1. Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays
that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and
Facts void."
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and Issue:
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to 1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila- 2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, 4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite 5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, 6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three 7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the disadvantageous to the government
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
Held:
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April
28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval
June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its
approved the JVA. jurisdiction.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing
Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
JVA itself is illegal. lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary
commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view
of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned
Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the
Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
reached by the Senate Committees. 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the
lands from private parties.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed
the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation
and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire
matters of public concern. reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
 2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may
the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the be too late for the public to expose its defects.
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access
from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense.
Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention. public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case 6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban
prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the "Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel 2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of individuals.
the public domain among Filipino Citizens. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA
from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service
and open only to those authorized to use the property. Property of public dominion referred
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of
raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to
economic and moral well being of the people.' increase the national wealth.

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of "Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the
constitutional rights — to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision,
matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law,
must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral
land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people
 The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands
allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
lands for some future public service. "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to
develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87
as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
parties because of Act No. 2874. whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its
patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding.
of the public domain is still CA No. 141. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the
property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of body concerned and approved by the Commission."
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain. to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering area publicly auctioned.
the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands
as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the government units and entities like PEA.
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private
parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA
State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
of the 1987 Constitution. patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in
whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President.
On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
public domain. private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and
not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less all kinds of lands."
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the
ownership of these lands to private corporations. defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it
on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a in a petition for registration?
determination of factual matters. For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of
titles under the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio. persons.

2. CMU vs Republic We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that
the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to
3. Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. No. 8936, October 2, 1915 successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an “innocent
FACTS purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest
The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner
said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, of the later certificate.
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and requirements of the law should be protected.
certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower courtshould be and is
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
wall. decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant other duplicate certificates issued.
.They immediately presented a petitionin the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment
and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of
said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant.

ISSUE
Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of
the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it