale conducted by respondent against its real
properties.

Our Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.

At the outset, the Court shall address the issue on double jeopardy as discussed by petitioner in its
Memorandum.

In his Comment, respondent reiterated the CA’s ruling that the RTC Decision amounts to an acquittal, hence, an
appeal does not lie. Arguing against it, petitioner contends that the rule on double jeopardy will not bar it from
pursuing its appeal because this is not a criminal case and respondent is not tried as an accused.

The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, contempt is not a criminal offense.37 However, a charge for contempt of
court partakes of the nature of a criminal action.38 Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a
prosecution for contempt.39 In fact, Section 11 of Rule 7140 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in
indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal cases. This Court has held that an alleged contemner
should be accorded the same rights as that of an accused.41 Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge
against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.42

Be that as it may, respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience
to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a
defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of
the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation."43

In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of
petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to
disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to
perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160,44 viz:

Section 176. Levy on Real Property. - After the expiration of the time required to pay the delinquent tax, fee, or
charge, real property may be levied on before, simultaneously, or after the distraint of personal property
belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. To this end, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may
be, shall prepare a duly authenticated certificate showing the name of the taxpayer and the amount of the tax,
fee, or charge, and penalty due from him. Said certificate shall operate with the force of a legal execution
throughout the Philippines. Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate the description of the property
upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the
assessor and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is located who shall annotate the
levy on the tax declaration and certificate of title of the property, respectively, and the delinquent taxpayer or, if
he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability
arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the property in question.

In case the levy on real property is not issued before or simultaneously with the warrant of distraint on personal
property, and the personal property of the taxpayer is not sufficient to satisfy his delinquency, the provincial,
city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, shall within thirty (30) days after execution of the distraint,
proceed with the levy on the taxpayer's real property. .

A report on any levy shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant, be submitted by the levying officer
to the sanggunian concerned.

Section 177. Penalty for Failure to Issue and Execute Warrant. - Without prejudice to criminal prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, any local treasurer who fails to issue or execute the warrant
of distraint or levy after the expiration of the time prescribed, or who is found guilty of abusing the exercise
thereof by competent authority shall be automatically dismissed from the service after due notice and hearing.

Noteworthy at this point is that there is nothing in the records which would show that petitioner availed of the
tax exemption or submitted the requirements to establish that it is exempted from paying real property taxes.
Section 206 of RA 7160 outlines the requirements for real property tax exemption, viz.:

Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by or for whom real property is
declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property under this Title shall file with the provincial, city or
municipal assessor within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient
documentary evidence in support of such claim including corporate charters, title of ownership, articles of
incorporation, by-laws, contracts, affidavits, certifications and mortgage deeds, and similar documents.

If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed, the property shall be listed as
taxable in the assessment roll. However, if the property shall be proven to be tax exempt, the same shall be
dropped from the assessment roll.

Neither did petitioner avail of the remedy of paying the assessed real property tax under protest as prescribed
in Section 25245 of RA 7160. Suffice it to say that the availment of these remedies could have prevented
respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the conduct of the subsequent public auction sale of
petitioner’s properties. Due to petitioner’s non-availment of these remedies, respondent therefore remained duty
bound to perform such acts, otherwise, he may be subjected to the penalties prescribed for non-performance of
his ministerial duties as provincial treasurer.

Respondent is not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. 3514.

Petitioner avers that respondent blatantly defied a final and binding Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514
declaring it exempt from paying taxes on its real properties. It argues that there is a shared identity of interest
between the defendants in Civil Case No. 3514 and respondent. Therefore, respondent is barred by the Decision
in the said case under the principle of res judicata.

The contention is specious. "Res judicata means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.’"46 For res judicata to apply there must among others be, between the first
and the second actions, identity of the parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.47 Here, there is no identity of parties between Civil Case No. 3514 and the instant case. "Identity of
parties exists ‘where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity.’"48 In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was directed against
Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor and Chief of the Permit and
License Division of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas, respectively. On the other hand, respondent, in the
instant case, is being sued in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. While the
defendants in both cases similarly sought to enforce the tax obligation of petitioner, they were sued under
different capacities. Moreover, there is no identity in the causes of action between the two cases. In Civil Case
No. 3514, the propriety of the municipal officials’ closure/stoppage of petitioner’s business operation in Balayan,
Batangas was the one in question while what is involved in this case is respondent’s act of issuing Warrants of
Levy and proceeding with the auction sale of the real properties of petitioner. Clearly, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. The RTC and the CA are therefore correct in ruling that respondent, not being a party
thereto, is not bound by the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514.

Petitioner’s reliance on the rulings in Civil Case No. 3514 and Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v.
Province of Pangasinan is misplaced.

In support of its prayer to annul the auction sale of its real properties, petitioner heavily relies on the Decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 3514 declaring that it is exempt from paying real property tax. In addition, it invokes
Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan49 wherein it was ruled that petitioner’s
real properties located within the territorial jurisdiction of Pangasinan that are actually, directly and exclusively
used in its franchise are exempt from realty tax.

As in Civil Case No. 3514, this Court’s Third Division in Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province
of Pangasinan50 has interpreted the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" in the first sentence of Section 5 of RA
7678 as limiting petitioner’s exemption from realty tax to real properties used in the pursuit of its legislative
franchise.1âwphi1 It was then held that RA 7678 exempted petitioner’s properties that are actually, directly, and
exclusively used in the conduct and operation of its franchise from real property tax.

But this ruling has already been abandoned.

In the later case of Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. City Government of Batangas,51 the Court en
banc speaking thru Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio pronounced:

Nowhere in the language of the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678 does it expressly or even impliedly
provide that petitioner’s real properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in its telecommunications
business are exempt from payment of realty tax. On the contrary the first sentence of Section 5 specifically
states that the petitioner, as the franchisee shall pay the ‘same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal
property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by
law to pay.’

The heading of Section 5 is ‘Tax Provisions,’ not Tax Exemptions. To reiterate, the phrase ‘exemption from real
estate tax’ or other words conveying exemption from realty tax do not appear in the first sentence of Section 5.
The phrase ‘exclusive of this franchise’ in the first sentence of Section 5 merely qualifies the phrase personal
property to exclude petitioner’s legislative franchise, which is an intangible personal property. Petitioner’s
franchise is subject to tax in the second sentence of Section 5 which imposes the ‘franchise tax.’ Thus, there is
no grant of tax exemption in the first sentence of Section 5.

The interpretation of the phrase exclusive of this franchise in the Bayantel and Digitel cases goes against the
basic principle in construing tax exemptions. In PLDT v. City of Davao the Court held that ‘tax exemptions
should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be
mistaken. They cannot be extended by mere implication or inference.’

Tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must point to a specific
provision of law conferring on the taxpayer in clear and plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any
doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved against the taxpayer.52

As things now stand, petitioner s real properties, whether used in the furtherance of its franchise or not, are
subject to real property tax. Hence, its reliance on the rulings in Civil Case No. 3514 and Digital
Telecommunications Philippines Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan53 becomes unavailing.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
October 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 29009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
(18) Garcia vs Manrique GR#186592 Oct 10, 2012;

DECISION
REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court filed against respondent Leo Ruben
C. Manrique (Manrique) for allegedly publishing statements which tend to directly impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice.

Factual Antecedents

The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation wherein
respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the
Supreme Court.

The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov. Garcia), Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Angeles),
Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento) and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De Mesa) alleged that the subject article undermines
the people’s faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief
from the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 185132. The pertinent
portions of the article which was entitled, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20-M?" and published in the
January 14 to 20, 2009 issue of the Luzon Tribune, are reproduced as follows:1

Bukod sa mga kontrobersiya na bumabalot ngayon sa Korte Suprema dahil sa isyu ng umano’y pagpapatalsik
kay Chief Justice Renato Puno, hindi maalis sa isip ng ilang Bataeño ang pagtatanong kung totoo nga kayang
binayaran ng kampo ni Bataan Governor Enrique Garcia, Jr. ang isa o ilang Mahestrado ng Korte upang mag-
isyu ng Temporary Restraining Order ang Korte na humarang sa implementasyon ng anim na buwang
suspensyon ng Punong Lalawigan.

Marami umano ang nagdududa kung papaano nakakuha ng TRO si Garcia gayung malinaw na ang kaso ay
kasalukuyang dinidinig noon ng Court of Appeals. Ito umano ay paglabag sa tinatawag na Forum Shopping.

xxxx

Dalawang Division ng Court of Appeals ang tumanggi na dinggin ang petisyon ni Garcia para sa TRO hanggang
sa dininig ito ng isang division. Nagpadala ng liham ang Court of Appeals sa mga magkakatunggaling partido
upang simulang dinggin ang kaso. Nakapagtataka umano kung bakit hindi ito binigyang galang ng Korte
Suprema.

Nang inilabas ng Korte ang TRO, malinaw na naihain na ang suspension order kay Garcia ng DILG kaya’t opisyal
ng epektibo ang suspensyon. Ano pa ba kaya ng na-TRO gayung sinisimulan na ni Garcia ang kanyang
suspensyon.

May mga nagsasabing binayaran umano ng hanggang sa ₱20-Milyon ang isang mahestrado ng Korte upang
pagbigyan ang kahilingan ni Garcia.

Madiin naman itong itinanggi ni Garcia at nagsabing hindi dapat bahiran ng dumi ang Korte Suprema at dapat
igalang ang desisyon nito.

Gayunpaman, marami ang nagtataka at laging nakakakuha ng TRO sa Korte Suprema si Garcia lalu na sa mga
mahahalagang kasong kanyang hinaharap.

xxxx

Ang kompiyansa ni Garcia umano ay kitang-kita sa mga miting kung saan siya ay nagsasalita na kayang-kaya
niyang lusutan ang lahat ng mga kaso niya at maging kung mayroon pang kasunod na mga kaso na isasampa
sa kanya.

Kaya naman hindi maalis ng ilan ang magduda na ang taong gipit sa kaso ay maaaring magbayad ng milyung-
milyon piso upang upuan ng Korte Suprema ang kaso at manatiling habang buhay ang TRO.

Prior to the publication of the foregoing article, two (2) interrelated petitions were filed before this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 185132 and 181311, entitled Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
and Province of Bataan v. Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, respectively.
In G.R. No. 185132, the Provincial Government of Bataan ordered for the conduct of a tax delinquency sale of
all the properties of Sunrise Paper Products Industries, Inc. (Sunrise) situated in Orani, Bataan. When no public
bidder participated in the delinquency sale, the provincial government acquired all the properties of Sunrise
which consisted of machineries and equipment, including the parcel of land where the factory stood.
Subsequently, Sunrise filed a petition for injunction which was docketed as Civil Case No. 8164, to annul the
auction sale and prevent the provincial government from consolidating its title over the properties. Two (2)
other creditors of Sunrise intervened in the proceedings. The provincial government entered into a compromise
agreement with Sunrise and the intervening creditors and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
8164. However, the trial court refused to dismiss the case and proceeded to hear the same on the merits.
Subsequently, it rendered a Decision dated June 15, 2007, which was thereafter challenged in another petition
docketed as G.R. No. 181311.

Meanwhile, former workers of Sunrise, namely: Josechito B. Gonzaga (Gonzaga), Ruel A. Magsino (Magsino)
and Alfredo B. Santos (Santos), filed criminal and administrative charges against petitioners Gov. Garcia,
Angeles, Talento and De Mesa, among others, before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-
0039-A. Subsequently, Deputy Ombudsman Orlando S. Casimiro (Ombudsman Casimiro) issued an Order dated
October 28, 2008, preventively suspending the petitioners.

Unyielding, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the Order dated
October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro, with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The CA, however, deferred the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of TRO and
instead issued Resolution dated November 14, 2008, requiring Gonzaga, Magsino and Santos to file a comment.
Dissatisfied with the action of the CA, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with this Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 185132. On November 19, 2008, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the public respondents
in OMB-L-A-08-0039-A from implementing the Order dated October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro,
specifically the order for the petitioners’ preventive suspension, until further orders of the Court. The issuance of
this TRO is the incident mentioned in Manrique’s article.

In his Comment,2 Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only
stated the facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he made any
degrading remarks against the Supreme Court and claimed that the article simply posed academic questions. If
the article ever had a critical undertone, it was directed against the actions of the petitioners, who are public
officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any rate, he asseverated that whatever was stated in his
article is protected by the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press1âwphi1.

The subject article falls under the

second type of contemptuous
publication.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the contents of Manrique’s article would constitute indirect contempt
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which reads:

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it is indispensable to their right of self-
preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the maintenance of their authority; and consequently to
the due administration of justice.3 It must however be exercised on the preservative not vindictive principle, and
on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt
for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons
but for the functions that they exercise.4

The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the courts impenetrable to public scrutiny nor
does it place them beyond the scope of legitimate criticism. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at
judicial authority.5 It is the cardinal condition of all such criticisms however that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty to respect courts6 and therefore warrants the wielding of the power to punish for contempt.

In his erudite dissenting opinion in People v. Alarcon,7 which was impliedly adopted in subsequent cases dealing
with contempt,8 Justice Manuel V. Moran noted the two kinds of publication which are punishable with
contempt, to wit:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication
which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced
in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind
of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand
of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there
is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt
exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. x x x
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.9 (Italics ours)

Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications relating to court and to court proceedings which can warrant the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt: (1) that which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding; and (2) that which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute.

We find the subject article illustrative of the second kind of contemptuous publication for insinuating that this
Court’s issuance of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on an illegal cause. The glaring innuendos of illegality
in the article is denigrating to the dignity of this Court and the ideals of fairness and justice that it represents. It
is demonstrative of disrespect not only for this Court, but also for the judicial system as a whole, tends to
promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary by creating the impression that the Court
cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially.10

This Court has always exercised utmost restraint and tolerance against criticisms on its decisions and issuances,
bearing in mind that official actions are subject to public opinion as a means of ensuring accountability.
Manrique’s article, however, has transgressed the ambit of fair criticism and depicted a legitimate action of this
Court as a reciprocated accommodation of the petitioners’ interest. Contrary to Manrique’s claim of objectivity,
his article contained nothing but baseless suspicion and aspersion on the integrity of this Court, calculated to
incite doubt on the mind of its readers on the legality of the issuance. It did not simply dwell on the propriety of
the issuance on the basis of some sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame this Court of an irregularity in the
discharge of duties but of committing the crime of bribery. The article insinuated that processes from this Court
may be obtained for reasons other than that their issuance is necessary to the administration of justice. Judging
from the title alone, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20M?" the article does not aim for an academic
discussion of the propriety of the issuance of the TRO but seeks to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this Court.
To suggest that the processes of this Court can be obtained through underhand means or that their issuance is
subject to negotiation and that members of this Court are easily swayed by money is a serious affront to the
integrity of the highest court of the land. Such imputation smacks of utter disrespect to this Court and such
temerity is deserving of contempt.

Manrique claims that he was only being critical of the actions of the petitioners as public officers and that no
disrespect was meant to the Court. While he claims good faith, the contents of his article bespeak otherwise. A
person’s intent, however good it maybe, cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or writing. It is
gathered from what is apparent, not on supposed or veiled objectives.

The truth is we consider public scrutiny of our decisions and official acts as a healthy component of democracy.
However, such must not transcend the wall of tolerable criticism and its end must always be to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the justice system and not to destroy public confidence in them. In People v.
Godoy,11 we stressed:

Generally, criticism of a court’s rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted after a case has
been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and
base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be;
but when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or
selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create
distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts.12

There is thus a need to distinguish between adverse criticism of the court’s decision after the case has ended
and scandalizing the court itself. The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as
such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case for contempt.13

A reading of the subject article shows that Manrique was not simply passing judgment on an official act of the
Court. He was actually intimating that the petitioners were able to obtain a TRO through illicit means, with the
complicity of this Court. As he hurls accusation of corruption against petitioners, he also unfairly smeared the
reputation of this Court by stirring the idea that one or some members of this Court yield to said illegal act. By
no means can such an imputation be justified by mere curiosity or suspicion. That he was only mulling on the
thought that such an illegal act transpired does not make his insinuation any less contemptuous. Manrique’s
article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an indecent attempt to malign the
petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of this Court.

It bears stressing that the Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.14 Thus, the inflexible demand to adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct is imposed upon all members of the judiciary. They are required to keep their
private as well as official conduct at all times free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond
reproach.15

Malicious publications cannot seek

the protection of the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.

Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press, albeit
unpersuasively, to extricate himself from liability. However, said constitutional protection is not a shield against
scurrilous publications, which are heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but to trigger doubt on
their integrity based on some imagined possibilities. Contrary to nourishing democracy and strengthening
judicial independence, which are the expected products of the guaranties of free speech and press, the
irresponsible exercise of these rights wounds democracy and leads to division.

In Alarcon, we emphasized:

It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that
freedom should not be confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing
vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate
exercise. As important as is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice and
secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. x x x.16

Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.17 For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.18

Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech;
rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free
speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefore and confidence therein.19

Therefore; Manrique's article, lacking in social value and aimed solely at besmirching the reputation of the
Court, is undeserving of the protection of the guaranties of free speech and press.

The critical role of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort renders it imperative that it maintains the ideals
of neutrality, integrity and independence:) the characteristics in which the people's trust and confidence are
built, alive and unscathed. Thus, justices and judges alike are constantly reminded to live up to the stringent
standards of the profession or else suffer the consequences. In return, the people are expected to respect and
abide by the rulings of this Court and must not be instrumental to its disrepute.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique is hereby
adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱
20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
(19) LBP vs Listana GR#152611 Aug 5, 2003; and

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated
December 11, 2001,[1] which annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.[2]
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares,
located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily
offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),[3] under
Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR
valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings
to determine the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank
of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY
SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired
area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the
landowner in the manner provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the
respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law.[5]
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner
Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999.He argued that such failure of
the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as
provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL.[6]
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as
Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he
complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,[8] which was however
denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000.[9] Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD,
manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994
DARAB New Rules of Procedure.[10]
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just
compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000.Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of
Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just
compensation to respondent.[11] On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against
Manager Alex A. Lorayes.[12]
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the
order of arrest.[13] The case was raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its
stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending
the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land
Bank.
SO ORDERED.[14]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was denied in an Order dated
April 2, 2001.[15]
Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,[16] docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENTS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION
THE FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION,
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.

B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD
ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD OF THE
BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL.

C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND PATENT
VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND
IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF
ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS THE
PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP
MANAGER.

D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE
MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS.[17]

As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent
before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via
a notice of appeal.[18]
Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
ones substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory
order. As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon.[19]
Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence,
unappealable. Therefore, respondents special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the
correct remedy under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be
subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an
order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the
assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[21]

On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the
PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any
person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the
commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose
out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact
but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

xxxxxxxxx

The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the
Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this
requirement:

1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt
proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the
heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying
any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is
now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

xxxxxxxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by
the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the
requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.[22]

Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a
verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt
against quasi-judicial entities, provides:

Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to
contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall
have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to
punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall
have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of
these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:

1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and
inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or
bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the
second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the
situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce
documents when required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers.For such violation, said person
shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body with
the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.[23](emphasis in the original)

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule
71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of
the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional
Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
 Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:[24] First, the Rules of Court clearly require the
filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge
was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio;rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the
PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of
a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000
and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A.
Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52,
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

(20) RULES 69, 70 and 71. -Judge Bacaraman