A.M. No.

12-8-07-CA June 16, 2015 n on these consolidated cases, whether to find for or against the
petitioners, will likewise affect the interests of other judges and justices in similar
Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity circumstance, including several members of this honorable court participating in these
Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations matters.
Commission
Antecedents
x-----------------------x
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando
A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
In her letter dated August 22, 2012,5 Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services
Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court ( MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983
to July 31, 1987, and as Commissioner of the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ), from
x-----------------------x February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, be considered as part of her judicial services "as in
the case of Hon. Bernar do P. Pardo, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court."
A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC Accordingly, Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her longevity pay be adjusted "from the
current 10% to 20% of [her] basic salary effective May 25, 1999."
Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her
Services as MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be considered as Part of Her We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of
Judicial Service and Included in the computation/adjustment of Her longevity pay Administrative Services ( OAS ), for study and recommendation.

RESOLUTION In her February 18, 2013 Memorandum,6 Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice
Salazar-
BRION, J.: to her present longevity pay. Atty. Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice
Salazar-Fe
Prefatory Statement present longevity pay. Nonetheless, she recommended that Justice Salazar-
services in the COMELEC be included in the computation of her longevity pay upon
The Consolidated Cases retirement "as in the case of Justice Pardo."
and the Affected Parties
B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan
-request dated August 22, 2012, of
Court of Appeals ( CA) Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando;1 (2) letter-request In her letter7 dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
dated September 11, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan;2 and (3) motion for Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , from March 3, 1998
reconsideration3 dated November 7, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.4 to November5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be
given a longevity pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her
The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim salary, allowances and benefits be made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on
longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their 8 of November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal
compensation package . Justice Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency
payment of her longevity pay for the services she had rendered before she joined the Comment of January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court and
Judiciary, as well as a re-computation of her retirement pay to include the claimed longevity Chief of Office of the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Just
pay. crediting of her services as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial service be granted, but
only for purposes of her retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory retirement on
Interest in the outcome of these consolidated cases goes beyond that of the petitioners; some
December 3, 2013;and (2) Justice Gacutan
incumbent justices and judges, before joining the Judiciary, also served in the Executive adjusted retroactive from her assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be
Department and would like to see these previous services credited in the computation of their
denied.9
longevity pay. Others who had also previously served with the Executive Department
currently enjoy longevity pay credit for their executive service; they would like to see their C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso
mistakenly granted longevity pay credits maintained.
In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration,10 The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129
October 23, 2012 Resolution11 that denied his request for the crediting of his services as is service in the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The CO MELEC is
NLRC Commissioner as judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits, an agency independent of the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered
specifically his longevity pay. as service rendered in the Judiciary.

Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 which amended Article 216 of the We find Justice Salazar- ice Pardo, to support her
Labor Code should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained under claim to longevity pay, misplaced.
this view that he already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was
appointed to the appellate court on February 4, 2004. b.1. Our Pardo Ruling

In In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,15 we
recommendation in our Resolution of November 27, 2012.12
longevity pay upon his retirement was predicated on the factual circumstances peculiar to him:
In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013,13 Atty. Ferrer-Flores he was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was
appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption
raised were a rehash of his arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request.14 in his service .

Our Rulings ng of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 12916

intervening service in the COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his
I. Letter of Justice Salazar-Fernando in A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC service in the Judiciary.

a. Services as MTC Judge Notably, the Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally interpreted the phrase "the Court" in
Section 3 of BP 129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of Appeals. The provision
We grant the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit as judicial service her previous reads:
services as MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, as judicial service in the computation of her
longevity pay. Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in
the government shall retain precedence to which he was entitled under his original
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang ( B.P. Blg.) 129 provides: appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes , be considered as
continuous and uninterrupted. (emphases supplied)
Section 42. Longevity pay. A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic
pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years This provision was an amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 which, as originally worded,
of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no referred only to the organization of the CA, the appointment process of its justices, and the
case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is means by which seniority of rank is determined among the CA justices. Executive Order No.
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. [Italics supplied; emphasis and 33 added this phrase, and hence Section 3 now reads as:
underscoring ours]
Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a
We find it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15, Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the
1983 to July 31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in hi s appointment, and the
rendered in the Judiciary and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
pay. appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date,
according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any member
b. Service as COMELEC Commissioner w ho is reappointed to the Court after rendering in any other position in the government shall
retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his service
We deny, however, the inclusion of Justice Salazar- it her services in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.
as COMELEC Commissioner, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as judicial
service for longevity pay purposes. Thus, had the Court given a more literal interpretation of the phrase added by EO No. 33,then
it would have interpreted its application to refer to an incumbent CA justice only. The phrase,
after all, had been added to Section 3 of BP 129, which referred to the organization of the CA.
 ave been The amendment to Section 3, as worded and interpreted in In Re: Justice Pardo , refers to the
appreciated in determining his longevity pay, as he was reappointed not to the CA, but to the reappointment of a member of the judiciary after serving in another branch of government.
Supreme Court. The judge shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment,
and his judicial service shall be considered uninterrupted.
Instead, the Court, taking a more liberal approach, interpreted the phrase "the Court" to mean
the entire judiciary. It noted that the additional phrase in Section 3 used the generic word
"Court" instead of Court of Appeals, and that to apply the stricter application of interpreting case. Section 3 refers to an original appointment , which is the first appointment by which a
"Court" to mean "Court of Appeals" would "lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would lawyer becomes a member of the judiciary.
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."
is especially applicable in determining his retirement and longevity pay. Once he leaves the
-time service outside of the judiciary, however, his original appointment is cut off; hence, Section 3 can only refer to the
judiciary was considered part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining hi s -appointed back to the
longevity pay. The same may be applied, for instance, to a trial court judge who rendered judiciary, as he is no longer part of it.
service outside the judiciary and then returned to being a member of the bench.
Section 3 works to bridge the gap between the time the judge left his original appointment and
his reappointment to the judiciary, provided the gap in service was rendered in another
amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 to all members of the judiciary. branch of government. Once reappointed to the judiciary, however, he can no longer avail of
Section 3, as Section 3 speaks of an original appointment. A second reappointment, after
b.2. The liberal Pardo ruling cannot and should not be extended to allow members of another service in a different government agency, would be succeeding the first
the judiciary to leave and return more than once, without interrupting the continuity of reappointment, and not the original appointment. Section 3 operates to bridge an original
their service. appointment with a reappointment, and not to connect a reappointment with a second
appointment. Had the latter interpretation been the intent behind the law, then it should and
The next question to be asked, then, refers to the frequency by which members of the would have made this situation clearer.
judiciary may be able to serve in other branches of government without breaking their
Further, the application of Section 3 appears to be limited to service in a single position in
of the judiciary to leave for other branches of government numerous times, and still maintain government outside of the judiciary. Section 3 speaks of "any other position in the
continuous and uninterrupted service in the judiciary? The answer to this question is a government," and thus uses a singular noun. After this single service, the judge or justice
resounding no. invoking the application of Section 3 must have returned to the judiciary in order for his
service to be deemed uninterrupted.
the
time he was appointed as Caloocan City Judge in 1974, until he retired as an Associate Additionally, it must not be lost on us that we have already given Section 3 a liberal
Justice of the Supreme Court in 2002. He occupied the positions of District Judge, Court of interpretation in In Re: Justice Pardo. To top this exercise of liberality with another liberal
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 34, Caloocan City, from May 3, 1974 to January 17, 1983; interpretation of the same provision, when the law is clear regarding its application, would
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Manila, from January 18, 1983 to March 29, 1993; amount to judicial legislation that furthers the interests within our ranks.
Associate Justice of the CA, from March 30, 1993 to February 16,
To recapitulate, Section 3 applies to any judge or justice, who left the judiciary, served in a
1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from February 17, 1995 to October 6, 1998; and Associate single non-judicial governmental post, and returned to the judiciary. This was what happened
Justice of the Supreme Court, from October 7, 1998 to February 10, 2002. in the case of Justice Pardo, when after a long and continuous service in the judiciary, he left
to serve in the COMELEC and from there was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.

terms of determining whether Section 3 of BP 129 allows judges and justices to leave the b.3. Justice Fernando is not entitled to her request even under the liberal Pardo ruling.
judiciary several times without breaking their continuous service. There was no occasion to
rule on this issue, as Justice Pardo left the judiciary only once, to serve in the COMELEC. Justice Salazar-Fernando effectively asks us in her present case to give her the benefit of our
Pardo ruling although the at
Proceeding from this conclusion, the next level of inquiry leads us to examine whether do not approximate the factual situation that Section 3 requires.
Section 3 of BP 129 allows multiple breaks in judicial office and considers these breaks as
part of a continuous and uninterrupted judicial service. In the first place, her record shows that her services in between her judicial services were not
continuous and uninterrupted.
We find that after Justice Salazar-
named Chairman of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) purposes of her longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC from March 3,
where she served from August 1987 to February 13, 1992. During this period, she 1998 to November 5, 2009, or for a period of eleven years and eight months.
concurrently held directorship posts at the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and at the
Office of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). In the later part of 1991,Justice Salazar-Fernando Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five
held the position of Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Secretary of the Land Transportation Office. years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a
monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
It was only after Justice Salazar- -
judicial offices that she was appointed as Commissioner of the COMELEC on February 14, We point out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor and
1992, and served in this capacity until February 15, 1998. Three (3) days later, or on February Employment an adjunct of the Executive Department albeit for policy and program
18, 1998, she started to serve as a consultant in the COMELEC until October 6, 1998. as NLRC
Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial service for longevity pay purposes since she did
Parenthetically, her service as consultant is not a "position in government" that should be not render such service while with the Judiciary.
considered a part of her government service as she did not occupy any specific position in
government. Moreover, it was only five (5) months after her COMELEC consultancy, or on b. NLRC Services Considered in Retirement Pay
March 25, 1999, that Justice Salazar-Fernando was appointed as Associate Justice of the CA.
Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened so that her situation did not comply is creditable as part of
with the requirement in Section 3 that only a single non-judicial position should intervene in overall government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended. Section 1 of
her judicial service record. this law provides:

Reduced to the bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered
ruling that had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not at least twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government,
entitle Justice Fernando to recognition of continuous service under the requirements of or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy y ears, or (b) resigns by reason of
Section 3. his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his
natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time
Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the crediting of Justice of his retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered at least twenty years'
will constitute an outright judicial legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the service in the Government, ten or more of which have been continuously rendered as such
Constitution. As earlier noted, Justice Salazar- Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to retire and receive
the factual circumstances Section 3 of BP 129 that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re: during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the salary
Justice Pardo. which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no
retiring Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel
If we had been liberal in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
least, not go beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or
read liberally a Court ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or
hear a re-echo of the charge that this Court selectively applies its liberality in favor of its own . collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest
(In fact, a favorable ruling in these consolidated cases may already raise eyebrows and adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted
questions as the Court will be ruling on matters that will directly affect some of its participating officers.
Members .)
Considering the express wordings of RA 910, which include service "in all other branches of
To sum up, Justice Salazar- the Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a
included in the computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement .
part of her government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended.
II. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan in A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
III. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA
a. Longevity Pay for Services as NLRC Commissioner
a. Background.
The chairman and members of the NLRC were entitled to receive an annual salary at least SEC. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court Appeals is
equivalent to the allowances and benefits of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of increased or decreased, salary shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the salary
the CA, respectively, prior to the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by RA 9347 . or the retirement pension which a Justice x x x who retired was receiving at the time of his
cessation in the office: Provided, That any benefits that have already accrued prior to such
Under RA 9347 (which took effect on August 26, 2006),17 NLRC commissioners were given increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.23 [underscore ours]
the equivalent rank of a CA Justice. The Labor Code, as now amended by Section 4 of RA
9347, reads: According to the Court, parity in rank and salary does not automatically mean parity in
retirement benefits under Section 3-A of RA 910. Notably, the automatic adjustment of
Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. The Chairman and members of the retirement benefits was expressly extended by RA 910, as amended, but only to Justices of
Commission shall have the same rank , receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be the SC and the CA, not to judicial officials with the equivalent rank. Additionally, since he
entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding and retired prior to the passage of RA 9227, DCA Ponferrada could not even invoke the automatic
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. [italics supplied, emphasis ours] adjustment of his retirement pay under Section 3-A of RA No. 910, as amended, to support
his request.24
In his present motion, Justice Veloso claims that RA 9347 should be given a retroactive
application. With the equivalent rank of a CA Justice from the time RA 9347 was amended, In the same way, RA 9347 was en acted into law only on July 27, 2006. Justice Veloso had,
his service as NLRC Commissioner should be considered as judicial service for purposes of by then (on February 4, 2004) left his post as NLRC Commissioner to assume the position of
his longevity pay. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. In the absence of any clear intent to give RA 9347
any retroactive effect, Justice Veloso cannot validly claim that he held the rank of a CA justice
b. Our ruling and the reasons therefore during his stint as NLRC Commissioner from 1989 to 2004.

b.1. RA 9347 does not provide for retroactivity. b.2. RA 9347 is not a curative statute.

"A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities[,] which would otherwise be void for want of
First, nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it conformity with certain existing legal requirements."25Simply put, curative laws are enacted
retroactive effect. We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the to validate acts done that otherwise would be invalid under existing laws.
legislative intention to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used.18 In "case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the RA 9347 is not a curative statute since it was not intended to supply deficiencies, abridge
retroactive effect."19 superfluities in existing laws, or curb evils; the insertion of the word "rank" in Article 216 was
merely to emphasize the increase in salaries and benefits of the NLRC Commissioners and
Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions of RA 9347. It is not labor arbiters.
ll No. 2035
(which became RA 9347).20 b.3. Grant of Equivalent Rank is not Service in the Judiciary

In Re: Request of Retired Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for Automatic At any rate, even if we recognize retroactivity as requested, the conferment of the rank of a
Adjustment of His Retirement Benefits to Include Special Allowance Under R.A. 9227,21 the CA Justice to Justice Veloso during his tenure as NLRC Commissioner would not entitle him
Court refused to extend the benefits provided by RA 9227 to official s of the Judiciary who to longevity pay.
retired prior to the passage of this law. RA 9227 granted a special allowance to justices,
judges, and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the CA or Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear: a judge or justice shall be paid a monthly longevity pay
judges of the RTC. Since the position of Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) carries the same equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five years of continuous, efficient, and
rank as an Associate Justice of the CA,22 retired DCA Ponferrada asked for the inclusion of meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. Service in the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA
the RA 9227 special allowance in his retirement pay. Justice, is not service with the Judiciary fo
service in the NLRC, however, m ay be credited as part of his government service for
The Court denied the request, noting that RA 9227 did not expressly provide for retroactivity retirement purposes under RA 910, as in the case of Justice Gacutan .
so that those who had retired at the time of its enactment would be covered. Although the
grant was extended to retired SC and CA justices, this was justified under Section 3-A of RA IV. General Discussions
910, as amended, which states:
With each of the consolidated petitions directly ruled upon, the following discussions are liberal interpretation the Court has applied in these rulings; that the ponencia disregards too
submitted to expound on the conclusions reached and to generally comment on the issues the intent of the relevant laws (referring to the subsequent laws that grants ranks, salaries and
the Dissents raised. benefits similar to those of their counterparts in the Judiciary), the legal presumption of
legislative awareness, and consideration of prior laws and jurisprudence in enacting a statute;
At the core of the issues raised is the question: should the past service of incumbent justices and claims that the contemporaneous construction given by the Department of Justice and
and judges, rendered at the Executive Department, be recognized under Section 42 of BP other Executive branch officers, which disc loses a similar treatment of the longevity pay
129 ( the longevity pay provision ) on the ground that their previous executive positions now
carry the rank, salary, and benefits of their counterparts in the Judiciary? Castro analyzes Section 42 and concludes that longevity pay is not a mere benefit but is a
component of the salary that should not be withheld from executive officers with the same
The law governing this issue is of course the longevity pay provision, heretofore quoted,26 rank, salary and benefits as their counterparts in the Judiciary.
whose salient points are summarized below:
For his part, Justice Velasco essentially joins the Dissent of Justice De Castro and questions
1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;
been credited with their past service in the Executive Department. He posits too that "what
2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts; matters is their receiving, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the salary of a Justice of
the CA at the time they served as NLRC Commissioners." If this is the case, Justice Veloso
3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service; claims they should be credited with their service with the NLRC for purposes of their longevity
pay.
4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;
Faced with these complications and dissents, the Court should not forget that our duty, first
5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is and foremost, is to correctly interpret the law as written, not to stick to our past rulings at all
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. costs nor to consider our personal interests. In doing this, we must also be reminded that at
the center of the dispute is Section 42 of BP 129 the provision on longevity pay that we
What would otherwise be a simple stand-alone provision is complicated by subsequent laws must consider with a fresh eye.
that grant the same ranks, salaries and benefits.
The consolidated cases, too, do not embody claims by executive officers against their own
- "as those of" their counterpart judge or justice (for the National Prosecution Service), Department for the enforcement of what the law involving their Department provides. These
or cases involve claims by CA justices members of the Judiciary who look up to laws
involving the Executive Department to secure, maintain or increase the longevity pay that
- "as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (for provides benefit for judges and justices. Our primary focus, however, must be the
the National Labor Relations Commission), and

- the [ "rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges"] as their

A. Statutory Construction & Interpretation Perspectives
counterpart Justice or Judge (for the Office of the Solicitor General).
a. First rule of statutory construction: the plain meaning rule.
These new levels of rank and salary are essentially what the present petitioners and the
incumbent justices and judges cite as basis for the grant or increase of their longevity pay. The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a
law (in this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what
Another complicating factor involves the past rulings of this Court where past executive
it plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.27
service had been recognized, not only for retirement pay purposes, but for longevity pay
purposes upon retirement. Interestingly, no in-depth look appears to have been made in these The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a
direct indicator of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under
services for longevity pay purposes. which the disputed longevity provision can be found is B.P. Blg. 129, An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes (simplified as BP 129 or
Interestingly, the Dissents, led by Justice De Castro, take a multi-pronged critique of the the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
ponencia generally chastising it for being overly strict in its reading of Section 42.
This title alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the
Among others, she posits that the ponencia disregards long established rulings of the Court
judiciary, unless an express contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception
on longevity pay without a clear finding of the legal error made, and disregards as well the
clause is evident under the terms of BP 129 or in any of the other related laws (specifically, in When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary ,
R. A. 9347, 9417, and 10071) discussed in this ponencia . the longevity pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous
Executive Department position, and which he may have been receiving because of his
As discussed more extensively below, these other general laws do not specifically mention at continued service in that department, will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued.
all the longevity provision under BP 129, a specific grant made only to the judges and justices
in the Judiciary. At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five
(5) years of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned.
Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below This application may sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the
ranting parity to
benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
Section 42. Longevity pay . A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic
pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years To reiterate for emphasis, for a transferring public official, now a new justice or judge, to be
of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary ; Provided , That in entitled to longevity pay under the terms of Section 42, he must first render continued,
no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary for at least five years; his prior continued
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. [italics supplied; emphasis and service in his previous department will not and should not be counted.
underscore ours ]
b. The general laws that the Dissents cite cannot prevail over a specific law.
As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity
pay is granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of General laws (such as Republic Act Nos. [RA] 9347, 9417, and 10071) that generally grant
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity the same ranks, salaries and benefits to public officers in the Executive Department as those
pay is equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay. of their specified counterparts in the Judiciary, cannot prevail over a special law such as BP
129 that specifically grants longevity pay solely to justices and judges who have rendered five
The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.
officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer
in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also A basic principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.30
be available t o a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the A later enactment like RA 9347 and RA 10071 cannot override BP 129 because the latter, as
Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not a special law, must prevail regardless of the dates of the enactment of these other laws.31
contemplated by law.
As we held in Hon. Bagatsing v. Judge Ramirez,32 a general provision must give way to a
Significantly, the Court has had occasion to speak about the purpose of longevity pay. In In particular provision. As a special provision on the grant of longevity pay, Section 42 of BP 129
Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,28 the Court governs and is controlling; to hold otherwise, as the dissent suggests, is to violate its clear
categorically declared that the purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to judges and mandate.
justices is to recompense them for each five y ears of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the Judiciary; it is the long service in the Judiciary - from the lowest to the Following the rule on general and special laws, the general laws granting the same salaries
highest court of the land and not in any other branch of government, that is rewarded,29 and benefits cannot apply to the longevity pay provision that, by its specific and express terms,
is solely for the benefit of judges and justices who have shown loyal service to the Judiciary; it
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive service, is not for those who have been granted similar ranks, salaries and benefits as those of their
the reason for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in counterpart judges and justices. That they cannot be beneficiaries of longevity pay is clinched
interpretation: these past services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the by its purpose the reward is intended for those with loyal service to the Judiciary.
services the law contemplates. The tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and
wording of Section 42 of BP 129. c. Is there room for liberality in reading and interpreting Section 42?

To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent is sts for any liberal
to grant executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar construction or interpretation; only the application of the letter of the law is required by basic
to that provided under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be statutory construction principles.

Department, to be given while the executive officer is still with that department. We should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and
import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the
law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. to tack and to credit, for longevity pay purposes, the past services that justices and judges
It has no place where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and rendered in the Executive Department.
do not at all leave room for discretion.
In fact, in their discussions, the Dissents take the view that the ponencia has engaged in
judicial legislation because it restricts the concept of salary merely to the "basic pay."
Judiciary, as the element of loyalty the virtue that longevity pay rewards is not at all
present. This Resolution does, in fact, reflect the views imputed to it and it has not been shy or
hesitant from the very start in taking this position. But rather than being narrow and illiberal in
We cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be doing this, we believe that our position hews to the letter of the law so that our stance cannot
to the point of engaging in judicial legislation an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids be the basis for the charge of judicial legislation.
this Court to do. We may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or
include, under its terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. We Judicial legislation in fact transpires when the Court reads into the law an interpretation that
cannot rewrite the law to conform to what we think should be the law. the four corners of that law cannot b ear. This expansive interpretation i.e., that the term
"salary" under Section 42 includes longevity pay so that equivalency of "salary" translates to
In the present case, where the law is clear, we should likewise be clear and decisive in its the mandatory recognition of longevity pay is unfortunately what the dissents espouse,
application lest we be accused of favoritism or accommodating former colleagues, or driven perhaps by thoughts of what the law ought to be.
indirectly, ourselves, who will all inevitably retire from our judicial posts.
What "ought to be" as a matter of policy is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide
d. Administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts. upon. The Court eloquently spoke in Canet v. Mayor Decena about this judicial limit, albeit in
the context of discussing the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius (literally, what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied). The Court said:36
construction to support its expansive reading of RA 9347 in relation with Section 42 of BP 129.
In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
The Dissent conveniently fails to mention that contemporaneous constructions of person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated
administrative or executive agencies are merely at best advisory and not binding on the maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum
courts, for by the Constitution and the law, the courts are given the task of finally determining what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that
what the law means.33 the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
We do so under our authority to state what the law is34 and deference to an agency
statutory interpretation should be withheld whenever it conflicts with the language of the Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
statute, as in the present case. neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
In Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,35 the Court had occasion to state and held: interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. the omission.

Thus, while the Executive possesses discretion in the implementation of laws, we should not Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor may
Constitution, not the Executive, and when a legal error exists, we must step in and intervene, they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute
the law had been. contains no limitations in its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a
provision of law expressly limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended
e. The question of Judicial Legislation to other transactions by interpretation. To do any of such things would be to do violence to the
language of the law and to invade the legislative sphere. [emphases ours]
Judicial legislation, in simplest terms, happens when the Court adds to what the law provides
and does so in the guise of interpretation, as the present dissents now want to do by seeking
Applied to the present consolidated cases, we cannot go beyond the terms of Section 42 by has exclusive cognizance of, and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
expanding its terms to what it does not include: when the law speaks of service "in the allocated sphere.38
Judiciary," it means what it says and cannot include service outside the Judiciary. To relate
this to the statutory construction rule discussed above give n the express and clear terms of Each branch cannot invade the domain of the others.39 This principle presupposes mutual
the law, the basic rule to apply is: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language respect by and between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments and entitles
employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction."37 them to be left alone to discharge their assigned duties as they see fit.40

B. The Grant of Rank, Benefits and their Implications We generally draw attention to this constitutional principle to emphasize that while all officials
in the three branches of government are government officials, vast differences may exist in
a. Judicial Rank and Executive Rank. the terms and conditions of their government service; these are ultimately traceable to the
separation of power principle.

counterpart judge or justice is a matter that has not been the subject of extensive Government officials perform specifically assigned functions peculiar to their respective
jurisprudential c overage. Hence, the subject of this Resolution proceeds on a path that so far departments and these functions justify their differing terms and conditions of government
remains untrodden. The novelty of the issue posed need not deter us as the matters before service. In the context of the present consolidated cases, distinctions must necessarily exist
us call for resolution and should be written about if only to serve as guides for the future. between one who is appointed to the position of a judge or justice, (which position carries law-
defined salaries, benefits, and conditions specific to judges and justices), and one who is
The Judiciary recognizes the ranks that the law accords to judges and justices. These judicial appointed to an executive position with the equivalent rank, salary or benefits of a justice or
ranks wholly pertain to the Judiciary as an independent, separate and co-equal branch of judge in the Judiciary.
government. Under our current constitutional set-up, no legislative or executive grant, fiat or
recognition of rank can make the grantee, who is not a judge or justice, a judicial officer, The extent to which those with equivalent executive and judicial ranks have commonalities or
without violating the constitutional principles of separation of powers and independence of the diverge in their salaries and benefits is a matter that the Constitution leaves, within limits, to
Judiciary. the discretion of the Legislature as a matter of policy. What is important to recognize is the
legal reality that the divergence of salaries and benefits across government, even among
those with equivalent ranks, is not at all unusual because these positions belong to different
justices is not and cannot be a conferment of "judicial rank" and does not thereby accord the branches of government and undertake functions peculiar to their departments.
grantees recognition as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who
had previous government service outside the Judiciary , it follows that the grant of rank to A convenient example to cite is the allowance benefit that members of the Office of the
them under their old executive positions does not render their service in these previous Solicitor General are given as peculiarly their own honoraria and allowances from client
positions equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless Congress by law says departments, agencies and instrumentalities.41 Members of the Judiciary do not enjoy these
otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits. same benefits.

To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example. By its
equivalent to the ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition doe s not terms, longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly, in all the
thereby create "judicial ranks" outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of these cited laws that grant similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between executive officials and
ranks as judges and justices. Technically, what Congress creates or grants are executive their counterparts in the Judiciary, no mention at all is made of longevity pay and its
ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks. enjoyment outside the Judiciary. Longevity pay, of course, is not unique as a feature of

Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of "judicial rank" in favor of by law, by rule or by practice that are not replicated in the executive agencies, in the same
those who are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice or a judge manner that there are benefits in executive agencies that the Judiciary does not share.
who is entitled to this formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits of the rank but
he/she remains an administrative official in the Judiciary, separate and distinct from the In this sense, it approximates the absurd to claim that the grant of the "same" benefits to
justices and judges who directly exercise judicial power, singly or collegially. executive officials with the "same" rank should encompass all the benefits that the comparator
judge or justice enjoys.
b. Commonalities and Divergence of Terms and Conditions of Government Service.
b.1. The Question of Fairness.
The principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches of government ordains that each of these three (3) great branches of government
A tempting question to raise when comparisons are made across branches of government (2) by which the rates of pay for each of the positions and employee groups/classes are
and when equivalency of salaries and benefits comes into focus, is the essential fairness, or determined according to the salary and wage schedules fixed by the Decree to be
lack of it, that results or should result. uniformly app lied to all belonging to a particular position.

The Judiciary, for example, may raise the point if we are the comparators and all our Under Section 4 of PD 985, this position classification and compensation standardization
benefits should be enjoyed by the Solicitors, is there no resulting unfairness because no la w scheme shall apply to
grants the Judiciary the same privilege of enjoying the benefits that the Office of the Solicitor amendment now includes the justices and judges in the Judiciary.
General enjoys?
Section 11 of PD 985 provides for the "Salary Schedule " under the compensation system for
To be sure, unfairness may factually result, but this is not a matter for the Judiciary to positions pa id on annual or monthly basis. The Schedule consists of twenty-eight grades with
examine in the absence of a case where this factual issue is raised and is relevant. Nor is each grade having eight prescribed steps. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and
there any indefensible inequality as a matter of law viewed from the prism of the legal responsibility that distinguishes it from the other grades in the Schedule. Each class of
iciary and the Executive position in the Position Classification System is assigned a "salary grade" and determines the
Department belong to different branches of government whose roles and functions in 42
government differ as pointed out above. Thus, ground/s for distinctions may exist that render
any seeming unfairness not legally objectionable. Under the Scheme, every covered position receives a "salary" or compensation

If the issue of unfairness will surface at all, this would transpire when the terms of the all covered positions or employees belonging to a particular "salary grade," regardless of the
longevity provision under BP 129 would be disregarded, i.e., if longevity pay would be department, bureau, office, etc., to which they belong, shall receive the same "salary rate,"
recognized in favor of the NLRC, the prosecutors and the solicitors under the terms of their expressed as annual, in pesos, as fixed under the "Salary Schedule" (subject to certain salary
respective laws, when longevity pay by the express terms fashioned out by Congress rate increments for each step within each salary grade). In short, a particular "salary grade"
should be granted only to those who have served continuous, efficient, and meritorious equates to a specific, fixed "salary rate."
service in the judiciary.
Prior to its amendment by PD 1597, Section 4 of PD 985 exempted from the position
Similarly unfair would be the tacking of previous services outside of the Judiciary rendered by classification and compensation standardization scheme the following positions or group of
judges and justices, incumbent or retired, for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42. Of government officials and employees: (1) elected officers and those whose compensation is
course, the main issue in this situation would be legality, but this situation, to our mind, is one fixed by the Constitution; (2) heads of executive departments and officials of equivalent rank:
that is both illegal and unfair. Unfairness comes in because of the grant of what is not legally (3) chiefs of diplomatic missions, ministers, and Foreign Service officers; (4) Justices and
due. Judges of the Judicial Department; (5) members of the armed forces; (6) heads and assistant
heads of GOCCs, including the senior management and technical positions; (7) heads of
D. The Salary and Longevity Pay state universities and colleges; (8) positions in the career executive service; and (9) provincial,
city, municipal and other local government officials and employees. The salaries or
a. The Applicable Law on Salary compensation and allowances of these exempted positions are those to be authorized by the
President.
An examination of BP 129 shows that its Section 41 treats of "salaries" of judges, while
Section 42 provides for longevity pay. er of
Implementation (L OI 93) adopting an integrated compensation scheme for positions in the
Under Section 41, the "salaries" or compensation (and allowances) that judges shall receive Judiciary. In almost the same fashion as PD 985, Para graph 3.0 of LOI 93 enumerated the
shall be the amount that the President may authorize following the guidelines set fort h in various positions in the Judicial Component of the Judiciary, i.e., Justices and Judges of the
Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 93, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 985, as Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Agrarian
amended by PD 1597. Relations, the First and Second Level Courts, the Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals, and the corresponding "salary rates" for each position, expressed as annual,
PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, implemented a position classification and compensation in pesos.
standardization scheme (Scheme) :

(1) under which positions are classified by occupational groups, series and classes of the Judicial Department, are now included in the coverage of Section 4 of PD 985. PD 985,
according to the similarities or differences in duties, responsibilities, and qualification as amended by PD 1597, now limits the exemptions to elected officers; to those whose
requirements; and compensation is fixed by the Constitution; and to local government officials and employees.
Note that Section 11 of PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, and even Paragraph 3.0 of LOI 93, b.2. Nature of Longevity Pay.
provided for fixed "salary rates" for each "salary grade" expressed as annual, in pesos. As
matters now stand, the "salary" or compensation that an employee or a position in the Based on these considerations, longevity pay should be treated as a benefit or an "add-on"
government will receive is the prevailing "salary rate," fixed under the "Salary Schedule," that and not a part, let alone an integral component of "salary," contrary to the Di

This consequence necessarily results as "salary" and longevity pay: (1) are treated under
The "salary rate" as expressed in annual fixed rates, based on the "salary grade" referred to different sections of BP 129; (2) have different bases for determination or computation; and (3)
under LOI 93 pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597 is the "salary" referred to in have different reasons for the payment or grant.
Section 41 of BP 129, i.e., an amount or salary rate fixed as annual, in pesos, that is based
In addition, Section 42 of BP 129 does not categorically state that the monthly longevity pay

b. Longevity Pay under Section 42. most liberal interpretation of Section 42 does not reveal any intention to treat longevity pay in

Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner of computing longevity pay,
i.e., to be pai On the contrary, Section 42 makes it clear that the "salary," which the Dissents submit serve
five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that as basis of the "salary" of executive officers with the same rank of a justice or judge, is that
the amount of longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixed amount, in referred to or contemplated in Section 41.

pay which, at the least, is equivalent to 5%. b.3. Section 42 Analyzed.

Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious Note in this regard that the last clause of Section 42 which states that: "in no case shall the
service: (1) in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added , exceed the
Judiciary is the basis and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank."
efficient service of the recipient in the Judiciary.

From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e., to the judges and presupposes an addition of components, and should be understood to refer to the total
justices of the Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due only upon the fulfillment of certain compensation received . This "total salary" is the "salary" (or the salary rate fixed under the
conditions) grant. In negative terms, it is not an absolute grant that is easily transferrable to
other departments of government. grade") plus the "add-on" longevity pay (or that portion or percentage of the "salary" as fixed
under the Salary Schedule) equivalent to at least 5% of the monthly salary.
b.1. Salary and Longevity Pay compared.
In formula form, this should read
In contrast with longevity pay, the "salary" under Section 41 entitles the official or employee to
its receipt from day one (or the first day of the first month) of his service. Its basis or reason Section 41 Salary + Section 42 Longevity Pay = Total Salary
for payment is the actual performance of service or assigned duties, without regard to the
months or years the recipient has been rendering the service. Where:

Note, too, that the service contemplated under Section 42 for entitlement to longevity pay is Salary = monthly salary rate of position per the Salary Schedule

"judiciary" to qualify "service," but also from the title of the statute to which this specific Longevity Pay = monthly salary rate x 5%.
provision belongs, i.e., "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." In these lights, the "same
salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks of and to which the NLRC Commissioners
shall be entitled, should be read and understood as the salary under Section 41 or the "salary in no way signifies that longevity pay is an integral part of the "salary" which a Justice or
rate," as provided under the "Salary Schedule" that corresponds to the "salary grade" of their Judge will receive each month by virtue of his position/rank/salary grade.
counterpart justice or judge. Other laws that grant other public officers in the executive
department with the "same salary" as their counterpart justice or judge (i.e., RA Nos. 9417
and 10071) should likewise be read and understood in this way. "Salary Schedule") plus any longevity pay to which he may be entitled. This treatment, to be
sure, does not make the longevity pay a part of the "salary."
In short, "total" simply modified "s alary," and in effect denotes that amount received or to be As the discussions below will show, the Dissent, without delving deep into legislative history
received as total compensation, and distinguishes this resulting amount from the "salary" and record of the statutes it cited as bases, took the easy route of resorting to hasty
received each month by virtue of the position/salary grade. generalizations to support its tenuous theory that these laws operate under the principle of "
equal in qualifications and equal in rank, equal in salaries and benefits received."

qualified or modified by the word "total," in contrast with the "total salary" under the first This interpretative route may be easy but is a very dangerous one in its implications, as
portion. Congress has not in any way shown that it has intended officers with the same rank and
qualifications across government to receive equal pay and equal benefits.
The last portion states: the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank: this "salary" of the
Justice or Judge next in rank should not be exceeded by the "total salary" (or total For this kind of "equalization" to prevail, the government must be ready to embark on a
compensation) of the recipient. The "salary" under the last phrase, when read together with comparison, not only of rank and qualifications, but on the quantification of job content and
the "total salary" under the first phrase, shows that "salary" is distinct, and to be pa id valuation of jobs of equal value, involving similar or allied activities undertaken across
separately from longevity pay, so that the latter cannot be an integral part of "salary." government.

To sum up, the "same salary" to be received by the public officials in the Executive This is the requirement that the "equal pay for equal work" principle established in
Department, with the same rank of justice or judge, is the "salary" of the justice or judge under jurisdictions with more advanced social legislation than the Philippines.43 To be sure, this is a
Section 41. The "salary" referred to in Section 41, in turn, and as explained above, is the serious policy matter that, under the terms of the Constitution, is not for this Court but for
"salary rate" fixed under the "Salary Congress to establish .

To fully support these contentions, we embark on a brief look into the laws that the Dissent
salary plus the longevity pay when the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071 is itself cited.
not reflected in any of the congressional deliberations. What the deliberations clearly reveal is
simply the intention to increase the "salaries" of the covered public officers in the Executive a. RA 934744 affecting the NLRC.
Department to the level of the "salaries" received by or granted to their counterpart in the
Judiciary. RA 9347 lapsed into law on July 27, 2006. This law was passed to address the then urgent
need to improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the National Labor Relations
This "salary" cannot but refer to the fixed sum that the system of "salary rate," "Salary Commission (NLRC), particularly its rate of disposition of pending cases and the reduction of
Schedule," and "salary grade" speaks of. It cannot refer to the variable amount of "total its ballooning backlog of labor cases.45 In dealing with these issues, Congress then focused
salary" that the dissent refers to, as the basis or comparator cannot be a variable amount that on measures that would encourage productivity and efficiency and boost the morale of NLRC
reflects the seniority that a judge or justice has attained after years in the service. officials.

Re Longevity pay of Justices of the The congressional measures Congress passed included the increase in the number of
Sandiganbayan, appearing at page 42 of this ponencia best illustrates how the "salary" and commissioner-members of the NLRC, the creation of positions for commission attorneys who
"total salary" concepts operate. would assist the NLRC commissioners in deciding the labor cases, and a provision for
retirement benefits to NLRC commissioners and labor arbiters equivalent to the retirement
E. The complete parity that the dissent advocates is a policy matter that Congress has not so benefits of justices of the CA and judges of the RTCs, respectively.
far expressed.
In appreciating RA 9347, note that as early as Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, the
The legislative history and record of the laws (that grant the same ranks, salaries, and commissioners of the NLRC were already given the same salary and benefits as justices of
benefits to officers in the Executive department equivalent to their specified counterparts in the CA . As the old Article 216 of the Labor Code provided, before the amendment:

salaries, and benefits or equal treatment between the executive officers/grantees and the Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the
comparator judges and justices whose longevity pay arises from BP 129. Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same
allowances and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court
In fact, the legislative history and record of these statutes positively show that Congress has of Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least
not yet gone as far as the Dissents wou equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
includes the grant of longevity pay under BP 129 to executive officers in the Executive Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of a Regional
Department. Director of said Department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least
equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant where longevity pay is a special and specific provision. Congress contented itself with the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the plain insertion of "retirement pay" and stopped there.
provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of
the aforementioned officials. (As amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, Thus, as matters now stand, NLRC officials retire under the retirement law applicable to
1989)46 executive officials, with parity of the terms of this retirement law with those of their
counterparts in the Judiciary. Retirement benefits specific to the Judiciary, however, were not
This old provision did not include retirement benefits in its wording. Thus, as enumerated, and should not be interpreted to be wholly included.
entitlement to equivalence was limited to salaries, allowances and benefits. To address the
perceived legislative gap, the amendatory RA 9347 expressly included the word retirement in b. RA 941749 affecting the OSG.
the enumeration. This grant applied to both commissioners and labor arbiters of the NLRC.
RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed
Aside from this observation, note too that the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not give to address the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) by
labor arbiters the salary, allowances and benefits equivalent to those of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC ) judges. Apart from addressing the issue on retirement benefits, RA 9347 also
sought to deal with the then situation of labor arbiters in terms of their salaries and In the sponsorship speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding Senate Bill No. 2249, the
emoluments. predecessor Senate Bill of RA 9417, S
on Justice and Human Rights, in crafting Senate Bill 2249, aimed to address the following
Thus, the congressional intent in RA 9347 was to deal with two gaps in PD 442 with respect issues regarding the OSG:
to the salaries, benefits, and emoluments of the members of the NLRC.
1. Increase the number of staff of the OSG and upgrade their positions;
The first was the grant of salaries and benefits to labor arbiters equivalent to those of RTC
judges, and the second was the express inclusion of the retirement benefits of the labor 2. Increase the existing 15 legal divisions of the OSG to 30;
arbiters and NLRC commissioners at the levels equivalent to those of RTC judges and CA
justices, respectively. 3. Provide health care services, insurance coverage and scholarship and other benefits
to all OSG employees subject to the availability of funds;
In the discussions and exchanges among the members of Congress among them, the
explanatory note of Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. in Senate Bill No. 120447 and the sponsorship 4. Grant franking privileges to the OSG;
speech of Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2035 (the senate bill that led to
RA 9347)48 nowhere did they deal with the issue of longevity pay as a benefit that should 5. Establish a provident fund within the OSG; and
be accorded to labor arbiters and commissioners of the NLRC.
6. Grant retirement benefits to qualified employees.50
In this light, we believe that to make the hasty generalization that the word benefit as
enumerated in Article 216 of the Labor Code should include longevity pay would run counter As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with
to the intention of the law. Note that had it been the intent of Congress to give the labor respect to the benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits
arbiters and commissioners of the NLRC all the benefits enjoyed by the members of the to be granted. Although Section 3 of RA 941751 provides that the Solicitor General shall have
Judiciary as provided in BP 129 and in other laws specifically applicable to members of the the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and
Judiciary, then it should not have amended Article 216 of the Labor Code by including privileges as the Presiding Justice of the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a
"retirement benefits" in the enumeration. Congress should have left the provision as it is since CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still allocated express provisions for the other benefits to be
it already provides for the general term benefit. enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These provisions are the following:

Parenthetically, retirement pay is a specific form of allowance under the general term benefits. Section 4- Compensation52
Congress had to include this item as an express benefit precisely because the use of the
general word benefit in the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not include all the benefits Section 5- Benefits and Privileges53
then being enjoyed by judges and justices of the Judiciary.
Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees54
In providing for retirement benefits, Congress significantly did not simply state that the NLRC
Section 7- Transportation Benefits55
shall enjoy the terms and benefits of judges and justices under their retirement law, RA 910,
Section 8- Other Benefits56
 Section 10- Grant of Special Allowances57 the salaries and benefits of prosecutors would not lead to an automatic increase in the
salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary.
Had Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG,
then it should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision Extending our judicial lens even further, the laws increasing the salaries and benefits of
pertaining to longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via executive officers in the OSG and the NLRC do not also provide for an automatic increase
sion without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can should there be increases in the salaries and benefits of the Judiciary; neither do these laws
this Court recognize the past service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for increase the salaries and benefits of the members of the Judiciary should the salaries and
purposes of longevity pay. benefits of these public officers increase.

A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were Had Congress really intended full parity between the Judiciary and other public officers in the
applicable to the type of service that the OSG provides. executive department, it would have provided for reciprocity in the automatic increase of
salaries, benefits and allowances, and the upgrading of the grades or levels of the
For example, OSG lawyers are entitle d to honoraria and allowances from client departments, emoluments of these public officers.
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government.58
Instead, the laws, as currently worded, allow for a situation where an increase in the salaries
This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the and benefits of prosecutors would not result in the increase in the salaries of members of the
Government and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is Judiciary, the OSG and NLRC. Thus, instead of equalization, the prosecutors (who were
not applicable to member s of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as merely granted a rank at par with their named counterparts in the Judiciary) would be in a
impartial judges of the cases before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and better position than the actual judges and justices themselves, in the absence of a similar
allowances on a per case basis. provision of law giving the same benefits to justices and judges in the event additional
emoluments would be given to these prosecutors.
Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is
that Congress did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the The inevitable conclusion from all these is that Congress, in increasing the salaries and
grant of the same salaries and benefits to members of the executive department and of the benefits of these officers, merely used the salary levels and benefits in the Judiciary as a
Judiciary. The congressional approach apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of yardstick to make their salaries and benefits comparable to fellow government employees
engaged in the administration of justice.
needs and activities. No equalization or standardization of benefits was ever intended on a
generalized or across-the-board basis. At the risk of endlessly belaboring a point, we cannot, without engaging in the prohibited act
of judi
F. The structure of the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of members of the parity in rank, salaries, benefits, and other emoluments among the public officers mentioned.
Judiciary, prosecutors, and public officers in the OSG and the NLRC further negate the
intended equal treatment among them. ra-Salonga are
not controlling in the present case, as they are a strained and erroneous application of
Section 42 of BP 129 that should be abandoned.
benefits of members of the Judiciary, the prosecution service, the OSG solicitors , and the
members of the NLRC aim to provide equality among these public officers in their salaries
and benefits. and Guevara-Salonga cannot be applied to the present case as they are erroneous

In terms of salaries, their rationalization has been addressed through Position Classification
and Compensation System of the government under PD 985, PD 1597 and LOI 93, Nor can these cases be cited to support the position that these past rulings already
heretofore discussed. It is through the amendments of these legislative enactments that parity established that the past services in the Executive Department of incumbent and retired
and equity can both be achieved in government. justices and judges, should be given credit for purposes of longevity pa y under Section 42 of
BP 129.
On the other hand, a look at the structure of the laws affecting the Judiciary, the prosecutors,
the OSG, and the NLRC shows that there could be no equal treatment among them. Notably, a. The Guevarra-Salonga & Dela Fuente Cases
under Section 16, par. 6 of RA 10071,59 only the prosecutors would have an automatic
increase in salaries and benefits in case the salaries and benefits in the Judiciary increase. The grants of longevity pay to Justice Guevara-Salonga and Justice Dela Fuente, in particular,
This provision, by itself, shows that Congress did not intend full parity, because increases in
 with RA 10071, which Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan case)61
granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) of their is a very interesting case that Justice De Castro uses as part of her argument on the liberal
counterparts in the Judiciary. stance the Court has taken on longevity pay.

Although RA 910 recognized, for purposes of retirement pay, past services in the Judiciary or Significantly, this case did not treat the longevity pay under Section 42 as an integral
in any other branch of the Government, the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of BP component of the salary of the recipient, to be given to and applied in equal degree and force,
129 recognizes only services in the Judiciary in determining the longevity pay of 5% of the and under absolute circumstances to public officials in the Executive Department granted the
basic salary (given for each five years of service) that is carried over into retirement from the "same salary" as their counterpart in the Judiciary.
service.
The Sandiganbayan ruling, in fact, does not apply to the factual situation of the present case;
In considering the longevity pay in the cases of Justices Guevarra-Salonga and Dela Fuente, it solely inv
the Court mistakenly recognized their services as prosecutors to be services in the Judiciary, following pronouncement in that case:
because RA 1007160 granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement
benefits) as their counterparts in the Judiciary. x x x longevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the
salary of the recipient thereof which may not be reduced despite the subsequent appointment
The Court failed to fully appreciate that the longevity pay provision under RA 910, in relation of a justice or judge next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and
with Section 42 of BP 129, is unique to the Judiciary and can be enjoyed only for services not having acquired any longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or
actually rendered, and by those who retired, in this branch of government. Thus, services at decrease of the salary of an incumbent justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X
the Department of Justice, i.e., outside of the Judiciary, should not have been recognized as of the Constitution; hence, such recipient continue to earn and receive addition l longevity pay
additional judicial service for purposes of longevity pay on retirement. as may be warranted by subsequent services in the judiciary, because the purpose of the
Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as
Notably, the Court did not comprehensively discuss in these cited rulings the nature of service such. The provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge concerned, after
required for the longevity provision to apply, nor the purpose, reason and history of the adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice or
longevity pay provision under BP 129, for the Dissents to conclude that the Court already judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and does not
treated the past service in the Executive Department to be equivalent to service in the proscribe a justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing to earn
Judiciary. and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such
implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the position next
As we earlier discussed, under our system of Government, the Judiciary is separate from, higher in rank.
serves a purpose and functions, and has powers, duties and prerogatives distinct from those
of the Executive Department. Hence, the Court, in these Resolutions, could not have
regarded service in the Executive as unqualifiedly equivalent to service in the Judiciary. who has rendered service in the Judiciary for a considerable length of time and who will
receive a total compensation that far exceeds the "salary" that a newly appointed Justice or
It should be considered, too, that an acceptance of past service in the Executive as service in Judge, who has not rendered any prior service in the Judiciary, will earn or receive based
the Judiciary may have no basis. The qualification for the grant by the Judiciary should be its simply on his "salary grade." The former, the "long-serving" Justice or Judge, will earn far
determination that there had been continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. No such more than the latter, the "newly-serving" Justice or Judge, because of the "add-on" longevity
determination can be done by the Judiciary if it will simply recognize longevity pay based pay that he (the long-serving Justice or Judge) will receive for his continued long service in
solely on service in a position under the Executive Department with rank, salaries, and the Judiciary, aside from the "salary" to which the latter (the newly-serving Justice or Judge)
benefits equivalent to specified positions in the Judiciary. shall only be entitled.

To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the The Court realized this scenario as problematic and the obvious inequity it may bring if it were
Executive simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation to cons true strictly the words of Section 42. It is iniquitous for the "long-serving" Justice or
would be legally problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the grantee would Judge if the "add-on" pay (longevity pay) that he earned under the law for his long and
qualify (based on efficient and meritorious service) since the past service would be with the dedicated service in the Judiciary would be reduced or eliminated altogether simply because
Executive, not with the Judiciary. Of course, for this Court to simply recognize that past of a new Justice or Judge w ho will not be entitle d to any "add-on" pay for lack of the required
executive service w ill be credited under Section 42 of BP 129 constitutes prohibited judicial long and dedicated service in the Judiciary, and who will thus receive lesser total
legislation for going beyond the requirement that service should be in the Judiciary. compensation.

b. The cited Sandiganbayan case.

The Court met the case head on and declared that the limitation refers only to the "initial With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity pay
implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge, who is already entitled to grants due to past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the grants
longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the already made, but their grants will have to be frozen at their current levels until their services
judiciary subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being outside the Judiciary are compensated for by their present and future judicial service.
appointed to the position next higher in rank." This case assumes importance in the present
consolidated cases as it stresses the purpose of longevity pay as discussed and interpreted in WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
these pronouncements: " to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as
such, " i.e., as justices or judges. (1) NOT the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and
the Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-
Flores;
al compensation can be variable because
seniority or years in the service is a factor taken into account. (2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that her
services as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be included in
the computation of her longevity pay;
liberality when such action is called for.
(3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Femando that her
c. Moving On services as COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity
pay;
Construing Section 42 as we do in this Resolution does not and will not negate the applicable
(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLRC
does not include longevity pay will rectify the error that the Co Commissioner be included in the computation. of her longevity pay from the time she
on this subject. started her judicial service;

a ruling (5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
that, as explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They are Veloso for lack of merit; and
erroneous because they introduced and included in the definition and composition of "salary"
under Section 41 an element that the law did not intend to include, either expressly or (6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity
impliedly. pay benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant to the guidelines
and declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution.
Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they were
clear and grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they involved an SO ORDERED.
interpretation not within the contemplation of words expressed by the statute; hence, they
were gravely abusive interpretation62 that did not and cannot confer any vested right ARTURO D. BRION
protected by the due process clause. The worst approach the Court can take now is to Associate Justice
compound the problem by perpetuating our past mistakes and simply burying our heads in
the sand of past-established rulings. WE CONCUR:

The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the abandonment of
our rulings on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-
Salonga and to strike them out of our ruling case law, without, however, withdrawing the

Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that it does not disavow the
longevity pay previously granted to the retired justices and judicial officials for services
rendered outside the Judiciary. They may continue enjoying their granted benefits as their
withdrawal now will be inequitable.