G.R. No.
L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11,
and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya
and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively.
Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds
that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power.
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board
to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City
of Butuan.
The aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees
for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places
of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and
other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan titled
"AN ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR
CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO
ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER
PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12)
YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT
SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET" is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
The Court agrees with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for
the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of
public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners. It has
been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise
of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
The decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
ANNOTATIONS:
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the
public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
The exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions
of the fundamental law, the police power measure must be reasonable.
Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent
only — and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
