Sheker vs Estate of Sheker, GR No.
157912
Doctrine:
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not
being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Issues:
Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
Ruling:
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other
initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate
of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration,
all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and
the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not
being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered
by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing
fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim
against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that
it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina
v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has
not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised
its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the
interest of substantial justice.
