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homonymy (ishtiräk) in form or meaning, where the particulars are

equal, but rather by a homonymy in meaning where the particulars
are unequal. For example, the term 'whiteness' (and 'blackness') 2
may be used for both the brilliant whiteness of snow and for dull
white such as that found in ivory. Such is the case with the term
'existence', which is used for both necessary and possible beings; but
existence is more perfect and superior in the necessary being than is
the superiority of one white colour over the other. Such disparity in
analogically predicated names (asma mushakkaka) does not pre-
clude the meaning from being originally a universal homonym. In
analogically predicated names there must be a meaning which is
a universal homonym, albeit such meaning exists solely in the
mind.
112. This is the source of division (taqsim), namely, the division of
the universal into its parts, as when it is said: 'That which exists is
divided into the necessary and the possible.' 1 This source is the
common denominator of all the parts. That the existence of the
necessary is more perfect than that of the possible does not preclude
the name of existence from being a universal meaning applied to
both of them. This applies to the other names and attributes used
for both the Creator and the created, such as the names 'living',
'knowing', 'powerful', 'hearing', 'seeing', as well as the attributes of
His 'knowledge', 'power', 'mercy', 'approval', 'anger', 'happiness',
and other names and attributes the messengers have reported.
113. Scholars have disagreed on this issue. Some, like Abü al-
'Abbäs al-Näshi', 1 one of the Mu'tazili leaders who preceded Abü
'All [al-Jubbä'I], said that these names are used in their real sense
(haqiqatan) for the Creator but metaphorically (majäzan) for the
created. A group of the Jahmls, Bätinis, 2 and philosophers held the
contrary; namely, that they are used metaphorically for the Creator

2
Here, as well as in al-Radd, Ibn Taymiyya presents us with the attributes of
'whiteness' and 'blackness' as two examples of analogical predicates. He does not,
however, pursue the latter example any further.
112 1 Taqsim, or qisma, is the division of the whole into its constitutive parts or,
here, the universal into its real or mental particulars. The distinction in this last division
is made between accidents, not essences. See Tahänawl, Kashshäf, ii. 1222.
113 1 Abü al-Abbäs 'Abd Alläh b. Muhammad al-Näshi' al-Akbar Ibn al-Shirshir, a
Mu'tazili who is said to have died in 293/905. He is also reported to have written a
number of works in refutation of Greek logic. See Ibn al-Murtadä, Tabaqät al-
Mu'tazila, 9 2 - 3 . See also Introduction, Part II, nn. 139-40, above.
2
On the Jahmls, see par. 96, n. 1, above; on the Bätinis, see Shahrastänl, Milal,
147 ff.; Encyclopaedia of Islam2, i. 1098-1100, s.v. 'Bätiniyya' (by M. G. S. Hudgson).
 76 Jahd al-Qariha

but in their real sense for created beings. 3 The majority of scholars,
however, have maintained that they are used in their real sense for
both Creator and created. This is the view of various Mu'tazill,
Ash'ari, and Karräml thinkers as well as the view of jurists, tradi-
tionists, and Süfls. It is also the view of the philosophers, though
many of these contradict themselves; for while admitting that some
of these names—such as 'existent', 'soul', 'essence', 'reality', etc.—
are used in their real sense [for both Creator and created], they
reject others for reasons adduced by those who maintain that none
of these names are applicable in their real sense to the Creator.
What applies to that which they admitted applies equally to what
they rejected. 4 But because of their incompetence they have drawn
distinctions between similar things. The denial of the real sense of all
these names precludes the existent from being in existence, when it
is already known that the existent is divided into the necessary and
the possible, the eternal and the contingent, the self-sufficient (ghani)
and that which is not ( f a q i r ) , the caused and the uncaused. It is also
known that the existence of the possible entails that of the necessary,
and the existence of the contingent entails that of the eternal. The
existence of that which is not self-sufficient entails the existence of
that which is, and the existence of the effected entails the existence
of that which is not effected. Thus, while there is a common matter
shared by the two existents, the Necessary Existent is distinguished
by qualities particular to it. The same applies to all other names.
114. In so far as the common factor is concerned, names designating
analogical predication (asma mushakkaka) are identical with names
referring to equal concepts (asmä' mutawäti'a).1 That is why the
early philosophers and others have not assigned a special term for
names designating analogical predication, for the term mutawäti'a

3
A relatively detailed statement concerning the various views on the names and
attributes of God may be found in Räzi, Muhassal, 116-32.
4
That is, what applies to the first group of names, which they took to be attributes
in their real sense, also applies to the second group, whose application to God in a real
sense they rejected.
114 1 A name that is considered mutawäti' carries a meaning applicable to more than
one object with the same degree of strength. Thus, when the name 'animal' is em-
ployed for a man, a horse, a dog, etc., the name applies to all with equal force.
According to technical dictionaries reflecting the consensus of later Arabic philosophers,
a name that is mutawäti' refers to the members of a class with equal strength, unlike a
mushakkik, which applies to class members with varying degrees of strength. See par.
i n , n. 1, above, as well as the next note. Amidi, Mubin, 50, s.v. mutawäti'; Tahänawi,
Kashshäf, ii. 1440, s.v. tawätu'.
 7i
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encompasses all such names. Names designating analogical predication

are a part (qism min) of the general mutawäti'a, but a counterpart
(qasim) of the specific mutawäti'a.2 Therefore, a universal common
factor, which is the object of the name 'general mutawäti'a.'', must be
established. This factor can be universal only in the mind, as their
demonstrative syllogism indicates. Furthermore, it is necessary to
establish the inequality signified by names designating analogical
predication which are the counterpart of the specific mutawäti'a.
Such is the signification of the Quranic demonstrative inferences
which are a fortiori arguments. The characteristic of the Lord that
distinguishes Him from others must thus be established. This charac-
teristic, whose affirmation entails the affirmation of His soul, is
signified by His signs, may He be glorified; it cannot be established
by means of a syllogism, be it demonstrative or not.
115. From the foregoing it is obvious that their demonstrative
syllogism cannot lead to the desired knowledge of beings and of their
Creator—a knowledge through which the soul reaches perfection.
How less tenable it is to say that no conclusion can be reached
except by means of syllogism!
116. This is a broad subject. However, the intention here is to
draw attention to the invalidity of their negative proposition, namely,
that no acquired knowledge may be attained except by means of
their demonstration. They have not been content with this categorical
negation which they have stubbornly insisted on, but they have also
reduced knowledge to narrow paths that can lead only to futile
results. They have claimed that arriving at the knowledge of God, of
His prophets and saints, occurs by means of a syllogism which
contains a middle term. Such was the view of Ibn Sinä and his
followers, 1 who, in holding this view, were still better than their
predecessors who rejected the knowledge of God and His prophets
2
Thus, according to Ibn Taymiyya the appellation mutawäti'a represents a broad
concept under which there are subsumed two categories, one analogical predication
and the other 'specific mutawäti'a'. Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyya takes the latter category
of the specific mulawäti' to mean that which the philosophers commonly designated as
mutawäti' (as explained in par. i n , n. 1, above).
116 1 In his argument for the existence of God Ibn Sinä does not employ the
syllogism in which the middle term is the cause of the presence of the major term in the
minor, but instead resorts to another syllogism in which the middle term is the effect of
the presence of the major in the minor. See Davidson, Proofs, 281-310, esp. 298-304,
and Marmura's section on Avicenna in Encyclopaedia Iranica, iii. 7 3 - 9 , esp. 7 6 - 8 . For
Ibn Taymiyya's own arguments for the existence of God see my 'Ibn Taymiyya on the
Existence of God', 53 ft.
135
Jahd al-Qariha

and who were most ignorant about the Lord of beings, about His
prophets and His Books. Although Ibn SInä is distinguished over
those philosophers in both knowledge and intellect, 2 he none the less
followed their logical method in deciding this issue. And although
those who adopted this method are more knowledgeable and more
intelligent than their predecessors, they remain more erroneous and
more ignorant than the Jews and Christians, for these believe in the
Necessary Existent and His attributes, whereas those misguided
[philosophers] do not, because of the arrogance and vanity stored in
their hearts. They are the followers of Pharaoh and his likes, and this
is why you find them either antagonistic to or critical of Moses and of
those like him who adhere to religion and revealed law.
117. God, the Exalted, said: 'Those who dispute concerning the
signs of God, without a warrant having come unto them, in their
hearts is only pride that they shall never attain.' 1 He also said:
'[Those who dispute concerning the signs of God, without a warrant
having come unto them], very hateful is that in the sight of God and
the believers; so God sets a seal on every heart proud, arrogant.' 2
He also said: 'So, when their messengers brought them the clear
signs, they rejoiced in what knowledge they had. And that which
they were wont to mock befell them. Then when they saw Our
might, they said: "We believe in God alone, and we disbelieve in
what we are associating with Him." But when they saw Our might
their belief did not profit them—the wont of God, as in the past,
touching His servants; then the unbelievers shall be lost.' 3 God
spoke at length about the argument of Pharaoh and about those who
followed him and followed Namrüd b. Kan'än 4 and their likes from
amongst the leaders of heresy and error. He also spoke at length in a
number of places about their dispute with Moses, Abraham, and
other messengers of God, may He bless them. God made the House
of Abraham the leaders of the faithful who inhabit Paradise, and the
House of Pharaoh the leaders of the inhabitants of Hell. God, the
Exalted, said: 'And he and his hosts were haughty in the land,

2
See Ibn Taymiyya, Muwäfaqat Sahih al-Manqül, ii. 255.
1
117 Quran, 40: 56.
2
Quran, 40: 35.
3
Quran, 40: 8 3 - 5 .
4
The Quranic Namrüd is the Nimrod of the Bible, who is seen as the enemy of
Abraham. See Quran, 2: 260, 29: 23; Encyclopaedia of Islam, iii/2, 842-3, s.v. 'Namrüd'
(by Bernard Heller).
 J a h d al-Qariha 7i

wrongfully; and they thought they should not be returned to Us.

Therefore We seized him and his hosts, and cast them into the sea;
so behold how was the end of the evildoers. And We appointed
them leaders, calling to the Fire; and on the Day of Resurrection
they shall not be helped; and We pursued them in this world with a
curse, and on the Day of Resurrection they shall be among the
spurned. And We gave Moses the Book, after that We had destroyed
the former generations, to be examples for people . . . Say: "Bring a
Book from God that gives better guidance than these, and follow it,
if you speak truly."' 5 He also said about the House of Abraham:
'And We appointed from amongst them leaders guiding by Our
command, when they endured patiently and had sure faith in Our
signs.' 6
118. What we mean is that the later philosophers who surpass
their predecessors in learning think that the knowledge of God and
His prophets is acquired by means of demonstrative syllogism. I have
refuted them at length elsewhere. 1 My intention here is to draw
attention to their invalid assertion that no knowledge may be attained
except by means of the demonstration which they have prescribed.
As this negative statement is invalid with regard to the knowledge
acquired by a human individual, it would be a fortiori invalid
concerning the knowledge of the Lord of beings, may He be glorified
and exalted, as well as concerning the knowledge of His angels and
prophets, may God bless them all.
119. The logicians have also divided the classes of proofs into
syllogism, induction, and analogy. They have argued that inferences
proceed either from the universal to the particular, or from the
particular to the universal, or from one particular to another. They
have also expressed this in terms of the specific and the general.
They argue: inferences proceed either from the general to the
specific, or from the specific to the general, or from one specific to
another. They have maintained that the first is a syllogism—by
which they mean a categorical syllogism. 1 They assign to syllogism
the term qiyäs, although many jurists and theologians use this term

5
Quran, 28: 39ft.
6
Quran, 32: 24.
118 1 He treated this issue in a number of his treatises; see e.g. Muwäfaqat Sahih al-
Manqül, ii. 253 ft. and passim; Tawhid al-Ulühiyya, 4 7 - 5 0 and passim.
119 1 Ibn Sinä, Ishärät, i. 415-21 (English trans., 129-30); Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 66;
Räzi, Lubäb al-Ishärät, 30.
137
Jahd al-Qariha

for analogy. For the majority of judicious people, however, qiyäs

encompasses both analogy and syllogism. 2 The logicians also hold
that the inference that proceeds from the particular to the universal
is induction. When it is complete, it is perfect induction, and it yields
certitude. When it is imperfect, it does not lead to certitude. The
first involves enumeration of the totality of the particulars, and then
formulating [a universal] judgement according to what is found in
the particulars. The second involves the enumeration of most of the
particulars. For example, a person may say: 'Animals move their
lower jaws when they eat, for we have observed them and found
them to do so.' Then he is told that crocodiles move their upper
jaws. 3
120. They also hold that the syllogism is divided into the cate-
gorical (iqtiräni)1 and the conditional (istithnai). In the latter, the
conclusion or its contradictory is mentioned in actuality (bil-fi'l). In
the former, the conclusion follows by the force of entailment (bil-
quwwa),2 as in a syllogism formed of categorical propositions; for
example, one may say 'All wines are inebriants', and 'All inebriants
are forbidden'. The conditional is formed of hypothetical [proposi-
tions], and is of two types. The first is conjunctive[-implicative], as in
our statement: 'If the prayer is valid, then the person praying has
performed ritual ablution.' The affirmation of the antecedent yields

2
On the scope of juridical qiyäs see Hallaq, 'Non-Analogical Arguments'.
3
Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 160-5, e s P- 163 for the example about crocodiles. See also
Baghdad!, Mu'tabar, i. 199-200.
120 1 Although 'conjunctive syllogism' seems to be a more accurate translation for
qiyäs iqtiräni than 'categorical syllogism', the term 'categorical' is nevertheless used,
since in contradistinction to the istithnä'i syllogism, the iqtiräni must have two premisses
with at least one affirmative universal premiss. It is significant that the expression qiyäs
hamli (lit. predicative, categorical) is used as a synonym for iqtiräni. See Ghazäli,
Maqäsid, 83.
2
Ibn Sinä, Ishärät, i. 425-7, 428ft. (English trans., 131—5). The distinction here lies
in the form in which the conclusion is found in the premisses. The conclusion 'Socrates
is mortal' is not to be expressed in the same manner in the premisses of a categorical
syllogism. The conclusion in this syllogism is entailed (bil-quwwa) by the premisses. In
the conditional hypothetical syllogism, on the other hand, the conclusion is itself
expressed in, and constitutes part of, the premisses. For example:

If his name is Miskawayhi, then he is a Persian

His name is Miskawayhi
Then, he is a Persian
The conclusion 'He is a Persian' is stated in the same form in the premisses. See also
Räzl, Tahrir, 140; Ijl, Sharh al-Ghurra, 202, 223ft.; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 84ft.
 7i
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the consequent, but the denial of the consequent leads to the denial
of the antecedent. 3
121. The second is the alternative-disjunctive syllogism. It may be
[i] disjunctive (mäni'at al-jam' wal-khuluww), as in our statement:
'Number is either even or odd', for evenness and oddness can never
coexist in one number: a number must be one or the other. Or [2]
exclusive-alternative (mäni'at al-jam'), as in our statement: 'This
object is either black or white'; that is, blackness and whiteness will
never simultaneously exist, although the object may be neither. Or
[3] inclusive-alternative (mäni'at al-khuluww), in which either the
antecedent or the consequent must exist, although both may exist
together. 1 Some logicians maintain that the disjunctive is the real
conditional syllogism, and that it corresponds to the two contra-
dictories (naqidayn) in the general and the specific. However, the
exclusive-alternative is more specific than the two contradictories,
for the contraries (diddayn) cannot both be true, though they may
both be false. The contraries are more specific than the contradic-
tories. On the other hand, the inclusive-alternative is more general
than the two contradictories. 2 The logicians find it difficult to illustrate
this last type by way of examples, unlike the first two, for which
there are many. 3
122. To illustrate the inclusive-alternative they give this example.
This man either travels by sea or he will not drown in it; that is, one
of the two must obtain—for he will not drown unless he is in the sea:
either he will not drown in the sea because he will not be travelling
by sea, or he may travel by sea, thus he may be both travelling and
drowning. 1 Examples are many. We say, for instance: this [man] is
3
The former is the modus ponens and the latter is the modus tollens. See Räzi,
Tahrir, 164; Brennan, Handbook, 79-80.
121 1 Ihn SInä, Ishärät, i. 499-503 (English trans., 145-7); Räzi, Tahrir, 164;
Baghdad!, Mu'labar, i. 152ff.; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 8 6 - 7 .
2
Contraries (addäd; sing, didd) are existential qualities (sifät wujüdiyya) that may
alternate as attributes of a thing, but cannot simultaneously exist in the same thing. The
difference between contraries and contradictories lies in the fact that while the said
qualities cannot simultaneously exist in both the contraries and contradictories, they
may exist in the contradictories but may not do so in the contraries. Existence and non-
existence, for instance, are contradictories; a thing cannot exist and not exist simul-
taneously, but must necessarily be in one state or the other. See Tahänawl, Kashshäf, i.
876, s.v. al-tadädd; Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 120, s.v. diddän.
3
Further on disjunctive syllogisms in the Avicennian tradition, see Maroth, Ibn
Sind, 55-69.
122 1 See an identical example given by Ibn SInä in Najät, 86, and Ishärät, i. 502
(English trans., 146).
 82 Jahd al-Qariha

either alive or he is not knowledgeable, not able, does not hear, see,
or speak. If he is alive, then the consequent obtains. If he is not,
then these attributes will not exist. However, a living thing may exist
without possessing these attributes. Likewise, it may be said: this
person has performed ritual ablution, or else he cannot pray. If
prayer is not performed, then ritual ablution has not been performed,
but if the latter is performed then so is the former; either one of the
two [conjuncts] must exist. This is also the case whenever the
condition (shart) is absent and the conditioned (mashrüt) exists. The
inclusive-alternative occurs whenever the conditioned exists but the
condition does not. The condition either exists or it does not exist.
When [the conditioned] is absent, the condition will also be absent.
Therefore, either the conditioned exists or the condition does not
exist. 2
123. Furthermore, they have divided categorical syllogisms into
four figures. The natural figure, in which the middle term is the
predicate in the major premiss and the subject in the minor, yields
the four conclusions: particular, universal, affirmative, and negative.
The second figure, in which the middle term is the predicate in both
premisses, yields only a negative conclusion. The third, in which the
middle term is a subject in both premisses, yields only a particular
conclusion. 1 The fourth figure leads to particular as well as universal
negative conclusions. The mind, however, is not inclined to this last
figure.2
124. In order to demonstrate, among other things, the validity of
the second and third figures, they have resorted to inferences by
contradictories (naqid), by conversion (al-'aks al-mustawi),1 and by
full contraposition ('aks al-naqid): from the truth of a proposition it
necessarily follows that its contradictory is false; that its converse is
2
The inclusive-alternative can also be defined and illustrated in terms of a condition
and its consequent. In contradistinction to the disjunctive and exclusive-alternative
syllogisms, in the inclusive-alternative both the antecedent (condition) and the con-
sequent (conditioned) may simultaneously exist in one thing. This amounts to saying
that since the consequent may exist without the antecedent (i.e. conditioned without
the condition), there is another condition (cause) which effects the conditioned, thus
rendering the first, stated condition a necessary but not sufficient cause.
123 1 On the three figures and their moods see Ibn SInä, Ishärät, i. 437-82 (English
trans., 134-43); Ibn Abi al-Salt, Taqwim, 23-44 ; Räzl, Tahrir, 148-53.
2
On the fourth figure see Räzl, Tahrir, 155-6; Khabisi, Sharh, 8 0 - 2 , 8 6 - 9 .
124 1 The text and the Leiden manuscript have 'aks without including the word
mustawi. However, the word is clearly implied here, as attested in the statement that
follows in al-Radd, p. 161, 14-18.
 7i
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true, and that its full contraposition is true. If our statement 'No one
among the pilgrims is a heretic' is valid, then our statement that 'No
heretic is a pilgrim' is also valid. 2
125. We maintain that these views of the logicians are either false
or unduly protracted, taking the reasoner far afield. They either
contain falsehood, which hinders truth, or take the reasoner on a
tiresome journey before leading him to the truth, when he can reach
the truth through easier methods. Some of our predecessors used to
illustrate this by the example of someone who, when asked 'Where is
your ear?', would raise his [right] hand very high and pass it around
to his left ear when he could have instead pointed directly to one ear
or the other. Nothing is better than God's description of His Book:
'Surely this Quran guides to the way that is straightest.' 1 The
straightest way to the noblest quests is that which God revealed
through His Messenger. The path of these philosophers, being false
in certain places, tortuous and prolonged in others, can lead them
only to that which will bring upon them the torment of God, not
happiness—needless to say, their ways do not lead to the perfection
of the human soul.
126. Evidence of their [error] is the baselessness and falsity of
their argument which restricts inferences to syllogism, induction, and
analogy. Also invalid and false is their claim that a conclusion results
from two premisses only, no more and no less. 1 They have argued in
favour of confining inferences to these three by saying that an
inference proceeds from the universal to the particular, from one
particular to the universal, or from one particular to another. 2 The
first is syllogism, the second induction, and the third analogy.
127. Our response is that you have not proven inferences to be
2
While the contradictory (naqid) of a statement is its negation, conversion ('aks al-
muslawi) is the transposition of the subject and predicate terms such that the second
statement is validly inferred from the first. For example, 'No man is a rock' may be
converted to 'No rock is a man'. On the other hand, full contraposition obtains when
the contradictory of the predicate in the proposition becomes the subject, and the
contradictory of the subject becomes the predicate. The contraposition of the statement
'All girls are intelligent persons' is 'No non-intelligent persons are non-girls'. See
Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 134, 219-20, s . w . 'aks al-muslawi, aks al-naqid, and naqid; Baghdad!,
Mu'tabar, i. 117-22; Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 121-9; Räzi, Tahrir, 133-4.
1
125 Quran, 17: 9.
1
126 Aristotle, Analytica Prior a, 42 a 32; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 67; Räzi, Tahrir, 139.
2
Räzi, Lubäb al-lshärät, 30; cf. Tüsi, Sharh al-lshärät, i. 416t., who distinguishes
between types of argument in terms of the subsumptive relation between the premisses
in each argument.
84 Jahd al-Qariha

restricted to syllogism, induction, and analogy. If by analogy you

mean an inference that proceeds from particular to particular, then
what you have said is not exhaustive. For there remains an inference
which proceeds from one universal to another concomitant universal,
corresponding to it in the general as well as in the specific. There is
also the inference from one particular to another concomitant
particular, wherein the existence of the one entails the existence of
the other, and the absence of the one entails the absence of the
other. These do not fall under what you have called syllogism,
induction, or analogy. These are the signs!
128. An example of such an inference is to deduce the rising of
the sun from daylight, and the existence of daylight from the rising
of the sun. This is not an inference that proceeds from the universal
to the particular. Rather, the inference that from a particular rising
of the sun there is a particular daylight is an inference which proceeds
from particular to particular. But the inference that from the genus
of daylight there follows the genus of the rising of the sun is an
inference that proceeds from universal to universal. The inference
concerning the direction of the Ka'ba from the position of the
stars—such as the North Star, Ursa Minor, and Ursa Major, as well
as the Minor Star near the Pole, known to some people as the Pole
(1qutb)—is one that proceeds from particular to particular. So also is
the inference that from the appearance of a star there appears
another star parallel to it in latitude; that with the rising of one star
another is setting; and yet another is taking a middle position—and
other similar inferences upon which people have agreed. God, the
Exalted, said: 'And by the stars they are guided.' 1
129. Inferring times and places on the basis of the location of
stars is a matter upon which Arabs, non-Arabs, religionists, and
philosophers have agreed. The inference from the appearance of the
Pleiades that other stars, to the east and west of them, or to the right
and left of them, have appeared, is one that proceeds from particular
to particular, because these stars are concomitant. Yet this inference
is not analogical. If the judgement is universal, then the inference
will proceed from one universal to another, not from universal to
particular. In fact, it will proceed from one of the universals to
another concomitant universal. He who knows the distances between
stars, and knows which of them appears simultaneously with daybreak,

1
128 Quran, 16: 16.
 J a h d al-Qariha 85

will infer upon observing their appearance how much of the night
has lapsed, and how much of it remains. This is an inference which
proceeds from one of the concomitants to the other. When one
knows the location of mountains and rivers and the direction of the
wind, one can infer on their basis the places that are concomitant
with them. If concomitance has always existed, and the time of its
origination is unknown, that is, it has existed since God created the
earth—such as the existence of mountains and great rivers, the Nile,
the Euphrates, Sayhän, Jayhän, 1 and the sea—then such an inference is
coextensive.
130. If, however, concomitance is not as ancient as the earth—such
as in the case of the Ka'ba, which, may God honour it, [Abraham]
al-Khalfl built and which remains glorified, never defeated—one
will, accordingly, infer things about it or by means of it. Its corners
face the four directions of the earth: the Black Stone faces the east;
and opposite to it, facing the west, is the Western corner, known as
the Damascene; the Yemenite corner faces the south, and that which
is opposite to it is called the Iraqi corner. The Damascene is next to
the Iraqi on the western side, and the Iraqi is next to the Damascene
on the northern side. The latter faces the [North] Pole. Therefore,
one infers the four directions from the location of the Ka'ba, and the
location of the Ka'ba from the four directions.
131. Also in the case of that which is not as ancient as the Ka'ba,
such as edifices and trees in the land, one infers things through them
according to what they are. One may say, for example, that what
distinguishes such-and-such a house is that in front of it there is a
tree having this or that characteristic. The house and the tree are
concomitants for a certain duration. This and similar inferences
proceed from one concomitant to the other; they are specific and
particular, yet they are not analogical.
132. Muslim thinkers have renounced the logicians' methods and
held the indicant to be that which yields a conclusion and leads to
what is sought to be proven. Knowledge of the indicant entails
knowledge of that which is sought to be proven. When it is subject to
sound reasoning, the indicant leads either to certitude or to high
probability. These thinkers have disagreed amongst themselves

129 ' Sayhän (also known as Sarus) is a river in Turkey that passes through the city of
Adana and flows into the Mediterranean south-west of Adana. The location of Jayhän
is to the east of Sayhän and it flows into the western side of the Gulf of Alexandretta.
Cf. the description of Yäqüt, Mu'jam al-Buldän, ii. 196, iii. 293-4.
 86 Jahd al-Qariha

concerning the indicant which leads to such probability, whether,

terminologically, it is to be called 'indicant' (dalil) or to be assigned
the name 'sign' (amära).1 The majority of scholars use 'indicant' for
both, although some of the speculative theologians apply the term
'indicant' only to that which yields certitude. 2
133. The governing principle concerning the indicant is that it
entails what is indicated. Thus, when the indicant is concomitant
with another matter, it is possible to infer that matter by means of it.
If both are mutual concomitants, then they can be inferred by means
of each other; the reasoner infers what is not known to him from
that which is. When concomitance is certain, the conclusion is
certain. But if concomitance is presumed—and it may turn out to be
suppositious—the indicant will be only probable. An example of
apodictic concomitance is the existence of creatures, which signifies
the existence of their exalted Creator, of His knowledge, power,
will, mercy, and wisdom. The existence of the creatures entails the
existence of these qualities, for creatures cannot exist without them;
creatures cannot exist without signifying the existence of God.
Another example is the proof of the Prophet's message in affirmation of
the truthfulness of what he related from God. He could relate from
God nothing but the truth, for, as a transmitter, he was infallible,
and his message from God could never be subject to error. This
indicant together with what it indicates are necessary concomitants,
and are never separable under any circumstances. Just like the
antecedent, the indicant may be existent or non-existent. By means
of either the antecedent or the indicant, one infers the existence or
absence [of a thing]. From the affirmation of a thing one infers the
negation of its contrary and contradictory; and from the negation of
its contradictory one infers that it is affirmed. Likewise, from the
affirmation of the antecedent one infers the affirmation of the
consequent, and from the negation of the consequent the negation of

132 1 Basri, Mu'tamad, ii. 690, reports that the theologians employ the term amära
for both rational and revelational evidence which leads to probability. The jurists,
however, use the term for rational, probable evidence. Probable textual evidence, such
as the solitary report, is identified as dalil (indicant). But see TahänawT, Kashshäf, i.
7 1 - 2 , s.v. amära, who maintains that both theologians and jurists consider the amära
as probable; see also Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 29-30, 93, s . w . amära and daläla.
1
Ibn Taymiyya's view does correspond with that of Basil. See preceding note.
 IOI
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the antecedent. Each indicant used in an inference must entail that

which it indicates. This [principle] encompasses everything that the
logicians have or have not held. That which they call a conditional
hypothetical syllogism contains nothing but the inference that from
the affirmation of the antecedent the consequent is affirmed, and
that from the negation of the consequent the antecedent is negated.
Whether this inference is cast in the conditional or the affirmative
form, its essence (haqiqa), whatever form it may take, will not
change as long as its subject-matter does not change. The issue is
one of rational meanings, not verbal forms.
134. Should someone argue: 'If the prayer is valid, then the person
praying has performed the ritual ablution; or if the sun has risen,
then there is daylight; or if the agent is knowing and powerful, then
he is living, etc.', what he is saying is that the validity of prayer
requires a valid performance of the ritual ablution, that from the
validity of prayer the affirmation of ritual ablution follows, that a
person would not be considered to have performed prayer unless he
had performed ritual ablution, and that ritual ablution is a pre-
requisite for the validity of prayer; for if the prerequisite is negated,
then that which is contingent upon it is also negated. He is also
saying that every person performing prayer must have performed
ritual ablution; therefore, he who has not performed ritual ablution
has not performed prayer. But such verbal formulations and formu-
lations of meaning encompassed in this inference may be expressed
in more ways than one.
135. The stronger the intellectual faculty and its conception
are, the richer its expression becomes. But if the intellect and its
expressions and concepts are feeble, then the person possessing that
intellect will be as if he were the prisoner of his own mind and
tongue. Such is the case with the Greek logicians: you find them to
be the most limited in knowledge and learning, and the weakest in
formulating concepts and clear expressions. This is why intelligent
people who follow the path of the logicians when treating of the
sciences employ methods that are prolix, compressed, affected, and
arbitrary. All they do is to explain the obvious and clarify the
intelligible. This may lead them to fall into all kinds of sophistry
from which God has saved those who do not follow their path. The
logicians are also affected with regard to their definitions: for
example, their definition of man as well as their definition of the sun
88 Jahd al-Qariha

as a star which rises during daytime. 1 No person, unless he is most

ignorant, would define the sun thus. There is nothing more obvious
to people than the sun. If someone does not know what the sun is, it
will be explained to him, and this explanation has nothing to do with
the definition they have given. Should someone not see the sun
because of blindness, he would, a fortiori, not be able to see daylight
or the stars, although he would hear enough from people to know
what the sun was without resorting to the logicians' method.
136. They admit that the first figure of the categorical syllogism
renders superfluous all other figures. Forming a concept of the first
figure is instinctive and need not be learned from them. Nor does
one need to form a concept of it according to their own methods in
order to draw inferences.
137. As to their doctrine that an inference must contain two and
only two premisses, 1 it is invalid, both coextensively and coexclusively
(tard wa-'aks),2 on the ground that people differ in their needs
concerning the number of premisses. While some people need only
one premiss because they know the rest of the premisses, others do
not even need an inference to acquire knowledge, for they may be in
possession of necessary knowledge (bil-darüra) . 3 Some of them may
need two premisses while others may need four or more. If someone
knows that all inebriants are prohibited, but would like to know
whether or not a particular beverage is prohibited, and he does not
know whether that beverage is an inebriant, he needs to know only

135 1 See pars. 9, n. 2, and 107 above, and par. 148 below. For other definitions of
the sun, see Ghazäll, Mi'yär, 302; Ibn Sinä, Hudüd, 27 (French trans., 39). Ibn
Taymiyya's objection to the definition of 'man' (insän), which I take here to be
'rational animal' (hayawän nätiq; Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 32), is obviously based on his
rejection of the five predicables as well as the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of
universals. See further pars. 2 7 - 9 , 3 2 - 9 above.
137 1 Ahmadnagarl, Jämi', iii. 107, s.v. qiyäs. Aristotle, Analytica Priora, 25 b 32ff.;
3 4 a i 5 - i 7 ; 4i a 6; and par. 140, n. 2, below.
2
That is, the proposition or the definition that 'an inference must contain two
premisses' is neither exclusive (mäni') nor exhaustive (jämi'); i.e. an inference may
consist of a single premiss or three or more premisses. See further par. 15, n. 1, above.
3
Necessary or immediate knowledge ('ilm darüri) occurs in the mind without any
reflection or inference, since the mind cannot but receive such knowledge. For example,
when my finger touches a flame, I immediately perceive pain without having, or being
able, to think of the means by which the knowledge of pain reached my mind. See
Baghdad!, Usui al-Din, 8 - 9 ; Shiräzi, Luma', 2 - 3 . Among the sources of immediate
knowledge are the five senses and multiply transmitted reports (akhbär mutawätira).
On the sense content of tawätur and immediate knowledge, see Hallaq, 'Inductive
Corroboration', 9 ff.
 IOI
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one premiss, namely, that this particular beverage is an inebriant. If

he is told that this beverage is prohibited, he may respond by
enquiring into the proof for its prohibition, whereupon the reasoner
will answer: the proof is that it is an inebriant. This is all that is
needed.
138. Likewise, two persons may disagree on whether or not a
certain kind of beverage is an inebriant. People often do enquire
about certain beverages, for someone may not know whether or not
a particular beverage is an inebriant, but may know that all inebriants
are prohibited. If he establishes, by means of a reliable report or
other evidence, that a particular beverage is an inebriant, then he
will know that it is prohibited. The same applies to all species and
particulars whose subsumption under a universal proposition, which
has a known judgement, is doubtful. An example in point is the
disagreement amongst people whether or not backgammon and chess
are forms of gambling, 1 whether the controversial date-wine is or is
not an inebriant, whether or not taking vows (nidhr) 2 and taking
oaths of divorce (taläq) and of freeing slaves ('atäq) 3 are subsumed
under God's statement: 'God has ordained for you the absolution of
your oaths'; 4 they also disagree on whether the reference in God's
statement ' . . . unless he makes remission in whose hand is the
marriage tie' 5 is to the husband or to the fully qualified guardian (al-
wall al-mustaqill)-, and other such examples.
139. An inference may require two premisses in the case of a
person who does not know that the inebriant, controversial date-
wine, is prohibited and that this particular beverage is an inebriant.
He will not know that it is prohibited unless he first knows that it is
an inebriant and that every inebriant is prohibited. He may also
know that a particular beverage is an inebriant, and that every
inebriant is alcoholic, but he may not know that the Prophet, may
God praise him, prohibited alcoholic beverages, because he may
1
138 In this connection see Ibn Taymiyya's tract Risälat Tahrim al-Nard wal-Shatranj,
1-35-
2
Nidhr is a religious oath to perform a permissible act (fi'l mubäh) out of piety. See
Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 215, s.v. nidhr. On the legal classification of acts as permissible,
recommended, obligatory, reprehensible, and forbidden, see Schacht, Introduction,
120-1.
3
'Atäq constitutes a language by which a slave is freed without conditions affecting
the contract of his manumission or his legal capacity as a freedman. See Tahänawl,
Kashshäf, ii. 1011, s . w . 'itq and 'atäq.
4
Quran, 66: 2.
5
Quran, 2: 237.
90 J a h d al-Qariha

have recently converted to Islam or may have been raised among

ignoramuses and heretics who doubt such a prohibition. He may
know that the Prophet, may God praise him, said: 'All inebriants are
prohibited', and may also know that this particular beverage is
alcoholic, and that the Prophet prohibited alcoholic beverages, but
he may not know that Muhammad is the Messenger of God, or that
the Messenger forbade all Muslims to drink these substances. He
may think that the Messenger allowed their consumption to some
Muslims, including himself. Or he may think that he allowed its
consumption for medicinal purposes, etc. It is not sufficient for this
person to know that intoxicating wine is categorically prohibited.
Rather, he needs to know that it is inebriating, that it is alcoholic,
that the Prophet, may God praise him, prohibited all inebriants, that
Muhammad is indeed the Messenger of God—so he prohibits what
God prohibits—and that he categorically prohibited wine and allowed
it neither for medicinal purposes nor for pleasure.
140. Furthermore, what demonstrates the invalidity of confining
inferences to two premisses is the logicians' definition of the
syllogism—which encompasses the apodictic, rhetorical, dialectical,
poetic, and sophistic—namely, that it is an argument 1 formed of
statements, 2 or one representing a combination of statements which,
if admitted as valid, another statement results therefrom. 3 They
argue: 'We have said "of statements" in order to exclude a single
proposition which in itself entails the truth of its obverse and the
obverse of its contradictory as well as the falsehood of its contra-
dictory; such a proposition does not constitute a syllogism. We have
not said "formed of premisses" because we cannot define a premiss
qua premiss unless it is a part of the syllogism; if we include it in the
definition of the syllogism, the definition will be circular.' 4 When a
1
140 Literally, qawl, i.e. 'statement'.
2
Ibn SInä, Naja!, 69: 'al-qiyäs qawl mu'allaf min aqwäl', that is, qiyäs is an
argument—or inference—consisting of statements. Note the use of the plural aqwäl,
rather than the dual qawlayn-, Ishärät, i. 4 2 1 - 3 (English trans., 130-1). Similarly,
GhazälT, Maqäsid, 67, states: 'wal-qiyäs 'ibära 'an aqäwll' (aqwäl = aqäwil). Cf.
Aristotle, Analytica Priora, 42 a 32: '. . . it is clear that a syllogistic conclusion follows
from two premisses and not from more than two'.
1
Aristotle, Analytica Priora, 24 b i8; idem, Topica, ioo a 25. Joseph, Introduction,
225.
4
The first part of this passage is a close reproduction of Qutb al-Din al-Räzi, Tahrir,
139. The whole passage seems to be a summary of the sources from which Tahänawl
derived his technical definition of qiyäs. See his Kashshäf, ii. 1190. See also Ibn 'All al-
RazI, Sharh al-Ghurra, 83; Ghazäll, Mi'yär, 131; Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi, Lubäb al-
Ishärät, 3 0 - 1 ; Ämidl, Mubin, 64.
 IOI
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declarative statement is part of a syllogism, they call it a premiss, but

if it is the result of a syllogism, they call it a conclusion. 5 When it is
detached from a syllogism, they call it a proposition. 6 It is called a
proposition, although it may also be called a conclusion or a premiss. 7
The declarative statement is a predicate, but not the subject -
predicate used in the technical vocabulary of the grammarians. The
former is more general than the latter. The [grammarians'] subject-
predicate exists only as a nominal sentence, whereas a [logical]
proposition may be a nominal as well as a verbal sentence, as, for
example, in the statement: 'Zayd has lied, and he who lies deserves
to be rebuked.'
141. The point here is that by 'statement'—in their postulate that
'a syllogism is an argument formed of statements'—they meant a
proposition which is a complete declarative statement, not an
individual word which is a single term, since a syllogism contains
three terms (hudüd), the minor, the middle, and the major. It may,
for instance, be said: wine, about which a legal ruling has not been
established, is an inebriant, and all inebriants are prohibited. Wine,
inebriants, and prohibition, each is an individual word which is a
term in a syllogism. But this is not what they meant by statement
(qawl); as they have explained it, they meant that each proposition
(qadiyya) is a statement. 1
142. They hold that the syllogism is an argument formed of
statements which, once admitted as valid, entail another statement. 1
What is entailed is the conclusion; it is a proposition, a predicate, a
complete sentence, but not an individual word. This is why they
have maintained that a syllogism is a composite postulate (qawlun
mu'allafun), and have called the totality of the two propositions an
argument. 2 If they assert that a syllogism is formed 'of statements',
which are propositions, then what is meant is not only two statements,
because the plural refers to two or more—as in God's statement:
' . . . if he has brothers, then to his mother a sixth' 3 —or three or
5
Fakhr al-DIn al-RäzI, Lubäb al-Ishärät, 3 0 - 1 .
6
Ibid.
7
Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 131.
1
141 Ibn 'All al-RäzI, Sharh al-Ghurra, 5 5 - 7 , 83; Baghdad!, Mu'tabar, i. 107-8,
"3-
1
142 See par. 140, nn. 2 - 3 , above.
2
See par. 140, n. 2, above.
3
Quran, 4: 11: 'fa'in käna lahu ikhwa fa-li-ummihi al-suds'. The share of the mother
is usually a third of her deceased son's estate except when he had two or more
92 J a h d al-Qariha

more. According to the majority of scholars, the latter is the plural.

However, the genus of number may have been meant, and thus the
reference would be to two or more, and the plural would not be
restricted to two. If they argue: A syllogism is formed of statements',
thereby meaning the genus of number, then what is meant is two or
more. So it is possible for a syllogism to be formed of three or four
premisses, and not just two. On the other hand, if they mean the
real plural, a syllogism would consist of three premisses or more. As
they certainly did not mean this, there remains only the former
[alternative],
143. If it is said that they admit of this [alternative] and argue that
'We hold that a syllogism consists of at least two premisses but there
may be more', then we reply that this is contrary to what you have
recorded in your own books where you admit of only two premisses.
They have declared that a syllogism leading to a conclusion, be it
categorical or conditional, may not consist of less than or more than
two premisses. They have justified this by arguing that the synthesized
conclusion contains no more than two parts, the subject and the
predicate. If the inference is conjunctive, then each of the conclusion's
two parts must correspond to one of the premisses; that is, each part
is either a subject or a predicate in the two premisses, but will not be
identical with either premiss. 1 They maintain: 'The conclusion
consists of no more than two parts, and therefore it presupposes no
more than two premisses. However, when an inference is conditional,
it must contain either a hypothetical or a disjunctive premiss that
corresponds to all the parts of the conclusion or to its contradictory.
It must also contain a conditional premiss, but there is no need for a
third.' 2
144. They argue: 'Under a syllogism an additional statement may
be joined to the two premisses; it may be either related or unrelated
to the syllogism. A statement related to the syllogism serves to
facilitate and improve the argument or to elucidate one or both
premisses.' They call this a compound syllogism (qiyäs murakkab)1
brothers (or a son). The plural form ikhwa (brothers) is thus taken as two or more, not
three or more, as would ordinarily be the case in Arabic. On the shares of the mother
see Ibn al-Bazzäz, al-Jämi' al-Wajiz, vi. 453.
143 1 Ibn Sinä, Ishärät, i. 428ff. (English trans., 133-4); Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 68; Ijl,
Sharh al-Ghurra, 199-202.
2
Ijl, Sharh al-Ghurra, 201-2, 224 ft.; Jurjänl, Häshiya, 140.
144 1 On compound syllogism or sorites see Ibn Sinä, Najät, 8 6 - 7 ; Räzl, Tahrir,
164-5; Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 9 6 - 9 . See also Brennan, Handbook, 7 6 - 9 , and Introduction,
Part I, Section 7, above.
 IOI
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and assert that it 'essentially consists of a number of syllogisms

formulated in order to determine a single conclusion. However, the
syllogism determining that conclusion is but one of these syllogisms;
the rest are put forth for the purpose of elucidating the premisses of
the syllogism.' 2 They maintain that some of the premisses in the
syllogism may be suppressed because they are assumed to be under-
stood, or in order to conceal the falsehood in the premiss so that it
may not be detected should it be stated. 3
145. They maintain that when a syllogism is cast with its own
conclusion in order to elucidate the premisses [of yet another
syllogism], it will be called a disjoined syllogism; otherwise, it is
conjoined. 1 For a conjoined syllogism, they give the example: 2

Every man is an animal

Every animal is corporeal
Every corporeal is substance
Therefore, every man is substance

For a disjoined syllogism, they give the example:

Every man is an animal
Every animal is corporeal
Therefore, every man is corporeal

They then say:

Every man is corporeal
Every corporeal is substance
Therefore, every man is substance 3

146. We reply to them: as it is [formally] stated, the conclusion

consists of no more than two parts. But in the mind the conclusion
consists of one thing, not two: that is, the affirmation or denial of the
judgemental relation; or, if you will, the affirmation or denial of an

2
Ibn Sinä, Najät, 8 6 - 7 , allows for inductive and analogical arguments as a subsidiary
part of the sorites (qiyäs murakkab), whose function it is to explicate the two premisses
of the main, categorical syllogism. See also Baghdädl, Mu'tabar, i. 161 ff.
3
The reference in this sentence is to the categorical, not the compound syllogism.
On the omission and addition of premisses in the syllogism, see Ghazäli, Mi'yär,
177-81.
1
145 Baghdad!, Mu'tabar, i. 162-4; Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 180.
2
Almost identical examples are afforded by Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 180.
3
The Arabic text is confused here, and the syllogism as stated makes no sense. Our
reading is 'kull insän jism wa-kull jism jawhar, fa-yalzam minhumä . . .'.
94 J a h d al-Qariha

attribute of a thing; or, if you will, the affirmation or denial of the

relation of the predicate to the subject, or similar expressions
which point to a single meaning intended by the proposition. If the
conclusion is that wine is or is not prohibited, or that man possesses
or does not possess sense perception, etc., then what is sought is the
affirmation or denial of the wine's prohibition or of man's possessing
sense perception. When a premiss bears a relation to that which is to
be proven, then what is sought after will be attained. The statement
'wine is an alcoholic beverage' bears a relation to the conclusion; so
does the statement 'man is an animal'. If one knows that all alcoholic
beverages are prohibited but has doubts whether or not the contro-
versial wine is identified as an alcoholic beverage by the Lawgiver,
and if it is said that wine is prohibited because it was established in
the Sahih that the Prophet, may God praise him, said: 'All inebriants
are alcoholic', 1 then the proposition—namely, our statement 'The
Prophet, may God praise him, said: "All inebriants are alcoholic"'—
results in the prohibition of wine, although his statement itself
encompasses an additional proposition. But this inference presup-
poses certain premisses in the mind of the hearer; namely, that what
has been authenticated by the traditionists necessitates the belief that
the Prophet, may God praise him, has said this, and that what the
Prophet has prohibited is forbidden, etc. If we needed to mention all
that upon which knowledge [of the conclusion] depends, even though it
may be known, the premisses would exceed two, if not ten.
147. If one is to follow their lead, then any person who reasons on
the basis of a statement from the Prophet, God praise him, must say:
'The Prophet forbade such-and-such, and what he forbade is prohib-
ited, and therefore, such-and-such is prohibited.' Or he must say:
'The Prophet made such-and-such an obligation, and whatever the
Prophet renders as obligatory must be so, and therefore, such-and-
such is obligatory.' If one is to prove the prohibition against marrying
one's own mother or daughters, one need say: 'God has forbidden
this in the Quran, 1 and whatever God forbade is prohibited.' Likewise,
if one is to prove on the basis of God's statement 'It is the duty of all
men towards God to come to the House as pilgrims' 2 that prayer,

146 1 It is not clear to which of the two Sahihs Ibn Taymiyya is referring. However,
the hadlth appears in both; see par. 52, n. 3, above.
1
147 See Quran, 4: 23.
2
Quran, 3: 97.
 J a h d al-Qariha IOI

payment of alms-tax, and pilgrimage are obligatory, then one must

maintain that in His Book God made pilgrimage obligatory, and
whatever God makes an obligation is obligatory. Intelligent people
consider such statements to be faltering, stammering, and superfluous,
explaining the obvious.
148. Such prolixities in their inferences are useless and resemble
their overextended discourse about definitions; for example, they
define the sun as a star which rises during the daytime. 1 Such state-
ments are nothing but a waste of time; they are tiresome for the
mind and replete with gibberish. Those who adopt their definitions
and demonstrations remain in disagreement amongst themselves
concerning matters apprehended by means other than their defini-
tions. They are also in disagreement concerning the demonstration
of matters which do not require their demonstration.
149. They also maintain: 'The conclusion consists of no more than
two parts, and therefore it presupposes no more than two premisses.' 1
We reply: if you mean that the conclusion consists of no more than
two individual terms, this will not be true, for it may be expressed by
means of several terms. For example, if someone is unsure whether
wine is prohibited by revelation, or permitted by either revelation or
analogy, he may be told that 'revelation prohibits wine'. The
conclusion here has three parts. Likewise, if he asks 'Is consensus
conclusive evidence?' the answer will be 'Consensus is conclusive
evidence'. The conclusion here has three parts. If he asks: 'Is or is
not man corporeal, sensible, growing, wilfully moving, and rational?',
what is required to be proven here is six parts. 2
150. On the whole, the subject and predicate 1 constituting a
declarative statement may be a sentence composed of two terms, or
of several terms if its content encompasses many components; for
example, the statement of God, the Exalted: 'And the Outstrippers,
the first of the Emigrants and the Helpers, and those who followed
1
148 See pars. 9, n. 2, and 135, n. 1, above.
1
149 See pars. 143 n. 1, and 140, nn. 2 - 3 , above.
2
All the editions as well as the Leiden manuscript have it as 'six parts', although
only five are enumerated. In light of the second sentence of par. 152, this seems to be a
mistake.
150 1 Arabic reserves two sets of terms for English 'subject'/'predicate'; the first,
mubtada'/khabar, is grammatical and the second, mawdü'/mahmül, is logical. Ibn
Taymiyya uses both sets here. Since English maintains no such terminological dis-
tinction, I have assimilated the translation of the two and rendered them as 'subject
and predicate'. See Ibn Tumlüs, Madkhal, 33, and Maimonides, Maqäla, 40.
96 J a h d al-Qariha

them in good-doing—God will be well pleased with them and they

will be well pleased with Him'; 2 or His statement, the Exalted: 'The
believers and those who emigrate and struggle for the sake of God—
those have hope of God's compassion'; 3 and His statement: 'And
those who have believed afterwards and emigrated, and struggled
with you—they belong to you', 4 as well as other components the
grammarians call adjectives, coordinate conjunctions, adverbs of
manner, of place, of time, etc.
151. If the proposition encompasses many components, it will
then be formed not of two but rather of several words and meanings.
But should it be argued that the conclusion consists of only two
meanings, which may be expressed in either two or more words,
then we say: this is not true, for it may consist of one, two, or several
meanings, depending on what the person—i.e. the reasoning thinker
and learned dialectician asking the question—seeks to prove. Each
of them may seek one, two, or many meanings; and expressing what
he seeks to prove may be done in one, two, or more words. If he
asks: 'Is wine prohibited?' he will be answered 'Yes'. This single
word will suffice to answer him. It would equally suffice to say: 'It is
prohibited.'
152. The logicians may argue: 'A proposition may contain within
it more than one proposition, as in the example you have mentioned
about man. 1 This single proposition contains five propositions which
require five conclusions. The propositions contained are: Is or is not
man corporeal? Does or does not man possess sense perception?
Does or does not man grow? Does or does not man move? Is or is
not man rational? And concerning wine, Is it or is it not prohibited?
And if it is prohibited is it prohibited on the basis of revelation or
analogy?' We answer: if you accept this, that is, if you hold that one
may imply plurality, then a single word may encompass the meaning
of a proposition. If someone asks 'Is the inebriating wine prohibited?'
he may be answered 'Yes'. The word 'yes' implies that what is said is
'It is prohibited'. If he asks 'What is the evidence for its prohibition?'
then he will be told: 'It is the prohibition of all inebriants', or that
'all inebriants are prohibited', in addition to the statement of the

2
Quran, 9: 100.
3
Quran, 2: 215.
4
Quran, 8: 75.
1
152 The example is given in par. 149 above.
 IOI
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Prophet, may God praise him, that 'All inebriants are prohibited', 2
and similar expressions in which evidence appears as an individual
word, which is a single part, not a proposition formed of two words,
the subject and the predicate. The Prophet's statement 'the prohibition
of all inebriants' (tahrimu kulli muskirin) is a construct ( m u d ä f ) , and
his statement ' . . . anna kulla muskirin haräm' ('all inebriants are
prohibited') with a fatha on the alif in anna is also singular. For anna
and its predicate signify a verbal noun in the singular (masdar
mufrad), but inna (with a kasra under the alif) introduces a predicate
and thus a complete sentence. 3
153. One may also argue: the evidence that wine is prohibited is
the aforementioned statement of the Prophet—God praise him—or
the Quran, or the consensus of the Companions, or a certain Quranic
verse or tradition. The evidence may also be the existence of a cause
of prohibition without evidence to the contrary; or it may be that this
wine shares with grape-wine that which necessitates prohibition; or it
may be any similar expression pointing to the evidence through a
singular term, not a proposition which is a complete sentence.
Furthermore, when this evidence, expressed by means of a singular
term, is set forth in detail, it will be expressed through numerous
words.
154. Your main argument is that the indicant, namely the
syllogism, consists of only two parts—or, if you will, two terms—and
that which encompasses terms in excess of two would constitute
more than one indicant, because each of the qualifications attached
to the terms needs an indicant. We reply: the same applies to the
two terms; they are two indicants, not one, for each premiss requires
one indicant. It will thus follow that limiting the number of premisses
to two is unjustifiably arbitrary. If what is to be proven may be
proven by means of a single term, or only by means of two, three,
four, or more, then making two terms, no more and no less, the sole
standard—and casting what has more than two terms into several
inferences when the excess appears in the conclusion, and in the prem-

2
See par. 52, n. 3, above.
3
In this and the following paragraph Ibn Taymiyya argues that a proposition does
not necessarily consist of two terms, a subject and a predicate. As an example he gives
the Arabic construct (idäfa), which does not contain a subject and a predicate. It must
be noted, however, that the construct tahrimu kulli muskirin may easily be reformulated
so as to consist of a subject and a predicate (e.g. kullu muskirin haräm) while keeping
intact the original meaning of the proposition.
98 J a h d al-Qariha

isses when it appears in the proof, thus yielding several syllogisms—is

purely arbitrary. This claim is no better than saying: 'The governing
principle concerning a conclusion is that it must be one term, and its
indicant one part. If what is to be proven is more than one part, then
it should be made into two, three, four, or more conclusions, in
accordance with its signification.' This view, assuming it has been
held, is better than theirs, on the ground that the term denoting the
indicant is singular, and a syllogism is an indicant, thus its meaning
must be singular. 1
155. The term qiyäs involves measurement, as when you say 'I
measured (qistu) such-and-such by means of such-and-such.' A
measurement is effected when one thing is used as a measure. If two
or three things are used as measures, there will be two or three
measurements, not one; these measurements constitute more than
one syllogism. The logicians' view that what exceeds two premisses
represents more than one syllogism, while that which encompasses
less than two represents only a half, not a complete, syllogism is pure
convention and has no rational foundation. 1 This view is similar to
their arbitrary distinction between essential and accidental attributes
which are inseparable from quiddity and existence. 2
156. It is clear, therefore, that these logicians have not based what
they call definition and demonstration upon an existing reality or
upon a rational matter. Rather, they have based it upon mere
convention, as in the case of the disagreement among scholars
concerning whether the cause is a name for that which necessitates
an effect so that in no circumstance does one occur without the
other—and thus it is open neither to refutation (naqid)1 nor to
particularizatiön (takhsis) 2 —or whether the cause is a name for that

1
154 Cf. Ibn Sinä, Najät, 94.
1
155 See par. 169, n. 1, below. For the conventional nature of Greek logic, see
Introduction, Part I, Section 2, above.
2
For a critique of the distinction between essence (dhät) and inseparable accident
('aradi läzim), see Introduction, Part I, Section 2, and pars. 3 5 - 6 , 38 above.
156 1 Naqd in the sense found here refers exclusively to the refutation of Coexten-
siveness (see par. 61, n. 4, above) whereby a certain cause is shown to produce no
effect. Tahänawi, Kashshäf, ii. 1310, and Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 219, s.v. naqd; Ibn 'Aqil,
Kitäb al-Jadal, 56 ft.
2
Particularizatiön of the cause represents a qualified form of Refutation (naqd).
Whereas in the latter the alleged cause is intrinsically incapable of producing any effect,
in the former the cause produces no effect because of an obstacle or an impediment
(mäni'). See Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 46, s.v. takhsis al-'illa; Tahänawi, Kashshäf, i. 431, ii.
1310-11, s . w . takhsis al-'illa and naqd.
 IOI
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which entails the effect, but which effect may not simultaneously
occur because of the absence of a necessary condition or because of
an existing impediment (mäni'). 3 It is also similar to the convention
laid down by dialecticians, some of whom give the name 'indicant'
(idalil) to that which absolutely necessitates what is indicated (madlül),
provided no opposing indicant exists. Others use 'indicant' to mean
that which necessitates what is indicated, although the two may not
occur simultaneously because of the absence of a necessary condition
or because of an existing impediment. Dialecticians also disagree on
whether the reasoner must, when discussing the indicant, identify
the opposing indicant generally or in detail when possible—or re-
frain from identifying it at all, or identify it generally but not in
detail.
157. These are matters of convention and coinage just like the
words that people agree to use in order to express what is in their
minds; they are not, as the logicians claim in their logic, self-evident
truths that are rationally agreed upon by all nations. Those jurists
and dialecticians who disagree on the cause and the indicant are
closer to reason than the logicians who claim that proof consists of
only two premisses, for this is choosing one number [of premisses] in
favour of another on no justifiable grounds. The jurists and theologians
have taken into consideration the fixed attributes in the cause and
the indicant, attributes that are either complete or sufficient. What
the latter have held is closer to truth and reason than the purely
arbitrary considerations of the logicians.
158. Accordingly, intelligent and learned men have described their
logic as being conventional, laid down by a Greek. 1 Intelligent men
find no need for it, nor do they depend on it for the acquisition of
knowledge. Moreover, this acquisition does not depend on the
expressions used in their language, such as philosophia, sophistike,
analytika, theologia, kategoria, and other terms by which they express
their meanings. No one argues that the generality of intelligent
people have a need for this language, especially those people whom
God has blessed with the knowledge of one of the noblest of
languages which comprises the highest degree of eloquence and
which elucidates in the briefest and most perfect manner that which
the mind conceives.

3
On mäni' see preceding note and the sources cited therein.
1
158 i.e. Aristotle.
 100 Jahd al-Qariha

159. This is the argument that Abü Sa'id al-SIräfl adduced in his
celebrated debate with Mattä the philosopher. 1 When Mattä com-
plimented logic and claimed that intelligent people need it, Abü
Sa'id responded that there is no need for it, and that the need is
rather for learning the Arabic language; for meanings are instinctive
and intellective, and in need of no special convention, while Arabic
is needed in order to understand meanings that must be learned.
That is why learning the Arabic language—upon which the under-
standing of the Quran and the traditions depends—is, unlike logic, a
religious obligation whenever such obligation can be fulfilled by the
individual Muslim.
160. The argument of the more recent scholars that the study of
logic is a religious obligation incumbent upon those who are able to
undertake it, and that it is one of the conditions which must be met
in order to interpret the Law, 1 is indicative of both their ignorance of
the Law and the uselessness of logic. The absurdity of this claim is
necessarily (idtiräran) known 2 from the religion of Islam: the
Companions and those who followed them willingly—the choice of
the community—and the leaders of the Muslims, knew what their
obligations were and how their knowledge and faith were to be
perfected long before Greek logic became known. How then can it
be argued that a science not validated by logic cannot be trusted, 3 or

159 1 See the text of the debate in Tawhidi, al-Imta wal-Mu'änasa, i. 104-43 (The
Eighth Night), and Margoliouth, 'The Discussion between Abü Bishr Mattä and Abü
Sa'id al-SIräfl', 92-110 (English trans., 111-29); Elamrani-Jamal, Logique, 61 ff.,
149-63. An analysis of the debate may be found in Muhsin Mahdi, 'Language and
Logic in Classical Islam', 51-83. For the biography of Abü Bishr Mattä Ibn Yünus see
QiftI, Tärikh, 323, and Rescher, Development, 119-22 and passim; for that of Abü
Sa'id al-SIräfi, see Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 93.
160 1 The reference here is to such philosophers as Ibn Rushd who argued that the
study of philosophy and logic is decreed by divine law. In fact, according to him, the
study of the 'books of ancients' and the art of rational reasoning is a legal obligation
incumbent upon Muslims. See his Fasl al-Maqäl, 6, I I , 30 (English trans., 4 4 - 5 , 48,
63). This attitude comes quite close to the well-known stance of Ghazäli when he
declared his mistrust of the religious knowledge and learning of scholars who do not
study logic. Ghazäli, Mustasfä, i. 10; cf. idem, Qistäs, 15 ff. See also Ibn Hazm, Taqrib,
231-2; and Goldziher, 'Attitude of Orthodox Islam', 186, where the exegete al-Mursi
(died probably in 655/1257) is said to have argued that the Quran contains references to
logic, mathematics, medicine, astrology, etc.
2
That is, such knowledge is self-evident and non-inferential. On immediate (darüri)
knowledge, see par. 137, n. 3, above.
3
This is a clear reference to the famous statement of Ghazäli in the opening pages of
his Mustasfä. See the first note to this paragraph.
 Jahd al-Qariha IOI

that natural intelligence cannot, in most cases, operate correctly

without logic? 4
161. They may argue: 'We are not saying that people need the
expressions of the logicians, but they do need the principles by which
the sciences are validated.' We respond: there is no doubt that the
unknown can be found out only by means of that which is known,
and people need to validate what they do not know on the basis of
what they do know. This is one of the validating criteria (mizän) that
God revealed when He said: 'God it is who sent down the Book with
the truth and the Balance (Mizän)'1 and when He also said: 'Indeed,
We sent Our messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down
with them the Book and the Balance (Mizän).'2 Such [criteria] exist
in this and other religious communities who have never heard of the
logic of the Greeks. It is thus established that people do not need the
logical principles which the logicians have expressed in their own
language; namely, their discourse concerning secondary intelligibles.
For the subject of logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as these
lead to the knowledge of that which is unknown: logic investigates
the states of secondary intelligibles, which are the relations fixed in
quiddities in so far as these relations are absolute such that they
make possible the realization (tahsil) of what is not realizable (mä
laysa bi-häsil), or they may be helpful in doing so in a universal,
though not a particular, way. 3 They claim that, in examining the
genus of the indicant, the logician does the same as the legal theore-
tician who examines a legal indicant and its degree of strength,
distinguishes between legal and non-legal indicants, and examines
the strength of indicants in order to give preponderance to the strong
over the weak when they stand in opposition. They maintain that a
logician examines absolute proofs which are more universal than
legal proofs, and distinguishes between proofs and pseudo-proofs.
They also claim that the relation of their logic to meanings is

4
This seems to be in response to statements such as those made by Färäbi, Tahsil, 4
(English trans., 14), and Ibn Sinä, Najät, 43, 99, and less directly by Baghdad),
Mu'tabar, i. 7. See also SuhrawardI, Hikmat al-lshräq, 18.
1
161 Quran, 42: 17.
2
Quran, 42: 25.
3
The Arabic text here reads as follows: 'wa-hiya al-nisab al-thäniya lil-mähiyyät min
haythu hiya mutlaqa 'urida lahä in känat müsila'. al-Radd, 179, has the same wording,
except 'al-nisab al-thäbita' in lieu of 'al-thäniya', which was already anticipated by
Nashshär (Jahd, 277), who also found the text incomprehensible and who gave the
plausible alternative: 'al-thäbita lil-mähiyyät min haythu hiya müsila. . .'.
 102 Jahd al-Qariha

the same as the relation of metre to poetry, of commodity-scale

to commodity, of a clock to time, of a measuring rod to things
measured. 4 The majority of Muslim scholars and other intelligent
people have held that this is false. The [philosophers'] logic can
distinguish neither between indicants and pseudo-indicants nor
between the form and content of proof. Logic is not needed to
validate meanings, nor is it fit to be used for this purpose. This is the
most fallacious of claims.
162. Our dispute with the logicians must centre around the
principles they have posited in logic as well as around their claim
that the concepts and judgements which one seeks may be obtained
only through these principles. They have premissed their logic upon
four claims, two negative and two affirmative: they have claimed that
no concept can be formed without the methods they have set forth in
logic, and that no judgement can be obtained without the methods
they have set forth in logic. These two claims are clearly the most
fallacious. They have also maintained that through the methods they
have elaborated the concepts of reality which could not previously be
formed can now be formed. This too is false. We have already
exposed these three claims. 1 Later on, we shall discuss their fourth
claim, which is more flagrant than the others; 2 namely, that their
demonstration leads to judgemental knowledge ('ilm al-tasdiq).
163. If they maintain that the knowledge of concepts and judge-
ments cannot be reached without logic, they are saying that human
intellects have no means of acquiring knowledge except through the
definitions and syllogistics they have prescribed. They have also
claimed that their definitions and syllogistics lead to the knowledge
which humans reach through their intellects; that is, whatever leads
to knowledge must conform solely to their methods. They have
prescribed a canonical instrument by which the processes of acquiring
knowledge are evaluated and their validity or invalidity is deter-
mined. Conforming to this instrument safeguards the mind from
erring in forming a concept or a judgement. 1

4
See similar statements in Färäbi, Tawti'a, 5 5 - 6 ; Ibn Tumlüs, Madkhal, 16; Räzl,
Tahrir, 5 - 6 .
1
162 See pars. 6ff., 17 ff., 41 ft. above.
2
See pars. 230 ff. below.
163 1 Ibn SInä, Ishärät, i. 167 (English trans., 47); Färäbi, Tawti'a, 55; Baghdädi,
Mu'tabar, i. 7; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 36; Ibn Tumlüs, Madkhal, 16; Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 208,
s.v. mantiq.
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164. This is the summary of what they have maintained. All these
claims of theirs are false, whether they are formulated in the negative or
the affirmative. The methods of others which they have rejected are
not all false, nor are all the methods they have adopted true, as they
have claimed, though some are true, just as some of the others'
methods are false. They, as well as others, must be right about
something they hold. Jews and Christians hold, in relation to the
totality of their own doctrines, more truthful doctrines than these
philosophers do. Even the polytheistic Arab idolaters and their likes
held relatively more truthful doctrines than those found in the entirety
of their philosophy, be it the theoretical or the practical, which treats
of ethics, society, and polity.
165. For this reason the Greeks were polytheists and worshippers
of stars and idols, much worse than the Jews and Christians even
after the latter had abrogated and distorted their own Scripture. Had
it not been for God, who was gracious enough to send to them the
religion of Christ and thus guide them to truth and monotheism
through his religion before its abrogation and corruption, they would
have remained like their fellow polytheists. But when Christianity
was altered, the Greeks came to believe in a religion that was
a combination of belief and heresy; one part of it was true, the
other false. This, however, is still better than the religion of their
predecessors.
166. Our discussion here aims at exposing the errors of those
philosophers who base 1 their erroneous doctrines upon the mistakes
of others. They cling to lies in transmitted reports, and to ignorance
in rational matters. For example, they say that Aristotle was the
minister of the Two-Horned one who is mentioned in the Quran. 2
They have claimed this because they have heard that Aristotle was
the minister of Alexander, and the Two-Horned one was also called
Alexander. 3 But this is an expression of their ignorance, for Alexander,
under whom Aristotle served, was the son of Philip the Macedonian
who is mentioned in the annals of the Greeks (al-Rüm), which are

166 1 The Rabat edition reads: 'al-ladhina yabnüna'; but the Leiden manuscript (fol.
155a, 1. 9) has it as 'al-ladhina yantahüna ma", meaning, in general terms, that the
philosophers end up multiplying their errors by adopting the erroneous doctrines of
others. Both readings, however, make sense.
2
See Quran, 18: 83, 86, 94, where the Two-Horned is positively depicted as
representing the forces of Good.
3
On Aristotle's relationship with Alexander the Great see Russell, History, 173-4.
See also Langer, Encyclopedia of World History, 6 4 - 7 .
104 J a h d al-Qariha

known to the Jews and Christians. This Alexander went to Jerusalem

but did not, according to those who know his history, reach Sudd. 4
He was a polytheist who worshipped idols. So were Aristotle and his
folk. But the Two-Horned one was a monotheist and believed in
God, and lived before Alexander the son of Philip. Those who call
the latter Alexander call him Alexander the son of Darius [as well]. 5
167. Thus, the views of those philosophers became widespread
among people lacking in reason and religion, such as the Karmatians
and the Bätinis, whose doctrine combines the philosophy of the
Greeks with the religion of the Magians, although outwardly they
adhere to the religion of Rafd. 1 Of the same stock are the ignorant
mystics and speculative theologians. Being heretics and hypocrites,
they find fertile ground in an ignorant (jähiliyya) environment which
is far from knowledge and faith. They also find wide acceptance
among hypocritical heretics as well as among the polytheistic Turks.
They always find acceptance among the heretical and hypocritical
enemies of God and of His Messenger.
168. Now, our discussion will revolve around their doctrine—
whose weakness is known—that in every inference there must be no
more and no less than two premisses. Since they have realized that
an inference may need more than two premisses or be restricted to
one, they have argued that under a syllogism there may be subsumed
an additional statement, namely, a third premiss over and above the
first two. The addition may be for an invalid reason or it may be for
a valid one, such as for the purpose of clarifying the two premisses.
They call this a compound syllogism (qiyäs murakkab), and argue
that it encompasses a number of syllogisms constructed in order to
reach more than one conclusion, although in themselves these syl-
logisms lead to only one conclusion. They say: 'One of the two
premisses may be suppressed because it is well known or even for no
4
Cf. Mufassal al-1'tiqäd, 160-1. Sudd is said to be located near Rayy. On the
alleged conversation between Sudd's inhabitants and Alexander the Great, see Yäqüt,
Mu'jam al-Buldärt, iii. 197ft. In Naqd al-Mantiq, 132, Alexander the son of Philip is
reported to have reached the 'lands of the Persians' but not the 'lands of the Turks'.
More important, al-Sudd in Jahd becomes al-sadd (dam) in Naqd al-Mantiq, and this
dam is reported not to have been built by the son of Philip.
5
See, in general, MaqdisI, al-Bad' wal-Ta'rikh, iii. 152ff.; Ibn al-Nadlm, Fihrist,
333-
167 1 The Räfidis, the followers of the 'religion of Rafd', are the Shl'Is who rejected
(rafadü) the Imamate of Abu Bakr and 'Umar. Further on this sect and its name, see
Ibn al-Murtadä, al-Munya, 93 ff.; Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. 'Räfidites' (by
J. H. Kramers).
 IOI
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valid reason at all.' They divide compound syllogisms into disjoined

and conjoined types. 1
169. We respond that this is an acknowledgement on your part
that some inferences need more than two premisses and some others
only one. You have also held that an inference which is in need of
more than two premisses contains in effect a number of syllogisms. 1
We answer you: you claim that the syllogism must encompass at least
two premisses; and if it encompasses more than two, it will consist of
more than one syllogism, each of which explicates one of the premisses.
Instead, you should say: 'What is needed is one premiss; and whatever
premiss may be added to it would be added for the purpose of
explicating that premiss.' Rationally, this is more tenable, since the
predication of a quality upon the thing qualified, of a judgement
upon the thing judged, or of a predicate upon a subject, 2 must be by
means of a middle which is the indicant. Therefore, one premiss is
indispensable, but what is in excess of one premiss may or may not
be needed.
170. As to the claim that the two-premiss syllogism is needed in
some cases, it is the same as the claim that in some particular cases
three premisses are needed while in some others four or five. One
number has no priority over another.
171. With regard to their view that one of the two premisses may
be suppressed because it is clear or for the purpose of deceiving [the
opponent], 1 the same may be said about suppressing the third or the
fourth premiss. When someone argues in favour of a certain issue by
adducing one premiss, it may not be sufficient to prove the point; if
two or three additional premisses do not suffice then he must adduce
still more premisses to the point of sufficiency. Once all the premisses
are set forth, those inadmissible will be excluded, and those inde-
fensible discarded, and so on, until the inference is completed. When
someone is asked about the evidence concerning the prohibition of a
particular beverage, he should say: 'It is prohibited.' If he is asked
'Why?' he should answer: 'Because it is an intoxicating wine.' This

1 an
168 For all these arguments see pars. 144-5 d notes therein.
1
169 Räzl, Tahrir, 164-5. See also Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 98 (11. 5 - 6 ) , where he strongly
implies that the compound syllogism (qiyäs murakkab), which involves more than two
premisses, represents more than one syllogism.
2
Ibn Taymiyya gives the two Arabic sets mubtada'lkhabar and mawdü'/mahmül,
both being assimilated here as subject/predicate. See further par. 150, n. 1, above.
171 1 Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 177-81.
 6 Jahd al-Qariha

premiss, if admitted to be true, should suffice if the hearer knows

that all intoxicants are prohibited. But if it is argued that this premiss
is inadmissible and that this particular beverage is not an intoxicant,
one will need to prove its intoxicating quality by means of a trust-
worthy report or through experimentation with similar beverages.
This inference is analogical and yields certitude. For if a certain
amount of beverage is sampled and found to be intoxicating, then
the remaining amount of that beverage will be known to be intoxicating
as well, because it possesses the same attribute. This is also the case
with other experiential matters, such as the knowledge that bread
satiates, water quenches the thirst, etc. Such matters are based on
analogy. In fact, all sensory matters that are known to be universal
are known to be so through analogical inference.
172. Should there be any objection concerning the prohibition of
inebriant wines, one would need two premisses; first, that this par-
ticular wine is confirmed to be an inebriant, and second, that all
inebriants are prohibited. The latter premiss may be confirmed by
several indicants, such as the statement of the Prophet, may God
praise him: 'All inebriants are prohibited', and 'Every beverage
which inebriates is prohibited'. Furthermore, when the Prophet was
asked about a beverage made of honey known as bat' as well as
about another made of corn and known as mizr, he answered—
when all-exhaustive knowledge had descended upon him—that 'All
inebriants are prohibited'. Now, these traditions are found in the
Sahih;1 along with multitudes of others, they are known to have been
uttered by the Prophet, may God praise him. They go to prove that
he prohibited all intoxicants. Should someone say: 'I know that this
is an inebriating wine, but I do not agree that wine is prohibited, or
that it is entirely prohibited', then he would have to prove the third
premiss, and so on.
173. The argument which demonstrates that a single premiss may
be sufficient for reaching a conclusion is that the indicant entails the
judgement indicated, as we have previously explained. Since the
major term entails the middle term and the middle term the minor
term, it is then established that the major entails the minor term. For
what is concomitant with the antecedent is an antecedent and what is
concomitant with the consequent is a consequent. The judgement is
a consequent of the indicant; the former can be known to be con-

1
172 See par. 146, n. 1, above.
 IOI
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comitant with the latter only by means of a middle, for the middle
follows the word 'because . . . ' . This is the view of the logicians. 1 Ibn
STnä and others have discussed the qualities (sifät) which are con-
comitant with that which is qualified ( m a w s ü f ) and have argued that
some of the qualities are obviously concomitant. They have used this
argument to respond to those among their associates who distinguish
between what is essential and what is necessary to the quiddity by
maintaining that, unlike an essential attribute, a necessary attribute
needs a middle. Against Ibn SInä they argued that many necessary
qualities, whose concomitance (luzüm) 2 is so obvious, need no
middle; 3 for them, the middle term is the indicant (dalil). 4
174. Some people think that the middle term is that which occupies
a middle position between the immediate and mediate necessary
[attributes] in the thing itself. This, however, is false, although what
is sought after becomes obvious in either case. 1 We say: if the
connection between a necessary attribute and its concomitant is self-
evident and is in no need of a middle term, then forming a concept
of the attribute and its concomitant would be sufficient for knowing
that the former is affirmed of the latter. Should they share a middle
term whose concomitance with them is obvious, then there would be
no need for a second middle. But if one of the two concomitants is
not self-evident, then a middle term would be needed. If neither is
self-evident, then two middle terms would be needed. In order to
express such a middle, a single premiss would be sufficient. Should
one enquire about the proof for the prohibition of an inebriating
wine, it should be argued that it has been authentically reported that
the Prophet, may God praise him, said: 'Every inebriant is alcoholic'
or 'Every inebriant is prohibited'. This middle, namely, the statement
of the Prophet, may God praise him, does not need a middle term
for the believer to know that for him inebriants are prohibited. The
conclusion that the wine in question is prohibited because inebriants
are prohibited needs no middle term either, for everyone knows that
if all inebriants are prohibited, then this particular, controversial
wine will also be prohibited. Every believer also knows that whenever
1
173 Ibn SInä, Ishärät, i. 210 (English trans., 56).
2
That is, such attributes are clearly necessary to quiddity.
3
Tust, Sharh al-Ishärät, i. 209ft.
4
See Ämidi, Mubln, 74, and par. 42, n. 2, above.
174 1 The meaning of the preceding two sentences, and consequently the whole
paragraph, is not completely clear to me. I have, therefore, given a literal translation of
it.
 8 Jahd al-Qariha

the Prophet, may God praise him, prohibits a thing, then that thing
becomes prohibited. If it is maintained that the evidence for wine's
prohibition is its inebriating quality, and if one knows that a beverage
is an inebriant and that all inebriants are prohibited, then one will
submit that it is prohibited. But one may forget, or may be ignorant
of, its being an inebriant. Also, if one said 'Because it is an alcoholic
beverage', one would be admitting that it is an alcoholic beverage,
and thus its prohibition would be affirmed. Should one admit its
prohibition after one has denied it, then one would realize this after
having been ignorant of it or would remember it after having forgotten
it, for not all things that one knows can be committed to memory.
175. The logicians have disagreed on whether two premisses are
sufficient to yield knowledge of the conclusion or whether a third
premiss 1 must be included. The latter view was held by Ibn Sfna and
other philosophers. They argued that a person may know that mules
do not procreate, but yet he may forget this. Thus, he may see a
mule with an inflated abdomen, and may ask: 'Is this mule pregnant
or not?' He will be answered: 'Don't you know that this is a mule?'
Having answered in the affirmative, he will then be asked: 'Don't
you know that mules do not procreate?' He will reply in the affirmative.
Ibn Slnä said: 'Only then will he remember that this mule cannot
procreate.' 2
176. [Fakhr al-DIn] al-RäzI and others disagreed with Ibn Slnä
and have argued that his view is not tenable, the reason being that if
a premiss is subsumed under one of the two [original] premisses but
is different from the two premisses, then it will constitute a distinct
premiss which must entail a conclusion. The manner of joining it to
the two [original] premisses would then be the same as that of
joining the second to the first. This [process] will ultimately lead to
the subsumption of an infinite number of premisses. However, if the
premiss is not known to be different from the two [original] premisses,
then it cannot be a condition (shart) for yielding a conclusion, because
a condition must be different from what is conditioned (mashrüt).
Since there is no difference here, it is therefore not a condition. The
example of the mule may be valid only when one premiss, the minor
or the major, is present in the mind. But when both become present
in the mind, we cannot admit of any doubt concerning the conclusion. 1

1
175 Literally: 'a third matter' (amr thälith).
2
The entire paragraph seems to have been taken from Räzi, Muhassal, 30.
1
176 This passage is an almost verbatim quotation from Räzi, Muhassal, 30.
 IOI
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177. I say: the truth of the matter is that this disagreement is the
inevitable result of their supposition that only two premisses are
needed. However, this supposition is not valid, because what is
needed is that by means of which the conclusion is reached, be it
one, two, or three premisses. Now, what is forgotten is not known
during the time it is forgotten; and only when it is recalled does it
become known in actuality. The indicant here is the knowledge that
mules do not procreate. This premiss was forgotten, and thus the
knowledge resulting from the indicant was not reached. What is
forgotten cannot lead to knowledge while it is forgotten; rather, it
yields knowledge only upon recollection, for it is then that it can be
present in the mind.
178. God, the Exalted, is free of forgetfulness and unawareness,
because these would contradict the reality of knowledge. He is also
free of slumber and sleep, because these contradict the perfection of
life and everlastingness, for sleep is the twin of death. 1 This is why
the inhabitants of Paradise neither sleep nor die; they are inspired to
glorify God just as each of us is bestowed with a soul.
179. What we mean here is that the purpose of the indicant is to
yield knowledge of the conclusion it entails, whether this is called
recollection, remembering, or otherwise. When one recalls the
indicant's entailment of the conclusion, one will then know that the
indicant signifies the conclusion. If this entailment is not obvious,
then there may be a need for one, two, three, or more premisses to
explicate it. The middle terms may vary from one person to another;
what may be taken by one person as a middle term leading to a
conclusion may not be taken as such by another. In fact, the latter
may arrive at another middle term. The middle is an indicant as well
as a means of knowing the connection between the consequent and
the antecedent, which are, respectively, the judgement and the thing
judged. The judgement is entailed by the thing judged so long as it is
the judgement upon the thing judged. The middle terms, which are
the indicants, may vary in quality and number in accordance with the
gift of intellectual aptitude which God bestows upon individual people.
For instance, when the middle term is a true statement, it might be
taken differently by two different persons. Similarly, if it were con-
firmed at the Royal Palace that the crescent moon had appeared,
and people dispersed and announced this in the city, then people
would know of the appearance of the crescent moon through persons

1
178 Cf. Quran, 2: 255.
110 Jahd al-Qariha

other than those who first reported the matter. The Quran and the
Sünna which people transmitted on the authority of the Messenger
reached the community, especially in the second and third centuries,
by means of persons other than those who first reported them. The
first transmitters had had their own Quran teachers and traditionists,
and so had the later transmitters; the first transmitters were the
mediators, the middle link between the later transmitters and the
utterances and deeds of the Prophet, and they were the ones who led
the later transmitters to this knowledge by reporting and teaching it
to them. This is also the case concerning knowables that are acquired
by means of the intellect or sense perception when someone points
or leads to them.
180. As for those who have held that the middle term of the
necessary quality is the middle affirmed of the object qualified, they
are wrong on several grounds, as we have explained elsewhere. 1 But
even if we suppose they were correct, the mental middle is more
general than the external middle, just as an indicant is more general
than a cause ('ilia). Every cause can lead to an effect, but not every
indicant can be a cause in the same thing (finafs al-amr). Likewise,
any middle of a given thing may be made a middle of that thing in
the mind, and thus it will become an indicant. But the reverse of this
is not tenable, because the indicant entails what is indicated. One
can reason on the basis of a cause that entails an effect as well as on
the basis of a middle that is concomitant with the antecedent and
with which a distant consequent is concomitant.
181. It is therefore obvious that, in either case, the conclusion
might be reached through a single premiss if there were no need for
other premisses. Sometimes, it is not possible to reach a conclusion
except through a number of premisses, in which case they must be
known. Confining the inference to no more and no less than two
premisses is purely arbitrary. This is why you will not find among
intelligent people and authors in various disciplines anyone who
restricts his inference to no more and no less than two premisses,
and who makes an effort at reducing multiple premisses to two and
complementing what falls short of two so that it becomes two. The
exceptions, however, are the Greek logicians and their followers.
But this is not the case with those who remain faithful to their sound
disposition (fitra) and follow in the footsteps of people such as the

1
180 See par. 174 above.
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Immigrants (Muhäjirün), the Supporters (Ansär), and those who

have followed them voluntarily, and the rest of Muslim scholars and
thinkers as well as other religious communities. Nor is it the case
with grammarians, physicians, or geometers, for no one has held
these views save for those who have followed the logicians and
imitated them in the matter of those definitions which consist of
genus and specific difference. They have derived no benefit from the
knowledge they have acquired from the logicians; they learned only
what is false and unnecessary, or harmful and useless, for the logicians'
teachings contain much error and are far too protracted.
182. Since an inference may at times need only one premiss, and
at others two or more, the method of Muslim thinkers has been such
that they set forth those premisses that they need and, unlike those
who follow the method of the logicians, do not restrict themselves to
two premisses. In their public writings and speeches, in their intro-
spective reasoning as well as in disputations which aim at teaching,
guiding, and debating with others, they follow the method I have
just mentioned. So do all sorts of intelligent people from other
religious communities, except for those who have followed in the
footsteps of these logicians.
183. Muslim thinkers continue to denounce the logicians' method
and expose its weaknesses, errors, intellectual inadequacy, and inar-
ticulateness. 1 They have shown that such a method is more likely to
corrupt the rational and linguistic faculties than to set them straight.
They are not willing to adopt it in their own reasoning or in their
scholarly disputations, whether these disputations are conducted
against a friend or a foe.
184. However, the use of this method has become widespread
since the time of Abü Hamid [al-Ghazäll]. He included in the begin-
ning of his work al-Mustasfä an introduction to Greek logic, and
alleged that the learning of those who do not know this logic is not to
be trusted. 1 In the field of logic, he composed Mi'yär al-'Ilm2 and
Mihakk al-Nazar,3 as well as a treatise which he entitled al-Qistäs al-
Mustaqim, where he discussed five rules of inference: 4 the three
categorical syllogisms, the hypothetical conjunctive, and the hypo-

1
183 See Introduction, Part II, above.
1
184 See Mustasfä, i. 10.
2
Mi'yär al-'Ilm. See list of References below.
3
See list of References below.
4
See Qistäs, 8ff., 15ff., 28ff., 3 3 f t . , 37ft. , 41 ff.
112 Jahd a l - Q a n h a

thetical disjunctive syllogism. He changed the terminology used for

these rules and introduced examples he borrowed from the writings
of Muslim scholars. In the latter treatise he maintained that he was
addressing some of the people of Ta'lim. 5 He also wrote a book on
the intentions of the philosophers, and another in which he refuted
them and exposed their heresy because they upheld the view of the
eternity of the world and denied that God knows particulars and that
there will be a Day of Judgement. 6 He has shown in the books he
wrote towards the end of his life that the logicians' method is false
and leads to uncertainty. He condemned it more than he condemned
the method of the speculative theologians. Early on in his life he
used to discuss in his works many of the logicians' views, using their
terminology and other terminology. But towards the end of his life
he went to great lengths to refute them and showed that their
method, which is more erroneous than that of the speculative theo-
logians, contains so much ignorance and heresy that it must be
censured. He died while studying the compilations of Bukhäri and
Muslim. The logic he propounded led him nowhere, and has removed
none of the doubt and perplexity which possessed him. To him logic
was to no avail.
185. However, because of what he wrote during his lifetime and
because of other things, many thinkers began incorporating Greek
logic into their fields of study to such an extent that those later
thinkers who followed in the footsteps of the logicians thought that
this logic was the only existing method and that what the logicians
maintained with regard to definition and demonstration was sound
and acceptable to intelligent people. Little did these thinkers know
that intelligent and learned Muslims and others have denounced and
decried it. Muslim thinkers have written many works about logic,
and the majority of Muslims denounce it categorically because of
what they have observed of its [damaging] effects and attendant
consequences, which show the logicians' views to be contrary to
sound knowledge and faith, views that led them to all sorts of
ignorance, heresy, and error.
186. What we mean here is that the logicians' claim that all infer-
ences depend on only two premisses is untenable. They call a syllogism

5
On the Ta'ltmis, see Shahrastänl, Milal, 147 ft.
6
This he did in the well-known treatise Tahäfut al-Faläsifa. See list of References
 Jahd al-Qarlha " 3

in which one of the premisses is suppressed an enthymeme (qiyäs al-

damir).1 They argue that the premiss may be suppressed owing to its
being known or owing to a mistake or for the purpose of falsification. 2
We respond: if the premiss is known, then it is like any other known
premiss, and thus suppression of one premiss would have no priority
over the suppression of two, three, or four. Should it be possible to
claim that in an inference which requires one premiss a second
premiss has been suppressed, and that in an inference which requires
two premisses a third has been suppressed, etc., then this could go
on ad infinitum. Those who reflect on this matter will find what I
have said to be true. It is for this reason that men of linguistic
eloquence and erudition, who establish demonstrative proofs and
conclusive postulates in the most intelligible manner, do not resort in
their discourse to the two-premiss [syllogism] propounded by the
logicians. Those who follow the latter's method constrict both mind
and tongue in the attainment of knowledge. You will find their
principles to be like their language—they are so shallow and inade-
quate that any intelligent person would reject them.
187. Ya'qüb Ibn Ishäq al-Kindi 1 was the leading philosopher of
Islam in his time. (I mean the philosopher who appeared in Islam,
for philosophers are not Muslims. A prominent judge in our times
was asked: 'Is Ibn Sinä one of the Muslim philosophers?' Thereupon
he replied: 'Islam has no philosophers'.) Ya'qüb [al-Kindi] used to
say, among other things, that 'non-existence is the absence of the
existence of such-and-such', and similar statements. If some of his
statements, like some of the statements of Ibn Sinä and others, are
found to be intelligible and eloquent, it is because he learned them
from intelligent and eloquent Muslims. Had he otherwise trodden
the path of his predecessors and relinquished what he had learned
from Muslims, his intellect and language would have been like those
of his predecessors.
188. The philosophers' ideas are adopted mostly by those people
who cannot comprehend what they say; despite their ignorance and
self-deception, these people extol the philosophers. They may under-

186 1 See Ämidi, Mubin, 74; cf. Ibn Rushd, Three Short Commentaries, 170 (English
trans., 63-4) .
2
Ibn Rushd, Talkhis Mantiq Aristü, i. 3 5 8 - 9 ; Black, Logic, 157 ft.
187 1 For the biography of Abü Yüsuf Ya'qüb Ibn Ishäq al-Kindi (d. c. 252/866), see
Qifti, Tärikh, 366-78; Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 357-65. For a general survey of his
philosophy, see Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 82-112.
114 Jahd al-Qariha

stand some, or most, or even all of what the philosophers hold, but
do not, at the same time, see the truth of the Prophet's Message,
may God praise him; they do not see what sound minds dictate, nor
do they realize that what the generality of intelligent people hold
contradicts what these philosophers propound. These people, having
good faith in these philosophers, were able to understand their
doctrine only after much labour and hardship. Only God knows the
extent to which they fell into the traps of the philosophers' errors.
Then they, like many of the learned men who had initially placed
their trust in the philosophers, were finally saved by God and came
to see the philosophers' errors. As a result they have withdrawn
from the philosophers' ranks and dissociated themselves from them,
and have even written in their refutation. Those who have not done
so have remained in error. The falsehood of the philosophers' meta-
physics is obvious to most people. This is why all Muslim thinkers
have declared them heretics.
189. Some people were confused concerning logic and could not
perceive its nature and attendant consequences. Nor were they aware
of what the generality of scholars have said with regard to the
logicians' contradictory views about logic. Although, admittedly, logic
contains obvious matters such as the first figure, these people did not
realize that what truth there lies in logic can be known without the
logicians, who follow unduly prolonged and thorny roads to the
attainment of that truth. Here we do not wish to expose their errors
concerning what they have affirmed about logic but rather what they
have denied—that is, their claims that no acquired knowledge may
be reached except by means of their [kind of] demonstration, which
is the syllogism. 1
190. They have held that proofs are of three sorts: syllogism,
induction, and analogy. Furthermore, they have claimed that analogy
does not yield certainty and that what does lead to certainty is only
the syllogism which consists of the premisses they have prescribed. 1
We have explained elsewhere that analogy and the categorical syl-
logism are coequal and that, if one yields certain or probable know-
ledge, the other will yield the same knowledge if the subject-matter
is one and the same. 2 What is important is the subject-matter, not
1
189 See par. 41 above and the ensuing critique.
190 1 Ibn Sinä, Ishärät, i. 415, 419 (English trans., 129-30). Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 66,
90; Räzl, Sharh al-Ghurra, 8 1 - 2 .
2
See e.g. pars. 216-29, 292 ft.
 IOI
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the form, of the inference. In fact, if the subject-matter is certain,

there will be no difference between an inference cast in the form of
analogy and one in the form of a syllogism, or between a hypothetical
and a disjunctive syllogism. Nor will there be a difference if the
argument is expressed in their terminology or in any other termin-
ology, especially if such terminology is better than theirs, more
evident to the mind, and pithier.
191. Take the most obvious of examples, such as the statement:
'This is a human, and every human is created, or is an animal, or is
capable of perception, or wilfully moves, or is rational', or whatever
other attribute necessary to humanity one cares to mention. If you
wish, you may cast the inference in the foregoing form. You may
also want to say: 'He is a human; therefore, he is created, capable of
perception, is an animal, and moves, just like other humans, because
they possess in common the attribute of humanity which entails these
attributes.' If you will, you may also say: 'This is a human, and
humanity entails these attributes; therefore, these attributes are
necessary to him.' You may also say: 'If he is a human, then he
either possesses these attributes or he does not. And since this last is
impossible, then the first remains, because these attributes are neces-
sary to a human, since his existence cannot be imagined without
them.' 1
192. Induction, on the other hand, is certain if it is complete, in
which case you will have reached a judgement about the entire class
on the basis of what you have found in all the particulars. But this is
neither an inference proceeding from particular to universal nor is it
one proceeding from specific to general; rather, it is an inference
that proceeds from one particular to another particular concomitant
with it. For the existence of a judgement concerning each and every
particular that falls under a universal necessitates that the judgement
be concomitant with that universal. Their argument that such an
inference proceeds from particular to universal is false. How could
this be the case when the indicant must entail what is indicated?
Should it be possible for the indicant to exist without that which is
indicated and the latter not to be entailed by the indicant, we would
not then know that that indicant is affirmed. We can know that what

191 1 This paragraph contains four distinct modes of argument with the same subject-
matter. The first is clearly a categorical syllogism, while the second is an analogy. The
third and fourth modes represent, respectively, the hypothetical and disjunctive
syllogisms.
 6 J a h d al-Qariha

is indicated is affirmed along with the indicant if we know that it

accompanies the indicant at times, but does not do so at others. If
we know this and still argue that what is indicated always accompanies
the indicant, then we shall be violating the principle of contradiction.
193. The concomitance we are speaking of here will result in an
inference in accordance with the form in which such concomitance
occurs. The stronger and more complete and obvious the concomi-
tance, the stronger and more complete and obvious the entailment.
Consider, for example, the created beings that signify the Creator,
glorified and exalted may He be; each and every creature is con-
comitant with its Creator, i.e. they can no more exist without the
existence of their Creator than without His knowledge, power, will,
wisdom, and mercy. Each and every creature signifies all these.
194. If the thing signified is concomitant with the signifier, then
the former must certainly be either equal to, or more general than,
the latter. The signifier cannot be more general than the thing signified.
If the logicians argue that in a syllogism one proceeds from the
universal to the particular, then it is not the particular which is the
judgement signified. Rather, the particular is that which is charac-
terized and identified as the locus of the judgement. It may be more
specific than, or equal to, its indicant, unlike the judgement which is
the attribute of the indicant and that which describes it; the judgement
can only be equal to, or more general than, its indicant. The judge-
ment is the thing signified which is concomitant with its indicant, and
this last is in turn concomitant with that which is characterized and
identified.
195. When you say 'Wine is prohibited because it is an alcoholic
beverage', its being an alcoholic beverage is the indicant. The latter
is concomitant with wine, and prohibition is concomitant with alcoholic
beverages. In the syllogism consisting of two premisses, you may say:
'All disputed wines are either intoxicants or alcoholic beverages' and
'All alcoholic beverages are prohibited'. Now, you have not proceeded
in your inference from the intoxicants, or the alcoholic beverages,
which are universals, to the disputed point itself, which is more
specific than both alcoholic beverages and wine. Therefore, this is
not an inference that proceeds from the universal to the particular;
rather, it is from the universal that you have inferred the prohibition
of wine. The logicians argue that since the prohibition of wine is
subsumed under the prohibition of all intoxicants, this would be an
inference that proceeds from the universal to the particular.
 IOI
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196. The verification of the matter is that what is affirmed of the

universal is affirmed of each of its particulars. Prohibition is more
general than, and is affirmed of, alcoholic beverages, and thus it is
affirmed of each particular falling under alcoholic beverages. There-
fore, this is an inference that proceeds from the affirmation of one
universal to the affirmation of the particulars of another universal.
The aforementioned indicant stands as a particular in relation to that
universal, and as a universal in relation to these particulars. This
they do not dispute, for the indicant is the middle term, and it is
more general than, or equal to, the minor term, whereas the major
term is equal to, or more general than, the middle term. The major
term is the judgement, the characteristic, the predicate; it is the
predicate in the conclusion. The minor term, on the other hand, is
the matter judged, the object of characterization, the subject; it is
the subject in the conclusion.
197. If their view concerning analogy—namely, that it proceeds
from one particular to another 1 —is stated in an unqualified manner
as 'an inference proceeding from a single particular to another', then
this view is erroneous. In analogy the inference proceeds on the basis
of a middle term, that is, the two particulars having in common the
cause of the judgement, or having the indicant of the judgement
together with the cause. Such an inference is either causal (qiyäs
'ilia) or indicational (qiyäs daläla).2
198. As to the argumentum a simili (qiyäs shabah), if it is used,
there will only be two possibilities: the common factor between the
original and the assimilated cases may be either the cause itself or
something which entails the cause. Having in common what entails
the cause does not necessarily entail the judgement common to the
two cases, for this commonality may or may not be conjoined with
the cause. Therefore, we cannot be certain of the validity of this
argument, since its validity depends on the cause being common to
both the original and the assimilated cases. We cannot be certain of
this commonality unless we know that the two cases share a cause or
share that which is a consequent of such a cause, for the affirmation
of the antecedent entails the affirmation of the consequent. If we
assume that both cases possess in common neither the antecedent
nor the cause itself, then the analogy will certainly be false, because

1
197 Ibn Sinä, Najät, 93; Räzi, Tahrir, 166; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 90.
2
For qiyäs al-'illa and qiyäs al-daläla, see par. 59, n. I, above.
 8 Jahd al-Qariha

the cause will be restricted to the original case; and as long as it is so

restricted, one cannot know if the analogy is valid. 1
199. The validity of analogy may be ascertained by the non-
existence of differences between the original and the assimilated
cases. 1 The non-existence of differences necessitates that the two
cases possess in common a single judgement, although the cause
itself or its indicant may not be known. Analogy may be made
complete by proving the non-existence of differences or by showing a
common factor (jämi'). Analogy encompasses both types, and both
entail a judgement. Each of them can be cast in the form of a
categorical syllogism in which the judgement is conjoined with the
universal and the universal with its particulars. This is the true
nature of the categorical syllogism. Analogy is not an inference that
merely proceeds from the affirmation of the judgement in one par-
ticular to its affirmation in another particular.
200. Should it be asked: 'How is one to know that the common
factor entails a judgement?' We reply: we know this in the same way
that the major premiss in the syllogism is known. The middle term is
the common factor. The conjoinment of the major term with the
middle term amounts to the conjoinment of the judgement with the
common factor, as has already been mentioned. When one particular
is conjoined with, or is an antecedent—and not a consequent—to
another, an inference may proceed from one to the other. If the
necessary connection is that of the essence ('an al-dhät), then the
proof will derive from the essence; but if the connection is based on
an attribute or a judgement, then the inference will proceed from
that attribute or judgement. It is clear then that their restricting
inferences [to the three types they have determined] is erroneous.

198 1 For a different (Hanball) view of argumentum a simili, see Ibn Qudäma,
Rawdat al-Näzir, 279-80.
199 1 In legal theory, this type of analogy is known as qiyäs ft ma'nä al-asl or tanqih
al-manät. It is an analogy from the negative, that is, the similarity between two things is
determined on the grounds that in certain relevant respects the two objects are not
different. For this analogy to be valid, it is not a condition that the positive, relevant
similarity in the two things be established. Now, this analogy is thought to lead to
conclusive knowledge when the absence of any difference between two objects or cases
is established with certainty. For example, a male slave ('abd) is accorded the same
contractual rights of manumission as those of a female slave (ama) on the grounds that
they are not different in any respect relative to contractual obligations. The decision to
accord the same rights is considered certain. However, when the absence of difference
is not conclusive, analogy leads to probable knowledge. See Tahänawi, Kashshäf, ii.
1196, s.v. qiyäs-, Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Näzir, 249-50.
 IOI
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201. All three types of argument they have distinguished revert to

the aforementioned conjoinment of the indicant with what is indicated.
The categorical syllogism they have elaborated may be cast in the
conditional form, and vice versa. The issue then comes down to one
meaning, namely, the subject-matter of the indicant. One cannot
know this subject-matter through the syllogistic form they have upheld.
If one comprehends the subject-matter in such a way that one realizes
that a certain thing entails another, then one will come to grips with
the process of inference (dalcila), be it cast in a syllogistic form or
not, or formulated in their terminology or not. In fact, the terminology
which the intellects and the language of Muslims have developed is
much better than the logicians' terminology.
202. The categorical syllogism comes down to one thing entailing
another, and this last entailing yet another—as has been mentioned.
This syllogism is the same as the conditional syllogism, which consists
of [two types]: the hypothetical and the disjunctive. The conditional
hypothetical syllogism is an inference made on the basis of entailment;
it proceeds from the affirmation of the antecedent, which is a pre-
requisite constituting a condition, to the affirmation of the consequent,
which is an effect constituting an apodosis. It also proceeds from the
denial of the consequent, which is the effect constituting an apodosis,
to the denial of the antecedent, which is a prerequisite constituting a
condition.
203. As for the conditional disjunctive [syllogism], which the legal
theorists call Classification and Successive Elimination (al-sabr wal-
taqsim) and the dialecticians call 'Classification and Examination'
(1al-taqsim wal-tardid) ,l it is an inference which proceeds from the
affirmation of one matter to the denial of another contradictory
matter, or from the denial of the former to the affirmation of the
latter. It consists of four 2 parts; thus, the disjunctive syllogism (mäni'at
al-jam' wal-khuluww)3 constitutes four conditionals; that is, if a thing
is affirmed, then its contradictory is denied, or if its contradictory is
affirmed, then the thing itself is denied. Or, if the thing is denied,
then its contradictory is affirmed, or if its contradictory is denied,
then the thing is affirmed. Positive exclusion proceeds from the

203 1 On the method of Classification and Successive Elimination, see par. 61, n. 2,
above.
2
Cf. par. 121 above and notes thereto.
3
Namely, the first type of the disjunctive alternative syllogism, as it has already
been expounded in par. 121 above.
120 J a h d al-Qariha

affirmation of one thing to the denial of its contraries, both being

mutually exclusive. Negative exclusion, on the other hand, is based
on contradiction and entailment; the two contradictories cannot both
be false, and thus they cannot both be denied. The apodosis of
negative exclusion is the existence of one thing that is true and
another that is false, not the coexistence in one thing of truth and
falsehood. Two things, one true and the other false, may entail each
other, though they cannot both be false, because their both being
false violates the Law of the Excluded Middle. 4
204. Generally speaking, all things have concomitants without
which they cannot exist, and all have contraries which negate their
existence. Thus the existence of a thing is inferred from the existence
of its concomitant, and its non-existence from the non-existence of
that concomitant. The non-existence of a thing is inferred from the
existence of its contradictory, and from the non-existence of its
contradictory one infers its existence, provided that these two are the
only possibilities involved. They cannot both be non-existent, and
cannot both be existent. 1 Such an inference is the result of knowing
the nature of a thing, its antecedent, and its consequent. When
natural intelligence forms a concept of a thing, it expresses the
concept in a variety of ways and casts it in different forms of inference.
But none of this is restricted to the syllogistic form they have pre-
scribed, nor to what they have called demonstration. They have
asserted that demonstration must consist of a particular type of
subject-matter; namely, the propositions they have prescribed. 2
They have excluded from first principles what they term estimations
(wahmiyyät)3 and widespread premisses (mashhürät). 4 But the rea-
soning of natural intelligence on the basis of these, especially the
former, is superior to its reasoning on the basis of the apodictic prem-
isses they have deemed to be the subject-matter of demonstration.
4
Note that the Arabic of the last few words is: 'li'anna irtifä'ahumä yaqtadi irtifä'a
wujüdi al-shay'i wa-'adamihi ma'an' ('because their both being false necessitates the
simultaneous existence and non-existence of one and the same thing').
1
204 Put differently, they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false.
:
Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 186ff.; idem, Maqäsid, 101, 102-4; Räzi, Tahrir, 166-7.
3
Estimations (wahmiyyät) are false propositions that stem from illusion, not sense
perception. Inferences consisting of such premisses are known as sophistical. Räzi,
Tahrir, 168; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, i n .
4
Mashhürät are universally accepted propositions, such as the notions that justice is
good and tyranny is bad. The philosophers held that unlike a priori propositions, which
are certain, mashhürät may be false. Räzi, Tahrir, 168; Baghdädl, Mu'tabar, i. 207;
Black, Logic, 141—3. For a detailed critique of the philosophical position, see al-Radd,
396-437.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 121

205. I have explained this matter in detail and have expounded

their views and contradictions with regard to it. By excluding such
subject-matter from first principles, they have omitted the means by
which the noblest of sciences, theoretical and applied, are acquired.
What they are left with is nothing but matters subsisting in the mind,
matters which have no existence in the external world. Had there
been sufficient space here, I would have discussed their views on this
issue together with my objections. But I have discussed all these
matters where they were relevant when dealing with the universal
and metaphysical sciences, for these are the issues that are to be
sought. 1
206. We have discoursed on logic because they have claimed that
logic is a canonical instrument which, when correctly used, safeguards
the mind from error. 1 Thus we needed to examine this instrument to
see whether or not it is what they say it is. When some of their
masters are shown the falseness of their views which reveal their
error, and when they fail to defend them, they proclaim: 'These
sciences have been developed for over a millennium by intellects and
have found acceptance amongst eminent people.' But to this we give
the following answers:
207. First, their claim is not valid, because intelligent people, who
are superior to them, have always rejected their arguments and
demonstrated their falsehoods and errors. As for the ancients, dis-
agreements amongst them are many and well known. They are
recorded in annals as well as in their own writings. This, however, is
not the place to discuss such matters. But during the epoch of Islam,
Muslim thinkers have extensively commented on the falseness of
their logical, metaphysical, and even physical and mathematical prin-
ciples. All Muslim sects, even the Räfidls, 1 have written on such
falsehoods. All sects of the other faiths and their scholars have
testified to the logicians' error and heresy; the knowledge of their
errors and heresy is so widespread that no person would deny it,
save for those who are pertinacious. The faithful are God's witnesses

205 1 Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of the philosophers, mystics, and theologians may be
found in a good number of treatises and tracts. See e.g. Muwäfaqat Sahlh al-Manqül;
Tawhid al-Rubübiyya; Mufassal al-I'tiqäd; Naqd al-Mantiq; Tawhid al-Ulühiyya\ Tafsil
al-Ijmäl.
1
206 See par. 163, n. 1, above.
1
207 The reference here may well be to the critique made by Abü Muhammad
al-Nawbakhtl. See par. 282, n. 4. below.
122 J a h d al-Qariha

on earth. If the eminent, distinguished scholars of all Muslim sects as

well as other learned men and believers have declared the logicians,
in general terms or in detail, to be erroneous and heretical, then it
cannot be that all learned men have accepted their views.
208. Second, their argument has no validity because the philosophy
that was predominant prior to Aristotle and which was adopted by
his predecessors was refuted for the most part by Aristotle, who
demonstrated their error. Ibn Sina and his followers also disagreed
with the ancients concerning a number of views the ancients espoused,
and have demonstrated their fallacies. The philosophers' attacks on
each other surpass the attacks of any group against another. Abü al-
Barakät [al-Baghdädl] 1 and his likes 2 have also seriously criticized
Aristotle; and they maintained that 'our goal is the truth, not the
fanatic following of a certain man or opinion'.
209. Third, the religion of idolaters is older than their philosophy,
and those who followed this religion are far greater in number than
those who followed the logicians. Also older than their philosophy is
the altered religion of the Jews; and the altered religion of the
Christians is close to Aristotle's time. For Aristotle lived about three
hundred years before Christ, so he was a contemporary of Alexander
the son of Philip whose [era] is recorded in the annals of the Greeks
(1al-Rüm) to which the Jews and Christians refer.
210. Fourth, even if we suppose that what they maintain is true,
these sciences are purely rational, and no one can acquire them by
blindly following the authority (taqlid) of others, but only by means
of pure reason. They cannot be validated by revelation, and cannot
be discussed except in purely rational terms. Therefore, if untainted
reason proves something in these sciences to be invalid, then reason
must not be abjured. Those who have adopted these sciences claim
that such sciences are not derived from an authority in which one
must have faith, but rather from sheer reason. Thus, only unadul-
terated reason should be the ultimate judge in these sciences.
211. They have argued 1 that induction is inferior to syllogism,
that is, to the categorical syllogism, and that analogy is inferior to
induction. 2 They have maintained that unlike induction, which may
1
208 Cf. Pines, 'Studies in Abu I-Barakät', 264ft., 285ft., 310ft.
2
Such as NawbakhtT. See par. 282, n. 4, below.
211 1 This and the following paragraphs (212-15) a r e Ihn Taymiyya's summary of the
logicians' views concerning the epistemological weakness of analogy.
2
See par. 190, n. 1, above.
 Jahd al-Qariha IOI

lead to certainty and in which the matter judged can only be a

universal, analogy leads only to probability and that what is judged
may be a particular. 3 They have held this on the ground that in
induction the universal is judged by that which is found in its par-
ticulars. If all particulars are enumerated, then induction will be
complete, as in the judgement that things which move have bodies,
since all the particulars which move, be they inanimate objects,
animals, or plants, are judged by this attribute. An instance of
incomplete induction is the judgement that animals move their lower
jaw when they chew because this [phenomenon] has been found to
be the case in most instances. It may be that other instances, such as
that of the crocodile, were not surveyed. 4 Unlike incomplete induction,
which is employed in dialectic, perfect induction is used in certitude.
212. Analogy, however, is assigning to one thing the judgement of
another thing on the ground that both possess a common factor, as
in the example they adduce: 'The World exists, and therefore it is
eternal just like the Creator'; or, 'The World is corporeal, and
therefore it is created just like man.' Analogy consists of an assimilated
case, an original case, a cause, and a judgement. In the aforemen-
tioned examples, the assimilated case is 'World', the original case is
'Creator' and 'man', the cause is 'existent' and 'corporeal', and the
judgement is 'eternal' and 'created'. 1 They maintain that induction
differs from analogy in that the matter judged in analogy may be
particular, but in induction it is always universal. 2 And analogy, they
have added, does not lead to certainty, because the factor common
to two matters does not necessarily entail that the judgement of one
matter is applicable to the other, unless it is shown that what is
common to them is a cause of that judgement. But this last can
only be probable, because the rational method by which this is
shown is confined—for those who use it—to Coextensiveness-cum-
Coexclusiveness (tard wa-'aks) and Classification and Successive
Elimination (sabr wa-taqsim).3

3
Ibid. See also Tüsi, Sharh al-Ishärät, i. 418; Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 160-1, 165 ft.; Ibn
Rushd, Talkhis Mantiq Arista, i. 3 5 2 - 4 .
4
Ibn Sinä, Ishärät, i. 418 (English trans., 127); Tüsi, Sharh al-Ishärät, i. 418;
Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 89-90.
1
212 For the components of analogy, see par. 60, n. 5, above.
2
See n. 3 in the preceding paragraph.
3
For Coextensiveness-cum-Coexclusiveness, see par. 61, n. 4; for Classification and
Successive Elimination, see pars. 61, n. 2, and 203 above.
124 Jahd al-Qariha

213. Coextensiveness-cum-Coexclusiveness is nothing but the con-

joinment of the judgement with the cause in both their presence and
absence. This [principle] is also indispensable in induction, although
it is not applicable to the assimilated case because what is sought to
be proven is not the assimilated case. Induction will thus be incom-
plete, especially since the cause of the judgement in the original case
may be composed of the common attributes plus other attributes,
and the cause's presence in these attributes is substantiated. When
the common attribute is found in the original case, the judgement
will then be established since the cause is complete. On the other
hand, if the attribute is not present, the judgement will not be
present because the cause is absent. In this case, the presence of the
common factor in the assimilated case does not necessarily entail the
affirmation of the judgement therein, because other attributes or a
part thereof may not be present.
214. Classification and Successive Elimination is mainly an argu-
ment in which the attributes in the original case are enumerated, and
then all attributes that prove invalid are eliminated, so that what
remains is the cause. This method also does not lead to certainty,
because it is possible that the judgement may be affirmed of the
original case on the basis of the case itself and not by virtue of an
external cause, for in that event an infinite regress inevitably results.
If the judgement is affirmed on account of an external cause, it is
possible that the [real] cause is other than what appears to be the
cause—one may not find the cause even though one may have
searched for it. In customary matters this is not the case, since we
would not doubt—provided our vision were sound and physical
obstacles were removed—that we would see a sea of mercury or a
mountain of gold should they exist before us. The cause of the
original case may be the totality, or part, of the attributes enumerated,
and these may not be realized in the assimilated case. The affirmation
of the judgement in an assimilated case on the basis of a common
factor without taking into account other attributes which coexist with
that factor in the original case undercuts the causality of the judgement,
because it is possible that the latter may have another cause. This is
quite conceivable. But even if the judgement has no other cause, the
cause may underlie a specific, not a general judgement. When the
attribute is shown to necessitate the judgement on account of its
universal essence—however unlikely this may be—analogy will not
be needed.
 IOI
Jahd al-Qariha

215. They have argued: 'Physiognomy (al-firäsa al-badaniyya) is

identical with analogy, with the exception that in the former the
common factor is the indicant of the cause, not the cause itself. 1 In
the idiom of the jurists, physiognomy would be known as "indicational
analogy" (qiyäs daläla). The inference in physiognomy proceeds
from the effect of the cause to the cause itself and then from that
cause to another effect. For physiognomy is based upon the assumption
that the physical constitution (mizäj) is the cause of inward and
outward appearances: the inference proceeds from outward appear-
ances to physical constitution, and from physical constitution to
inward appearances; for example, one infers that, as is the case with
lions, stout shoulders and head indicate courage on the ground that
both [stoutness and courage] are the causal consequents of a given
constitution. But in order to establish the cause in the original case,
the methods of Coextensiveness-cum-Coexclusiveness (dawarän) or
Classification and Successive Elimination must be used, as we have
already mentioned. Should the cause of the two judgements in the
assimilated case be one and the same, then one of the two judgements
may be affirmed of the assimilated case without the cause found in
the original case. In this event, the other judgement will not be
entailed.' 2 These are their views. 3
216. We reply that their distinction between a categorical syllogism
and analogy—that the former is capable of leading to certainty while
the latter to nothing but probability—is invalid. In fact, whenever
one of them leads to certainty so does the other, and whenever one
of them leads to nothing but probability the other does likewise.
When the evidence results in certainty or in probability, this is so not
because its form is syllogistic and not analogical, but rather because
the syllogism contains conclusive evidence. If either an analogy or a
syllogism encompasses a matter that entails a certain judgement,
then certainty is attained. However, if they encompass a matter that
entails a probable judgement, then only probable knowledge obtains.
What is known in a syllogism as the middle term is the common
attribute in analogy. The major premiss containing the major term's
entailment of the minor demonstrates the efficiency of the attribute
common to both cases, the original and the assimilated. That which

215 1 Ct. Ibn SInä, Najät, 95, who maintains that the physiognomical inference
resembles both the enthymeme (qiyäs idmäri) and analogy.
2
Ibid.; Baghdad!, Mu'tabar, i. 202-3.
3
See par. 211, n. 1, above.
 126 Jahd al-Qariha

proves the truthfulness of the major premiss also proves that the
common denominator entails the judgement; the major term's entail-
ment of the middle in a syllogism amounts to the judgement's entail-
ment of the common denominator in an analogy.
217. You may say: 'In analogy with date-wine, grape-wine was
prohibited because alcoholic beverages were rendered forbidden on
the ground that they are intoxicants, and the attribute of intoxication
is found in date-wine.' This statement would be tantamount to saying:
'All wine is intoxicating, and all intoxicants are prohibited; therefore,
wine is prohibited.' 'Wine' is the subject of the conclusion, and it is
the minor term; whereas 'prohibition' is its predicate and is the
major term. 'Intoxicants' takes a middle position between the subject
and the predicate; it is the middle term, which represents the predicate
of the minor and the subject of the major.
218. You may argue: 'In analogy with date-wine, grape-wine is
prohibited since the cause in the original case is intoxication, and this
last is found in the assimilated case. Therefore, prohibition is estab-
lished on the ground that the cause is present.' Here, you have
inferred the prohibition of wine on the basis of intoxication, which is
the middle term. In analogy, however, you add the mention of the
original case on the basis of which the judgement of the assimilated
case is established. This is done because the mind is quicker to
perceive the similarity between the original and the assimilated cases
than to comprehend the mere subsumption of the latter under a
universal, comprehensive statement. However, if the efficiency of
the common attribute is proven, there need not be mention of the
original case.
219. An analogy is drawn either by demonstrating a common
denominator or by proving the absence of differences [between the
assimilated and the original cases]. 1 The common denominator is
either the cause itself or its indicant. Proving the absence of differences
in analogy here means establishing the middle term. One may say:
'A is equal to C and B is equal to C, therefore A is equal to B.'
Here, the equivalence is the middle term. 2 Proving the absence of

1
219 See par. 199, n. 1, above.
2
Note that Ibn Taymiyya considers this equivalence analogical, while the
philosophers generally deem it syllogistic. For a logical account of the syllogism of
equivalence (qiyäs al-musäwäl) see Ibn Slnä, Ishärät, i. 4 9 5 - 6 (English trans., 145). On
the other hand, Tüsl, Shark al-Ishärät, i. 495, does acknowledge that qiyäs al-musäwät
may encompass analogy (mumäthala wa-mushäbaha).
 IOI
Jahd al-Qariha

differences represents equivalence. To maintain that the only dif-

ference between the assimilated and the original cases is such-and-
such, and that this difference is irrelevant, is to maintain that the
assimilated case is equal to the original case, and that the judgement
of the one is the same as the judgement of the other.
220. To their argument that the common attribute, which is the
cause of judgement, is only probable, we respond that we disagree
because theirs is a categorical claim which they have not proven. We
proceed to say: that which proves the causality of the common
attribute is the same as that which proves the truthfulness of the
major proposition. Conversely, what proves the truthfulness of the
major premiss in a categorical syllogism is the same as that which
proves the causality of the common attribute in analogy, be it certain
or probable. The common denominator in analogy is the middle
term. The concomitance of this denominator with the judgement
represents the concomitance of the major with the middle term, and
the concomitance of the middle with the minor represents the con-
comitance of the common denominator with the minor term, and
this represents the establishment of the cause in the assimilated case.
221. If the common attribute—known as the common denominator,
the cause, the evidence of the cause, the locus, etc.—is established
in, and conjoined with, the assimilated case, then this entails the
truth of the minor premiss. Likewise, if the judgement is affirmed of,
and concomitant with, the common attribute, then this entails the
truth of the major premiss. The inclusion of the original case leads to
the affirmation of one of the two premisses. When analogy is drawn
by means of proving the absence of differences, then a particular,
original case must exist, because the commonality represents the
equality and similitude between the two cases, namely, the absence
of difference, which is the middle term. On the other hand, when
analogy is drawn by means of demonstrating the existence of a
cause, the mention of the original case may be omitted, provided
that it is not needed in proving the causality of the attribute. However,
if the original case, which is the major term, is needed in order to
prove the causality of the attribute, then this case must be mentioned
because it complements the proof of the common denominator's
causality.
222. Those who draw a distinction between analogy and the categ-
orical syllogism attempt to show that analogy leads to probability
when it is formed of a particular subject-matter. The subject-matter
 128 Jahd al-Qariha

that leads only to probability in analogy also leads to nothing but

probability in a categorical syllogism. If they take a subject-matter
that leads to certainty in a categorical syllogism, then it will lead to
certainty in analogy as well. Indeed, in analogy certainty appears
even more perfect, for if it is stated in a categorical syllogism that
'Every man is an animal, and every animal is corporeal; therefore,
every man is corporeal', then 'animal' is the middle term. In analogy
it is the common denominator, for one may argue: 'Man is corporeal
in analogy to horses and other animals.' Now, these animals qua
animals entail their being corporeal. If the cause of the judgement in
the original case is disputed, and if one argues: 'We do not agree
that animality entails corporeality', then the dispute will be about the
statement 'Every animal is corporeal', because if the denominator,
common to the original and the assimilated cases, is recognized as a
cause, then what is meant by it is that which entails a judgement,
whether the common denominator is itself the cause which brings
about a judgement outside the mind or that which entails such a
cause.
223. Some scholars call both of these 'causes', 1 especially those
who hold that what is meant by 'cause' is the identifier (mu'arrif)—i.e.
the sign (amära), the characteristic ('aläma),2 the indicant, not the
efficient cause or the motive. 3 Those who mean by cause the motive,
which is the efficient cause, recognize also the causality of acts.
Other than in acts, the cause may be explained in terms of a neces-
sitating attribute (wasf mustalzim), such as humanity entailing ani-
mality and animality entailing corporeality, without one producing
an effect (mu'aththir) upon the other. We have explained elsewhere
that what leads to the knowledge that an animal is corporeal itself
leads to the knowledge that man is corporeal, since we have demon-
strated that the categorical syllogism they uphold is of little use, if
any at all. We have also explained that what leads to knowledge of

223 1 That is, both the cause which entails a judgement and that which is not a cause
proper but is concomitant with such a cause and is thus capable of effecting a judgement.
2
See par. 132, n. 1, above. Amära and 'aläma are virtual synonyms. Jurjäni,
Ta'rifät, 29, s.v. amära.
1
Ämidl, Ihkäm, iii. 17-18, remarks that Muslim scholars have disagreed on whether
or not the term 'ilia (cause) must be exclusively used for that which points out and
merely signifies the judgement. Amid! himself subscribes to what seems to be the
majority position that the 'ilia must encompass a motive which is the rationale (hikma)
behind the revelation of a judgement for a given case.
 IOI
188 Jahd al-Qariha

the truth of the major premiss in rational matters itself leads to

knowledge of the truth of the particulars subsumed under that premiss,
including the minor premiss as well as the conclusion. (Ibn Taymiyya
then said): their contradictions and errors are far beyond what can
be recorded here. 4
224. Our purpose here is to comment on logic, on their views
concerning demonstration, on their exaltation of the categorical syl-
logism and their underestimation of analogy, and on their claim that
the latter leads merely to probability while certain knowledge is
obtained only through the former. This claim is false, for both
categorical syllogism and analogy are in fact of the same kind. A
valid analogy is better suited to lead to a conclusion, be it certain or
probable, than is a mere categorical syllogism. This is why most
intelligent people resort to analogy more often than they do to a
categorical syllogism. In fact, a categorical syllogism cannot be valid
in inferring a general matter without the mediation of analogy. All
that which constitutes proof concerning the validity of a categorical
syllogism with regard to a given matter also constitutes proof con-
cerning the validity of analogy in the same matter. Their doctrine
that 'No more than one issues from one' is an example in point; 1 it is
one of the most famous of their erroneous metaphysical views. But
their valid doctrines also demonstrate this, for a categorical syllogism,
they all agree, must include a universal, affirmative proposition
because two negative or particular premisses cannot result in a
conclusion.
225. The universal exists only in the mind. If the particulars of a
universal exist in the extramental world, then this will be conducive
to the knowledge that it is a universal affirmative. Once a person
senses the existence of an extramental matter, he derives therefrom
a universal quality, especially if the particulars are numerous. The
knowledge that a common quality is affirmed of an extramental
particular from which a universal has been abstracted is the source of
knowledge of a universal proposition. Thus, analogy is the source of

4
I am unable to locate this sentence in al-Radd. These must be Suyüti's own words
referring to Ibn Taymiyya's critique of the philosophers' doctrine that 'only one issues
from one' (al-Radd, 214-33). Having dominantly metaphysical contents, this criticism
was excluded from the text abridged by Suyüti.
224 1 Baghdädl, Mu'tabar, iii. 156ft.; Tüsl, Shark al-Ishärät, iii-iv. 645ft.; Räzi,
Muhassal, 145-6; Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 288ff.; SuhrawardI, Hikmat al-Ishräq, 125. For a
detailed critique of this doctrine, see al-Radd, 214ft., 312 ff.
130 Jahd al-Qariha

categorical syllogism; it is either a means of attaining a syllogism, or,

one may argue, without it a syllogism cannot exist. So how can the
latter be stronger than the former?
226. They illustrate the universals by giving such examples as 'the
whole is greater than its individual parts', 'contradictories cannot be
simultaneously both true and false', 'things equal to one thing are
equal to one another', etc. A good number of extramental particulars
belonging to each of these universals is known. If one of these
universals is to be realized in the mind, an example of one of its
particulars is given, and the absence of a difference, or the presence
of a common factor between this and other particulars, is demon-
strated. Thereupon, the mind determines that the judgement of the
universal common to the particulars is affirmed. This is precisely
what analogy is.
227. Even if we assume that a categorical syllogism stands in no
need of analogy, and that the knowledge of universal propositions
does not, to begin with, presuppose the knowledge of particulars, we
cannot argue that knowledge of the universal, whose extramental
particulars are known to exist, is less perfect than knowledge of that
whose extramental particulars are unknown. The knowledge of par-
ticulars only adds to the perfection of the universal. It is therefore
clear that the form of inference they have rejected is more perfect
than that which they have adopted.
228. You also ought to know that in metaphysical as well as
physical logic they have altered some of the doctrines of Aristotle.
But what they have added to metaphysics is better than Aristotle's
own doctrines, for I have reflected on both doctrines. In metaphysics,
Aristotle and his followers are far more ignorant than the Jews and
the Christians. In physics, however, most of his doctrines are good,
and in logic his doctrines are better than those in metaphysics.
229. Views concerning the weakness of analogy have been pro-
pounded by more recent logicians 1 when they realized that the jurists
often resort to analogy. The latter apply analogy frequently in prob-
able subject-matters. Probability results here from the subject-
matter, not the form of inference. Even if the inference were to be
cast in the form of a categorical syllogism, the result would remain
probable. The logicians thought that the weakness issues from the

229 1 The phrase 'more recent logicians' seems to refer to Färäbl and those who
flourished after him. See e.g. Färäbl, al-Qiyäs al-Saghir, 266ff. (English trans., 93ff.).
 Jahd al-Qarlha 131

form, so they declared the form of their inference to be certain, and

that of the jurists to be probable. They cite theological examples in
order to prove that the theologians employ probable inferences in
their argumentation. An example of an inference they cite is: 'The
celestial sphere is a composite body, and therefore it is contingent,
analogous to man and other created beings.' 2 Then they set out to
prove the weakness of this inference. If they succeed in doing so, it is
because its subject-matter is weak. This argument—adduced by the
Jahmls, the Qadaris, and those Ash'aris and others who followed
them concerning the contingency of bodies—is weak because its
subject-matter, not its form, is probable. Therefore, there is no
difference between casting the argument in the form of analogy and
casting it in the form of a categorical syllogism.

Chapter [4]

230. THE FOURTH AND MOST ENIGMATIC POINT: Their

Doctrine that Syllogism or Demonstration Leads to the Certain Know-
ledge of Judgements (tasdiqät).' The logicians' error concerning the
first three points—i.e. that concepts cannot be formed except by
means of the definition, that concepts are formed by means of the
definition, and that no judgements can be attained except by means
of the syllogism—is clear with the least of reflection; it is easy to
prove and comprehend. But they have confused people by their
exaggerations and protracted discussions. The most obvious of the
errors is their claim that concepts cannot be formed except by means
of the definitions they have prescribed. Next comes their claim that
no judgement can be attained except by means of the syllogism they
have set forth. There is no way to establish with certainty this
categorical denial. In fact, there is no evidence to prove it. Its falsity
is rather known on the grounds that judgements are attained without
the syllogism they have prescribed, and concepts are formed without

2
See an almost identical example in Ibn Sinä, Najät, 93, and Tüsl, Sharh al-Ishärät,
i. 419-20.
230 1 Like all Arabic logicians Ibn Sin a (Ishärät, i. 185 (English trans., 49-50)) states
that lasdiq may be reached by one of the three main arguments, namely, the syllogism,
induction, or analogy. And since induction and analogy do not lead to certainty, the
only remaining apodictic argument is the syllogism. See sources cited in par. 41, n. 2,
above.
 132 Jahd al-Qariha

the definitions they have expounded. These [matters] differ from the
Fourth Point since a syllogism formed of two premisses resulting in a
conclusion is in itself valid.
231. What Muslim thinkers have shown in their discussions of the
Greek logic attributed to Aristotle is that the forms of the syllogism
and the subject-matter that the logicians have elaborated with great
efforts are of no use in the acquisition of knowledge. Indeed, anything
whose knowledge can be acquired by means of their syllogisms can
also be acquired by other means. Nothing in their syllogisms is
indispensable for knowing what is otherwise unknown, and therefore
the syllogism is needless. Logic does not effect knowledge when it is
used, and when it is not, knowledge can still be acquired; logic
involves a protracted, tedious procedure; and in addition to its being
of no use as a means of acquiring knowledge, it is tiresome for the
mind, time-wasting, and contains much drivel. Proofs and demon-
strations, however, are expected to yield knowledge and to indicate
the means by which that knowledge may be acquired.
232. Muslim thinkers have held that logic does not lead to the
knowledge sought after, and may constitute an obstacle in the way of
attaining that knowledge because logic is tedious for the mind. If a
person wished to travel to Mecca or to other cities, he would, with
moderate pace, arrive in a short time if he followed the familiar,
straightforward path. However, if he had the misfortune of being led
astray—linguistically, straying ( ' a s f ) means to roam about without
following a designated path, to move in circles and to tread deviant
ways 1 —he would be extremely tired before he arrived at his desti-
nation, that is, if he arrived at all. Otherwise, he might arrive at a
different destination, and might entertain falsehoods, in addition to
becoming weak because of exhaustion and fatigue overtaking him. If
he maintained this state of simple ignorance 2 he would neither achieve
his purpose nor find rest. This is the case with these logicians!
233. Those who were present at the deathbed of Khünaji, 1 the

1
232 Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-'Arab, ix. 245-6. s.v. 's-f-,
2
Simple ignorance (al-jahl al-basit) is a condition in which the mind forms no
concept of a particular object: it is not a misapprehension of a thing (the latter being
known as complex ignorance, jahl murakkab), but rather a state of having no knowledge
whatsoever of that thing. See Tahänawl, Kashshäf, i. 253-4, s - v - Jurjäni, Ta'rifät,
71, s.v. al-jahl al-basit.
233 1 On Khünaji, see par. 57, n. 1, above. Cf. Goldziher, 'Attitude of Orthodox
Islam', 190.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 133

chief logician of his time, reported that just before his death he said:
'I die knowing nothing except that the possible presupposes the
necessary.' He then added: 'And presupposition is a negative attribute,
so I die knowing nothing.'
234. This is their condition when they end up in a state of simple
ignorance. But those who have reached the degree of complex
ignorance 1 are many. People liken those among them who have
mastered a certain science to a person who, when asked 'Where is
your ear?', answers by extending his [right] hand, with effort, over
his head to his [left] ear, when he could have pointed to it from
below his head, for this would have been shorter and easier. 2
235. When matters comprehended instinctively are approached by
non-instinctive means, one will be tormenting the soul in vain. This
is similar to the case of a man who is told to divide a certain sum of
money into equal portions among a number of individuals, a task
that should be performed without difficulty. Someone may say to
him: 'Wait, you cannot divide it without knowing the definition of
division and without drawing a distinction between division and
multiplication. Division is the opposite of multiplication. The latter
is carried out by compounding the units of one number by the units
of the other, whereas the former by dividing the units of one number
by the units of the other. This is why, when the quotient is multiplied
by the divisor, the result is the dividend, and when the number
resulting from multiplication is divided by one of the two numbers
multiplied, the result is the other number.' He then adds: 'What I
have said about the definition of multiplication is not valid because it
applies to the multiplication of integers, not fractional numbers. An
all-inclusive definition would be: Multiplication is the sum total whose
relation to one of the numbers multiplied is the same as the relation
of figure one to the other number.' He will further say: 'The multi-
plication of one-half by one-quarter results in one-eighth. The relation
of one-eighth to one-quarter is the same as the relation of one-half to
the figure one.' Although these are valid statements, it is clear that
the person who has the money and who wishes to distribute it
equally among a number of individuals would agonize in vain if he
were to force himself to understand all this before he divided the

234 1 On complex ignorance (jahl murakkab), see par. 232, n. 2, above, and Jurjäni,
Ta'rlfäl, 71, s.v. al-jahl al-murakkab.
2
See par. 125 above.
 134 Jahd al-Qariha

money. He may not even understand these matters and may find
them problematic.
236. The indicant and demonstration also lead one to what is to
be proven and acquired. Whenever the indicant entails a matter, it
can be used to infer that matter. Accordingly, it is said: 'Reasoning
correctly on the basis of indicants leads to certain or probable know-
ledge.' 1 What is meant is that whatever entails something such that it
is that thing's antecedent constitutes an indicant as well as demon-
strative evidence with regard to that thing, whether both are existent
or non-existent, or one existent and the other non-existent. The
indicant is at all times conjoined with what is indicated. The latter is
the consequent of the former.
237. The indicant may be a single premiss from which, once it is
known, the conclusion will [also] be known. The reasoner may need
two, three, four, five, or more premisses. There is no fixed number
of premisses that all people should use in the same way and in all
enquiries. The number of premisses depends on the aptitude of the
reasoner who investigates both the context of what is to be proven
and the indicant together with its antecedents and consequents. If
the reasoner were to know that the conclusion may be extracted
from a single premiss, then the proof he would need in order to
arrive at the conclusion would consist of that one premiss. For
example, if someone knows that alcoholic beverages are prohibited,
and that grape-wine is an inebriant, all he needs is the premiss 'All
inebriants are alcoholic beverages', which he did not [previously]
know. When he is told that in the Sahih it was verified that the
Prophet, may God praise him, said: 'All inebriants are alcoholic
beverages', 1 he will then reach his conclusion. He need not say
'Every wine is an inebriant' or 'Every inebriant is an alcoholic beverage'.
Nor does he need to say 'Every inebriant is an alcoholic beverage' or
'Every alcoholic beverage is prohibited', for all this is obvious and
known to him. However, he may not know whether the term
'alcoholic beverage' is limited to some inebriants—as a group of
Muslims has held—or whether it comprises all inebriants. If he

236 1 This definition of indicant is juridical. See Bäji, Hudüd, 3 7 - 9 ; TahänawT,

Kashshäf, i. 4 9 2 - 3 , s.v. dalli. For a philosophical definition, see under dalil in Jurjäni,
Ta'rlfät, 93, and Ämidi, Mubin, 74. The former defines the indicant as affirming the
middle term in a syllogism of the major, and the subsumption of the minor under the
middle. See also par. 42, n. 2, above.
1
237 See par. 52, n. 3, above.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 135

establishes that the Lawgiver meant by 'alcoholic beverages' all

inebriants and not particular ones, then he is able to prove what he
set out to prove. In the Sahih of Muslim, this tradition was narrated
in two forms: 'Every inebriant is an alcoholic beverage' and 'Every
inebriant is prohibited'. 2 The Prophet did not say, in the manner of
the Greeks, that 'Every inebriant is an alcoholic beverage' and 'Every
alcoholic beverage is prohibited', for he, may God praise him, with
his knowledge and eloquence, is far above expressing himself in their
drivelling ways. He merely meant to lay down the judgement, and
for doing so he did not need to produce evidence. But if he had
meant to elucidate an indicant—since God clearly stated in the
Quran all divine matters that determine belief in Him, in His mess-
engers, and in the Day of Judgement—then he, may God praise
him, would have been, of all beings, the most knowledgeable of the
truth and the best fitted to expound it.
238. Thus, it is clear that not all inferences require as many as two
premisses, nor is it sufficient in all of them to have only two. In order
to achieve demonstrative proof, there should be as many premisses
as are needed, be it one, two, or more. Furthermore, what is intended
as universal guidance, such as the Quran which God revealed to
mankind as eloquent demonstration, encompasses as many indicants
as are necessary to benefit the generality of people. The general
types of these indicants can be explicated; but those which are used
by particular individuals cannot be precisely accounted for, and thus
cannot be adequately characterized. These may be discarded since
they are relevant only to the speaker—such as his praying for himself,
or when others take into consideration his particular situation when
they address him, or when he speaks of his own state of affairs, etc.
239. Furthermore, the syllogism they have elaborated does not
lead to the knowledge of any particular existent. And those universal
matters can be individually comprehended by means easier than
their syllogism. No universal proposition may be known through
their syllogism without its particulars being known by means of other
inferences. Such inferences may well be easier, for the knowledge of
particulars may be more explicit than the knowledge of universals, a
matter we have discussed elsewhere. 1
240. We mean to say here that what is sought after is knowledge,

2
See par. 52, n. 3, above.
1
239 See e.g. pars. 56 above and 2 6 1 - 7 below.
136 Jahd al-Qariha

and the means to it is the indicant. Thus, he who knows the indicant
pertaining to what he seeks to prove will prove it, whether he casts
the inference in the form of their syllogism or not. But if he does not
know that indicant, then the logicians' syllogism will be of no use to
him. No one but an ignoramus who does not understand the nature
of their syllogism will claim that the syllogism serves to distinguish
between true and false proofs. The truth about their syllogism is that
it offers nothing but the mode and form of the inference.
241. As for the indicant which entails what is indicated, there is
nothing in their syllogism to deny or affirm it. 1 Such entailment
depends on the premisses known to be encompassed by the indicant;
their syllogism does not deal with validating or invalidating premisses.
The logicians discuss this matter only when they treat of the subject-
matter of a syllogism, that is, when they discuss the premisses in so
far as their validation is concerned. But their views on these issues,
as we have mentioned elsewhere, are replete with errors. 2
242. What is meant here is that the truth which must be considered in
any demonstration or indicant existing in the world is concomitance
(luzüm). When one knows that a thing is concomitant with another,
one will infer the consequent from the antecedent, though one may
not employ the term 'concomitance' or even conceive its meaning.
For if one knows that a certain thing requires another, or that in
order for one thing to exist another must exist, etc., then one will
apprehend that concomitance. For example, it is known that every-
thing in existence is a sign (äya) of God, for existence requires and
presupposes Him; it is necessary for everything to have a creator, as
God, the Exalted, has said: 'Or were they created out of nothing?
Or are they the creators?' 1 Jubayr b. Mut'im said: 'When I heard
this verse I felt my heart was broken.' 2 This is an all-inclusive
classification. 3 The most preliminary intellectual reflection will preclude

241 1 That is, there is nothing in the syllogism as such that establishes the truthfulness
of the middle term as predicated of the major or minor term.
2
See e.g. pars. 302-6; al-Radd, 384 ft. For the philosophers' discussion concerning
the subject-matter of premisses, see Ibn Sinä, Najäl, 97 ft.; idem, Ishärät, i. 510 ft.
(English trans., 148-9); Ghazäli, Maqäsid, 100ff.; Räzi, Tahrir, 166ff.
1
242 Quran, 52: 35.
2
Bukhärl, Sahih, iii. 339. Jubayr b. Mut'im b. 'Adi b. Nawfal b. 'Abd Manäf (d.
58/677 or 59/678) is identified as someone who converted to Islam towards the end of
the Prophet's career.
3
The reference is to the aforestated Quranic verse which offers no fourth logical
possibility; either the World created itself, or it was created ex nihilo through no
agency, or God was the Creator.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 137

the argument that men were created without a creator. That they
created themselves would be even more unacceptable. Therefore, it
will be known that a creator created them.
243. God, may H e be glorified, revealed the indicant in the form
of a disapproving question in order to make it obvious that the
proposition used as an indicant is instinctive, self-evident, well rooted
in minds, and undeniable. No one of sound intelligence can argue for
the existence of a created being without arguing for the existence of
the creator of that being. Nor can one claim that the being is self-
created.
244. Many scholars adopt a certain method of inference and argue
that no other method can lead to the knowledge required. This
negative statement has no validity, though their own method may be
valid. The more that people need to know a thing the easier God
makes it for their minds to apprehend the indicants which lead to
that thing. The indicants establishing the existence of the Maker, His
unity, and the signs of prophecy are very many, and people employ
numerous methods in order to apprehend such indicants.
245. Most people, however, do not need many of these methods,
and those who use them are either unfamiliar with other methods or
they avoid them. Some people find more benefit in subtle and obscure
methods which are lengthy and which encompass many premisses,
because their minds are accustomed to reflect upon intricate matters.
They are not pleased when the proof consists of a few, obvious
premisses. With such people logico-theological and other similar
methods may be used, since such methods agree with their nature,
though the knowledge being sought does not absolutely depend on
such methods. There are those who, when comprehending something
which the common, not so bright people are capable of compre-
hending, do not consider themselves to have excelled over the latter
in any science; so they become inclined to acquire the knowledge of
hidden and intricate matters which consist of many premisses. This is
why many of the Sunn! scholars like to study intricate, exact sciences,
such as algebra, Reduction (muqäbala),1 difficult cases in the laws of
inheritance and bequests, and the science of circular reasoning, 2
which is valid in and by itself.
246. The science of inheritance is of two types: legal rulings and
1
245 See par. 81, n. 2, above.
2
i.e. the science of circular reasoning as it pertains to cases of positive law. For an
example of reasoning in one such case, see par. 248, n. 1, below.
197
Jahd al-Qariha

arithmetic. Legal rulings are of three types: the first is the legal
rulings according to the doctrines of a particular jurist: the second
is the science of the Companions' traditions concerning their
disagreements about these rulings; and the third is the science
dealing with the indicants (adilla) derived from the Book and the
Sünna. On the other hand, the arithmetic of inheritance deals with
the principles governing legal cases, their validation, their abrogation,
and the division of estates. This second type is entirely rational and
is known by means of the intellect just like the arithmetic of legal
transactions and other matters which people are in need of. Under
this science they have also treated the arithmetic of the unknown
(majhül), which is called algebra, and Reduction—an ancient science.
The first person known to have incorporated algebra and Reduction
into the science of bequests and circular argumentation is Muhammad
b. Müsä al-Khuwärizml. 1 Some people cite 'All b. Abi Tälib as
someone who dealt with it, and who learned it from a Jew. But this
is a lie.
247. The term 'circularity' (dawr) is applied to three types of
argument. [The first is] universal circularity (dawr kawni) employed
in rational inferences; namely, P cannot exist without the existence
of Q, but Q cannot exist without the existence of P.1 A group of
scholars has deemed this argument invalid. AmidI and others have
rightly held that circularity is of two types: petitio principii (dawr
qabli) and conjunctive circularity (dawr ma'i).2 The former, con-
sidered invalid, is employed in reasoning about causes, about the
agent, the efficient [cause], etc., as when one says that two things
cannot be the causes of each other, for this would lead to circularity
that entails the existence of both things before each other. The
latter, on the other hand, is valid. It is the circular, simultaneous
existence of the condition (shart) with the conditioned (mashrüt), or
of one attribute with another. For example, fatherhood cannot exist
without sonship, and sonship cannot exist without fatherhood.
248. The second type is the circularity found in cases of positive

246 1 Abu 'Ali Muhammad b. Müsä al-Khuwärizml (d. after 232/846), the author of
Kitäb al-Jabr wal-Muqäbala. See Brockelmann, Geschichte, suppl. i. 381-2, and sources
cited in par. 81, n. 2, above.
247 1 Arabic: 'lä yakün hädhä hattä yakün hädhä wa-lä yakün hädhä hattä yakün
hädhä'. I have substituted P and Q for hädhä.
2
See par. 46, n. 5, above.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 139
1
law such as that mentioned in the Surayjiyya and other cases. We
have dedicated a treatise to this circularity and shown it to be
invalid, on the basis of both reason and revelation. 2 We have also
shown whether or not the Law contains elements of this circularity.
249. The third type is arithmetical circularity, as in the statement:
P cannot be known until Q is known. The solution to this is sought
by means of arithmetic, algebra, and Reduction. We have shown
that all legal questions introduced by the Messenger, may God praise
him, can be solved without resorting to algebra and Reduction,
though these sciences are legitimate. We have also shown 1 that the
Law of Islam and the means by which it is arrived at do not depend
on any science that is learned from non-Muslims, though such a
science may be valid. For the methods of algebra and Reduction are
indeed prolix, and as we have said with regard to logic, God has
provided us with other methods to substitute for them.
250. Thus, everything the Prophet, may God praise him, decreed,
such as the knowledge of the Qibla's direction, of the times of daily
prayer, of daybreak and the appearance of the crescent moon—all
this may be known through the methods which the Companions and
those who voluntarily followed them adopted; they needed nothing
else. Many people, however, have invented other methods, without
which, they thought, one cannot arrive at the Law. But they have
done this because they are ignorant. They are like those who think
that without knowing the longitudes and latitudes of countries, the
direction of the Qibla cannot be known. Though these [methods of
theirs] are arithmetically valid and are arrived at by means of reason,
the Muslims' knowledge of their Qibla does not depend upon them.

248 1 The Surayjiyya is traditionally a Shäfi'i case of divorce that takes its name from
the renowned Shäfi'i jurist Ahmad b. 'Umar Ihn Surayj (d. 306/918), although other
legal schools later participated in the controversy surrounding this case. This controversy
revolved around whether divorce takes effect if the husband declares that when he
pronounces the divorce of his wife at a future date his wife shall be divorced triply.
Now, at a later date he does utter once the statement of divorce. Ibn Surayj and Ibn
Taymiyya, among others, declared such a statement of divorce void and thus inoperable as
it involves circularity. Ghazäli held this view, but later changed his position on the issue
and declared the divorce issuing from such statements valid. See 'Abdurrahmän
Badawi, Les CEuvres d'al-Ghazäll, 5 0 - 2 , 207-9.
2
I am unable to find any reference to this treatise, which may, at any rate, have
constituted part of a larger juridical work. For a list of such works, see Brockelmann,
Geschichte, suppl. ii. 124-5.
1
249 This he seems to have done in the work referred to in par. 248, n. 2, above.
 140 Jahd al-Qariha

In fact, it was established on the authority of the Lawgiver, may God

praise him, that he said: 'The Qibla is between the East and the
West.' Al-Tirmidhi reported this tradition to be sound. 1
251. This is why the majority of scholars hold that the person
performing prayer is under no obligation to infer the direction of the
Qibla on the basis of the location of the North Pole and the North
Star, or for that matter of any other location. The prayer of people
in Syria will be valid so long as they pray with the West to their right
and the East to their left. It is also impossible to determine, by
means of arithmetic, the exact time the crescent moon appears. For
even though they may know that the light emanating from the moon
is a reflection of the sun, and that when the two bodies meet in
conjunction the light of the moon disappears, and when it departs
from the sun it regains light, the best they can do is to determine
exactly, through arithmetic, the distance between the moon and the
sun when the latter sets. This may be so if we assume the correctness
of the calculations and their arithmetical mean. They call this 'the
science of astrometry' ("dm al-taqwim wal-ta'dil),1 because they
calculate the median between the highest and lowest paths travelled
by the stars. Even if we assume that they did manage to determine
the moon's position at sunset, this would not prove that the crescent
moon had been detected. Detection is a sensory matter and is affected
by several factors, such as the clarity or density of the air, the high or
low position of the star, and the strength or weakness of one's
eyesight. There are those who cannot see the crescent, and there are
others, with keener eyesight, who can.
252. This is why the ancient astrologers such as Ptolemy, the
author of Almagest, and others have discussed nothing of these
issues. Only later scholars such as Küshyär al-Daylaml 1 and the likes
of him discussed them. When they saw that the Law commands the

250 1 TirmidhT, Sahih, i. 70. The thrust of this hadith is that the prayer of Muslims is
valid as long as they pray while facing more or less the direction of the Qibla.
Identifying the precise geographical location of the Qibla constitutes no condition for
the prayer's validity.
251 1 Dozy defines taqwim and ta'dil as the science treating of the 'determination de
la position des astres pour un temps donne' (Supplement, ii. 103, 427, s . w . '-d-l and
q-w-m). For the calculation procedures of taqwim and ta'dil, see Battänl, al-Zij
al-Säbi', 108 ff.
252 1 Probably Küshyär b. Labbän al-JIli, an astronomer and mathematician who
died sometime in the first quarter of the fifth/eleventh century. See Brockelmann,
Geschichte, i. 2 5 2 - 3; suppl. i. 3 9 7 - 8 ; Sezgin, Geschichte, vi. 246-9.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 141

detection of the crescent, they wished to determine this by means of

arithmetic, and thus they went astray and led others into error.
Those who argue that the crescent cannot be seen at twelve or ten
degrees, etc., have gone wrong, for one person may detect it at a
smaller number of degrees while another cannot do so at the same
degree. They have resorted neither to reason nor to revelation, and
because of this the eminent scholars in their field have disavowed
their views.
253. Ibn Taymiyya then said: 1 the validity of the form of a syllogism
is irrefutable, but we shall make clear that it does not lead to
knowledge of things in the external world, and that their stipulation
of two premisses, no more and no less, is erroneous. Even if the
syllogism yields certitude, it cannot alone lead to certainty about
things existing in the external world. We argue that in the syllogistic
form the conclusion is undoubtedly certain if the subject-matter is
certain. If we say: 'Every A is B\ and 'Every B is C ' , there will be
no doubt that, if the premisses are certain, this combination will
result in the certain conclusion that 'Every A is C". But it must be
maintained that the numerous figures they have elaborated and the
conditions they have stipulated for their validity are useless, tedious,
and prolix. These resemble the flesh of a camel found on the summit
of a mountain; the mountain is not easy to climb, nor the flesh
plump enough to make it worth hauling.
254. When the subject-matter is valid, it is possible to cast it into
the natural (fitri) first figure. The rest of the figures are not needed,
for their validity is proven only when they are converted to the first
figure either through proving the absurdity of the contradiction in
the reductio ad absurdum argument, or through conversion ('aks al-
mustawi) and full contraposition ('aks al-naqid).1 For the affirmation
of one of two contradictories entails the negation of the other if all
possibilities of contradiction have been taken into account. Thus,
from the validity of a proposition they infer the invalidity of
its contradictory as well as the validity of its conversion and
contraposition. The mind's conception of the form of an inference
resembles a person's calculation of the number of slaves and the
property he owns. Natural intelligence can form a concept of a valid

253 1 This is Suyütl's statement, by which he intimates the return of Ibn Taymiyya to
the treatment of logic after having digressed to discuss metaphysical and other matters
in al-Radd, 265-93.
1
254 For these see par. 124, n. 2, above.
142 Jahd al-Qariha

syllogism without learning how to do so. Just as people make

arithmetical and other calculations, they, through their natural
intelligence, think in accordance with the three modes; namely,
subsumption, concomitance, and division. 2 The logicians may accept
these modes.
255. To sum up, we do not deny that a syllogism leads to certitude
when its subject-matter is certain. But we maintain that a logical
syllogism is not needed to arrive at certitude, for it may be reached
without a syllogism. Therefore, the attainment of certitude does not
hinge on a syllogism.
256. Furthermore, the apodictic subject-matters they have spoken
o f 1 do not lead to knowledge of existing objects, and thus they do
not yield any result that suits the soul. In fact, the knowledge of the
extramental reality, as it is, represents the same kind of knowledge
that is arrived at by means of analogy. Therefore, no knowledge is
possible through a logical categorical syllogism—which they call
demonstration—without its being also possible through analogy,
which they have deemed to be weak. A syllogism must include a
universal premiss; but the universality of the proposition cannot be
known unless it be ascertained that all the particulars under that
universal share one common factor, and this is done by means
of analogy. We should like to explain this in the following consider-
ations:
257. First, they have limited the apodictic subject-matters to those
types with which they are familiar: 1
258. The first of these are sensory matters (hissiyyät). It is known
that through the senses universal and general matters cannot be
perceived. Sensory matters do not lend themselves to universal and
general propositions which can serve as premisses in apodictic
demonstration. In their example 'Fire burns', etc., they do not know
for certain the universality of this proposition. All they rely on is
experiment and custom, which are of the same kind as analogy. If
the universality of the proposition is known on the basis of the fact
that fire possesses a power to burn, then the knowledge that every
fire necessarily possesses this power is a universal judgement as well.

2
Here, subsumption (tadäkhul) stands for the categorical syllogism, concomitance
(taläzum) for the conditional syllogism, and division (taqsim) for the alternative-
disjunctive syllogism.
1
256 See sources cited in par. 204, n. 2, above.
1
257 See sources cited in par. 204, n. 2, above.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 143

Someone may argue: 'The stuff of fire must include this power, and
whatever lacks this power is not fire.' Though this statement may be
true, it does not conclusively ascertain that all things possessing this
power will burn everything they encounter, albeit this is usually the
case. [The burning ability of fire] is the object of analogy, categorical
syllogism, custom, and imperfect induction—that is, if we grant
them this. But how could this be the case when it is known that fire
does not burn salamander stone, hyacinth, and objects coated with
manufactured material? I do not know of any universal proposition
that is based on sense perception which cannot be refuted, though
universal propositions are not sensory. A sensory proposition would
be of the type 'This fire burns', since only particular things are
perceived through the senses. 1
259. Concerning rational judgement, they argue that when the
mind observes particulars, it becomes ready to be effused by a
universal, general proposition. This is known to be of the same
genus as analogy. The universality of such a judgement cannot be
trusted if the general judgement is not known to be concomitant with
the factor common to all particulars. But if the general judgement is
known to be concomitant with the common factor, it will be
so known in all the particulars. Therefore, the knowledge of such
particulars will not depend on concomitance, though intelligent people
have agreed that none of the universal propositions derived on the
basis of custom are beyond refutation.
260. The second are the inner senses, such as one's perception of
one's own hunger, pain, or pleasure. All these are particulars, and,
unlike the case with the apprehension of certain external sensory
matters such as the sun and the moon, people do not all share in
perceiving the very same particulars. 1 In the inner senses there is a
certain particularity in the perceiving person and the object perceived,
a particularity which is not found in external sense perception. Should
all people share in perceiving the very same particulars, then this
would resemble custom ('ädiyyät).2 But the logicians have proffered

1
258 Cf. Räzl, Muhassal, 9 - 1 3 ; TüsT, Talkhis al-Muhassal, 9 ff.
1
260 For a more detailed statement, see par. 302 below.
2
Custom or customary knowledge is the perception by the generality of people of a
habitual course of events or a habitual matter, such as the knowledge that a particular
mountain which they have observed has not transformed into gold. Some philosophers
consider this category to belong to intuitive perception. Further on the concept of 'äda
in theology, see Wolfson, Philosophy, 544-51. See also Harawi, Durr, 312; Jurjani,
Ta'rifäl, 127, s.v. 'äda.
144 J a h d al-Qariha

no proof to the effect that minds are necessarily equal under these
circumstances and that the parts of the rational soul (al-nafs al-
nätiqa)3 are equal to each other.
261. The third are experiential matters (mujarrabät), which are all
particular, for experience decides only in particular matters. Such
also are the multiply transmitted reports (mutawätirät) which are
known through the senses, such as that which is heard or seen. What
is heard is a particular statement, and what is seen is a particular
body, a particular colour, act, or matter. 1 As to intuitive matters
(hadsiyyät), if they are considered certain, they are like experiential
matters. However, the difference between intuitive and experiential
matters does not relate to the general and the particular; the latter
relate to the very acts of the experiencers, whereas the former are
about their acts. Some people call both experiential matters 2 and are
thus left only with first principles, which are rational axioms
(badihiyyät 'aqliyya). The universal first principles are absolute
propositions concerning numbers, quantities, etc.; for example, one
is half two, things that are equal to one thing are equal to each
other, and so on. These are in the mind and do not exist as universals
outside the mind.
262. It is therefore obvious that the universal, demonstrative
propositions which they employ in their syllogisms and which must,
in so far as universality is concerned, be considered certain, cannot
be used for matters existing in the external world; rather, they are
used with regard to matters in the mind. Thus, the logicians cannot
discover matters in external existence through the demonstrative
syllogism; and that is what we sought to prove.
263. Accordingly, they did not have the knowledge to enumerate
exhaustively the categories of existence. Whereas Aristotle enumer-
3
The parts of the rational soul are three, each representing a stage in the spiritual
development of the human soul: first, the peaceful soul (al-nafs al-mutma'inna), which
is righteous and not susceptible to passions and desires; second, the self-accusing or
self-blaming soul (al-nafs al-lawwäma), which arises upon the departure from the path
of rectitude; finally, the commanding soul (al-nafs al-ammära), which is not only
susceptible to passions, but is also ruled by base desires. See Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 218, s.v.
al-nafs al-nätiqa; Sheikh, Dictionary, 136-8, s.v. al-nafs al-ammära, al-nafs al-lawwäma,
and al-nafs al-mutma'inna.
1
261 On mutawätirät, see pars. 16, n. 2, and 137, n. 3, above.
2
See e.g. Ghazäli, Mi'yär, 188-92, where he in effect subsumes intuitive proposi-
tions under the experiential category. Räzl, Tahrir, 167, remarks that the difference
between the two types of propositions is that the former requires the repetition of
experience for inductive support while the latter leads to knowledge at first occurrence.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 145

ated the kinds of existents in the ten categories—substance, quantity,

quality, place, time, position, act, passion, possession, and relation 1 —
they agreed that there is no way to establish that these categories are
exhaustive.
264. The second consideration. We should argue that if a syllogism
must encompass a universal proposition, that proposition must revert
to something that is known through means other than the syllogism.
Otherwise, it would entail circularity and infinite regress. Since it
follows from their views that universal propositions must be arrived
at by means other than the syllogism, we say the following: the
natural intelligence's apprehension of the existing particulars subsumed
under a categorical proposition arrived at by means other than
the syllogism is stronger than its apprehension of that categor-
ical proposition; for example, one is half two; one body cannot
[simultaneously] exist in two places; or contraries cannot be re-
conciled. The knowledge that this particular one is half two is instinc-
tually stronger than the knowledge that every one is a half of every
two. The same goes for any given number.
265. Now, what is intended by these universal propositions is to
arrive at knowledge of things existing in the external world or at
mental estimates (muqaddarät dhihniyya).1 The latter are of little
use. As to the former, however, the knowledge of their being
particular things existing extramentally is more manifest and stronger
than the knowledge of their being particulars through a categorical
syllogism which entails them. Thus, the syllogism does not yield
much benefit, and in fact represents unduly protracted reasoning.
When it is used, it is for the purpose of addressing those who are
pertinacious or those who are in error; they will be given an example,
and a universal premiss will be presented to them in order to rebut
their error and pertinacity. But there is no need for a syllogism in the
case of those whose natural intelligence is sound.
266. As to their statement that no two contraries can be reconciled,
one will know, before formulating in the mind the universal proposition
'No two contraries can both be true', that any two things which are
contrary to each other cannot both be true. One will also know that
a certain body cannot simultaneously exist in two different places

263 1 Aristotle, Categoriae, i b 2 5 - 2 a 4 ; Ibn SInä, Najät, 116-17; Ihn Rushd, Talkhis
Mantiq Aristü, i. 17-55; Ibn Tumlüs, Madkhal, 42ff.; Sheikh, Dictionary, 132, s.v. al-
maqülät al-'ashr.
1
265 i.e. things that exist in the mind.
146 J a h d al-Qariha

before one knows that 'All bodies cannot simultaneously exist in two
places'. Examples of this kind are numerous. Thus, there exists no
particular that one seeks to know through these universal propositions
without its being known prior to these propositions: such universal
propositions are not needed in order to know these particulars.
Through universals one knows the resemblances of these particulars
which are in the mind but which do not exist extramentally.
267. Things existing extramentally may be known without a
syllogism. If it is claimed that certain people arrive at the knowledge
of some extramental particulars by means of a syllogism, this syllogism
will be based on analogy, whose certitude they reject. Thus, they
waver between two matters; if they admit that analogy, like syllogism,
is divided into that which is probable and that which is certain, then
their distinction between syllogism and analogy will be void. If, on
the other hand, they argue that there is a difference between the
two, and that, unlike analogy, categorical syllogism yields certitude,
then we reject their argument (muni'ü)1 because it does not rest on
evidence, and we demonstrate to them that certitude is not attainable in
these matters unless it is [first] attained by means of analogy. The
unknown particulars in the external world will be known by drawing
an analogy to the particulars that are known. No man of sound mind
will dispute this truth. Indeed, this is one of the most distinctive
characteristics which distinguishes the intellect from sense perception,
for sense perception apprehends only particulars whereas the intellect
apprehends particulars in a universal and absolute manner, albeit
this occurs through analogy. Moreover, the intellect apprehends
particulars in their universality without being in possession of all of
them; for they become universal in the intellect after the intellect has
formed a concept of a certain number of them. But when the intellect is
separated from individual particulars by a long lapse of time, it will
commit frequent errors by formulating excessively general or unduly
restrictive judgements. This often happens to people when they
think that their universal propositions are valid, though upon
investigation this turns out not to be the case. They form a concept
of a thing in their intellects, and the object of their conception is
rationally tenable. Accordingly, they base their arguments on it and

267 1 M a « ' (passive muni'a) constitutes the refusal of the opponent's argument on the
ground that it is not supported by evidence (dalil). See Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 207, s.v.
mumäna'a. For a detailed discussion of man' in the context of dialectic, see Tüfi,
'Alam al-Jadhal, 58 ft.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 147

think that they have discoursed on the basis of quiddity abstracted in

itself (mujarrada bi-nafsiha) in so far as it is a quiddity qua quiddity,
without its being subsistent extramentally or in the mind. 2 Thus, they
say: 'man qua man; existence qua existence; blackness qua blackness',
etc.
268. They also think that this quiddity, which they have abstracted
from all negative and affirmative conditions, is realized extramentally
in this abstracted form. This, however, is a mistake, just like the
mistake committed by their predecessors concerning the abstraction
of numbers, of Platonic Forms, and of other things. These abstractions
are only in the mind, and not everything that the mind postulates
will exist extramentally; this is known as mental contingency (imkän
dhihni). Contingency is of two types: [first,] mental, namely, when a
thing is exposed to the mind but the mind does not know it to be
impossible; it holds the thing to be possible not because it knows that
that thing is possible but rather because it does not know it to be
impossible, although [the existence of] the thing may be impossible
in the extramental world; and [second,] extramental, namely, that
[the existence of] the thing is known to be possible in the extramental
world. This knowledge obtains when it is known that the thing or its
like exists in the extramental world; or when it is known that what is
less likely to exist does exist extramentally. Should that which is less
likely to admit of [extramental] existence exist or be capable of
[such] existence, then what is more likely to exist does a fortiori
exist.
269. This is the method of the Quran in demonstrating the
contingency of Resurrection. The Quran demonstrates this contingency
in places by speaking of those whose lives God took and thereafter
resurrected, as He spoke of the folk of Moses who queried: 'Show us
God plainly', 1 whereupon God said: 'And even while you gazed, the
lightning seized you, then We revived you after your death.' 2 He also
spoke of 'those who went forth from their habitations in the
thousands, fearing death, and God said to them: Die, and then He
brought them back to life'; 3 and of 'him who was passing by a

2
See e.g. Ibn STnä, Shifä': Madkhal, 13, 34, 37, and passim; Tüsi, Shark al-Ishäräl,
i. 202-3, 7'< Marmura, 'Avicenna's Chapter on Universals', 38ft.; and Introduction,
2I

Part I, Sections 2 - 3 , above.

269 1 Quran, 4: 153.
2
Quran, 2: 5 5 - 6 .
3
Quran, 2: 243.
148 Jahd al-Qariha

village. . . and God made him die a hundred years, then he brought
him back to life'; 4 and of Abraham when he said: 'Lord! show me
how You give life to the d e a d . . ,', 5 and so on to the end of the
narrative. The Quran also spoke of Christ, who, with the permission
of God, used to resurrect the dead, and of the People of the Cave
who were resurrected after three hundred and nine years. 6
270. At other times the Quran proves the contingency of Resur-
rection by means of [comparing] primal genesis with Resurrection,
the latter being easier than creation, as in His statement: 'If you are
in doubt concerning the Resurrection, then lo! We have created you
from dust'; 1 and His statements: 'Say: He shall revive them who
originated them the first time'; 2 'Say: He who created you at first';3
'And it is H e who originates creation, then brings it back again, and
it is very easy for Him.' 4
271. At yet other times, the Quran proves Resurrection through
the creation of the heavens and the earth, for their creation is
greater than the restoration of man, as evidenced in His question:
'Have they not seen that God who created the heavens and earth,
not being wearied by creating them, is able to give life to the dead?' 1
At still other times, the Quran proves the contingency of Resurrection
through the creation of plants, as in His statement: 'It is He who
sends the winds, bearing good tidings [before His mercy, till when
they are charged with heavy clouds, We drive them to a dead land,
and therewith send down water, and bring forth therewith all fruits].
Even so We shall bring forth the dead.' 2
272. It is then clear that the truth about rational evidence upheld
by the leading theologians and philosophers concerning metaphysical
enquiries has been revealed in the Glorious Quran in a more eloquent
and perfect form, it being free from the numerous errors overriding
their doctrines. For their errors in metaphysics are very many, and
they are here more often misguided than not, and more ignorant
than knowledgeable. This is why towards the end of his life Abü
4
Quran, 2: 259.
5
Quran, 2: 260.
6
See Quran, 18: 26.
1
270 Quran, 22: 5.
2
Quran, 36: 78.
3
Quran, 17: 51.
4
Quran, 30: 27.
1
271 Quran, 46: 33.
2
Quran, 7: 57.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 149

'Abd Allah al-Räzi remarked in his work Aqsäm al-Ladhdhätl that 'I
have contemplated the theological schools and philosophical
methods, but found them incapable of healing the soul or quenching
the thirst. I found the best of paths to be that of the Quran; it is
more explicit in affirmation—"The Beneficent, who is established on
the Throne"; 2 "Unto Him good words ascend" 3 —and more explicit
in negation—"Like Him there is naught"; 4 "They cannot compass it
in knowledge." 5 He who has had my experience would know what I
know.'
273. What we mean is that extramental contingency is known
through existence, and not merely on the grounds that the imposs-
ibility of existence cannot be ascertained—as a group of scholars,
amongst them Ämidl, argues. Even less valid than affirming
extramental contingency through mental contingency is the philoso-
phers' view, such as that of Ibn Slnä, that extramental contingency
may be established merely through the possibility of forming a concept
of it in the mind. 1 Furthermore, when they attempt to prove an
intelligible, extramental existent which can in no way be an object of
sense perception, they adduce the concept of the universal, absolute
man, which includes the individuals existing in the external world.
But this leads only to the possibility of the existence of these
intelligibles in the mind, for the universal cannot exist qua universal
except in the mind. How different is the philosophers' method of
proving extramental contingency from that of the Quran!
274. By means of such false methods the philosophers wish to
drive people away from the certain knowledge and rational demon-
stration that have become innate to them, as well as from divine
reports revealed through the messengers about God and the Day of
Judgement. They also wish to construct of such false propositions
and corrupt illusions rational principles by means of which they can
oppose not only what God has sent down through the messengers
and the signs (äyät) He has revealed in His Books, but also the

272 1 This work of Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi does not seem to be extant. Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziyya reports it as one of the last treatises that Räzi wrote. Ibn Qayyim cites Räzi
as saying that the ultimate source of guidance is not speculative thought but the Quran.
See Ijtimä' al-Juyüsh, 214-15. See also Muwäfaqat Sahih al-Manqül, i. 9 2 - 3 .
2
Quran, 20: 5.
3
Quran, 35: 10.
4
Quran, 42: I I .
5
Quran, 20: n o .
1
273 Cf. Ibn Sinä, Shifä': Madkhal, 65-72.
 150 J a h d al-Qariha

natural intelligence which God bestowed on His subjects and the

foundations of the indubitable rational proofs. With their principles
they have corrupted both the rational and religious sciences. Rational
knowledge is based upon sound and healthy natural intelligence, and
religious knowledge upon the belief in the prophets, may God praise
them. The prophets, may God praise them, have perfected both for
people: they have introduced people to the rational indicants by
means of which matters that can be attained through reflection and
reasoning are apprehended, and they have communicated to people
the invisible details that they are unable to perceive through their
own reflection and reasoning.
275. The teachings of the prophets, may they be praised, are not
confined only to revelation, as many people think. Rather, the
prophets have elucidated rational demonstrations through which
divine knowledge is attained, knowledge that these philosophers
have never attained. The prophets' teachings, may God praise them,
are thus inclusive of both rational and revelational indicants, unlike
the teachings of those who disagreed with them, teachings which
lead to neither rational nor revelational indicants. Their unjustifiable
arrogance is another matter besides. God, the Exalted, said: 'Those
who dispute concerning the signs of God, without any authority
having come to them, in their breasts is only pride, that they shall
never attain. So seek thou refuge in God; surely He is the All-
hearing, the All-seeing.' 1 He also said: 'Those who dispute concerning
the signs of God, without any authority having come to them, very
hateful is that in the sight of God and the believers; so God sets a
seal on every heart proud, arrogant', 2 and 'When their messengers
brought them the clear signs, they rejoiced in what knowledge they
had, and were encompassed by what they mocked at.' 3 Statements
like these are many in the Quran. About this matter I have written
the treatise Daf Ta'ärud al-Shar' wal-'Aql,4 However, since they
have formed a concept in their minds of what they have imagined
to exist in the external world, most of their knowledge in metaphysics
and mathematics is based on this concept.

1
275 Quran, 40: 56.
2
Quran, 40: 40.
3
Quran, 40: 83.
4
The correct title is Dar' Ta'ärud al-'Aql wal-Naql, which is the same as Muwäfaqat
Sahih al-Manqül li-Sarih al-Ma'qül. An edition bearing the former title was published
in Cairo in 1971. See Brockelmann, Geschichte, suppl. ii. 122, and the editors'
introduction to Muwäfaqat Sahih al-Manqül, i. 55.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 151
276. When people knowledgeable of the truth ponder the philo-
sophers' various sciences, they will not find them knowledgeable of
things existing in the external world, except for the category of what
they call physics and what is relative to it in the way of mathematics.
Mathematics abstracted in the mind is a judgement of mental estimates
(maqädir dhihniyya) that have no existence outside the mind. When
what they call the science of metaphysics is pondered, one will find
in it no knowledge of a thing existing in the external world. They
have formed concepts of matters existing in their minds but which
have no reality in the external world. Thus, the ultimate aim of their
speculation and the end of their philosophy and wisdom is the absolute,
universal existent which is conditioned by a negation of all existential
attributes.
277. We mean that in demonstrative enquiries and rational
matters they often make claims on the basis of what they posit in
their minds. They maintain: 'We discuss [only] universal matters and
purely rational issues.' But when something is mentioned to them,
they answer: 'We would rather discuss more general things, and
discuss truth qua truth', and so on. But then they will be requested
to substantiate that what they have mentioned does exist in the
external world. They will be asked: 'Explain what thing this is!'
Their ignorance will then become obvious. It will also become obvious
that what they hold are things that exist in the mind and have no
reality in external particulars. For instance, they will be asked to give
an example of the universal; but examples are particular matters.
When they fail to do so and say 'we discuss [only] universal matters',
one should know that they speak without knowledge; they speak
about things they do not know to have an existence in the external
world. Rather, they speak about things which do not, or cannot,
have knowable existence in the external world. Otherwise, if the
knowledge of externally existing matters is universal, then the objects
of this knowledge must be established in the external world. Al-
Khusrawshähl 1 was one of their leaders and one of the leading
followers of [Fakhr al-DIn] al-Räzi. He used to remark: 'We could
not find anything but these universals.' He would be puzzled and

277 1 Shams al-DIn Abii Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamld b. Yünus b. Khalil al-
Khurawshähi al-Tabrizi (d. 652/1254) was a Shäfi'T jurist and theologian, and a student
of Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi. Al-Subki reported his name to be al-Khurawshähi, while Ibn
al-'Imäd gave it as al-Khusrawshähi, after Khusrawshäh, a village near Tabriz. See his
biography in Subki, Tabaqät, v. 60, and Ibn al-'Imäd, Shadharät al-Dhahab, v. 255-6.
152 J a h d al-Qariha

entertain doubts, and would repeatedly say: 'By God, I do not know
what 1 believe!'
278. What we mean to say is that if the universals, which they
uphold, constitute knowledge, then it is knowledge arrived at by
analogy and is in no way dependent upon logical, categorical
syllogisms. The particulars which are subsumed under that which
they claim to be established through a syllogism can more easily be
known without that syllogism. Deducing these particulars through
the syllogism, which they call demonstration, is an inference which
proceeds from the more known to the less known. But in the theory
of definition they denounce defining that which is not known by
means of what is known. In the theory of demonstration doing so
would be even worse, for in demonstration all that is needed is to
explain, define, and explicate what is indicated. If the latter is more
clear [than the indicant], then the inference will proceed from the
unknown to the known!
279. Ibn Taymiyya said: the philosophers who uphold demon-
strative logic—which Aristotle devised—and physics and metaphysics,
which are associated with it, are not a unified group; they are of
different persuasions, and God alone can enumerate the disagree-
ments and divisions amongst them! Their disagreements and divisions
are far greater than those existing within any one community, such
as that of the Jews or Christians. The further these philosophers are
from following the messengers and revealed scriptures, the more
divided and disagreed they are. They are more misguided than the
Jews and Christians, as has been reported in the tradition narrated
by Tirmidhi from Abü Umäma on the authority of the Prophet, may
he be praised, who said: 'No nation goes astray after having been
rightly guided without having been given to disputes.' 1 The Prophet
then recited God's statement: 'They raise not the objection save to
dispute; nay, but they are a contentious folk', 2 for nothing decides
disputes among people except a revealed book or a divine prophet.
God, the Exalted, said: 'Mankind were one community; then God
sent forth the prophets as bearers of good tidings and as warners,
and He sent down with them the Book with the truth, that He might
decide between people concerning that wherein they differed. . ,'. 3

1
279 Tirmidhi, Sahih, ii. 318 (commentary on Sural al-Zukhruf, Quran, 43).
2
Quran, 43: 58.
3
Quran, 2: 213.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 153

He also said: 'We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and
revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance, so that mankind
might uphold justice', 4 and 'If you should quarrel about anything,
refer it to God and the Messenger'. 5
280. In His Book God elucidated, by giving examples and rational
inferences, the means by which truth can be distinguished from
falsehood. He also commanded togetherness and harmony, and
forbade division and disagreement. He spoke of the recipients of
mercy that they do not disagree amongst themselves; H e said: 'But
they continue in their differences excepting those on whom thy Lord
has mercy.' 1 This is why the people who follow the Messenger most
closely disagree among themselves less than all other groups who
claim to adhere to the Sünna. All those who are close to the Sünna
disagree among themselves less than those who are far from it, such
as the Mu'tazills and the Räfidts, whom we find to be in disagreement
amongst themselves more than any other group.
281. No one, on the other hand, can enumerate the differences
among philosophers. In his treatise al-Maqälät, al-Imäm Abü al-
Hasan al-Ash'ari discussed the doctrines of non-Muslims and gave
an account of the great majority of their views, except for those of
FäräbT and Ibn Slnä. 1 Likewise, in his treatise al-Daqaiq, al-Qädi
Abü Bakr Ibn al-Tayyib [al-Bäqilläni] refuted the philosophers and
astronomers, and found the Arab theologians' logic superior to that
of the Greeks. 2 So did the Mu'tazilT and Shl'I theologians 3 and
others when they refuted the philosophers. Al-Ghazäll also wrote
the treatise al-Tahäfut to refute them.
282. Muslim scholars continue to write in refutation of the philo-
sophers' logic, and to expose the errors in their discourse concerning
both definition and syllogism. They also continue to expose the
philosophers' errors in metaphysics and other matters. No Muslim
scholar has attached importance to their method; in fact, the Ash'aris,
Mu'tazills, Karrämls, 1 ShT'Is, and speculative thinkers in other groups
4 5
Quran, 42: 25. Quran, 4: 59.
1
280 Quran, 11: 120.
281 1 It is to be noted that Ash'arl died in 330/941, Färäbl and Ibn Slnä in 339/950
and 428/1037, respectively.
2
For Bäqillänl's work, see par. 89, n. 3, above.
3
Such as the Mu'tazills al-Näshi' al-Akbar Ibn al-Shirshir and Abü Häshim al-
Jubbä'i and the Shl'I Nawbakhti. See pars. 89, n. 4, and 282, n. 4, and Introduction,
Part II, above.
1
282 For the Karrämls, see par. 18, n. 1, above.
 154 Jahd al-Qariha

have condemned their method and exposed its falsehood. The first
scholar to have mixed their logic with Islamic principles is Abü
Hamid al-Ghazäll. 2 Muslim scholars have since discussed logic3 at
too great a length to be mentioned here. The refutation of the
logicians is set forth in many a theological work. In Abu Muhammad
al-Hasan b. Müsä al-NawbakhtT's work al-Ärä' wal-Diyänät4 there is
a useful chapter (fas/) of such refutation. Having discussed Aristotle's
logical method, he said:

Some Muslim theologians have objected to these principles of logic. They

have said: 'The statement of the logician that a syllogism cannot be formed
of a single premiss is mistaken, because if the reasoner wishes to infer that
"Man is substance" he can infer this very conclusion—without producing
two premisses—b y arguing that "the evidence that man is substance is that
man is susceptible to contrary [qualities] at various times". The reasoner
does not need a second premiss, that is to say that "everything susceptible to
contraries at various times is substance", because the particular is subsumed
under the general. Whichever of the two he uses to draw the inference will
render the other needless. Having observed an effect o n e infers that there is
a cause, and having observed writing that there is a writer, without needing
two premisses to infer that this is the case.'
The logicians have answered: 'We argue that there must be t w o premisses.
W h e n only one of the premisses is m e n t i o n e d, it is because the other, being
known t o the reasoner, is left out, as he has n o need for it.'
We reply: 'We d o not find two universal premisses through which the
validity of a conclusion is inferred; for when the reasoner says "substance is
the attribute of all living creatures, and life is the attribute of all humans",
the conclusion will be "substance is the attribute of all humans". The state-
ment "Substance is the attribute of all living creatures" is equal in the mind
to the statement "Substance is the attribute of all humans". In practical
matters they will not find the conclusion to depend on two self-evident

2
See pars. 184-5 above.
3
Literally: 'discussed it' (takallama fihi). The pronominal suffix in fihi may refer to
Ghazäll, but it makes better sense to take logic as the referent.
4
Abü Muhammad al-Hasan b. Müsä al-Nawbakhti (or Abü Muhammad al-Hasan b.
Muhammad al-Nawbakhti) was an Imäml theologian and philosopher (died before
310/922). See Encyclopaedia of Islam, iii/2. 887 (no. 3), s.v. 'Nawbakhtl'; Zirikll,
A'läm, ii. 224; Ritter's introduction to Firaq al-Shi'a, pp. h ä ' f f . On his name, see
Amin, A'yän al-Shi'a, v. 271. s.v. 'Hasan b. Muhammad'. Brockelmann, Geschichte,
suppl. i. 319, mistakenly identifies al-Ärä' wal-Diyänät with another of Nawbakhtl's
works, Firaq al-Shi'a. The passage quoted by Ibn Taymiyya in this paragraph, for
instance, is not to be found in the latter work. In his Dhari'a, i. 3 4 - 5 , Tihränl
distinguishes between the two works and reports on the authority of Ibn al-Nadim that
Nawbakhtl did not complete al-Ärä' wal-Diyänät. See Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 251-2;
and Introduction, Part II, above.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 155

premisses. A n d since this is the case, one of them will suffice.' We also
respond t o them: 'Show us t w o primary premisses which do not presuppose a
demonstrative syllogism, and by m e a n s of which a disputed matter can be
settled, while at the same time this matter can be apprehended in the
intellect prior to the conclusion. Should you not be able to find such prem-
isses, your claim will be invalidated.'
I have asked mor e than o n e of their leaders to show me this, but they
could not. What Aristotle discussed is neither found in external existence nor
is it known.
A s for what Aristotle maintained thereafter concerning the t w o remaining
figures, neither of them is used according to [the principles] upon which he
founded them. If they are validated through converting their t w o premisses
s o that they revert to the first figure, then what we have said about the first
figure applies to them.

283. Ibn Taymiyya said: what Nawbakhtl meant was that all figures
are validated through their conversion to the first figure, as has been
previously explained. Therefore, figures and their validation are
artificial and tedious, in addition to being needless. In the first figure
the affirmative, negative universal, and particular propositions may
all be used. But since the futility of the first figure has been es-
tablished, the futility of what is derived from it and what cannot be
validated without being converted to it is a fortiori established.
284. What is meant is that in this community—thanks be to God—
there still are people who discern and refute the falsehoods found in
the doctrines of those who are in error. As it is God who guides
these people to do so, they agree—in opinion as well as in what is
revealed—to accept truth and reject falsehood without mutual con-
sultation or collusion. 1 What these scholars have drawn attention to
agrees with what we have pointed out, that the logical syllogism is
dispensable and that its use causes excessive labour for the mind as
well as much reflection and discourse to no avail.
285. The third consideration. Universal, general propositions do
not exist in the extramental world as such. They are universal in the
mind, not in particulars. Matters existing in the extramental world
are particular; every existing thing has a reality particular to it, a
reality which distinguishes it from other existing things that share no
such reality with it. Therefore, it is not possible to infer the particu-
larity of an individual existent through a syllogism. They admit this

284 1 On the significance of this, see par. 16, n. 2, above, and Hallaq, 'Inductive
Corroboration', 9 ff.
156 Jahd al-Qariha

and maintain that 'the syllogism does not prove particular matters'.
They express this by saying that 'it does not lead to particulars but
only to universals'. Thus, the syllogism does not give knowledge of
externally existing individuals. Every existent exists individually; and
the syllogism therefore does not lead to the apprehension of the
realities of existents. Instead, the syllogism leads to universal, ab-
solute matters subsisting in the mind but not to those matters ex-
ternally substantiated in individuals. None of the syllogistic arguments
that scholars speak of and describe as demonstrative proofs of the
existence of the Creator, may He be glorified, proves His individual
essence; rather, they prove an absolute matter, and forming a con-
cept of this absolute matter does not preclude another sharing in the
concept. For if we say 'This is created' and 'Everything created must
have a Creator', then this statement indicates an absolute, universal
creator whose concept does not preclude another sharing in the
concept. His individual essence is known through another means,
which God implants in the heart. They do admit this because the
conclusion does not go beyond the premisses, and the premisses
must include a universal proposition. The universal, on the other
hand, does not indicate an individual. And this is contrary to the
signs that God mentions in His Book, such as His statement: 'Surely
in the creation of the heavens and the earth, [and the alternation of
night and d a y. . . and the turning about of the winds and the clouds
compelled between heaven and earth, surely are signs for people
who have sense]' 1 and other statements that indicate individuals,
such as the sun, which is the sign of daylight. The indicant is more
general than a syllogism, for it may be used to infer a particular from
a particular, such as inferring the location of the Ka'ba from the
location of the stars and planets. Signs thus signify the Creator
himself, may He be glorified, but not a factor common to Him and
others. Everything other than He needs Him: therefore, from the
existence of a thing, the existence of the individual essence of the
Creator himself necessarily follows.

286. The fourth consideration. The middle term, which is repeated

in a categorical syllogism—namely, 'alcoholic beverage' in the
example 'Every intoxicant is an alcoholic beverage' and 'Every
alcoholic beverage is forbidden'—is the locus (manät) of the judge-
ment (hukm) in analogy, which is the common factor bringing together

1
285 Quran, 2: 164.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 157

the original and the assimilated cases. The two inferences are iden-
tical; what is known through one is known through the other. More-
over, if the indicant is certain, then it will lead to certitude in both
inferences, and if it is probable, then it will lead to probability in
both.
287. The claim of the logicians and their followers that certitude
obtains through a categorical syllogism and not through analogy is
entirely false. 1 It is a claim made by those who cannot conceive the
true nature of the two inferences. One may know through revealed
texts that all intoxicants are forbidden, as has been established in
sound traditions. 2 Since this is the case, no categorical syllogism or
any other inference can be deemed to result in a judgement. Indeed,
a judgement (hukm) may be known without an inference. Therefore,
their doctrine that judgemental knowledge ('ilm tasdiqi) can be
attained only by logical syllogism is false, as has previously been
shown.
288. What we mean to do here is to show that the syllogism is of
little or no use. For if what is to be proven is a universal proposition—
e.g. 'All intoxicants are forbidden'—which is known to have been
received from the Prophet, then the purpose is attained. Universal
propositions received from the Prophet lead to the knowledge of
divine matters, while those derived from the logicians' sciences are
either susceptible to refutation (muntaqada), 1 or equivalent to
analogy, or do not lead to a knowledge of individual matters existing
externally, but rather to mental estimates (muqaddarät dhihniyya),
such as arithmetic and geometry. For although a universal proposi-
tion deals with such estimates, the subsumption of a particular under
the universal proposition is possible [only] by means of sense percep-
tion, not syllogism. Therefore, a syllogism cannot lead to the know-
ledge sought after; nor do the logicians have an exclusive possession
of universal propositions. All nations, while taking analogy to be
equal to the categorical syllogism, share the knowledge of these
universals without the philosophers' logic occurring in their minds.
289. Proving the existence of the Creator and the truthfulness of
prophecy does not depend on syllogistics, but rather on signs which
1
287 See par. 190, n. 1, above.
2
See par. 52, n. 3, above.
288 1 That is, they are amenable to the proof that they are not universals by establish-
ing that at least one of their members does not partake of the attribute (predicate)
shared by all other members.
158 Jahd al-Qariha

point to an individual who has no partner and who is known by

means of necessary knowledge which requires no inference. What is
attained by categorical syllogism is the same as that which is attained
by analogy; namely, a universal matter which does not lead to the
knowledge which is only particular to the Lord and the Messenger
unless another [kind of] knowledge is joined to it. 1
290. The fifth consideration. They argue that a categorical syllog-
ism represents the knowledge that a judgement is affirmed of each
member [of the class]. We reply: it is known—and they submit—
that the affirmation of some judgements of some of their members
must be self-evident. 1 For if the conclusion requires two premisses,
the latter must ultimately rest on two premisses that can be known
without two more premisses; otherwise, fallacious circularity or in-
finite regress will result. Now, if one assumes that two premisses are
known through the same means, then no syllogism is required, as
when one knows that 'Every man is an animal' and 'Every sensible
animal moves by will'. Knowing that 'Every man moves by will' is
more manifest and obvious. If the two premisses are known through
one and the same inference, then once they become known, they
need not be elucidated. However, if the means by which they become
known are different, then one of the premisses that is not known
must be elucidated, whereas the other which is known need not be.
This is obvious in any given matter. Thus, it is clear that their logic is
a waste of time, full of drivel, and exhausting for the mind.
291. The sixth consideration. Doubtless, the major premiss is either
more general than, or equal to, the minor; but it is never more
restricted than the minor. The conclusion is more restricted than, or
equal to, the major, but more general than, or equal to, the minor; it
is never more restricted than the minor. The senses first become
cognizant of concrete particulars, and from these they proceed to
universal propositions. One human after another is observed, and
each one is seen to be sensible and to move by will, so we formulate
the general statement 'All humans are sensible and move by will'.
We hold that the universal proposition is known either through a
syllogism or without a syllogism. But since in a syllogism there must
be a universal proposition, it follows that such a proposition cannot

289 ' For Ibn Taymiyya's arguments for God's existence, see Hallaq, 'Ibn Taymiyya
on the Existence of God'.
1
290 See e.g. Räzi, Tahrir, 16 ff.; Ibn Sinä, Najäl, 97.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 159

be known without [another] universal proposition, and this entails

either circularity or infinite regress. The issue then must ultimately
rest with a general, universal proposition which is known axioma-
tically. To this argument they submit. But if the universal proposition
can be known without the mediation of a syllogism, so can the other
proposition. The characterization of a proposition as being self-
evident or acquired is not a quality essential to the proposition,
where all people should view it equally. Rather, it is a relative,
relational matter depending upon one's own condition; for someone
who knows the proposition without an indicant, the proposition will
be self-evident; and for another who needs to reason and infer, it
will be inferential, and so on with regard to other matters. Since
universal propositions may be known without an indicant or a syl-
logism, and since such knowledge is not predetermined by the pro-
positions themselves but rather hinges on the special conditions of
each person, one cannot maintain that what Zayd has known by
means of a syllogism others cannot know without a syllogism, for this
would be a fallacious, negative statement.
292. The seventh consideration. From the foregoing it becomes
obvious that a categorical syllogism can be converted into an analogy,
and vice versa. Should someone ask: 'How do you know that the
middle term entails the judgement?', we answer: the same way we
arrive at the knowledge of the major proposition in a categorical
syllogism. In the statement 'This agent exercises control over his
acts, and whoever exercises control over his acts is knowing', what-
ever is said to be the middle term ('ilia) of this universal proposition
is also found in analogy. Furthermore, in the latter there exists an
original case in which the judgement and the common factor are
found, and on the basis of which an analogy may be drawn. 1 In a
categorical syllogism no particular through which the judgement is
established is mentioned; and it is known, as sound-minded people
agree, that the mention of the common universal together with some
of its particulars is more firmly established in the mind than when it
is mentioned without any particular.
293. This is why sound-minded people hold that the intellect is
subordinate to sense perception, for while sense perception appre-
hends particulars, the intellect arrives through them at a common,
universal factor. Universals occur in the mind only after compre-

1
292 On the components of analogical inference, see par. 60, n. 5, above.
219
J a h d al-Qariha

hending concrete particulars. Thus the knowledge of concrete par-

ticulars is one of the most important means to the knowledge of
universals. Why then should the enumeration of particulars be a
cause for weakening a syllogism? And why should deleting them
cause a syllogism to be strengthened? The essence of the intellect is
this, to apprehend universals through apprehending particulars. To
deny this would be to deny the essence of the human intellect; and
he who holds the universal without the enumeration of its particulars
to be stronger than that universal which is stated together with
examples of its particulars would be contentious.
294. Sound-minded people agree that adducing examples aids in
the apprehension of universals, and that a situation in which an
example is given is not the same as another in which no example is
afforded. Those who ponder all the rationally based universals which
people use in medicine, arithmetic, the crafts, trade, etc., will find
this to be true. A person may reject a matter until he observes an
instance of its genera, and only then does he acknowledge its species;
from this he will derive a universal judgement. God, may He be
glorified, thus said: 'Noah's folk denied the messengers' 1 and 'The
folk of 'Ad denied the messengers', 2 etc. To each of these groups
only one messenger was sent; but the philosophers rejected the
genus of messengers—their rejection was not of one messenger in
particular.
295. One of the greatest attributes of the intellect is the appre-
hension of similitude and difference. Once the intellect conceives of
two similar things, it knows that they are alike, and thus it applies
the same judgement to both of them, such as, for example, when it
observes two pools of water, two piles of soil, or two portions of air.
The intellect thus applies a universal judgement to the common
factor. Applying the judgement to one of the concrete particulars
and drawing an analogy between it and another similar particular
while mentioning the common factor would give a better elucidation.
This is [an example of] coextensive analogy. But when the intellect
apprehends two different matters, such as water and soil, it differen-
tiates between them. This is [an example of] coexclusive analogy. 1
296. What God commanded in His Book to be taken as an example

1
294 Quran, 26: 105.
2
Quran, 26: 123.
1
295 See par. 296, nn. 1 - 2 , below.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 161

(i'tibär)1 involves both coextensive and coexclusive analogy (qiyäs

tard wa-'aks).2 Since He annihilated those who disbelieved the mes-
sengers by their accusing the messengers of being liars, it was to be
taken as an example that whoever does as they did will be afflicted
with a punishment similar to that meted out to them, and will thus
avoid accusing the messengers in order to avoid such a punishment;
this is [a case of] coextensive analogy. It will also be known that
those who do not accuse the messengers of lying are not so afflicted
with punishment; this is [a case of] coexclusive analogy, which was
intended to give an example of those who were punished. The gist of
this analogy is that what is established in the assimilated case is the
opposite of the judgement in the original case, not its equivalent.
Both types [of analogy] involve reaching a lesson (i'tibär). God, the
Exalted, said: 'In their stories is surely a lesson for men of under-
standing', 3 and 'There has already been a sign for you in the two
companies that encountered each other, one company fighting in the
way of God and another unbelieving; they saw them twice the like of
them, as the eye sees, but God confirms with His help whom He
will. Surely in that there is a lesson for men possessed of eyes.' 4
God, the Exalted, also said: 'God it is who has sent down the Book
with the truth, and also the Balance (mizän)', 5 and 'Indeed, we sent
Our messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down with them
the Book and the Balance so that men may uphold justice.' 6
297. Our forefathers have interpreted 'Balance' as meaning
justice ('adt), and some of them have understood it to be that by
means of which things are weighed. The two meanings, however, are
inseparable. God said that He sent down the Balance just as He

296 1 Quran, 59: 2, commands 'And reason (i'tabirü), o ye who have vision.' Gener-
ally speaking, i'tibär, means 'consideration' or 'to consider a matter duly'. The root
'-b-r connotes the notion of crossing or passing from one side to another. Sunni jurists
and theologians took this verse, among others, as a divine sanction of juridical qiyäs,
since the purpose and function of qiyäs is to proceed (pass = 'ubür) from the known to
the unknown. See e.g. Ihn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Näzir, 255.
2
Unlike tard and 'aks employed in definitions (par. 15, n. 1) and in the verification
of the 'ilia (par. 61, n. 4), coextensive and coexclusive analogies are, respectively, the
derivation from the original case of the conclusion (judgement = hukm) which is the
effect of the 'ilia (cause), and the derivation from the same case of the contrary of the
conclusion which is the effect of the contrary of the 'ilia. See Jurjänl, Ta'rifät, 123,
133-4, s . w . tard and 'aks.
3
Quran, 12: i n .
4
Quran, 3: 13.
5
Quran, 42: 17.
6
Quran, 42: 25.
 2 J a h d al-Qariha

revealed the Book, so that people may uphold equity (gist).1 The
means by which similar qualities and measures are known belongs to
the Balance. And so does that by which differences among different
things are known. For instance, if we know that God, the Exalted,
forbade date-wine on the grounds that it deters [people] from remem-
bering God and from performing prayer, and that it sows the seeds
of enmity and hatred among the faithful, and we observe that grape-
wine resembles date-wine in these respects, then the common factor—
namely, the middle term—is the Balance which God has revealed
into our hearts so that we may weigh one [thing] and treat it as
the other. By so doing we will not draw a distinction between two
similar things. Valid inference thus stems from the justice God has
commanded. 2 He who knows the universal without knowing the
particular will have possession of the Balance only. The purpose of
the Balance is to weigh those matters existing extramentally, for if it
were not for their particulars the universals would not be considered—
just as without the weighable objects the Balance would be needless.
There is no doubt that if a weighable object is weighed against
another object by means of the Balance—which is the common,
universal quality in the mind—such weighing will be more perfect
than that in which any of the individual particulars present in the
mind is weighed in the absence of another.
298. On the following grounds no intelligent man should think
that the rational Balance which God revealed is Greek logic: first,
God revealed the Balance together with His Books since the time of
Noah, Abraham, Moses, and others, and before He created the
Greeks. Greek logic was formulated by Aristotle three hundred
years before Christ; so the ancient peoples could not have used it as
a balance. Second, although our community, the followers of Islam,
has been in the practice of employing rational balances, none of the
forefathers had heard of this Greek logic. It appeared in Islam when
Greek books (al-kutub al-Rümiyya) were translated into Arabic
during the reign of al-Ma'mün or thereabout. Third, subsequent to
its translation, and after Muslim scholars had become familiar with
it, they constantly censured and condemned it, and paid no attention
to it or to those who applied it to their rational and religious in-

1
297 See par. 296. nn. 4 - 5 , above.
2
This and the following paragraphs constitute a response to such logicians as
Ghazäli and Ibn Rushd who argued that logic and syllogistics are prescribed by the
Quran. See par. 160, n. 1, above.
 J a h d al-Qarlha

ferences (mawäzin). No one should say that 'what is peculiar to their

logic is merely their technical concepts; otherwise, rational thought is
common to all peoples', because this is not so; in logic there are
numerous false notions.
299. Furthermore, they have taken logic as the balance of rational
balances, which are the rational inferences. They have also claimed
that it is a canonical instrument which can, when properly used,
protect the mind from erring in its thought. 1 This, however, is not
true, for if a balance were in need of another balance, the result
would be infinite regress. Moreover, when natural intelligence is
sound, it measures [things] by means of the rational balance, but if it
is dull or defective, logic only renders it more so. One finds that the
generality of those who apply logic to their sciences are bound to go
astray, and they fail to produce rational indicants adequately. And if
they do adequately produce rational indicants, they avoid considering
them in terms of logic because logic is deficient and prolix. It prolongs
the road; renders the clear ambiguous; and causes errors and fallacies.
But when they relinquish natural (fitri) and rational knowledge of
particulars in favour of categorical syllogisms—whose concepts,
which they have coined, are ill defined and include both truth and
falsehood—the result is so erroneous that it stands in contrast to
what the balances are meant to be. Such balances then become
iniquitous, not just. Those who use them are among the defrauders
'Who, when they measure against the people, take full measure but,
when they measure for them or weigh for them, do scrimp.' 2 Great is
the difference, however, between scrimping material possession
and scrimping the intellect and religion! Most of them, however,
do not mean to be scrimpy, but they are like a person who has
inherited balances from his father, and who uses them to measure
for and against himself, but does not know whether they are just or
iniquitous.
300. The Balance that God has revealed together with the Book is
a just Balance which comprises the consideration of a thing in the
light of its equivalent or opposite, so that similar things are treated
as equivalent and distinct things as different. For God has instilled in
the instincts (fitar) and intellects of His subjects the knowledge to
discern what is similar and what is different. Should someone say: 'If
this can be known through reason, why did God make it part of what

1 :
299 See par. 163, n. 1, above. Quran, 88: 2 - 3 .
164 Jahd al-Qariha

He revealed through the messengers?' We answer: he did so because

the messengers imparted rational examples for people by means of
which they apprehend similitude and difference. The messengers led
and guided people to that by means of which justice may be achieved,
and by which sound rational inferences, which are employed in
religious enquiries, may be known. The prophetic sciences are not
limited to transmitting revelation; and the messengers, may God
praise them, have imparted examples and elucidated the rational
sciences through which God's religion may, theoretically and prac-
tically, be perfected. Whenever natural intelligence veers away from
religion, or whenever it is corrupted because it happens to adopt
false opinions and heretical doctrines, the messengers' instruc-
tion and guidance will perfect this intelligence so that corruption is
eliminated. The Quran and the traditions are replete with this: God
shows the truths by means of rational inferences and examples, and
He elucidates the methods by which two similar things are to be
treated equally and two different things differently. He admonishes
those who diverge from these [methods], as in His questions: 'Or
do those who commit ill-deeds suppose that We shall make them
as those who believe and do good works?' 1 and 'Shall We then
treat those who have surrendered as We treat the sinners? What ails
you then, how you judge?' 2 meaning that this is a wrongful, not a
just, judgement, for it treats dissimilar things as similar. An indica-
tion of the treatment of similar things as equal are His questions
'Are your disbelievers better than those?' 3 and 'Or did you suppose
you should enter Paradise without there had come upon you the like
of those who passed away before you?' 4
301. We mean to say that the rational Balance, as God has men-
tioned in His Book, is the truth, and is not limited to Greek logic.
The Balance is the sound inference which encompasses equating two
similar things and differentiating between two dissimilar things,
whether the form of that inference is a categorical syllogism or an
analogy. But the forms of analogy are the source, and they are more
perfect [than the syllogism]. The balance is the common factor,
namely, the middle term ( j ä m i ' ) .
302. The eighth consideration. Just as they have confined certitude
to the syllogistic form, they have limited certitude to the subject-

1 2
300 Quran, 46: 21. Quran, 68: 3 5 - 6 .
1 4
Quran, 64: 43. Quran, 2: 214.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 165

matter of the propositions they have upheld: [i.e.] the sensory, the a
priori, the multiply transmitted, the experiential, and the intuitive. 1
It is known that there is no evidence in favour of rejecting other
propositions. In addition to these, however, they also admit into
sensory, rational, and other propositions what humans customarily
share, and by so doing they fall into contradictions. All humans
share in seeing and hearing certain things—they all see the sun, the
moon, and the stars. But they see the genus o f clouds and lightning,
though what one group sees is not the very clouds and lightning the
other sees. In the same manner they share in hearing the sound of
thunder. But people do not share the hearing of each other's speech
and sound; each group hears what other groups may not have heard.
The same applies to most things that are visible. Not all people share
the smell, taste, and touch of one thing in essence; for what one
group smells, tastes, or touches is not [necessarily] the same as that
which another group smells, tastes, or touches. The objects may
be identical in genus but not in essence. Furthermore, concerning
that which is known through multiple transmission, experience, or
intuition, one group may know it by multiple transmission or by
experience while another may not. But both groups may know some-
thing by genus, as when one group tries a medicine, and another
group tries the genus of that medicine. Thus, they will share the
knowledge of the genus of the thing experienced, albeit not the very
thing itself ('ayn al-mujarrab).
303. In logic they further maintain that multiple transmissions and
experiential and intuitive matters are particular to those who appre-
hend them, and therefore they do not constitute evidence against
others [who were not subject to them]. 1 One should answer them:
the same applies to the objects of smell, taste, and touch. Indeed,
more people share multiply transmitted traditions, since these are
narrated by a large number of transmitters; therefore the number of
hearers is greater, and they all share in hearing the tradition from a
large number of people. This is different from what is perceived by
the senses, for it is particular to the person who senses it. If someone
maintains: 'I have seen, heard, tasted, touched, or smelled [such-
and-such]', he cannot use this [experience] as evidence against another
person. Even if we assume that a number of people have shared the

1
302 Räzl, Tahrir, 166-7; Ghazäll, Mi'yär, 186-93; idem, Maqäsid, 102-4.
1
303 See par. 43, n. 2, above.
166 J a h d al-Qariha

perception of these sensory matters with him, it does not follow that
still other people have sensed them; those who have not sensed them
cannot apprehend them except by means of hearing about them (bi-
tariq al-khabar).
304. Most of their universal sciences dealing with the state of
things existing in the external world derive from the knowledge
of the regularity of these things; and this they call intuition. Most of
their rational, natural, and astronomical sciences ('ulüm falakiyya),
such as astrology ('ilm al-hay'a),1 belong to experiential matters, and
these are not subject to demonstrative proof. That these natural
bodies have been subject to experiment, and so has motion, is not
known to most people except through verbal transmission, though
multiple transmission (tawätur) in such matters remains scarce.
305. At best, an experiment may be cited on the authority of a
physician or a mathematician. The best one can find is Ptolemy's
statement: 'This is what so-and-so has observed', or Galen's state-
ment: 'This is what I have experimented with', or 'So-and-so told me
that he experimented with such-and-such'. In all of this there is no
multiple transmission whatsoever. If we grant that someone other
than he has also experimented with a certain thing, the report about
the experiment would be transmitted through fewer than multiple
channels. Most people do not experiment with those things on which
the philosophers have experimented, nor do they apprehend through
observation what the philosophers have apprehended. Even if the
latter maintain that a group of people has observed [something], the
report would, at best, be of the type of limited multiple transmission,
which only a certain number of people (tä'ifa) transmit. Thus, those
who claim that what has been multiply transmitted from the prophets
does not constitute proof for them cannot use a similar multiple
transmission as a proof against others. They should neither extol the
science of astrology and philosophy, nor claim that it is a rational
science arrived at through demonstration.
306. This is the condition of the most important foundation upon
which their rational demonstration rests! What is one to think of
metaphysics (and of the discourse of their First Teacher, Aristotle)
which when learned people ponder they derive from it no knowledge

304 1 'Ilm al-falak, or its plural al-'ulüm al-falakiyya, was often used interchangeably
with 'ilm al-hay'a in Arabic writings. When astrology was to be distinguished from
astronomy, the Arabic equivalent of the former was sinä'at ahkäm al-nujüm. See Pines,
'The Semantic Distinction between the Terms Astronomy and Astrology', 345.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 167

except that the philosophers are amongst the most ignorant creatures
concerning the Lord of beings and that the Jewish and Christian
heretics are more knowledgeable than they are about these matters?
307. The ninth consideration.1 The prophets and saints possess
revealed and inspired knowledge that is not within the compass of
the syllogism which the philosophers prescribe. Nor is it within the
compass of physiognomy and the like. Since the philosophers include
their syllogism in the sensory and intelligible propositions they have
stipulated, they cannot deny what they have not stipulated; they are
thus left with no standard [against which they can judge matters
outside their system], Ibn Sinä and his followers have enumerated
the propositions which must be admitted and which constitute the
subject-matter of demonstration: [i.e.] the a priori, the sensory, the
experiential, the intuitive, and the multiply transmitted. To these
they sometimes add propositions which coexist with their own

307 1 This is the tenth consideration in al-Radd. In the ninth consideration, omitted
altogether by Suyütl, Ibn Taymiyya argues at length (al-Radd, 396-437) against the
logicians who maintained that widespread (mashhürät), and to a lesser extent
estimative (wahmiyyät), propositions do not lead to certain knowledge. See Ibn Sinä,
Najät, 9 8 - 9 ; Räzl, Tahrir, 168. The more important aspects of Ibn Taymiyya's critique
are as follows. His first argument addresses the distinction made by the logicians
between a priori statements and widespread premisses; in the latter the subject is
affirmed of the predicate through a middle term, while in the former such affirmation,
whether mental or extramental, needs no middle. Ibn Taymiyya rejects this
classification, since, in his view, the apprehension of the predication of one attribute
upon another is not an objective fact intrinsic to the thing itself, but is rather a relative
matter that changes from one person to another. In one and the same thing about
which we affirm a given attribute of another, one person might consider such an
affirmation as a priori, needing no middle term, while another might deem such a
middle necessary. In Ibn Taymiyya's view there is simply nothing objectively inherent
in a proposition which makes it a priori: whether a proposition is so considered or not
is a relative matter dependent upon the individual and the quality of his apprehension.
(Here he levels a lengthy critique against Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi for espousing the
aforementioned distinction between a priori and widespread propositions (pp. 402-
19).) Secondly, Ibn Taymiyya asserts that statements of the widespread kind, such as
'Justice is good' and 'Tyranny is deplorable', are known with certitude to all
communities and groups, including the philosophers themselves. The knowledge of
such propositions is more ingrained in the minds of people and quantitatively far more
abundant than that of medical propositions known through experiment. And since the
latter are deemed by the philosophers to lead to certitude, it is only logical, Ibn
Taymiyya maintains, that widespread propositions should also be considered certain.
(On the apodictic nature of experiential propositions, see Räzl, Tahrir, 166; Ghazälf,
Maqäsid, 103). Finally, Ibn Taymiyya argues that widespread propositions are
necessary (darüriyya) in the soul and that it is the function of the faculty of natural
intelligence (fitra) to apprehend them. It is because such knowledge is so instinctive
that all nations share in these propositions.
168 J a h d al-Qariha

definitions (qadäyä qiyäsätuhä ma'ahä).2 However, they adduce no

evidence in favour of confining propositions to these, and it is for
this reason that their supporters admit this taxonomy to be dis-
persed, not exhaustive—and incapable of being proven. Since this is
the case, it does not follow that anything which is not covered by
their syllogism cannot be apprehended. Therefore, logic is not a
canonical instrument which, when correctly used, protects one from
falling into error. For when propositions apprehended through dif-
ferent methods present themselves, they cannot be evaluated by
means of these proofs.
308. The generality of these logicians deem false that which is
reached through inferences other than their syllogism. This is the
highest form of ignorance, particularly when that which they have
rejected belongs to the traditions of the prophets. If the noblest of
all sciences cannot be known through their method, then two matters
arise; the first being that they cannot disprove what they have rejected
if it falls outside the scope of their syllogism; and the second being
that what they know is but little compared with what they do not
know. Then how much more meagre is their knowledge when it is
known that it does not lead to salvation and happiness?
309. The tenth consideration. They deem sound knowledge, which
must be admitted, to be invalid, and consider that which is false
or which has the semblance of knowledge to be true knowledge.
Accordingly, they claim that the prophets' message concerning the
knowledge of God's existence and attributes and of resurrection has
no reality in actual existence, 1 and that the prophets communicated
to the masses what they fancied about these matters in order that the
masses might benefit in conducting the affairs of their earthly life,
but not in order that they might apprehend the truth. This, they
claim, is a sort of lying in the interest of the people. 2 They also argue
that the Prophet is well versed in practical, but not theoretical,

2
Propositions which coexist with their definitions (qadäyä hudüduhä ma'ahä) can
only be another name for propositions which coexist with their own syllogisms (qadäyä
qiyäsätuhä ma'ahä). See sources cited in par. 302, n. 1, above, where qadäyä
qiyäsätuhä ma'ahä is always considered one of the demonstrative propositions. A
proposition of this type is one apprehended by means of a middle, although such a
middle is presupposed in the mind. Thus, whenever a minor premiss is brought before
the mind, the conclusion will simultaneously occur with it since the middle term is
constantly present (lä ya'zub 'an al-dhihn). See Ghazäll, Mi'yär, 192; Räzi, Tahrir, 166;
Jurjäni, Ta'rifät, 155, s.v. al-qadäyä al-lati qiyäsätuhä ma'ahä.
1
309 Cf. Ghazäll, Tahäfut, 282ft. (English trans., 229ff.).
2
See par. 87, nn. 1 - 2 , above.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 169
3
religion. Some of them hold the philosopher to be superior to all
prophets, including our Prophet, 4 may he be praised most highly.
They do not think it necessary to follow a particular prophet, whether
it be Muhammad or someone else. This is why, when the Tatars
appeared and some of them wanted to convert to Islam, a philo-
sopher who was in the company of Hulagu is reported to have
advised him not to allow conversion. He said that the language of
Islam is Arabic, and you are not in need of Islam's Law.
310. Furthermore, those of them who follow the Prophet in re-
ligious practices do not follow him with regard to the principles of
religion or matters of faith. To them, the Prophet is as one of the
four eponyms of the legal schools is to the speculative theologians;
for when the speculative theologians follow one of the four legal
schools, they follow it only in positive law, but do not abide by its
legal theory nor by its doctrine concerning the unity of God. On
these last matters they may deem their own leading theologians to be
superior. 1
311. The Prophet spoke of God's specific names and attributes, as
well as of the angels, the Throne, the Seat, Paradise, and Hell; none
of these can be known through their syllogism. He spoke, too, of
particular issues that had existed or that will come into existence;
also none of these can be known through their syllogism, whether it
be demonstrative or not. Their syllogisms lead only to universal
matters, and these are particular issues. The Prophet, may he be
praised, predicted the particular events that will take place. He
spoke of the Tatars who appeared six hundred years after his predic-
tion, as well as of the fire (när) which broke out in the year 655,
before the coming of the Tatars. 1 How could one imagine that their
3
See par. 87, nn. 1 - 2 , above.
4
This seems to be the implication in Ikhwän al-Safä', Rasä'il (Risäla f i al-Ärä' wal-
Diyänät, no. 42), iv. 2 1 - 2 .
310 1 The abridgement of the preceding paragraph represents an extremely rare
instance in which Suyüti paraphrases, and even alters, the text of al-Radd. Suyütl here
speaks of the four eponyms representing the surviving legal schools, whereas in al-
Radd, 443, Ibn Taymiyya does not limit them to four, but speaks of madhähib (schools)
in a general sense, including the madhähib of lesser mujtahidün. Thus, in addition to
Abü Hanlfa (d. 150/767), Mälik (d. 179/795), Shäfi'I (d. 204/820), and Ibn Hanbal (d.
241/855), he mentions Ishäq Ibn Rähawayhi (d. 238/852), al-Layth b. Sa'd (d. 157/773),
al-Awzä'I (d. 158/774), and Däwüd b. A l l al-Zähiri (d. 270/884).
311 1 From the description of Subki, what was taken as a fire seems to have been a
volcano which erupted near Medina for a period of over a month. This event was seen
as a fulfilment of the Prophetic statement: 'The Day of Judgement shall not occur until
fire breaks out in the land of the Hijäz.' See Subki, Tabaqät, v. 112; Ibn al-Wardi,
Tatimma, ii. 281.
170 J a h d al-Qariha

syllogism and demonstration can inform us about a particular human

or a particular nation, let alone about someone having the attributes
which the Prophet reported?
312. Among their evils and heresies is their view that the Creator,
the Exalted, does not know particulars. Nor does He know Moses
and Jesus as individuals, nor others, nor any event in detail. 1 Our
refutation of them with regard to this matter has been expounded
elsewhere, however. 2 The intention here is to let people know that
their ignorant and heretical views are extremely erroneous because
they try to avoid that which is inevitable and for the rejection of
which they have no evidence whatsoever.
313. The eleventh consideration. They do acknowledge external as
well as inner sensations, such as hunger, pain, and pleasure. But
they deny the existence of what only some people observe, such as
the angels and the demons, and what the soul sees upon death. 1 The
Book and the Sünna speak in affirmation of such visions. However, a
detailed discussion of these issues belongs elsewhere. The point
we would like to make is that the false logical principles which
they adopted concerning the rejection of that which cannot be re-
jected inevitably brought upon them ignorance and heresy which
blinded them, thus making them worse than the Jewish and Christian
heretics.
314. The twelfth consideration. According to them, for a pro-
position to be demonstrative means that it is known with certainty
to those who use it in inferences; to be dialectical means that it
is universally admitted (musallama); to be rhetorical means that
it is widespread (mashhüra), accepted (maqbüla), or probable
(maznüna)} All these distinctions, in accordance with their own
principles, are contingently relational and relative to the proposition,
and do not constitute qualities that are inseparable, or, much less,
essential to it. In fact, these distinctions contain no quality which is
inherent in the proposition itself; rather, they are relative qualities to

1
312 See par. 45, n. 3, above.
2
See al-Radd, 476-7 ; Marmura, 'Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge', 299ff.,
3 0 3 - 4 (n. 34).
313 1 Cf. Shahrastänl, Milal, 30, 55. In al-Radd, 471, Ibn Taymiyya remarks that the
majority of the early great philosophers, such as Hippocrates, did not subscribe to such
views.
314 1 Ibn Slnä, Ishärät, i. 510ft. (English trans., 148-9); Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 106ff.;
Räzl, Tahrir, 168; KhabisI, Sharh, 95 ff.
 J a h d al-Qarlha 171

be considered from the viewpoint of those who are cognizant of

them. The proposition may be known to be true, and yet one may
not be cognizant of it, let alone perceive it as probable or certain.
The proposition may be rhetorical or dialectical, and it may be true
in itself. It may also be demonstrative, as they themselves admit.
And since this is the case, the messengers, may they be praised, have
communicated propositions which are in themselves true, and which
are not, in any way, false or invalid. They have also elucidated
apodictic methods by means of which the truthfulness of common
(imushtarak) propositions can be established, and from which the
human species derives benefit—this is the knowledge that is beneficial
for people.
315. These philosophers, however, did not follow this path. Instead
they followed the path of relativity, and thus held demonstrative
propositions to be that which the reasoner knows with certitude.
Other propositions they have held to be non-demonstrative, though
another reasoner may know them [with certainty]. Accordingly,
what is demonstrative for one person or group may not be so for
others. Thus, apodictic propositions cannot be given an exhaustive
and exclusive definition (hadd jämi' mäni'),1 because they differ
according to the state of mind of the person who knows or does not
know them. The artisans in every field know propositions that no
one else knows. Thus, considering how the artisans in each field view
matters to be truthful or false, right or wrong, it would be impossible
by the logicians' method to distinguish between truth and falsehood,
right and wrong. Contrary to the method of the prophets, theirs
cannot be commonly beneficial to humans. The prophets have com-
municated truthful propositions which distinguish between truth and
falsehood, right and wrong. Whatever contradicts the truth is false,
and whatever contradicts right is wrong. This is why God made the
Book which He revealed a judge amongst people in their disputes.
He also revealed the Balance as well as that which is weighed by
it so that truth may be distinguished from falsehood. 2 Every truth
has a balance by which it is weighed. This is contrary to what the
philosopher-logicians have held, which can neither lead to the truth
nor distinguish between truthfulness and falsehood; nor does it con-
stitute a balance by means of which one knows truth from falsehood.

1
315 On exhaustive and exclusive definition see par. 15, n. 1, above.
2
See pars. 297, 300, 301 above.
172 J a h d al-Qariha

316. As for the speculative theologians, whatever part of their

discourse agrees with what the prophets have brought down is valid.
But whatever disagrees with it belongs to heresy, whether judged by
revelation or reason.
317. It may be argued: 'We hold demonstrative propositions to be
relative, for everything a person apprehends on the basis of his own
premisses is for him demonstrative, although for others it may not be
so.' We should respond: you do not hold this view, since those who
do would not find the subject-matter of demonstration in particular
things, though it is possible for many people to apprehend matters
other than those particular ones which you have specified. If they
argue: 'We do not specify the subject-matters', then a part of logic is
invalidated, and that is what we sought to prove.
318. The thirteenth consideration. They think that their method is
universal and comprehends all the methods of knowledge cultivated
by man. But this is not so. Through sense perception, reason, or
truthful traditions, people have acquired a good deal of knowledge
which cannot be known through the methods they have mentioned.
Included in this knowledge is what the prophets, may God praise
them, taught. But the philosophers wished to make the teachings of
the prophets conform to their invalid canons. Accordingly, they held
that a prophet possesses powers greater than those of others, so
much so that he grasps the middle term without being taught (ta'lim).
When he forms a concept, he apprehends through these powers the
definition which others may find difficult or impossible to formulate
without being taught, because the perceptive powers of the Prophetic
souls are unlimited. They have held that what the prophets tell about
the invisible is known through a logical syllogism, a claim which is
utterly false. 1 As we have previously mentioned, through logical
syllogism only universal matters can be apprehended, and this they
admit. But the messengers have told about individual, singular, and
particular matters, matters of the past, present, and future. Therefore,
what the messengers have taught does not obtain through the logical
syllogism. Ibn Sinä even held the Lord's knowledge of His creatures
to be of this kind; but God, the Exalted, is far above what he
claimed. 2
319. From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the

1
318 Ibn Sinä, Najät, 205-6, 339; Ghazäll, Maqäsid, 3 8 0 - 3.
2
Marmura, 'Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge', 3 0 2 - 3.
 Jahd al-Qarlha 173

methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have

stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also
become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those
which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than
those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have
prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither
noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people—in their
knowledge and practice they are the lowest of all humans. In many
ways, the heretical Jews and Christians are more noble in their
knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even
elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Chris-
tians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books],
let alone prior to their doing so. In condemning Ibn Sinä's al-Shifa
Ibn al-Qushayri recited the following: 1

W e severed the ties of brotherhood with those stricken

by the malady of the book of al-Shifa
H o w often have I said t o them
Y o u are about to be swept away by the book of al-Shifä'
W h e n they m a d e little of our warning
W e turned t o G o d and H e was sufficient
T h e y then died while following the religion of Aristotle
A n d w e lived according to the Religion of the C h o s e n . 2

320. Someone may argue: 'Some of the logicians' views with regard
to confining the methods of acquiring knowledge [to what they have
prescribed] are found in the discourse of Muslim theologians. Some of
the latter even espouse it verbatim or with changes in terminology.' 1
We answer: not all the doctrines of the speculative theologians are
true. However, all that which the messengers have brought down is
true. Whatever in the views of the speculative theologians and others
corresponds to what the messengers have brought down is true;
whatever does not conform is false. The forefathers' and the leading
scholars' condemnation of the heretically innovative speculative
theologians is well known.
321. Ibn Taymiyya said: it is astonishing that these people claim to

319 1 Ibn Hajar al-Asqaläni attributes this poem to Zayn al-DIn al-Subki. See al-
Durar, ii. 396-7.
2
i.e. Muhammad the Prophet.
320 1 This seemingly anonymous statement finds full support in the writings of a great
many theologians. See e.g. Räzi, Ma'älim Usül al-Din, 3 ff. and passim.
174 J a h d al-Qariha

want to protect the true Religion with their defective minds and false
syllogisms. What they have done instead is that which only the
heretics, the enemies of religion, have dared to do. They have
neither protected Islam nor defeated the enemy. What is also as-
tonishing is that they avoid following and imitating the infallible
prophets who speak nothing but the truth. Instead, they imitate, and
associate with, those who diverge from what the prophets have
brought down—those whom they know to be fallible, who are at
times wrong and at others right. It is only God who ensures the
truth.
322. Al-Suyüti said: this is the end of what I have abridged from
Ibn Taymiyya's treatise. I have conveyed his words verbatim, mostly
without any change. I have omitted much of his treatise, which
consists of twenty fascicles. However, I have deleted nothing of
value; what I did delete was not pertinent to the main argument. The
deletions are either digressions or replies to metaphysical and other
queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians' views that
do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc. Those
who read this abridgement of mine will benefit more from it than
they would should they take up the original work, for the latter is
complex and difficult to use.
323. Thanks be to God. May He praise and give peace to Muham-
mad, the last of the prophets, and to his family and Companions.
 EMENDATIONS TO THE ARABIC TEXT

THE following corrections do not include alterations to the punctuation of

the text, although more often than not I departed from the editors' division
of phrases and sentences. The left-hand column gives the page and line
number in the Rabat edition of Jahd al-Qariha. In the right-hand column the
words to be corrected are followed by the sign ' > ' introducing the emendation.
The basis of the emendation in the Leiden manuscript (L) and/or the Bombay
edition of the unabridged work ( B ) is then cited.

87: 1 yusawwir > yatasawwar (L 137a: 11; B 11: 2)

87: 2 mukhätab > takhätub (B 549: 29)
87: 9 aw fl al-man' > aw al-'aks ( L 137a: 16)
88: 1 — > fasl (L 137a: 23)
90: 9 wa'in idda'at > wa'in idda'ü (B 31: 16)
93: 4 min ghayr taqlid lil-khabar > min ghayr taqlid lil-mukhbir (B
39: 1)
94: 8 al-musammä > al-musammi ( L 138b: 10)
94: 12 kalämihi aw taswir > kalämihi wal-thäni bayän tasdiq kalämihi.
wa-taswir . . . (B 40: 13)
94: 13 li-taswir > ka-taswir (B 40: 14)
96: 16 bil-ma'nä > lil-ma'nä (B 61: 17)
97: 8 al-'ämm > al-tämm (L 139a: 18; B 62: 18)
98: 5-6 bayna al-wujüd wal-thubüt wa-kadhälika al-tafriq bayna al-wujüd
wal-mähiyya > bayna al-wujüd wal-mähiyya (L 139a: 29)
98: 11 wal-mähiyya > wal-mudda ( B 66: 15)
99: 13 h-k-m > tahakkum (L 139b: 16; B 71: 15)
100: 3 yakhtur. . . lä yakhtur > takhtur. . . lä takhtur (L 139b: 21; B 71:
20-1)
101: 9 al-fusül al-mumayyiza > al-fusül al-dhätiyya al-mumayyiza (L
140a: 8)
101: 11 wa-yumkin al-äkhar > wa-yumkin shakhsan an yaj'alahu dhätiyyan
wa-yumkin al-äkhar ( L 140a: 10)
102: 9 — > al-maqäm al-thälith (B 88: 1)
106: 8 al-mutawätirät > al-mu'aththirät ( B 107: 19)
106: 13 al-nafsiyyät > al-yaqiniyyät ( B 108: 2)
106: 15 qärabahä > färaqahä (B 108: 4)
107: 9 al-'ayn > al-mu'ayyan (L 141a: 22)
110: 7 khamr > muskir ( L 141b: 29)
114: 8 - 9 burhänihim min qadiyya > burhänihim an yuqäl: idhä käna lä
budda min qadiyya (B 115: 2 - 3 )
116: 11 al-tafriq > al-taqrir (L 143a: 18; B 117: 4)
176 Emendations to the Arabic Text

118: 5 li-madlülätihä ghayra anna al-mantiqiyyin wa-jumhür > li-

madlülätihä min ghayri i'tibär dhälik bi-mizän al-mantiqiyyin läkin
jumhür . . . (L 143b: 10)
121: 12 al-ladhl yahsul > al-ladhi lä yahsul ( L 144a: 22; B 121: 14)
122: 5 kull alifjim > al-alif jim ( L 144a: 31; B 560: 18)
123: 3 min al-kulliyya > min al-qadäyä al-kulliyya (B 123: 1)
123: 4 al-'ulüm thalätha > al-'ulüm 'indahum thalätha ( B 123: 3)
123: 7 minhumä > fihimä (B 123: 8)
125: 5 qü' > wuqu (L 145a: 2)
130: 8 al-handasa wa-sammühu > al-handasa fa-ja'alühu ashkälan kal-
ashkäl al-handasiyya wa-sammühu ( L 146a: 4 - 5 ; B 137: 18)
130: 8 li-hudüd > ka-hudüd (B 137: 19)
131: 13 wa-nafs aqsämih > wa-nafs inqisämih ( L 146a: 21; B 139: 3)
131: 17 fa-laysa mä > fa-laysa fihä mä ( L 146a: 24; B 139: 7)
140: 7 al-faläsifa al-mutaqaddimin > al-faläsifa wal-mutakallimün läkin
al-mutakallimün yaqülün bil-hudüth li-kawn al-fä'il 'indahum
fä'ilan bil-ikhtiyär wa-hädhä ghalat 'alä al-tä'ifatayn bal lam yaqul
dhälika ahad min al-matakallimin wa-lä al-faläsifa al-mutaqaddimin
(L 148a: 8 - 1 0 ; B 149: 3 - 6 )
141: 8 - 9 ma'lümihi, lam yastafidü > ma'lümihi, wa-hum lamya'lamü 'ilman
yabqä bi-baqä' ma'lümih lam yastafidü (B 150: 7 - 8 )
144: 4 al-mawjüd al-wäjib > al-wujüd al-wäjib (B 153: 7 - 8 )
144: 10 al-'ayn > al-mu'ayyan ( B 154: 7)
144: 14 dalil 'alä malzüm > dalil 'alä läzimih ( L 149a: 3)
148: 15 rusulunä > rusuluhum ( L 149b: 24; also Quran, 40: 83)
154: 6 wa-kadhk > wa-kadhä ( L 150b: 27)
158: 5 min hasr > min ghayr hasr (B 166: 16)
164: 8 kull hayawän jism wa-kull jism jawhar fa-kull insän hayawän fa-
yalzam > kull insän jism wa-kull jism jawhar, fa-yalzam (see par.
145, n. 3, above)
165: 15 wajaba, fa-idhä > wajaba, fa-hädhä qad wajaba, fa-idhä. . . (L
153a: 10-11; B 173: 3 - 4 )
167: 8 wa-ma'änin mutta'ada > wa-ma'änin muta'addida ( B 174: 7)
172: 15 huwa al-ma'qülät min haythu > huwa al-ma'qülät al-thäniya min
haythu (L 154b: 8; B 179: 20)
172: 16 al-nisab al-thäniya > al-nisab al-thäbita (B 179: 21)
181: 8 muqaddimatayn lä fil-intäj Wanna al-shart mughäyir lil-mashrüt
wa-laysa > muqaddimatayn faqat wa-laysa (B 191: 23-192: 1)
185: 2 kitäban fi tahäfutihim > kitäban fi maqäsidihim wa kitäban fi
tahäfutihim ( L 157a: 10)
188: 8 w-j-d > wa-khudh ( L 157b: 21)
189: 15 lä yakün illä a'amm > lä yakün a'amm (B 202: 10)
189: 18 sighat > sifat (B 202: 14)
 177 Emendations to the Arabic Text

194: 1 wa'innamä > wa'inna mä (L 159a: 3; B 206: 17-18)

198: 10 li-ghayrihä abadan > li-ghari mä abdä (L 159b: 21)
201: 3 muta'adhdhir > muhdar ( L 160a: 24; B 212: 7)
206: 9 bil-hadd wa-man' husül al-tasdiq bil-hadd wa-man' > bil-hadd wo-
man' ( L 161a: 31)
206: 10 al-tasdiq bil-qiyäs > al-tasdiq illä bil-qiyäs ( L 161a: 31)
211: 3 wa-hädhä > wa-hädhihi (B 251: 14)
217: 12 ta'ab. > ta'ab. fa-hwa lahmu jamalin ghathth 'aid ra'si jabalin
wa'r, lä sahl fa-yurtaqä wa-lä samin fa-yuntaqal ( L 163b: 17-18;
5 2 9 7 : 14-15)
217: 17 radda 'alä > rü'iya ( L 163a: 21; B 297: 19)
219: 13 al-ashi' > illä shay'an ( B 300: 2 0 - 1 ; cf. also L 164a: 13)
225: 13 Aqsäm al-Dhät > Aqsäm al-Ladhdhät (B 321: 10)
226: 9 yumaththilün bi-hädhihi > bi-mithl hädhihi (B 323: 2)
227: 11 allaftu kitäban > allaftu fihi kitäban (B 324: 12)
232: 9 al-mutaqaddimatän > al-muqaddimatän ( L 166b: 5; B 338: 21)
232: 15 fihä > fthimä (L 166b: 31; B 339: 5)
232: 18 yusta'mal jami' > yusta'mal fihi jami' (L 167a: 2; B 339: 10)
234: 1 fa'idhä qäla > fa'idhä qulnä ( L 167a: 17; B 344: 16)
236: 16 bil-iräda, fa-naqül > bil-iräda, fa-naqdi qadä'an 'ämman anna
kull insän hassäs mutaharrik bil-iräda, fa-naqül. . . (L 167b: 24)
236: 17 qiyäs, wal-qiyäs > qiyäs aw bi-ghayr tawassut qiyäs, wal-qiyäs (B
363: 12)
237: 1 al-'ämm > al-'ämma (L 167b: 7; B 363: 16)
243: 13 al-haml > akmal ( L 169a: 17)
248: 15 h(ijriyya) > — (L 170a: 16)
250: 13 jämi', bal > jämi' mäni', bal ( L 170b: 6; B 472: 15)
 LIST OF PARAGRAPHS

THE numbers appearing under R, L, and B indicate the beginnings of

paragraphs in the translation. Line numbers, separated by a colon, appear
after page or f o l i o numbers.
R: the 1961 Rabat edition of Jahd al-Qariha-,
L: the Leiden manuscript of Jahd al-Qariha-,
B: the 1949 B o m b a y edition of al-Radd 'aid al-Mantiqiyyin.

Par. R L B Par. R L B

1 — 136a: 9 1 — 29 94: 17 138b: 15 40: 18

2 — 136a: 18 2 — 30 95: 11 138b: 24 49: 13
3 82: 3 136a: 19 3:8 3i 96: 7 139a: 4 61: 6
4 83:5 136a: 28 4: 7 32 97: 8 139a: 18 62: 18
5 83: 8 136b: 2 4: 13 33 97: 14 139a: 22 64: 11
6 84: 1 136b: 7 7: 9 34 98: 10 139b: 1 66: 15
7 84:9 136b: 12 8: 1 35 99: 4 139b: 8 70: 2
8 84: 15 136b: 17 8: 8 36 99: 10 139b: 14 71: 12
9 85: 6 136b: 21 8: 13 37 100: 15 139b: 30 73: 10
10 85: 16 136b: 28 9: 1 38 101: 9 140a: 8 76: 18
11 86:3 137a: 1 9: 5 39 101: 13 140a: 11 IT- 4
12 86: 12 137a: 7 10: 2 40 102: 7 140a: 19 —

13 86: 16 137a: 10 11: 1 4i 102: 9 140a: 21 88: 8

14 87:4 137a: 12 11: 5 42 103: i 140a: 26 88: 15
15 87: 8 137a: 16 11: 12 43 104: 1 140b: 7 92: 3
16 87: 12 137a: 19 13: 13 44 104: 6 140b: 12 100: 6
17 88: 1 137a: 23 14: 14 45 104: 12 140b: 15 102: 16
18 88: 6 137a: 27 14: 19 46 105: 13 140b: 29 107: 2
19 88: 14 137b: 2 27: 9 47 106: 10 141a: 7 107: 20
20 89: 14 137b: 13 3i: 3 48 106: 17 141a: 13 108: 6
21 90: 13 137b: 25 31: 18 49 107: 15 141a: 26 109: 2
22 9i: 3 137b: 30 32: 4 50 108: 12 141b: 7 109: 19
23 91: 10 138a: 4 33: 20 5i 109: 8 141b: 16 no: 7
24 91: 16 138a: 8 37: 11 52 109: 14 141b: 21 n o : 15
25 92: 4 138a: 11 37: 18 53 no: 15 142a: 4 i i i : 13
26 92: 17 138a: 20 38: 17 54 112: 3 142a: 21 112: 20
27 93: 7 138a: 25 39: 5 55 112: 16 142a: 31 113: 16
28 94: 10 138b: 11 40: 11 56 "3: 3 142b: 4 113: 20
1
In conjunction with Nashshär's edition, 201: 7.
2
In conjunction with Nashshär's edition, 201: 17.
 List of Paragraphs 179

Par. R L B Par. R L B
57 113: 14 142b: 11 114: 9 98 137: 13 147b: 4 146: 11
58 114: 8 142b: 20 115: 2 99 137: 15 147b: 5 146: 13
59 115: 1 142b: 28 115: 16 100 138:5 147b: 10 147: 7
60 "5: 17 143a: 9 116: 12 101 138: 17 147b: 19 147: 19
61 116: 12 143a: 20 "7: 5 102 139: 6 147b: 24 148: 3
62 117: 13 143b: 2 118: 2 103 139: 15 147b: 31 148: 12
63 118: 4 143b: 8 118: 10 104 140: 6 148a: 7 149: 2
64 118: 16 143b: 18 118: 23 105 141: 3 148a: 20 150: 1
65 119: 5 143b: 23 119: 11 106 141: 8 148a: 23 150: 7
66 120: 1 143b: 31 120: 2 107 142: 6 148b: 2 151: 1
67 120: 15 144a: 10 120: 20 108 143: 2 148b: 11 151: 15
68 121: 6 144a: 16 121: 7 109 143: 10 148b: 18 152: 15
69 121: 12 144a: 22 121: 13 no 144: 4 148b: 26 153: 7
70 122: 2 144a: 28 121: 21 HI 145: i 149a: 5 154: 18
7i 122: 10 i44b: 3 122: 15 112 145: 17 149a: 17 155: 11
72 122: 16 144b: 6 122: 20 113 146: 6 149a: 22 155: 19
73 123: 14 144b: 16 123: 20 114 147: 3 149b: 2 156: 16
74 124: 6 144b: 22 124: 6 115 147: 13 149b: 10 157: 6
75 124: 9 144b: 24 124: 16 116 147: 15 149b: 11 157:8
76 125: 4 145a: 1 125: 8 117 148: 12 149b: 22 158: I
77 125: 16 145a: 10 133:8 118 149: 13 150a: 4 159: 2
78 127: 3 145a: 27 134: 11 119 150: 4 150a: 9 159: 11
79 127: 7 145a: 29 134: 16 120 151: 1 150a: 18 160: 2
80 128: 3 I45b: 8 135: 15 121 151: 8 150a: 23 160: 8
81 128: 13 145b: 14 136: 9 122 151: 17 150a: 28 160: 17
82 129: 10 i45b: 25 137: 5 123 152: 12 150b: 5 161: 9
83 130: 8 146a: 4 137: 18 124 152: 17 150b: 9 161: 14
84 130: 13 146a: 8 138:4 125 153: 4 150b: 12 161: 21
85 131: 10 146a: 18 138: 22 126 153: 15 150b: 21 162: 15
86 131: 17 146a: 24 139: 7 127 154: 3 150b: 24 162: 21
87 132: 11 146b: 2 139: 17 128 154: 9 150b: 29 163: 7
88 133: 6 146b: 10 140: 9 129 155: i 151a: 4 164: 3
89 133: 16 146b: 18 141: 7 130 155: 14 151a: 12 164: 16
90 134: 9 146b: 26 143: 2 131 156: 4 151a: 18 165: 3
9i 134: 16 146b: 30 143: 8 132 156: 9 151a: 21 165: 9
92 135: 5 I47a: 5 143: 17 133 156: 15 151a: 25 165: 15
93 135: 13 147a: 10 144: 7 134 157: 17 151b: 9 166: 12
94 136: 3 147a: 16 144: 14 135 158:7 151b: 15 166: 20
95 136: 8 147a: 20 145: i 136 159: i 151b: 24 167: 14
96 136: 15 147a: 24 145: 9 137 159: 6 151b: 26 167: 18
97 137: 8 147a: 31 146: 6 138 159: 16 152a: 2 168: 13
 List of Paragraphs 239

Par. R L B Par. R L B

139 160 10 152a: 9 169: 1 181 183 7 156b: 18 193: 14

140 161 4 152a: 18 169: 15 182 184 2 156b: 28 194: 6
141 161 17 152a: 27 170: 7 183 184 9 157a: 2 194: 12
142 162 5 152b: 1 170: 12 184 184 13 I57a: 5 194: 17
143 162 17 152b: 8 171: 2 185 185 10 I57a: 15 198: 12
144 163 12 152b: 16 171: 12 186 185 18 157a: 21 198: 19
145 164 4 152b: 22 171: 19 187 186 12 157a: 30 199: 14
146 164 10 152b: 27 172: 3 188 187 1 I57b: 5 199: 22
147 165 13 I53a: 9 172: 21 189 187 10 157b: 12 200: 9
148 166 3 I53a: 14 173: 9 190 187 17 157b: 16 200: 17
149 166 9 153a: 19 173: 15 191 188 8 157b: 21 201: 5
150 j66 16 153a: 24 173: 22 192 188 17 157b: 26 201: 15
151 167 7 I53a: 30 174: 7 193 189 9 158a: 4 202: 3
152 167 16 I53b: 5 174: 17 194 189 14 158a: 8 202: 8
153 168 12 153b: 16 175: 12 195 190 1 158a: 13 202: 17
154 169 1 153b: 20 175: 18 196 190 8 158a: 18 203: 2
155 169 15 I53b: 31 176: 8 197 190 16 158a: 22 203: 12
156 170 3 154a: 6 176: 16 198 191 1 158a: 25 203: 17
157 170 14 154a: 14 177: 3 199 191 8 158a: 30 204: 3
158 171 4 154a: 19 177: 13 200 191 16 158b: 4 204: 9
159 171 11 154a: 24 178:5 201 192 4 158b: 8 204: 15
160 172 1 154a: 30 179: 2 202 192 12 158b: 14 205: 5
161 172 7 I54b: 3 179: 10 203 192 17 158b: 18 205: 10
162 173 11 154b: 19 180: 16 204 193 10 158b: 25 206: 6
163 174 3 154b: 24 181: 6 205 194 1 159a: 2 206: 17
164 174 10 154b: 29 181: 13 206 194 7 159a: 6 206: 22
165 175 3 I55a: 4 182: 1 207 194 13 159a: 10 207: 6
166 175 10 i55a: 9 186: 2 208 195 6 159a: 18 207: 18
167 176 1 155a: 16 187: 1 209 195 13 159a: 22 208: 1
168 176 7 155a: 21 187: 8 210 196 1 159a: 25 208: 6
169 176 16 155a: 27 188:3 211 196 8 159a: 29 208: 13
170 177 9 I55b: 4 188: 13 212 197 3 I59b: 5 209: 4
171 177 13 i55b: 6 188: 15 213 197 15 159b: 13 209: 16
172 178 8 155b: 16 189: 10 214 198 7 159b: 18 210: 1
173 178 17 i55b: 23 189: 20 215 199 1 159b: 27 210: 12
174 179 10 155b: 29 190: 9 216 199 11 160a: 4 211: 3
175 180 11 156a: 13 191: 9 217 200 4 160a: 13 211: 13
176 180 16 156a: 17 191: 15 218 200 10 160a: 17 211: 18
177 181 7 156a: 24 191: 23 219 200 16 160a: 21 212: 2
178 181 15 156a: 30 192: 6 220 201 5 160a: 25 212: 9
179 182 1 156b: 2 192: 10 221 201 13 160a: 31 212: 16
180 182 18 156b: 14 193: 6 222 202 6 160b: 8 213: 4
 List of Paragraphs 181

Par. R B Par. R B
223 203: 1 160b: 18 213: 19 265 221: 18 164b: 10 316: 8
224 203: 11 160b: 25 233: 7 266 222: 6 164b: 15 316: 13
225 204: 5 161a: 3 233: 17 267 222: 13 164b: 19 316: 22
226 204: 12 161a: 7 234: 3 268 223: 14 165a: 2 317: 21
227 205: 1 161a: 12 234: 9 269 224: 8 165a: 10 318: 19
228 205: 6 161a: 15 234: 15 270 224: 16 165a: 16 320: 2
229 205: 11 161a: 19 234: 19 271 225: 3 165a: 19 320: 12
230 206: 6 161a: 28 246: 14 272 225:8 165a: 22 321: 5
231 207: 3 161b: 6 248:3 273 226: 1 165a: 31 321: 17
232 207: 11 161b: 12 248: 11 274 226: 9 165b: 5 323: 2
233 208: 3 161b: 19 248: 20 275 227: 1 165b: 14 324: 1
234 208: 6 161b: 21 249: 3 276 227: 14 165b: 24 325: 5
235 208: 10 161b: 24 249: 8 277 228: 5 165b: 29 326: 5
236 209: 8 162a: 5 250: 3 278 229: 1 166a: 9 327: 14
237 209: 16 162a: 9 250: 11 279 229: 9 166a: 15 332: 4
238 210: 18 162a: 24 251: 9 280 230: 4 166a: 26 333: 14
211: 7 162a: 29 251: 18 281 230: 10 166b: 1 334: 14
239
240 211: 12 162b: 2 252: 4 282 230: 17 166b: 5 337: 4
241 211: 17 162b: 5 252: 8 283 232: 16 166b: 31 339: 6
242 212: 6 162b: 9 252: 14 284 233: 3 167a: 3 339: 12
212: 15 162b: 16 253: 3 233: 9 167a: 7 344: i
243 285
213: 1 162b: 19 254: 3 234: 12 167a: 25 353: 20
244 286
213: 6 162b: 24 255: 2 234: 17 167a: 29 354: 8
245 287
213: 17 163a: 1 256: 2 235: 5 167b: 2 355: 13
246 288
214: 9 163a: 9 257: 1 235: 14 167b: 9 356: i
247 289
215: 1 163a: 15 257: 16 236: 1 167b: 12 361: 16
248 290
215: 4 163a: 17 257: 19 236: 12 167b: 20 363: 4
249 291
215: 11 163a: 21 237: 9 168a: 2 365: 2
250 258:9 292
216: 3 163a: 29 238: 3 168a: 8 368: 2
251 259: 16 293
216: 16 163b: 7 238: 11 168a: 12 368: 8
252 265: 3 294
217: 5 163b: 12 239: 1 168a: 18 371: 1
253 293: 14 295
217: 13 163b: 18 239: 7 168a: 22 371: 6
254 297: 16 296
218: 5 163b: 25 239: 17 168a: 30 371: 18
255 298: 20 297
218: 9 163b: 28 240: 13 168b: 10 373: 18
256 299: 1 298
218: 17 164a: 2 241: 9 168b: 18 374: 6
257 300: 4 299
219: 1 164a: 3 242: 7 168b: 31 382:4
258 300: 6 300
219: 14 164a: 13 243: 10 169a: 14
259 300: 21 301 383: 6
220: 1 164a: 18 243: 15 169a: 18
260 301: 11 302 384: 13
220: 8 164a: 23 169a: 30
261 302: 15 303 244: 14 385: 11
221: 1 164a: 31 169b: 6
262 303: 3 304 245: 7 388: 8
221: 4 164b: 1 169b: 9
263 303: 8 305 245: 13 393: 6
221: 9 164b: 4 169b: 15
264 315: 19 306 246: 5 394: 9
 List of Paragraphs 182

Par. R L B Par. R L B

307 246: 9 169b: 18 437: 12 316 251: 7 170b: 14 473: 2

308 247: 3 169b: 26 438: 2 317 251: 9 170b: 15 473: 5
309 247: 10 169b: 30 438: 13 318 251: 15 170b: 19 473: 12
310 248: 4 170a: 7 443: 11 319 252: 13 170b: 29 500: 16
3" 248: 9 170a: 10 445: 6 320 253: 7 171a: 8 5 i i : 23
312 249: 1 170a: 17 461: 9 321 253: 14 171a: 12 —

313 249: 7 170a: 21 469: 11 322 254: 6 171a: 17 3 —

314 249: 14 170a: 26 471: 23 323 — 171a: 23 —

315 250: 9 170b: 3 472: 11

3
In conjunction with Nashshär's edition, 343: 14-18.
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 I N D E X O F T I T L E S IN T H E T E X T

Almagest 140 Mihakk al-Nazar I11

Aqsäm al-Ladhdhät 149 Mi'yär al-'Ilm f i Fann al-Mantiq 20, 111
at-Ärä' wal-Diyänäl 154 Muhassal (Afkär al-Mulaqaddimin
al-Asrär al-Khafiyya f i al- 'Ulüm wal-Muta'akhkhirin min al-'Ulamä'
al-'Aqliyya 63 wal-Hukamä' wal-Mutakallimin) 38,
51.72
Book Lambda 64 Müjaz 42
Mustasfä i n
Daf Ta'ärud al-Shar' wal-'Aql 150
Daqä'iq al-Haqä'iq 63, 153 Nasihat Ahl al-lmän f i al-Radd 'alä
Mantiq al-Yünän 3
Hikmat al-lshräq 63
al-Qistäs al-Mustaqim 111
Jahd al-Qariha f i Tajrid al-Nasiha 3
Rumüz al-Kunüz 63
Kashf al-Asrär wa-Hatk al-Astär 64
Kashf Asrär al-Mantiq 42 Sahih (of Muslim) 39, 94, 135
Kashf al-Haqä'iq 63 Sahih (of Bukhäri) 39, 94
al-Shifä' 173
al-Mabähith al-Mashriqiyya 63
Maqälät 153 Tahäfut al-Faläsifa 153
 INDEX OF ARABI C TERMS

'äda 143 n. burhän inna 3m.

'ädiyyät 143
ähäd, see khabar wähid daläla xli, 119
ahl al-bida' 65 dalil (pl. adilla) 31, 47, 86, 99, 107,
ahl al-kaläm xiv, 15 I34n., 138, 146 n.
ahl al-ra'y 15 n. dalil 'aqli liiin.
ahl al-sunna wal-jamaa liiin. darüra 88
ahwäl 37 darüri i o n . , ioon., 167n.
ajnäs xv dawäm 61
ajzä' 18 dawarän 46, 125
akhbär mutawätira 88 n. dawr xxix, 138
see also tawätur and mutawätir dawr kawni 138
'aks 10, 46 dawr ma'i (iqtiräni) 35, 138
'aks muslawi 82, 83n., 141 dawr qabli 35 n., 138
'aks al-naqid 82, 141 see also tasalsul
äla qänüniyya 6 dhäl (pl. dhawät) 4 n . , 6 n . , 26, 98 n., 1
'älam al-mithäl xxv dhäti 5 n . , 9 n . , 14, 27n., 74n.
'aläma 128 didd 81
amära 86, 128
ämir xxvi faläsifa 4n.
anwä' xv falsafa xxiv
'aql 9n. far' 45 n.
'arad 'ämm xvi fard 'ayn 21
'arad läzim 26 n., 27 n., 98 n. fard kifäya 21
'aradi 9n. farq mu 'aththir 47
'aradi läzim ghayr muqawwim 29 n. fasl (pl. fusül) 5 n.
asl xxxvi, 45 n. faslmumayyiz 28
asmä' mushakkaka 76 fasl qarib 8n.
see also tashkik f i al-kathra xxi
asmä' mushtaraka 75 fiqh xxvin.
asmä' mutawäti'a 76 firäsa badaniyya 125
awwaliyyät 10 n. fitra (p\. filar) xl, 27, 110, 163, i ö 7 n .
äya (pl. äyät) 71, 136, 149 fitri 141, 163
a 'yän thäbita xxv fusül xvi
'ayn 74
gharizat al-'aql 5n.
ba'd al-kathra xxi ghayrmäni' ion., i6n.
badiha 72 see also mäni'
badihiyyät 'aqliyya 144
bil-fi'l 80 hadd xiv, 411., 511., 6 n . , I 9 n . , 2on., 21
bil-quwwa 80 61 n., 91
bi-shart al-itläq xxii ajzä' al-hadd 18
bi-shart lä shay' xxi hadd haqiqi 8
bi-shart nafy al-umür al-thubütiyya xxii hadd jämi' mäni' 171; see also jämi'
bi-tariq al-tashkik 74 and mäni'
see also tashkik hadd näqis 8n.
burhän daläla 46 hadd tämm xv, 8n.
burhän 'illa 46 al-jam' bil-hadd 47 n.
 Index of Arabic Terms 199
hads 36 khässa xvi, 9
hadsiyyät 144 khusüs 40
häl 53 kulli 'aqli xxi
see also ahwäl kullitabn xxi, 58n.
haqiqa xxii, 87 kulli mantiqi xxi
haqä'iq murakkaba 9
haqiqa 48, 75 lä bi-shart shay' xxi, xxii
see also majäz lafz xviii
hawäs 32 lä tufäriq 5n.
hayülä 25, 53 see also läzim
hayyiz 5311. läzim xvi
hikma 128 läzim ghayr mufäriq 18 n.
hikma 'amaliyya 6211., 66 see also lä tufäriq
hissiyyät 511., 142 luzüm 107, 136
hujja 3 o n . , 3 i n .
hukm (p. ahkäm) xxxvi, 311., 31 n., 4411., mabda' 74 n.
4511. ,49, 156, 157, 161 n. mädda 25, 68 n.
huwa bi-hä huwa xxii madlül 99
al-ma 'düm shay' thäbit fial- 'adam xxv
idtiräran, see darüra and "dm darüri mahall 53
ijtihäd liii, 3n. mähiyya 4n.
see also mujtahid juz'al-mähiyya 27n.
ikhtiläf al-faläsifa xlv mahmül 49, 95 n., 105 n.
ilghä' al-färiq 47 n. mahsüsät ion.
'ilia 31 n., 4 4 n . , 45, 4 7 n . , n o , 128, 159, majäz 48 n., 75
161 n. makän 25
'ilm bil-mawjüdät al-khärija xxxn. ma'mür xxvi
'ilm darüri 88 n. man' 146 n.
'ilm al-falak i66n. manät 156
'ilm al-hay'a 166 mäni' 11, 16, 88n., 9 8 n . , 99, 171
'ilm al-taqwim wal-ta'dil 140 mäni'at al-jam' 81
'ilm tasdiq 102, 157 mäni'at al-jam' wal-khulluww 81, 119
iltizäm xix mäni'at al-khuluww 81
imän 66 maqsad xviii
imkän dhihni 147 mashhürät 120, iÖ7n.
iqtiräni 80 mashrüt 69, 82, 108, 138
ishtiräk 75 see also shart
see also sharika matlüb 9, 31 n.
ism (pi. asmä") 20 n. mawdu 5 n . , 49, 53, 9 5 n . , I05n.
istithnä' 80 mawjüd 37 n.
mawsüf 107
jahl basit 132 n. mithäl 49 n., 51
jahlmurakkab I32n., 133 n. mizäj 125
jämi' u n . , 8 8 n . , 118, 164, 171 mu'ärada 11
jawhar 53 n. mu'arrif 128
jins sn. mu'aththir 128
jins 'äli 51 n. mu'aththirät 35
jins 'ämm 51 mu'aththir tämm 35 n.
jins ba'id 8 n . , 28 n. mubtada' 49, 95 n., 105 n.
jins qarib 8n.,28n. mudda 25, 68 n.
mufäriq xvi, 18n.
khabar 49, 95, 105 n., 166 ghayr mufäriq xvi, 18 n.
khabar wähid 17 mufrad 16
 200 Index of Arabic Terms 200

muhaqqiqün 12 n. qadiyya musallama 170

mujarrabät 144, 165 qarina (pl. qarä'in) I I , 17
mujarrada 147 qawl (pl. aqwäl) 5 n . , 90 n . , 91
mujtahid (pi. mujtahidün) liii, 3 qawl mu'allaf 91
see also ijtihäd qawl shärih 19 n.
munäsaba 4611. qisma, see taqsim
muntaqada 157 qiyäs 8, 48, 79, 80, 98, 161 n.
muqäbala 59, 137 qiyäs burhäni 4n.
muqaddarät dhihniyya 145, 157 qiyäs al-daläla 44 n., 117, 125
muqaddima (pi. muqaddimät) 3011. qiyäs al-damir 113
muqaddimät ma'lüma 30 n. qiyäs f i ma'nä al-asl Ii8n.
muqaddimät sädiqa wäjibat al- qiyäs fiqhi 48 n.
qabül 10 n. qiyäs hamli 80 n.
muqallid 311. qiyäs idmäri 125 n.
muqärina 57 qiyäs iqtiräni 80 n.
muqawwim xvi qiyäs murakkab 92, 104, 105n.
muqawwim lil-mähiyya 511., 18 qiyäs al-musäwät I2ön.
qiwäm 21 n. qiyäs shabah 117
murakkab 16 qiyäs al-shumül xiv
mushakkak, see tashkik qiyäs al-ta'lil (= qiyäs 'illa) 44, 117
mushtarak 171 qiyäs tamthil xxxvin.
see also ishtiräk and sharika qiyäs tard wa-'aks 161
mutäbaqa xixn.
mutafalsifa 4n. rasm xvi, 9 n . , I 9 n . , 25, 61 n.
mutahayyiz 53 al-rusüm al-järiya majrä al-hudüd 9n.
mutakkalimün 12 n.
see also ahl al-kaläm sabab xvi
mutawäti' 7 6 - 7 sabr wa-taqsim 45, 119, 123
mutawätir (pl. mutawätirät) 11 n., 32, salaf Iii, 74
3 3 n . , 3 5 , 144 sharika 54
mutlaq xxi shart 47, 69, 82, 108, 138
mutlaq bi-shart al-itläq xxi see also bi-shart and mashrüt
muttarida 56 sifät 107
sifät wujüdiyya 81 n.
al-nafs al-ammära I44n. sinä'at ahkäm al-nujüm i66n.
al-nafs al-lawwäma 144 n. sinä'at al-hadd 13
al-nafs al-mutma'inna 144 n.
al-nafs al-nätiqa 144 tabi'iyya 42
naqd 10, 98 n. tadäkhul 142 n.
naqid 81, 82, 8 3 n . , 98 tadammun xix
natija 31 n. tafsir al-kaläm wa-sharhih 19 n.
nazari 35 n. tahaqqaqa 48
nubuwwat al-tashri' 62 n. tahaqquq 73
nuzzär 12 tahstl mä laysa bi-häsil 101
tajriba 32
qabl al-kathra xxi takäfu al-adilla 30
qadäyä hudüduhä ma'ahä l68n. takhsis 98
qadäyä qiyäsätuhä ma'ahä 168 takhtari' xvii
qadiyya 91 taläzum xxxvi, xxxviii, 141 n.
qadiyya khabariyya 15 ta'lif xv
qadiyya maqbüla 170 tanqih al-manät Ii8n.
qadiyya mashhüra 170 taqlid 18, 2 6 n . , 122
qadiyya maznüna 170 see also muqallid
 Index of Arabic Terms 260

taqsim 75, 1 4 m . 'ulüm falakiyya 166

taqslm wa-tardid 119 'umüm 40
tard 10, 46 •urf 19
lard wa-'aks 88, 123, 161 n. usul al-din 48
tarjama 20 usül al-fiqh xxxiii, liii n., 48
tasalsulfi al-mu 'aththirät 35 n.
tasalsul muqärin 35 n. wad' xvii
tasalsul muta'äqib 3511. Wahdat al-Wujüd xii, xiii
tasawwur (sing, tasawwurät) xv, 4 n . , 5, wähid 16 n.
14 wahmiyyät 120, 167 n.
tasawwur tämm 9 waläyä 62 n.
tasdiq (pl. tasdiqät) xv, 4 n . , 5, 3on., 31, wasf mustalzim 128
102, 131 n. wujüd 5n.
tashkik xxvi n., 74, 76 n. wujüd kulli xxii, 55 n.
tawätur n , 17n., 32n., 33 n., 166 wujüd mutlaq 53
see also mutawätir
yartasim xx
'ulüm al-awä'il xiii yutäbiq xxiii
 GENERAL INDEX

'Abd al-Jabbär, Abu al-Hasan Descartes, R. xlviii

al-Asadabädi 64 dialecticians 96, 99, 119
'Abd al-Räziq, Su'äd Ivi, Ivii
Abraham 68, 7 8 - 9 , 85, 162 Epicurus xxxix
Alexander the Great 103, 104, 122 Ess, Joseph van xlii
Alexander the son of Darius 104 Euclid 55
Alexandria 4 European philosophers xlviii
'All b. A b i Tälib 138
Ämidl, Sayf al-DIn xiv, i , 6 3 n . , 7 0 , 138,
Färäbi, Abü Nasr xiv, lviii, 153
149
Farghäni, Sa'Id xxvi
Apollonius xiii Färid, Abü al-Najä xliv
Arberry, A. J. lviii Farrä', Abü Ya'lä, see Ibn al-Farrä'
Archelaos xxxix
Ariston of Chios xxxix, xl, xli, xlviii
Galen 166
Aristotle xiv, xv, xvii, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii,
Ghazäli, Abü Hamid 1, lviii, 12, 20, 46,
xxxv, xli, xlviii, Iii n., liii n., 12, 57,
65, 68, 70, 103, 104, 122, 130, 132, 48, 57n., 58, 64, i o o n . , i n , i 3 9 n . ,
144, 152, 154-5, 166, 173 153, 154, 162 n.
Aristotelian realism xlvi grammarians 7, 8, 91, 96, 111
Ash'ari, Abü al-Hasan xliv, 12, 153 Greeks xi, xxxix, xlii, xlviii, 101, 103-4,
Ash'ari, Abü Müsä 39 122, 135, 153, 162
Ash'aris xiv, 12, 76, 131, 153 S
Avicenna, see Ibn SInä Haydarabad lv
Hellenic tradition xiv
Bacon, F. xlix Hermetic philosophy xiii
Baghdad!, Abü al-Barakät xiv, xlvi, xlvii, Hill!, Ibn Muttahar 63 n.
lviii, 55, 122 Hulagu 169
Bäqilläni, Abü Bakr xliv, 12, 64, 153
Bätinis 75, 104 Ibn 'Aqll, Abü al-Wafä' 13
Berkeley, G. xlix Ibn 'ArabI, Muhyi al-Din xii, xiii, xxii,
Bombay lv, lvi, lvii xxiv, xxv, xxvi, 24n., 62n.
Brahman creed xliii Ibn Asbät, Yüsuf 67
British empiricists xlviii Ibn 'Ayyäsh, Ibrähim xliv
British philosophy xlix Ibn al-Farrä', Abü Ya'lä 13, 64
Brown, Thomas xlix Ibn Fürak, Abü Bakr 12, 64
Bukhäri, Abü 'Abd Alläh Muhammad Ibn Hanbai, Ahmad 67
112 Ibn al-Haysam 13
Büsiri, 'Ali al-Shäfi'I Iviin. Ibn Hazm, 'All 48
Ibn al-Jarräh, Waki' 67
Campbell, G. xlix Ibn Karräm, Muhammad 12 n.
Christ 33 n., 103, 148, 162, 170 Ibn al-Khayyät 24 n.
Christian dogma xliv Ibn Malkä, see Baghdad!, Abü al-Barakät
Christianity xliv Ibn Masarra xiii
Christians xliv, liin., 14, 33, 64, 78, 103, Ibn al-Mubärak, 'Abd Alläh 67
104, 122, 130, 152, 167, 170, 173 Ibn Qäsim, 'Abd al-Rahmän lv
Cyrenaics xxxix Ibn Qäsim, Muhammad lv
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya xliii
Dar al-Kutub al-Azhariyya lv, lvi Ibn Qudäma, Muwaffaq al-Din 46, 48
 General Index 203
Ibn Rushd, Abu al-Walid xlv, lviii, 68, Lukasiewicz, Jan xxxviii n.
ioon.
Ibn Sab'In, Muhyl al-DIn 'Abd al-Haqq Magian creed xliii
xii, xxiv Magians 104
Ibn al-Saläh, 'Uthmän b. ' A b d Ma'mün, the caliph 162
al-Rahmän xliv Maqdisi, see Ibn Qudäma
Ibn al-Shirshir, Abu al-'Abbäs al-Näshi' Mattä b. Yünus xlii, xliii, 100
al-Akbar xlii, 75 Mäturidls xlv
Ibn SInä xii, xiii, xiv, xvii, xx, xxi, xxii, Mill, J. S. xlix
xxv, xlv, xlvi, 1, liiin., lviii, 20, 53, Moses 33n., 78, 162, 170
61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 77, 78, 107, Müsawl, Hibat Alläh 13 n.
108, 113, 122, 149, 153, 167, 172, 173 Muslim, Abü al-Hasan b. al-Hajjäj 112,
Avicennian neoplatonists xxi 135
Avicennian realism xlvi Mu'tazills xxv, xlii, xlv, 12, I3n., 2 4 n . ,
Ibn Surayj, Ahmad b . ' U m a r 139n. 65, 75. 77. 153
Ibn Wäsil, Muhammad 59 mystical pantheism xxiv, xxvi
Ikhwän al-Safä' xiii see also Süfls and Ittihädl Süfis
Imäm al-Haramayn, see Juwaynl
India lv
Namrüd b. Kan'än 78
Indian philosophy xiii NasafI, Maymün 13
Isfarälnl, Abu Ishäq 12, 64 Nashshär, 'All Säml lv, lvi, lvii
Ishräql theory of universals xxv Näshi' al-Akbar, see Ibn al-Shirshir
Ismä'llls liiin., 63, 64n., 66 Nawbakhti, Hasan b. Müsä xlii, xliii,
Ittihädl Süfls xii xlviii, I 3 n . , 154, 155
see also Süfis Neoplatonism xiii, 57n.
Nicomachus xiii
Jäbir b. Hayyän xiii nominalism xlvi
Jahmls xxiv, 6 6 - 7 , 75, 131 Nuwwäb Siddlq Hasan Khän lv
Jews 14, 33, 64, 67, 78, 103, 104, 122,
130, 152, 167, 173 Occam, William xlix
Jllänl, 'Abd Alläh xlix
JIII, 'Abd al-Qädir xii
Patzig, G. xxxviii n.
Jubayr b. Mut'im 136
Peripatetics xlvi, Ii
Jubbä'i, Abü 'All 13, 75
Philip the Macedonian 103, 104
Jubbä'I, Abü Häshim 13
Pickthall, M. M. lviii
Judaism Hin.
Plato xiv, xxxix, 57
jurists 19, 44, 45. 76, 79. 99. 130, 138 Ptolemy 140, 166
Juwaynl, Imäm al-Haramayn 1, 13, 46, 47 Ptolemaic doctrines xiii
Pythagoras xiii, 56
Karmatianism 66
Karmatians 104
Qadaris 131
Karrämls 12, 13 n., 76, 153
Qirqisäni, Ya'qüb b. Ishäq xliv
Khizänat al-Kutub al-Äsafiyya lv
Qünawi, A h m a d b. Mas'üd xii, xxii, xxiv
Khünajl, Muhammad 42, 132
Khusrawshähi, Shams al-DIn 151
Khuwärizmi, Muhammad b. Müsä 59 n., Rabat lv, lvi, lvii
138 Räfidis xxv, 63, 65, 104, 121, 153
Kindi, Ya'qüb b. Ishäq 113 Ramus, Petrus xlviii
Küshyär al-Daylaml 140 Räzi, Fakhr al-DIn xiv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii,
Kutubl, 'Abd al-Samad lv, lvi lviii, 14, 20, 46, 68, 70, 108, 149, 151,
i67n.
legal theoreticians 8, 45, 48, 101, 119 Rescher, N. xliv
Locke, J. xviii Rüml, Sadr al-DIn xxvi
204 General Index

Sanchez, Francois xlviii Ta'llmls 112

Sceptics xli, xlii, xlvii Tatars 169
Sextus Empiricus xxviii, xxixn., xxxix, Temple, W. xlviii
xl, xli, xlviii theologians xiv, 1, lviii, 3 n . , 8, 12, 14, 15,
Shahrastänl, 'Abd al-Karim 64 33, 46, 50, 51, 53, 62, 66, 70, 79, 86,
Shi'is xiv, xlv, 1, 12, 66, 153 99, 104, 112, 121 n., 131, 148, 153-4,
SIräfT, Abü Sa'id xlii, xliii, 100 169, 172, 173
Smiley, T . xxxviiin. Tilimsäni, Sulaymän b. 'Ali xii, xxiv,
Socrates xxxix xxvi
Sophists xli Tirmidhi, Abü 'Isä 140, 152
speculative mysticism xxiv, xxxix Turks 104
see also Süfls and Ittihädi Süfls Tüsl, Abü Ja'far 13
Stoics xiv, xli Tüsi Nasir al-DIn xlv, lviii, 70
Stoicism xiii
Stoic logic xxxix, xl Urmawi, Mahmüd b. Abi Bakr xiv
Süfls xiv, xxvii, 1, lviii, 12, 66, 76, 121 n.
Süfism xiii Yemen lv
SuhrawardI, Shihäb al-Din xlv, xlvi, xlvii, Yüsuf b. Asbät 67
xlviii, 20, 54, 70
Suyütl, Jaläl al-DTn xlix, liii, liv, lv, lvii, Zaydl Imäms lv
3 n . , 24, 26, 55 n., I29n., 141 n., Zeller, E. xl
167n., 174 Zeno xxxix