ALMIROL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN (G.R. NO.

L-22486, MARCH 20, 1968)

FACTS:

1. Teodoro Almirol bought a parcel of land in Esperanza, Agusan from Arsenio Abalo.

2. Almirol then went to the Register of Deeds (ROD) of Agusan to have the Deed of Sale registered and to

secure a transfer certificate in his name. However, the ROD refused.

3. It was based on the ground that the said property was conjugal and it is necessary that both spouses sign

the document. However, since the wife was dead when the sale was made, the husband cannot dispose

the whole property without first liquidating and transferring it in his name and the heirs by means of

extrajudicial settlement. The consent of the heirs must also be procured.

4. Aggrieved, Almirol went to the RTC of Agusan to have the ROD be compelled to register the Deed of Sale

and issue the transfer certificate of title.

5. However, the RTC dismissed the petition saying that the adequate remedy is the one provided for under

Sec. 4 of RA 1151 – that is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Hence, petition.

ISSUE: Was the RTC correct?

RULING: Yes. But the ROD should have registered it still.

1. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the ROD to determine; this function belongs properly to a

court of competent jurisdiction.

2. However, where any party in interest does not agree with the ROD, the question shall be submitted to

the Commissioner of Land Registration (Sec. 4, RA 1151).

3. The lower court’s resolution was affirmed.

G.R. No. 76265 April 22, 1992

VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF

NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ,
CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents.

G.R. No. 83280 April 22, 1992

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA,
FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENA M.
OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAÑO MANALO, respondents.

FACTS:

Amando Clemente owns Lot 671-A as evidenced by a transfer of certificate. He later converted it into a
subdivision named Clemville Subdivision. The petitioners of this case are the buyers and occupants of portions
of the said lot. The other petitioner, Virginia Calalang alleged that she is the registered owner of a portion of
Lot 671-A as evidenced by TCT’s. She only came to know of INK’s claim when she a prospective buyer of a
portion of the land saw "no trespassing" sign. She inquired on the status of the land and learned that it has a
pending consulta case filed before the Administrator of the Naitonal Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta case arise when the Register of Deeds found that there are two sets of
titles issued on the same land to different owners.

Lot 671-A is actually a part of Lot 671 which is owned by Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) who claimed to have bought it
from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. INK began fencing the whole area and placed the sign "NO TRESPASSING —
IGLESIA NI KRISTO PROPERTY SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984." Case 61969 was a case that
upheld the validity of the sale between Lucia dela Cruz and INK.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the dela Cruz case (Case no 61969) should apply to this case to determine the validity
of the titles of the petitioners.

RULING: YES. The dela Cruz case was already final when it was decided upon by the Supreme Court on July 25,
1984. That issue of ownership in that case has been resolved already and the principle of res judicata should
be applied. Even if the parties were not the parties in such case, they cannot claim that they were never notified
of that the case was pending. Amando Clemente was never a registered owner of the land because his
predecessors-in-interest have lost their rights over that land when the lot was sold to Lucia dela Cruz in 1943.

The sale to Lucia dela Cruz was valid and the registration the lot under her name in the Primary Book of the
Registry of Deeds was a constructive notice to the whole world. And even if they claim that Clemente, their
predecessor, has a title, the same cannot be preferred over Lucia’s since Clemente’s title was issued in 1951.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the title of Lucia dela Cruz over the land has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

YES. INK was issued a Torrens Title over the lot as a result of the sale in 1975. The actions instituted by the
petitioners took place in 1986. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible
and incontrovertible one year from its final decree of registration. A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners
to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time.

September 30, 1927

 Oppen vs Compas

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for certiorari of petitioner Ernesto Oppen, Inc.
(EOI), assailing Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in a Land Registration Case.

The case involves two (2) parcels of land and previously registered in the name of Philippine Merchant
Marine School Inc. (PMMSI). The said properties were levied upon and the writ of execution issued by the MeTC.
The MeTC-decision approved the compromise agreement between Manufacturers Building, Inc. (MBI) and
PMMSI. Thereafter, the Notice of Levy in favor of MBI was annotated at the back of the 2 TCTs.

Pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the MeTC, EOI annotated its lien on one of the TCTs. A
certificate of sale was issued in its favor in 1987, and entered in the TCT in 1989. The said property was later
sold in a public auction where EOI was the highest bidder and the Final Deed of Sale was issued after the lapse
of the redemption period. Subsequently, EOI filed for the cancellation of PMMSI's title and the issuance of a new
one under EOI's name. Pursuant to a writ of execution, a TCT in the name of EOI was issued in 2003.

Meanwhile, in 2002, an alias writ of execution was issued by the MeTC in connection with the case
between PMMSI and MBI. The properties covered were sold in a public auction in which respondent Alberto
Compas (Compas) was the winning bidder and had the sale annotated on both titles on the same year. The Final
Deed of Sale was issued to Compas after PMMSI failed to redeem the said properties during the redemption
period which expired in 2003.
In the year 2005, Compas filed a petition for the cancellation of the TCTs and for the issuance of new
titles in his name before the RTC. Upon learning that one of the TCTs had been cancelled and a new TCT had
been issued in its place under EOI's name, Compas filed his Motion to Admit Amended Petition. EOI filed first
motion to dismiss due to failure to state cause of action and after denial, a second motion to dismiss arguing
that under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, the court with jurisdiction was the court where the original registration
was filed and docketed.

The RTC issued an order denying EOI's second motion to dismiss on the ground that Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529 was inapplicable and that it was vested with jurisdiction under Section 2 thereof. EOI sought the
reconsideration but was denied.

EOI filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals but the the decision of the RTC was sustained
by the Court of Appeals. EOI moved for reconsideration but was still denied.

Thus, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING:

It is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The jurisdiction of regional trial
courts in land registration cases is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It expressly provides:

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for

the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance (RTC) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions.

EOI cannot insist that the action should have been filed with the RTC where the original registration
was filed and issued considering that the case involved controversial issues. Even granting that Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529 was applicable, EOI's second motion to dismiss should still be denied.

Granting it to be so, the second motion to dismiss was rightfully denied as EOI waived the ground of
improper venue after it had filed its first motion to dismiss pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule. Section 8 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.

Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a
pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a
pleading that is the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion,
must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because under
Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only
the following defenses Under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is
barred by the statute of limitations or prescription.

In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of
forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was
existent and available at the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to
explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was
deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.