Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.

Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:

This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan

Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past
twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan
and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the
Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on
their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public
Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of
certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation

- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional
because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called “Subordinate
Legislation”. It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern
government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been
delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of
discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no

property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for
the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, “to amend,
modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and
circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case
was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, “the liberty and property of the citizens should be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When
private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private
use only.

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. vs. Public Service Commission (PSC) G.R.

No. 47065 June 26, 1940 Delegation of Powers, Separation of Powers,
Certificate of Public Convenience
OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to

operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged in
transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility.
Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the
application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the
service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less
depreciation, and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC
constitute undue delegation of powers?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at
the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration
of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving
the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in
addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

EDU VS ERICTA
Posted by kaye lee on 2:56 PM

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]

FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order
No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of
the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event that Judge
would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety
and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted
in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on
April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in
the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that

Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear.
There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,
far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, respondent-appellee.

Jose Yulo for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg,
as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The
petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of
the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the
introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as
shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the
Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing

contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary
notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into
the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That
at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the
presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if
the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign
cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.

SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons,
namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner
would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for;
and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the
failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the
petitioner appealed to this court.

The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the
fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to
import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective. Act No. 3052
reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-

seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to
import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any
foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the
head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or
introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign
countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and
such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the
Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or
introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of
serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the
importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is
authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the
Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department,
prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.

"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue
regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both
fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive
order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions
require it."
 SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its
nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No.
3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation of the cattle without the
approval of the head of the corresponding department.

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of

laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former
laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing
McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97
Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)

This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of
statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563,
568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is
not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner
because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to
relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.

But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155
is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature
passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally
recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the
development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police
power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado,
187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said
in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214),
that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of
denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act
No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not
for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume
to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.
(6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not
holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful
delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think that such is the case; as Judge
Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad
Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case:

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends
section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute
prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of
the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute
in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the
importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a
tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of
the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff
Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction
between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law.
ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and `amendment.')"

The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG
Ostrand, J

Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)

FACTS:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg,
as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The
petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons,
namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner
would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for;
and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the
failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the
petitioner appealed to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent as cause of action

HELD:
Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public
welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the
scope of the police power.

The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act
No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not
for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume
to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

G.R. No. L-34674 | October 26, 1931 | MAURICIO CRUZ,

petitioner-appellant, vs.

STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry,

respondent-appellee. |

OSTRAND, J.:FACTS

:Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila
for theissuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the
Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of tenlarge cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz
attacked theconstitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation
of cattle fromforeign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole
purpose of theenactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the
country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a causeof action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No.
3155 was declaredunconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the
relief demandedbecause Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would
prohibit therespondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155
was constitutionaland, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of
petitioner’s failure to fileanother complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court. Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by
the factalleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed
to importcattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional,Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.

ISSUES

:1.WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional2.WON the lower court erred in not holding
that the power given by Act No. 3155 to theGovernor-General to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition provided in theact constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers3.WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law

RULING

1.

No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of
lawsby implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless
it isnecessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely
valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the
countryand to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign
cattle.It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the
publicwelfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within
thescope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to
theexercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and
thepublic interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was
reasonablenecessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its
power inpassing the Act.

2.

No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
whichnecessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
ordiscretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Thefirst cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no
unlawfuldelegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3.

No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law.
Itdoes not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the
Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

G.R. No. L-28790

Facts:

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he isentitled to the
same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He
approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered
by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring
himto explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Noblejas
answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the
Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this
case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the

Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge).

Ruling:

No.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges
equivalent to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only
by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the
Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.

Petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privilege of a Judge of First Instance” includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This include (a) the Judicial
Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant Solicitors General; (c) the City Fiscal of
Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal of Manila and (e) SEC Commissioner.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function,
but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of
Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not
automatically mean that they are judicial in character.Still, the resolution of the
consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

Petition is Dismissed.

. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DAVAO

PILOTSASSOCIATION G.R. No. 116356 June 29, 1998
Facts: On September 25, 1989, private respondent elevated a complaint against
petitioner for sum of money and attorney's fees alleging that private respondent had
rendered pilotage services to petitioner between with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18.
Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed
to pay P703,290.18 with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint.
On November 18, 1989 petitioner disputed the claims of private respondent
assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088 upon which it bases its claims; that the
subject of the complaint falls within the scope and authority of the Philippine Ports
Authority by virtue of PD No. 857 ; that Executive Order No. 1088 is an unwarranted
repeal or modification of the Philippine Ports Authority Charter, among others.
Petitioner argues that EO 1088 is not constitutional, because its interpretation
and application are left to private respondent, a private person, and it constitutes an
undue delegation of power. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in
accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the
administrative body vested under PD 857 with the power to regulate and prescribe
pilotage fees. It on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars because EO
1088 setsa higher rate.
Issues: Whether Executive Order 1088 is unconstitutional. Whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power on private respondent.
Held: Petition DENIED. Reiterating the pronouncement of the Court in Philippine
Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that EO 1088 is valid. E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates
without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease
rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix
new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service
charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise
vessels in all Philippine ports. ´Petitioner cannot insist on paying pilotage fees based on
the PPA circulars because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void
and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As stated by the Court
in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, "the conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with either the letter or spirit of the law." It is axiomatic that an administrative agency,
like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to
enforce it. Therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such
as EO 1088, the latter prevails. In conclusion, the Court made it clear that E.O. No.
1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The
PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by
E.O. No. 1088.

Paz Garcia vs Catalino Macaraig, Jr.

39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo
City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig
was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his
Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would
be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an
extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice,
he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months
allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego
his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail,
whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent,
dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig
has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has
received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the
duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping
the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as
Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances
mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer
who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid
himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with
favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to
assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and
what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the
other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on
check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present
constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this
Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted
to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst
still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels
very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

MEMBER OF JUDICIARY SHOULD NOT ASSUME A POSITION OR PERFORM ADUTY

NON-JUDICIAL IN CHARACTER; RATIONALE THEREFOR. — While the doctrine of
separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor,
thepractical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justifya member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty
non- judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departurefrom its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only
a highercourt, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is
not asubordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensablethat there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as
expected, to beconfined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
no less than themaintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less . . . Ourholding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, a 1968
decision. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who penned the opinion, first referred to the above
Richardson decision aswell as to Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. It
went on to state: "In thisspirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and its members shouldnot and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assumeany duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions, anda law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate
disputes between public utilities waspronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." It isclear from the above Noblejas decision that even
prior to the Constitution, there was acommitment to the principle that a member of the
judiciary cannot be asked todischarge non-judicial functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v.
Pasay Transportation Co.,mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court,
was quite explicit. Thus:"The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise anypower or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected withthe administering of judicial functions."

Philamlife v. Ansaldo - Jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner

234 SCRA 509

Facts:

> Ramon M. Paterno sent a letter-complaint to the Insurance Commissioner alleging

certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers
of the Philamlife as a result of certain practices by said company.
> Commissioner requested petitioner Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as
Philamlife's president, to comment on respondent Paterno's letter.

> The complaint prays that provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract of
Agency executed between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing
provisions as published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be
declared as null and void. He also asked that the amounts of such charges and fees
already deducted and collected by Philamlife in connection therewith be reimbursed to
the agents, with interest at the prevailing rate reckoned from the date when they were
deducted

> Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant
to the President, asked that the Commissioner first rule on the questions of the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner over the subject matter of the letters-
complaint and the legal standing of Paterno.

> Insurance Commissioner set the case for hearing and sent subpoena to the officers
of Philamlife. Ortega filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the Insurance
company has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that there is no
complaint sufficient in form and contents has been filed.

> The motion to quash was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the insurance commissioner had jurisdiction over the legality of the
Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents.

Held:

No, it does not have jurisdiction.

The general regulatory authority of the Insurance Commissioner is described in Section

414 of the Insurance Code, to wit:

"The Insurance Commissioner shall have the duty to see that all laws relating to
insurance, insurance companies and other insurance matters, mutual benefit
associations and trusts for charitable uses are faithfully executed and to perform the
duties imposed upon him by this Code, . . . ."
On the other hand, Section 415 provides:

"In addition to the administrative sanctions provided elsewhere in this Code, the
Insurance Commissioner is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon
insurance companies, their directors and/or officers and/or agents, for any willful failure
or refusal to comply with, or violation of any provision of this Code, or any order,
instruction, regulation or ruling of the Insurance Commissioner, or any commission of
irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be
determined by the Insurance Commissioner, the following:
a) fines not in excess of five hundred pesos a day; and
b) suspension, or after due hearing, removal of directors and/or officers and/or agents."

A plain reading of the above-quoted provisions show that the Insurance Commissioner
has the authority to regulate the business of insurance, which is defined as follows:

"(2) The term 'doing an insurance business' or 'transacting an insurance

business,' within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to
make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety,
any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental of the surety; (c)
doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as
constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d)
doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing
in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2 [2])
Since the contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not
included within the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code
cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Benito Symaco vs. Paterio Aquino

FACTS:

 Benito Symaco is the owner of a certain lot in Malabon Rizal where Paterio
Aquino is the mayor.
  Aquino filed for a building permit to perform repairs on his house. However,
upon inspection it was found that the old building was totally demolished and a
new one was being constructed.
 He was then ordered to file a new building permit which he did.
 However, before the mayor could approve the endorsed report of the
investigating officer from the District Engineer's Office. A letter from A.M.
Raymundo and Company was received asking the Mayor to withhold the issuance
of the permit.
 There was filed a civil action for forcible entry, with prayer for preliminary,
injunction, against Aquino by A.M. Raymundo and Company before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malabon, the subject matter of which covered or concerned a
portion of the parcel of land on which the petitioner was constructing his
building.
 Aquino then informed Symaco that pending the final dissolution of the case, he
will withhold the issuance of the building permit.
 Symaco then filed a petition for mandamus in the CFI of Rizal. The trial court
ruled in favor of Symaco stating that the issuance of the building permit is a
ministerial duty upon submission of the complete requirements.
 Aquino is now appealing the decision of the CFI.

ISSUES:

1. WON the issuance of the building permit is a ministerial duty-YES

2. WON Sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code provides for a plain,
alternative, and speedy remedy-NO

RULING:

WON the issuance of the building permit is a ministerial duty-YES

Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the writ of
mandamus.
Under this provision of the Rules of Court, to be entitled to a writ of mandamus,
petitioner must show (1) that a tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled, and (2) that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall
be per-formed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
nor judgment.
Article I of Ordinance No. 20, series of 1941, of the Municipal Council of Malabon
provides the requirements for the issuance of a building permit.
We agree with the lower curt that the moment petitioner complied with the
requirements under said ordinance for the issuance of a building permit, the petitioner
became entitled to it and the respondent's duty became ministerial and it was,
thereupon, incumbent upon him to issue the same. There is nothing in the ordinance
which grants respondent the discretion to refuse the issuance of a building permit to an
applicant owner, tenant, manager, or contractor. All that the ordinance requires is that
said applicant must state the data mentioned therein.
The pending forcible entry case is a private matter. As the lower court stated, "if the
petitioner is allowed to build, no damages in case of adverse decision will be the
petitioner himself who has to remove the decision will be the petitioner himself who has
to remove the building should the court find that the land upon which it stands does not
belong to him."
WON Sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code provides for a plain, alternative,
and speedy remedy-NO

Sec. 2188 provides for resort to the provincial governor. But the remedy with the above-
quoted provision gives is neither plain, speedy, nor adequate. It is primary object, it will
be noted, is the removal, suspension, or other disciplinary action of the erring municipal
order, rather than to compel the performance of a legal duty.
It has been held that the other remedy that would bar mandamus, must not only be
adequate in the general sense of the term, but also specific and appropriate
to the circumstances of the particular case.
It must be the remedy that it will be efficacious to afford relief upon the very
subject matter involved, and to enforce the right or performance of the duty
in question.
It cannot be said to be fully adequate, unless it is commensurate with the
necessities and rights of the complaining party under all the circumstances of
the case, reaches the end intended, and actually compels performance of a
duty.
In fine, the remedy which will preclude mandamus must be equally as convenient,
complete, beneficial, and effective as would be mandamus, and be sufficiently
speedy to prevent material injury.