ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.

DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners, The said judgment would become so only after one year from
vs. the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to
FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the
JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros pursuant thereto.4
Oriental (Branch III).
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision
of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30
days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners
during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one
CRUZ, J.: years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of
the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more
rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it
1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves
was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition
followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on for review. 5
March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957.
On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the
dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory
December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered,
denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the
us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the
judge.2 issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied
this remedy before the decree is issued? 6
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved
here are errors of law and lawyers. Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition
earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the the world because the land has not yet been registered and
decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was
held, had operated against the petitioners. 3 Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v.
Moran 7 where it was held:
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet
become final and executory because the land in dispute had
 ... It is conceded that no decree of registration effective and efficient administration of justice
has been entered and section 38 of the Land that, once a judgment has become final, the
Registration Act provides that a petition for winning party be not, through a mere
review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
must be filed "within one year after entry of the Courts must therefore guard against any
decree." Giving this provision a literal scheme calculated to bring about that result.
interpretation, it may first blush seem that the Constituted as they are to put an end to
petition for review cannot be presented until the controversies, courts should frown upon any
final decree has been entered. But on further attempt to prolong them."8
reflection, it is obvious that such could not have
been the intention of the Legislature and that There should be a greater awareness on the
what it meant would have been better part of litigants that the time of the judiciary,
expressed by stating that such petitioners must much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be presented before the expiration of one year be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be commendable, to evade the operation of a
given a reasonable construction and there can decision final and executory, especially so,
be no possible reason for requiring the where, as shown in this case, the clear and
complaining party to wait until the final decree is manifest absence of any right calling for
entered before urging his claim of fraud. We vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9
therefore hold that a petition for review under
section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as
rendition of the court's decision and before the it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
expiration of one year from the entry of the final persuasive force. Defendants had to display
decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied). ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso
v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice.
and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the
asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty parties according to law. Procedural rules are
one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy
now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
even ordinary common sense. pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: before. We do so again. 10

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime Regarding the argument that the private respondents took
and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for
review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had
been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the
filing of the petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to
move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the
private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were
the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents
who were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers

is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of
distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By
doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same
time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn
upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong
interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most
of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its
disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed
precisely to circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist

in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge
this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the
law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not
be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do
not deserve the attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.

This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.
 EN BANC SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
RESOLUTION against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
CORONA, J.:
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law. 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
the Philippine bar.
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his welfare.3
law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules
Thus, this petition. of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
to Bar) of the Rules of Court: the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any
breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
professional privilege.4 legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: to judicial disciplinary control.14

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
standing, is entitled to practice law. the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
law. loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules privilege denied to foreigners.16
of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6 citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license accrues.
to practice.10
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires JJ., concur.
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law Quisumbing, J., on leave.
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to
do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual

membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of

mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not

only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew
his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good

standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay

is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro,
 whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.
Complainant,

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of

- versus - Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent
who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.

ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the
of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Kabacan, North Cotabato,
motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order[2] of November 15,
Respondent. 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the

motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and
come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, North Cotabato, standsadministratively charged with In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the following explanation:
loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was
placed under his care and custody.
After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the Mlang chief of
police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he
affidavit-complaint[1] filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.
Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle,
which was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against
He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan
Kabacan police station for which he (respondent) prepared a chief of police.
receipt.

Belying respondents averments, Pentecostes, in his

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a Rejoinder,[6] contended as follows:
hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When the court finally
ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November
15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to
cannibalized and unserviceable. respondent by police operatives[7] of Mlang.

Respondents act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a

clear case of hand washing as the records showed that respondent
From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding
was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for
that he be responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the
this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the
latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he
chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the police
accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to
blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn
discover that the motorcycle was missing.
over.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to
Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint
the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for
requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for
investigation, report and recommendation.
the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the
letter, however.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan,

North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his findings
He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record
and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative
of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where the turnover
complaint against respondent.[9]
was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn
statements of Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed
In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the
knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because
of Kabacan. the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be
held responsible for its eventual loss.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that
the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating
Mlang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to judges recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the
the PNP of Kabacan. evidence.[11]

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabangs recommendation for
condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of the dismissal of the complaint against respondent, subject to certain
Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle
of Pentecostes claim that the vehicle was cannibalized from the upon its delivery to respondent and the latters lack of authority for
time it was under respondents custody until its transfer to the PNP the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.
of Kabacan.

In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s
While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual
and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable
condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned over to
courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made
respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during
a wise decision in turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP
the investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing
of Kabacan.
parts when it was delivered to respondent.

To Judge Rabangs report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a

From the testimony of Pentecostes witness
Motion for Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the conclusion
SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was
that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already
loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact,
cannibalized when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court
according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not
from the Mlang police station.
run by itself.
Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk
evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned over to the of Court.
PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to
ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only
when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he
bring the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA
added. Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all
to secure prior authority from the court before evidence is turned record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
warned to be more careful to prevent any similar incident from belonging to his office.
arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondents lack of authority to From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the
transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account of which RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and
respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct. safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the
termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial
It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, court.
files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks
of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning
2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides: over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was
mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the
trial court.
All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and
before the case/s involving such evidence shall have been
Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt
evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to
suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent
the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal
took and subsequently transferred its custody to the Kabacan
Case No. 1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was responsible for
police.
it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on
the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as
clerk of court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are
essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform
delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of
With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to
justice.[17] Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
it was delivered by the Mlang police to respondent and at the time
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their
it was turned over by respondent to the Kabacan police station. The
charge.
Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo
Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in good
running condition when they delivered it to respondent. Later
during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the the driver Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and
of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or
motorcycle when the vehicle was turned over to respondent another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the
on August 1, 1995.[15] court or the efficient administration of justice.[19]

Even respondents following testimony that: The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of
their exalted positions as keepers of public faith.[20] The exacting
standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are
reflective of the premium placed on the image of the court of
x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he
justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
immediately delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it
official or otherwise, of court personnel.[21] It becomes the
could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a
imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with the
motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and
dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to
deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan[16] (Italics supplied)
maintain the courts good name and standing as true temples of
justice.[22]
 SO ORDERED.

By transferring Pentecostes motorcycle without authority,

respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping it
under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the
consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of

action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public
officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial
evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies
simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension
of One Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering that this is
respondents first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown
by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan,

is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for 15 days
without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 EN BANC
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, entrusted to him for payment of
Complainant, real estate taxes on property
- versus - belonging to Bernardo, situated in
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, a subdivision known as Valle
Respondent. Verde I; and

b) part of another sum

of P40,000.00 entrusted to him
RESOLUTION for payment of taxes and expenses
in connection with the registration
NACHURA, J.: of title of Bernardo to another
property in a subdivision known
as Valle Verde V;
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case
No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed 2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old
a) a special power of attorney
and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years. dated March 16, 1985,
purportedly executed in his favor
by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51,
complainants affidavit dates
The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as October 4, 1989);
follows. b) a deed of sale dated October
22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.);
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his and
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
c) a deed of assignment
administrative offenses: purportedly executed by the
spouses Tomas and Remedios
1) misappropriating and converting to his
personal use:
 Pastor, in Bernardos favor (Annex Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the
Q, par. 52, id.);
petition for reinstatement.
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without
funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement
thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.[1] in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed
against the petition.[2]

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads: rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic]
respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
the charges against him and hereby imposes on justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants
him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
finality of this judgment, and effective
immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to
copy of this Decision be spread in his record in practice law. The Court will take into consideration the
the Bar Confidants Office, and notice thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
well as the Court Administrator who is nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred,
DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
of this Decision.
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
SO ORDERED. reinstatement.[3]

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejias name
allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-
one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he correct offenders.
has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to
leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of
have suffered due to his disbarment. law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
publication containing his religious and social writings. He also legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
organized a religious organization and named it El Cristo privilege to practice law.[4]
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of hereby GRANTED.
disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases
for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured
the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing
a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this
experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus,
while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all,
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