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JAMAILA DAGCUTAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (CASE DIGESTS)
(TUE-WED) 6:30-8:30 PM CLASS

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION


MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

ISSUES:
Whether Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony

RULING:
It is a self-executing provision. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

10, second par., Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become
a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.


OPOSA VS FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was
filed as a taxpayer's class against defendant Secretary of DENR. Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the
full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question. The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling
that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.

ISSUES:
Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action
Whether the complaint raises a political issue


RULING:
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
Thus, right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence,
the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. After careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon
the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
























 KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

FACTS:
This suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. Petitioners maintain that the Equipment
Lease Agreement is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in
the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case, that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding
because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, §1 (e), that the power to determine whether the
ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO, that for lack of funds
the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract, that
what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the
Court as their forum.

ISSUE:
Whether the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corp. is invalid

RULING:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:
The ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office; Under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association,
collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itself holds or conducts such lottery; and the ELA
in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.

E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not
refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in §§ 6 and 7 but they
refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings
or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O.
No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract
of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of
purchase and sale.














 FRANCISCO VS HR SPEAKER
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution
Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

RULING:
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.


 JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, through his Cabinet and respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not
a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.
1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUE:
Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore
non-justiciable

RULING:
To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.



















 SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

FACTS:
Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted a petition for quo warranto seeking to oust Senator Guingona as minority
leader of the Senate and to declare Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

The Senate convened for the first regular session for the eleventh Congress. The agenda was the election of
officers. Senator Fernan gaining majority vote of 20 to 2, was declared as the President of the Senate. Sen.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and thus also a
minority, had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the court the subject petition for quo warranto
alleging that Sen. Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and execising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Sen. Tatad.

ISSUE:
Whether the court have jurisdiction over the petition
Whether there was an actual violation of the Constitution
Whether Sen. Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of senate minority leader
Whether Sen. Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Sen. Guingona as the minority leader

RULING:
YES, the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate of its officials committed a violation of the constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their function or prerogatives.

NO, there was no violation. The court may only inquire as to whether an act of congress or its officials has been
with grave abuse of discretion. The constitution is clear regarding the manner of electing the Senate President
and a House Speaker but is silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chamber of Congress.
The method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the court. The constitution vests in each house the
power to determine the rules of its proceedings. The court has no authority to interfere into the exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold.

NO, there was no usurpation. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof
of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate,
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader,
he was recognized as such by the Senate President.

Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for
acts done within their competence and authority.

 BONDOC VS PINEDA
201 SCRA 792

FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the HRET which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC
and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, a decision had been reached in
which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him
that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:
Whether the House of Representatives may change the dominant political party’s representation in the House
Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest
pending therein
Whether the Supreme Court may review and annul that action of the House

RULING:
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc,
is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of
the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member
of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor
of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong
arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor
indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

 ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
63 PHIL 136

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the
most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No
8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of
protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec.
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition. Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain
and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
Whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction

RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4
Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.


















 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY VS COMELEC
GR no. 159139 January 13, 2004

FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436. On October
29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved
to conduct biddings for the three phases of its Automated Election System:

Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System;
Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing System;
Phase III-Electronic Transmissions.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5 billion to fund the AES
for May 10, 2004 elections and an additional P 500 million upon request of the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued
an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”. There are 57 bidders who participated therein. The Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both
of them were referred to the Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST).
Nevertheless, the DOST stated that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks during
the technical evaluation. However, despite their failures, the COMELEC en banc still issued Resolution No. 6074,
awarding the project to MPC. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a letter to the
COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. wherein they protested the award of the contract to respondent MPC.
However, the COMELEC rejected the protest.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to MPC in violation of law
and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure

RULING:
YES, the petitioners have locus standi. Our nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance,
pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of
this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest”. It is of "paramount public interest"
and "transcendental importance”. This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the
liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society.

The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 serves to eliminate the prematurity
issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. Such letter-
protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because
it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings (1) by allowing
MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding
the contract to MPC/MPEI. It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by
permitting the winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantive amendment
without public bidding.





THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

MAGALLONA VS ERMITTA
G.R. No. 187167 August 16, 2011

FACTS:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties.

RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as
“regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.

ISSUES:
Whether RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional

RULING:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost
points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters.
RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.

No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding
the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends
to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is
further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic
waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe
the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or
producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

 TECSON VS COMELEC
G.R NO. 161434 MARCH 3, 2004

FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on
9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated
with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUE:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the
Philippines



RULING:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date,
month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations
made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them
on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe
was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.







































 MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In
the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines,
she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip
to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in
his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On
25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action
for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name
any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen



RULING:
YES. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided
that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)



















 VALLES VS COMELEC
337 SCRA 543

FACTS:
In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
petition. When Lopez ran for re-election in 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor
of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to
run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle
of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and
that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No.
95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an
Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself
with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No.
404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is a Filipino
If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian
passport
Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic
Act 7160

RULING:
YES. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

NO. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact
that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. As held by this court in the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country
has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose
or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through theprocess of
repatriation does not hold water.

The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for
a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares
that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of
candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent
was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As
aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual
citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.


















 BENGSON III VS HRET
G.R. NO. 142840 MAY 7, 2001

FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country.” Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who
was then running for re-election.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE:
Whether Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING:
YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen by naturalization, repatriation, and by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to desertion of the armed
forces, services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II, service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality which means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship.

CO VS HRET
199 SCRA 692

FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the
congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for
the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in
its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

ISSUE:
Whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines

RULING:
YES. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a
resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-
Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan
never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-
up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a
Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of
the local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in
search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong
graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank
of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as
a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution
removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the
article on this subject.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article
IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973,
if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.



















 LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 221677-221670 MARCH 11, 2006

FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally adopted by FPJ and Susan
Roces in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then
based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. Before assuming her post as appointed
Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her
bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banccancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her
COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that Poe is qualified as candidate
for presidency.

ISSUES:
Whether Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
Whether Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

RULING:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are
typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein
there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s
bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec
4 of the Rules on Evidence.

The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements
of animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.


FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
257 SCRA 731

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he
was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really
wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.















 TABASA VS CA
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006

FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father became a
naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter,
he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request
with the BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal
charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with
the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
BID.

ISSUE:
Whether he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is not an undocumented
alien subject to deportation.


RULING:
NO. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person entitled to
repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien,
or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.

Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in his case because
he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to
children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.


MERCADO VS MANZANO
307 SCRA 630

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground that he is both
an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC
granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code
RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position.

RULING:
NO, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.













JACOT VS DAL & COMELEC
G.R. NO 179848

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he
failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who
became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225.



ISSUE:
Whether Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor



RULING:
NO. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for
those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.


AASJS MEMBER CALILANG VS DATUMANONG
G.R. NO. 160869

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act
Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

ISSUE:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional
Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

RULING:
NO. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern
of Rep. Act No. 9225.



 CO KIM CHAM VS TAN KEH
75 PHIL 133

FACTS:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the
time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines
in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no
de facto government.

ISSUE:
Whether judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces

Whether the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.

Whether those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and
proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation

RULING:
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after
the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.

The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but
also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into
consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all
judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments
during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other
government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law.

Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course
as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country
which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And
Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with
the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of
nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will
permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.


LAWYER’S LEAGUE VS AQUINO
G.R. NO. 73748

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have a personality to sue
Whether the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate

RULING:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the
judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners
did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.


GP VS MONTE PIEDAD
G.R. NO 9959

FACTS:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to
$400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid,
$80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital,
petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The
respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit
against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold
or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the
cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only
by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

ISSUES:
Whether the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the
reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

RULING:
Pursuant to the doctrine of Parens Patriae, the government being the protector of the rights of the people has
the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation
of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged
in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The
beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to
the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to
exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative
department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.


 TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. NO. 118295

FACTS
The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippines Senate to the President’s Ratification of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. It was contended that the agreement places nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the
Filipino First Policy.

Petitioners maintained that this Agreement was an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because
it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare
if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.

RULING:
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family
of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda —
international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation
but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties xxx. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment
of the obligations undertaken.

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuality
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions
enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.















 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP PEACE PANEL
G.R. NO. 183591

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself:
a) To create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) To revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) To concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

RULING:
The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.

The concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,”
the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.







 PERALTA VS DIRECTOR OF PRISON
75 PHIL 285

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas
corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the
aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights
of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional

RULING:
YES. It is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the
power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such,
the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having
ceased to be valid.


LAUREL VS MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto
was then suspended.

ISSUE:
Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was then suspended

RULING:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or
society which constitute the state).




 REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 83

FACTS:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The Court of First Instance
in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines.

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan,
and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award
in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the said decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon
City and Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the
strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine
Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees,
pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

ISSUES:
Whether the state can be sued without its consent
Whether the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid

RULING:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence
to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private
parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted.

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. From a logical
and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of
a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.








 TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
125 SCRA 302

FACTS
The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice 2087 advertising for public hearing a certain tract of public forest land.
Petitioner submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond.
Later that year, President Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to convert
the land into a forest reserve for watershed purposes. The Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
General Memorandum No. 46 granting ordinary timber license where the area is not more than 3,000 hectares.
This was subsequently revoked by General Memorandum No. 60.

ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of State immunity applies in this case

RULING:
YES. Petitioners not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is
a suit against the State which cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent.


REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO
148 SCRA 424

FACTS:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the Philippines to dismiss
the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of
a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private
property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the
trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under
claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the
day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow them to present
their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate
Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without
its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

ISSUE:
Whether the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land


RULING:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.
A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed
against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed
by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon
a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the
complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.

PNB VS PABALA
83 SCRA 595

FACTS:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon
Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave
abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character
and therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of
non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

ISSUES:
Whether Philippine National Bank can be sued
Whether the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank
is valid

RULING:
In this case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When
the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity
and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be
made the object of a notice of garnishment.
PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has
entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect
can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB are subject for garnishment. Funds of public corporations
which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution should be imposed
immediately.





 DA VS NLRC
NOVEMBER 11, 1993

FACTS:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture as filed and requested by National Labor
Relations Commission.

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to
be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were
deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal
the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims,
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from
suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

RULING:
NO. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be
sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.”
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity
when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.











 SANDERS VS VERIDIANO
162 SCRA 88

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City.
Private respondents, Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers, are American citizens permanently residing in the
Philippines and were employed as game room attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On
October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent
full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent part-time plus back wages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and, thus,
filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages

RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment,
work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the
official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as
officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private
respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of
which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

MOBILE PHIL INC. VS CUSTOMS ARRASTRES SERVICE
18 SCRA 1120

FACTS:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The
shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs
then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case plus other damages.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary
functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.


ISSUES:
Whether both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state immunity

RULINGS:
YES, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages
involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that
the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily
result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government
entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing
Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be filed.

PNB VS CIR
81 SCRA 314

FACTS:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the
counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the
order assailed is challenged on two grounds:
That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law and
That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to quash,
petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment which was denied for the lack of
merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated
May 6, 1970.” The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

ISSUES:
Whether the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion

RULING:
NO. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that the funds could
be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from
garnishment.

As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government owned
and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It
may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME
195 SCRA 692

FACTS:
The case was filed by petitioner, which was a municipal corporation under and in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand
truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven
by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a
result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a
Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its
answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription
of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause
of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver
of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed
for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss

RULING:
YES. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial.
However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered
a decision against the municipality and its driver.

The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily
failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict
committed by its regular employee.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never
be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the
driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.




 MERRUIT VS GPI
34 PHIL 311

FACTS:
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741 together with the costs of the cause.

Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance which
turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured.
His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking
a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his
occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized
the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:
Whether the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against it
Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government

RULING:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special
agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by Justice Story of United States “The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest.”


USA VS GUINTO
82 SCRA 644

FACTS:
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607,
private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering
services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust operation for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of
the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by the
respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of
state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are immune from suit




RULING:
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They cannot
be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners
are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by
private persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR
No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident.


REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
G.R. NO. 54705

FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement
includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the
respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-
defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from
suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement

RULING:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate
test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is
no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the
respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.












 USA VS RUZ
136 SCRA 487

FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United
States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded
to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed
this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was
signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein
informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity

RULING:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without
its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The correct
test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of
the act













 FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
G.R. NO. L-6060

FACTS:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging
that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing
to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-
payment of the instalments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract
of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of
the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all
his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued
for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged
to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by
virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that
when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to
the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action
to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the
Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel
mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint
in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the
vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short,
by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes
down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.










 AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
43 SCRA 360

FACTS:
Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo
Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case in CFI
Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government
cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such. CFI rendered a decision
which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus
dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent

RULING:
YES. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot.

Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

STATE PRINCIPLES & POLICIES

BASCO VS PAGCOR
G.R. NO. 91649 MAY 14, 1991

FACTS:
PD 1869 is the charter which created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. PAGCOR was created
to enable the government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. Section 13 par 2 of the decree exempts PAGCOR, franchise holder from paying any “tax of any
kind or form, income or otherwise… whether national or local”. According to the petitioners, this waived the
Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees which is recognized by law.


ISSUE:
Whether the exemption clause of PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy


RULING:
The city of Manila, being a municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state which has the inherent
power of the state to tax.
The court added that since one of the roles of PAGCOR is to regulate gambling casinos,
this “places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the government…” PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempted from local taxes, otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded, or subjected to
control by a mere local government.

The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a state concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the state to retain it or delegate it to local government.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 148334 JANUARY 21, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were
conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were
proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona,
who vacated a seat in the senate.

Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the
13th elected senator.

ISSUE:
Whether Court had jurisdiction

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity
of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasan’s right in
the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA
6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in
case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not
informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there
had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct
of the Comelec.






 KURODA VS JALADONI
83 PHIL 171

FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines is charged before the military commission with war crimes. The
petitioner tenders that National War Crimes Office established by Executive Order 68 has no jurisdiction over
his case since the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention. He also claimed that Melville Hussey
and Robert Port are not attorneys authorized to practice law in the Philippines and that they do not have
personality as prosecution since the United Stated is not a pary in interest in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague
Convention

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the order is valid and constitutional in pursuant to Section 3 Article 2 of the
Constitution.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part and are wholly
based on generally accepted principles of international law. Such rules and procedures therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed in the Philippines was under
the sovereignty of the United States and thus were equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. This rights and
obligations were not erased by the assumption of full sovereignty.

Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the rules of court. There is
nothing in the said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before the said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines.


PHILIP MORRIS VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 91332 JULY 16, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in the Philippines and
registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners
moved to enjoin respondent Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol
‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners relied on Section
21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court
denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines,
respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner. CA granted the injunction but on a
subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.

ISSUE:
Whether there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right of property to such trademark or trade name

RULING:
NO. There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of
the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the
Philippines.

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-
requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.

In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in
the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the
foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.


GOVERNMENT OF USA VS PURUGANAN
G.R. NO. 148571

FACTS:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such
warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:
Whether the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

RULING:
NO. The court agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its
laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.










 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 115

FACTS:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial
declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality
of the Act.

ISSUE:
Whether a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

RULING:
YES, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no
conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or
amends RA No. 2207, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency."

Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the
Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice
and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542
indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government
has already constituted valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between
RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether the executive agreements may be validated in our courts

RULING:
NO. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.


EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
251 SCRA 569

FACTS:
Actions were filed regarding the issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and
reciting the patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act
No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry
against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v.
Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system
of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt
school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or
non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.

ISSUE:
Whether the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified. Religious freedom is
a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
“external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.


AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
64 PHIL 201

FACTS:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.

The petitioner, in the fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney,
the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing.
The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part remained unsold.

The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the commemorative
postage stamps. It was provided therein that, ‘No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.’

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation of church and state

RULING:
NO. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the purest principles of morality,
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order
to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under
a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs.
Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court
in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny
the petition for a writ of prohibition.

 YMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. NO. 294819

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following grounds:

ISSUE:
Whether the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn
Whether the RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products
Whether the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom
Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude
Whether the RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law
Whether the RH Law violates the right to free speech
Whether the RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution
Whether the RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

RULING:
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution’s
plain and ordinary meaning, the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins
at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly
take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure preventing abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law
is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce
abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate
under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729. Meanwhile, the requirement
of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been
tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective”.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would
violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of
e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion
of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in
their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise
their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to
that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen
in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health
care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono. Besides, the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt
from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise









LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
270 SCRA 106

FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”. MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the
petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the People’s Initiative
is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term
limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of
people’s initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence
the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

RULING:
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition. Since
the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the
petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition
was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and
the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago
notwithstanding Roco’s petition. COMELEC did not even act on Roco’s petition. In the final analysis, when the
system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a
nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be recalled that intervenor Roco
filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them
to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996,
it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting
the case for hearing.










 MACIAS VS COMELEC
32 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan
and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented
to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their
respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege
that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because it was passed without printed final copies which must be
furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage, it was approved more than 3
years after the return of the last census of the population and it apportioned districts without regard to the
number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

ISSUES:
Whether the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is in accordance with the
constitution

RULING:
NO. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said
constitutional provision in several ways namely:
It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only.
It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only
Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having been
assigned to it.
Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only.
Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three.
Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got
two. These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment.
Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then,
Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with
967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.


















 MARIANO VS COMELEC
GR NO 118577

FACTS:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854 as unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said
to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI,
Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return
of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI
of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

ISSUE:
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

RULING:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new
city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner
cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides
that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since
it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. 


VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS COMELEC 3
42 SCRA 244

FACTS:
The first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of
123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated. The COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list
representatives from 12 parties and organizations, which had obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to APEC, which obtained 5.5% of
the votes. 

PAG-ASA filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the 20% membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the 2% vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would
defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House. Thereafter, 9 other party-list organizations filed their
respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they
filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas
OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

The COMELEC
Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by 80%
district representatives and twenty 20% party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the
2% vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the
party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up”.

ISSUE: 
Whether
the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling
Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time

RULING:
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties,
organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements
of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.

The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard
an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge
the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law find lobby for
its approval and enactment by the legislature.

The system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors
of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage the multi-party system."
Considering these elements, but ignoring the 2% threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-
list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least 1 representative." 

In the suits, made respondents
together with the COMELEC were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll
body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought
the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had
obtained at least 2%of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them. On the contention that a strict application of
the 2%threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been
the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes,
but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context
of the actual election process.
 
In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. 
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote
and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Having determined that the 20% seat allocation is merely
a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the 2% vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled to.











 BANAT VS COMELEC
GR NO 179271

FACTS:
BANAT filed a petition before the NBC because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher
asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941.
On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional
Whether the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional
Whether the Constitution prohibits the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections

RULING:
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from
being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections. 

In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 isunconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates
the attainment of the permissive ceiling. 

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the
two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of
the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat
cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. 

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a
political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate
in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections
in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

 TOBIAS VS ABALOS
239 SCRA 106

FACTS:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of
the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district. The petitioners contended that
the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject
one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional
district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided
by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided
in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 7675 violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of representatives

RULING:
The contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the
section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

With regards, to the contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said
Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district















 ATONG PAGLAUM INC. VS COMELEC
GR NO 203766

FACTS:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013
party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized
or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists

RULING:
NO. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order
to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or
regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery
– unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only
reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups
from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5
of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and
do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.









 98:e0:d9:a0:53:af
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is
not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao
has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with
the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City but it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also
while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district. Sema was a
congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato. Later, Sema was contending
that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the
voting. She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province, that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9054 is unconstitutional
Whether ARMM can create validly LGUs

RULING: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. The creation of any of the four local government units, province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM
cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population
requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province
of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not
cities and provinces.



 BAGABUYO VS COMELEC
GR NO 176970

FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately
to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether a plebiscite was required in the case at bar

RULING:
NO, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de
Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries
of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s
territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment
or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro
now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means
better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.


















 MARCOS VS COMELEC
SEPTEMBER 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was 7 months.

Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as
she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.

The COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections based on
the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.



ISSUE:
Whether Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement
to be eligible in running as representative

RULING:
YES. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince
the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot
be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte



 AQUINO VS COMELEC
GR NO. 120265

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second
District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art.
VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman

RULING:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he
must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of
candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his
certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of
petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac
to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.


SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
GR NO. 157870

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9165 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of 5 qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug
test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional

RULING:
NO. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision “no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise
of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.


FLORES VS DRILON
223 SCRA 568

FACTS:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of
the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of
Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUE:
Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment
or designation of elective officials to other government posts
Whether the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an
excepted circumstance

RULING:
YES, Sec. 7 of Art IX-B of the Constitution Provides that No elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post. This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment
in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.

NO. Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.


 AEVELINO VS CUENCO
83 PHIL 17

FACTS:
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters,
they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could
deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu
propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers.

Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-
tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session
which suggestion was carried unanimously.
The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.

Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution No. 68, and submitted his motion
for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly
elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate

ISSUE:
Whether the court has jurisdiction on subject matter
Whether Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved
Whether the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines Senate and oust
respondent

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against the doctrine of
separation of powers.

In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the House”,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority of all the members of the Senate
less one, constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. At any session hereafter held with thirteen
or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.


ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
GR NO 127255

FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, whichamends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption andmoved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.



ISSUE:
Whether RA 8240 is void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House 



RULING:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved.

No rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter
of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there
was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established
the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

OSMENA VS PENDATUN
109 PHIL 863

FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. He disparaged then
President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower
house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the
resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter
and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether Osmeña’s immunity has been violated

RULING:
NO. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees
the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 126055

FACTS:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said
to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified.
Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for
provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution




RULING:
YES. Section 13 of RA 3019 provides: Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple
or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been
held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may
be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

ABBAS VS ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
166 SCRA 651

FACTS:
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC.
The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later
on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate
the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —-
requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso
that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if
not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of
this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight

RULING:
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate,
the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating
in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.


GUINGONA VS GONZALES
GR NO 106971

FACTS:
The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission
on Appointments is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the
Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5
to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate

ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18



RULING:
The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is
not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not
in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate
to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full
complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and
that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art VI, Sec. 18 is that there
must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement
allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of
proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even
if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted,
so long as it has the required quorum.


DAZA VS SINGSON
180 SCRA 496

FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments


RULING:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, the authority of the House of Representatives to change
its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments
and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.















 MANALO VS SISTOZA
312 SCRA 239

FACTS:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine
National Police are to be appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including
Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office.

Pres. Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said
appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the
validity of the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission, Sistoza et al are
acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.

He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also
insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried
out by the courts.

ISSUE:
Whether Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid

RULING:
NO. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and as
much as possible, courts must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by
Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution. Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four
groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President.

There is also no merit to the contention that PNP officers are akin to officers of the armed forces. Sections 26
and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the Constitution. Courts have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the
fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.


PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by
his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons. Jalosjos avers that his
constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government
to respect his mandate.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
and to leave his cell

RULING:
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a
free man. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system. All persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

The court finds that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.












 JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876

FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place
him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang
to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune
from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even
libelous.

ISSUE:
Whether the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.

RULING:
NO. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused
the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.















TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. NO. 179817

FACTS:
July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials.

On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.

4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in
the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests". The trial court denied all the
requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:
Whether membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general

RULING:
NO, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
be released on bail or on recognizance. Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.














PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
113 SCRA 31

FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero claiming that the votes were not properly counted –
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased
ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner
Sixto de Guzman, Jr. to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance
as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel before any administrative body. This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as
counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene,
not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies

RULING:
NO, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from
appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself
as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented
himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere
workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done
indirectly.



















POWERS OF CONGRESS

PEOPLE VS VERA
65 PHIL 56

FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the
he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act
of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be
an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUES:
Whether Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power

RULING:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non-
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.









 US VS ANG TANG HO
43 PHIL 1

FACTS:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing
the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.

Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was
charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

RULING:
YES. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause”
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,”
and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not
specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,”
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of
the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-
General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
















 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
166 SCRA 533

FACTS:
The petitioner challenges the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA on the principal
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan,
March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA
but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air
Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers.

Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

ISSUE:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative power

RULING:
NO. There was no principle violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a)
of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate
legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in’
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.




 PELAEZ VS AUDITOR-GENERAL
15 SCRA 569

FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create
a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created
by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.

RULING:
NO. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public
welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
and NOT the creation of municipality. The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative.






 TATAD VS DOE
281 SCRA 353

FACTS:
The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996.” Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power

RULING:
Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two
accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15
can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180
that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable.


KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS GARCIA JR.
239 SCRA 386

FACTS:
The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity of a memorandum which,
among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed
transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB, and without hearing and approval thereof
by said agency.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of notice and hearing and the delegation of authority in the increase or decrease of
transportation fares to provincial bus and jeepney operators is illegal?

RULING:
Under Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today,
is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order 202.

The authority given by the LTFRB to the bus operators to set fares over and above the authorized existing fare
is illegal and invalid, as it is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative authority. Under the maxim potestas
delegate non delegari potest – “what has been delegated cannot be delegated.”

The policy allowing provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares would result not only to a chaotic
situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators
who may increase fares, every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or
whenever they deem it necessary to do so. Furthermore, under the Section 16 (a) of Public Service Act, there
must be proper notice and hearing in the fixing of rates, to arrive at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to
both the public utility and the public.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SEPTEMBER 1, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4,
5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions
have been satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent
(1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable
upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that
the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary
of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such
that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.

RULING:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.


 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
GR NO. 166715

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their
best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix
an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President

RULING:
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test
and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover,
the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.

BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF.
The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request
for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has
been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had
been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds
into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds
are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted
by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUE:
Whether the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional
Whether presidential pork barrel system is constitutional



RULING:
NO, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only
the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have
to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it
by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which
he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such
system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after
the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.
It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.

YES, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork
barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR
and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869
(as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures
shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

ARAULLO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR NO. 209287

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP.

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the GAA. Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).

ISSUE:
Whether the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” of Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution.
Whether the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
Whether the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

RULING:
NO, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did
not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional
funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

NO, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP
was the transfer of funds.

NO, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads
of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project
in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although
some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings
was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.


DEMETRIA VS ALBA
148 SCRA 208

FACTS:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether par 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional

RULING:
NO. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether
or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.

But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another
here.


PCGG VS COCOFED
GR NO. 147063

FACTS:
The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of
allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. Among the properties sequestered by
the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of
the alleged “one million coconut farmers,” the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF
companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of the said
UCPB shares, the PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.
On November 15, 1990, upon Motion of Private Respondent COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that herein private respondents – in
particular, COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies – had not been impleaded by the PCGG as parties-
defendants in its July 31, 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR No. 96073
in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of elections for
the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining
Order enjoining the holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered
the UCPB to proceed with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares
to be voted by their registered owners.

On February 23, 2001, “COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.” filed the “Class Action Omnibus Motion” referred
to earlier in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F, asking the court a quo:

“1. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more
than one million coconut farmers; and
“2. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the
names of the 14 CIIF holding companies including those registered in the name of the PCGG.”

ISSUE:
Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered UCPB shares

RULING:
The registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This principle
applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator
cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these
sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if
it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr. Two
clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares
exist (1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in
their own names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow
landed in private hands. The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield
to truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that
the prima facie beneficial owner should be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie
fact of ownership. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities
are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when
the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1)
originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the
two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v.
Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares. Herein, the money used to purchase the
sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the
coconut levy funds. The sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not
with alleged ill-gotten wealth. As the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, but are in
fact prima facie public funds, the Court believes that the government should be allowed to vote the questioned
shares, because they belong to it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner. The Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in
depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which are prima facie public in
character.


CRUZ VS PARAS
123 SCRA 569

FACTS:
Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibits the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended
that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing.

RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City
Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places
of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' 

The first section reads, "The municipal or city
board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling
alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954,
the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title,
however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to
prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact
wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissed the cases.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid

RULING:
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in
the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence
extending to all "the great public needs.

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the
seal of doom certainly commends itself.

Under the Local Gov’t Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise
in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once
more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation
and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel
petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than
a temporary termination of their business.

Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.


TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
GR NO 75697

FACTS:
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section
10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject
matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the
said PD.

ISSUE: Whether Tio’s arguments are correct

RULING:
NO.The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to,
and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign
to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit
such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the
direction and control of the [VRB].”


 TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630

FACTS:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB
11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after
the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking
out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”.

ISSUE:
Whether the EVAT law is procedurally infirm

RULING:
NO. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent
with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What
the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note
also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR
version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that
it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.


GONZALEZ VS MACARAIG
191 SCRA 452

FACTS:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of
an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25
[5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE:
Whether the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution

RULING:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated
as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step
further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.


PILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
GR NO. 113105

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special
provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses,
provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings,
not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of
the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to
augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 are constitutional
Whether the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation
of funds therefore is constitutional

RULING:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning
the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies
were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies
have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions
to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien
to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP,
the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
“congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues
of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand
can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and
3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the
Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more
so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1)
of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the
spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention,
the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme
Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President
said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot
be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President
has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones
to be embodied in the guidelines.


TANADA VS TUVERA
136 SCRA 27

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a a writ of mandamus, invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern, to compel the respondent public officials to cause the publication of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and
administrative order. Respondent further contend that the publication in Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of the law because law themselves provides their own effectivity dates.


ISSUE:
Whether the publication in Official Gazette is required before any law or statute takes effect

RULING:
YES. The publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law.
Presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative or
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. On
the other hand, presidential issuances of general applicability which have not been published shall have no force
& effect.


PVB EMPLOYEES VS JUDGE VERA
GR NO. 105364

FACTS:
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees Union filed claim for
accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.

On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by then Pres. Corazon Aquino
and was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law sought the rehabilitation of the PVB
which means that Congress mandated that the PVB be not dissolved.

However, the liquidation judge, Judge Benjamin Vega, did not immediately stop the liquidation proceeding. In
fact he went on with it.

When questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did not immediately take effect and that it only took effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette or on March 10, 1992.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Benjamin Vega is correct

RULING:
NO. R.A. 7169 provides in its effectivity clause that it shall take effect upon its approval.

As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”. Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended
to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law
by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it
became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette,
and not on March 10, 1992.














 SENATE VS ERMITTA
GR NO. 169777

FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to
Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better
enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly
the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate
attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to exempt themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation

RULING:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in
the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned
and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in
aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour,
it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.







 BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON
GR NO. L-89914

FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the
Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated
Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee.

After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending
civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to
Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry
regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive
relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE:
Whether the inquiry sought by the SBRC should be granted

RULING:
NO, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.





 STANDARD CHARTER BANK VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS
GR NO. 167173

FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged
speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of
a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of
legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative
inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases

RULING:
YES. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged
speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in
selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct
an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the
Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of
criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent
Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed
during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of
persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such
Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the
liabilities of the offender


NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOP VS SP
155 SCRA 421

FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO
II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they
alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither
the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants
the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is
the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.


ISSUE:
Whether LGUs can issue contempt

RULING:
NO. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative
bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance
of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to
be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither
can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine
of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of
power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body
has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc
Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be
void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.


ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
87 PHIL 29

FACTS:
The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of
Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government
of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate
adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether
the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of
the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the
Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the
Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or
to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.

It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was
already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the
recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question
which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's
paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the
same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of
the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.


ISSUE:
Whether Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00
Whether Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session

RULING:
YES, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to
be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment.

YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session.

The court finds no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for
the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing
relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce
it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the
present case.

GUDANI VS SENGA
GR NO. 170165

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing
of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that
a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to
be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.



ISSUE:
Whether the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry



RULING:
YES. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At
the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent
on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-
chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the
refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-
chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the
right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The
duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.













 NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATION
GR NO. 180643

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to
the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the
head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. He refused to answer 3 questions.

He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Whether the communications elicited by the subject 3 questions covered by executive privilege

RULING:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials
and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not
in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide elements of
presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2)
The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the 3 questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
The court is convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of
the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for 11 hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject
to limitation.


EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT


MACALINTAL VS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
GR NO 191618

FACTS:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s
petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President
under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether PET is constitutional
Whether PET exercises quasi-judicial power

RULING:
YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

NO. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.”
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.


SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393

FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that
Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be
consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to
appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president

RULING:
NO. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands
undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran
et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.









 ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
GR NO 146710-15

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson , a close friend of the President, alleged that he had
personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a
grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which
culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13,
2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought
to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered
by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as
well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of
protesters.
On January 19, The PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains
that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty
verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in
the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also
prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may invoke immunity from suits


RULING:
The issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immune from suit, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot
claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another).


ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
GR NO 95367

FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the
anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents
relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers

RULING:
YES. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can
be made for privilege resting on other considerations.










 SENATE VS ERMITTA
GR NO 169777

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President. Petitioners
contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires
that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear before
investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or
confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.

The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive department as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege
speech of Senator Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions
of the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise
issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the same day the
President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan
and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying
the President’s order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

RULING:
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence, it deprives it of the
information in possession of these officials.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is
incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it
does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for
investigation, as held in Arnault case.

Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is defined by Schwartz as “the power of the government to
withhold information from the public, the courts and the Congress.”

The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.


CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317

FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this
EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
(i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:
Whether EO 284 is constitutional

RULING:
NO, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.


PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER VS ELMA
GR NO 138965

FACTS: 
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.

Petitioner questions Elma's
concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that the appointments contravene Section
13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that
respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.

Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding
multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of
executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials
given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.

He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in his case. This provision, according to him, would
allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said
official; and (2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists
a close relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions
of either position would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further added
that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

ISSUE:
Whether the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices void

RULING:
The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being
incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he
accepted the second office as CPLC.


MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
177 SCRA 668

FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino
barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats and events.

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUE:
Whether the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

RULING:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined
& exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at
153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request
of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or
of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

The question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude
that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there
are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take pre-emptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people.
She has to uphold the Constitution.











 MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
178 SCRA 760

FACTS:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return
of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. A motion for
Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted

RULING:
NO. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government,
to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the
legal president.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does
not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987
Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.

It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that
duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily














 BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
GR NO 192935

FACTS:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said
PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that it violates separation of powers as
it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation; the
provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent
like the Truth Commission; the E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ and it
violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:
Whether the said E.O is unconstitutional

RULING:
YES, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power
to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality
of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting
the inquiry.















 PICHAY VS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
GR NO 196425

FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to
submit its report and recommendations to the President. However on November 15, 2010, President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-
established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees (BOT), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc. Petitioner, along with the other members of the BOT of LWUA, was required to submit their respective
written explanations and in compliance, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as a case involving
the same transaction was already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether EO No. 13 violates the equal protection clause insofar as limiting the IAD-ODESLA’s investigation only
to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government
RULING:
NO. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the
law, “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupation bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.

There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled on the substantial distinctions between elective and
appointive public officials: The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate, with a
definite term and may be removed only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, complete
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.









 OCAMPO VS ENRIQUEZ
GR NO 225973

FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General
Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on the Funeral
Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion when they
issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB

Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated the Constitution,
and domestic and international laws

Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the
pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former
President to interment at the LNMB

Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos at
the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to
the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines

RULING:
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the
Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The counterpart
of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by
the legislature in its enactment of laws.

 DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
GR NO 149725

FACTS:
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C.
Gaddi, issued a Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato—Providing for the Redefinition of Functions
and Realignment of Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Office. Respondents filed a petition for
nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction

RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director from transferring the offices.
DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order xxx for being
bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato
City. Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural errors. Motion for Reconsideration denied.

ISSUES:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR

RULING:
YES, The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. In this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering
the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of
this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. INC. VS PANO
21 SCRA 895

FACTS:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest
zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.

Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s
request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the
President.

Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision
whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is
the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary

RULING:
YES. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the
president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance
is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which
has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed,
disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting
the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

GANZON VS CA
200 SCRA 271

FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders
against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600
days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego
to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove
local officials

RULING:
YES. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary
authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision
of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.


DADOLE VS COA
GR NO 125350

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to
RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall
be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000
from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President

RULING:
YES. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X
of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials
were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can
be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter
has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs















 GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND VS SPRINGER
50 PHIL 259

FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. In November
1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate
President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in
the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of
state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President
and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was
filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE:
Whether the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC

RULING:
NO. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons
to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned
and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,
through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the
legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.


SARMIENTO VS MISON
156 SCRA 549

FACTS:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment
of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the
confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.

ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment


RULING:
NO. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the
COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the
head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by
the COA.


CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
172 SCRA 160

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are
among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c),
Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view
of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
Whether Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation
Whether Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment

RULING:
NO. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art
7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of
CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art
7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to
the President alone.

Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President
to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

 RUFINO VS EDRIGA
GR NO 139554

FACTS:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote
Philippine culture.

On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s
charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure
or influence of politics.” PD 15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from seven to nine trustees. Later,
Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during
the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo,
Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).

On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a
term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. Except for Tantoco, the
Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January
1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President
Estrada’s appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section
6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held
at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group claimed that
it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was
vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The
Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation
x x x.”

On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared the
Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court’s Decision
ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board
the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on
the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal
rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees
should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals also denied the Endriga group’s motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the authority to appoint and elect their
fellow trustees when there is vacancy

RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended which authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by
election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs
afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control
of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.” This
provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be
unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and
undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of
control.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of
insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have control of all the
executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to
control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes,
influence.


AYTONA VS CASTILLO
4 SCRA 1

FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all,
350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo
warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to
Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:
Whether the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
NO. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration
was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The
filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly
be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a
few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an
abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

JORGE VS MAYOR
10 SCRA 331

FACTS:
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and successive
promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in December 13, 1961,
he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA
confirmed the said ad interim appointment.

President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments extended and
released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13 1961.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that pursuant
to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment was among those revoked by
Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been
designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for mandamus and quo
warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed Director of Lands.

ISSUE:
Whether Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim
appointment

RULING:
NO. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was
made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary
history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance that the session ended late in the night of December
13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is
to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular
course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by,
Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA
and thereafter, the office never became vacant.







 DE CASTRO VS JBC
GR NO 191002

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the
Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created
by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of
nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision,
Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members
of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court
erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII

RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only
Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.

Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010
decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does
not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.


DE RAMA VS CA
GR NO 131136

FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter
to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former
mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall
of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these
were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits
only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials.
The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long
as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.



ISSUE:
Whether the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution





RULING:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically
those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President
or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the
last days of his or her tenure.

LLAMAS VS ORBOS
202 SCRA 844

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found
guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than
30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office
without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether pardon is applicable to administrative cases

RULING:
The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and
convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered
view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

TORRES VS GONZALES
152 SCRA 272

FACTS:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition
that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon.
Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that
the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa
charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence

RULING:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.


MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
GR NO 78239

FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance
who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to back pay for
the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate
her former position.

ISSUE:
Whether Monsanto entitled to back pay
Whether a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment
Whether petitioner may be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence



RULING:
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has
been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered,
and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be
entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment
but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation
and novation.


TORRES VS DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF PRISONS
GR NO 122338

FACTS:
Wilfredo Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa and sentenced to serve a prison term up to November
02, 2000. He was granted pardon on the condition that he will “not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines.” Such conditional pardon was later cancelled on the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and
Parole after he was charged of multiple counts of estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether a convict who breached his conditional pardon may avail of the writ of habeas corpus

RULING:
NO. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. The incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional
pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial
scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his final conviction until November 02, 2000.


 IBP VS ZAMORA
GR NO 141284

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
Whether the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
Whether the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

RULING:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered
as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is
no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.






 LACSON VS PEREZ
MAY 10, 2001

FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as
General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for
prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court,
wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition
is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly
effected by the same

RULING:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition
has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police
authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until
May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper
at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period
in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders,
nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure
orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’
prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints
have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its
purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.













 DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR NO 171396

FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued
for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded
on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in
jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution
are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:
Whether PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional

RULING:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional. The issue cannot be
considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because
there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which
are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of
the calling out power of the president by the president.


FORTUN VS GMA
GR NO 190293

FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued
on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On
December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress
convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December
12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic

RULING:
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious
in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable. President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses
of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same.

Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take
over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law
or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest
had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and
sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face
of a determined and amply armed government presence.

AMPATUAN VS PUNO
GR NO 190259

FACTS:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three
days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to
the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO
273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy
as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional
government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent
incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional.


ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
Whether the President had factual bases for her actions

RULING:
The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated
post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting
ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of
the ARMM.

The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same.

The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,
it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s
judgment.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great
loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to
take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places
and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual
bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.


LAGMAN VS MEDIALDEA
GR NO 231658

FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole
island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the
president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required
by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City
(and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades. Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII

Whether the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have
been taken by Congress jointly or separately
Whether the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law
Whether there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

RULING:
YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.

YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his
power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on
the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate
proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power
to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or
deny the Court of its power to review.

NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely,
at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner
by which the President decides which power to choose.

YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with
neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.
As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without
any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
exists.












 NICOLAS VS ROMULO
GR NO 175888

FACTS:
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of
the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a
crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the
VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together
with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the
VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE:
Whether the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing

RULING:
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress
that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as
the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is
another form of implementation of its provisions.

BAYAN VS ZAMORA
342 SCRA 449

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified
by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines
to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

ISSUE:
Whether the VFA unconstitutional



RULING:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed
by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision
in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United
States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the
VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally
as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated
that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the
United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with
its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.




















 PIMENTEL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR NO 158088

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the
Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the
President

RULING:
NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also
the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's
foreign affairs.

In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but
this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the
treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to
ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

GO TEK VS DEPORTATION BOARD
79 SCRA 17

FACTS:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a chinaman,
praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation to the President because he was an undesirable
alien.

Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss. The Board denied the motion ruling that a conviction is not required before
the State may deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to
make a report and recommendation to the President.

Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI. The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the
Qua Chee Gan case. It held that Sec. 37(3) of the Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude and, thus, the complaint was premature since mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground
for deportation under the Immigration Law. The Board appealed the decision to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in
section 37 of the Immigration Law
Whether prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the board to continue its
investigation

RULING:
Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after
due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of
Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation, as charged against the alien, under Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law.

When deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his powers, it need not be under any ground
specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law; such a requirement is relevant only when the deportation is effect
by the Commissioner of Immigration.

Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation

There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the
law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so
undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state.

The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of
aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with Sec. 69 of the RAC.

After all, the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to
public welfare is absolute and unqualified.

As the President is granted full discretion as regards deportation, it is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case.


JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT


ENDENCIA VS DAVID
93 PHIL 696

FACTS:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE: 
Whether section 13 RA No. 590 can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of
judicial officer

RULING: 
NO. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. It is further held that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.


NITAFAN VS CIR
152 SCRA 284

FACTS:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the CIR from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to
a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had
already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the
justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue
once and for all.

ISSUE:
Whether the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax

RULING:
NO. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices
and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges
may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the
whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well
as other members of the judiciary.

The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will
immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.

Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.





 DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
112 SCRA 294

FACTS:
BP 129 was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he
would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law
would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He
averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by BP 129

RULING:
YES. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course,
to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior
courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be
in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”












 CALIDA VS SERENO
GR NO 237428

FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed
as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any
permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine
(9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation,
she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of
UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence
of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the
JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31,
2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The
JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that
since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the
private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice.
Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than
15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued
by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon.
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno
was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for
determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting
to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’
SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction
under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the
Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare
as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against
her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment
Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers

RULING:
A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction. The SC have concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of
the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications,
the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition
based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warrantoproceedings are essentially judicial
in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment
court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity
of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be
contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as
a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The
OSG is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by
the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to
(1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in these quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to
be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue
in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses
to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she
is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first
place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to
be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely
a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable
official may be removed from office. The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose
a quo warranto action against impeachable officers

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted
for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules
expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar.

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment
or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid
is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof
are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warrantoproceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.











 GSIS VS HEIRS OF CABALLERO
GR NO 158090

FACTS:
Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot designated as Lot No. 3355, Ts-
268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, containing an area of 800 square meters
and situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a residential/commercial building
consisting of two (2) stories.

Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. Fernando and his wife likewise executed
a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the afore-stated property as security.

Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, the mortgage covering the subject
property was foreclosed, and the same was sold at a public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder in
the amount of P36,283.00. For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the designated period,
GSIS executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the name of petitioner.

GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the
consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued
occupancy of the subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be allowed to repurchase the same
through partial payments. Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for
several years, but no agreement was reached between the parties.

GSIS scheduled the subject property for public bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's daughter,
Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while Carmelita Mercantile Trading
Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since CMTC was the highest bidder, it was
awarded the subject property. The Board of Trustees of the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award
of the subject property to CMTC for a total consideration of P450,000.00. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed between petitioner and CMTC on July 27, 1989, transferring the subject property to CMTC.
Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the name of GSIS was cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in the name
of CMTC.

Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS and its responsible
officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among others, that judgment be
rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void; declaring the
Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and CMTC null and void ab initio; declaring TCT No. 76183 of the
Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and void ab initio; declaring the bid made by Fernando
in the amount of P350,000.00 for the repurchase of his property as the winning bid; and ordering petitioner to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of Fernando. He also prayed for
payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

In his complaint,
Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC misrepresented itself to be
wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its representative Carmelita Ang Hao
had no prior authority from its board of directors in an appropriate board resolution to participate in the bidding.
The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or invest its funds for purposes other than its primary
purpose. Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said corporation
has no authority to do so. The GSIS also disregarded Fernando's prior right to buy back his family home and lot
in violation of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with abuse of power and authority when it
issued the TCT in favor of CMTC without requiring the CMTC to submit its supporting papers as required by the
law.

GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. The GSIS alleged that
Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property; however, he did
not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by law.
There is also no "prior right to buy back" that can be exercised by Fernando. Further, it averred that the articles
of incorporation and other papers of CMTC were all in order. In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that
Fernando owed GSIS the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including additional interests from
January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to February
1988.

After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision,
the trial court granted GSIS's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the
amount of P249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from the CMTC and represents
payment which was not turned over to GSIS, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of the
consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.

Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved by the Decision, the Caballero’s filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA, in its Decision
dated December 17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the
judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of GSIS, be deleted. GSIS filed
a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated. An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of
Party, was filed by the surviving heirs of Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002. They prayed that they be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, as respondents in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS’s counterclaim of rentals collected by the
Caballero’s against CMTC is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of
docket fees before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim

RULING:
GSIS submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against GSIS for annulment of bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Caballero, on the other hand, alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive
and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are
the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata
bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC agreed with the CA's
view that GSIS's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from
the CMTC is permissive.The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish GSIS's claim for the recovery of rentals.

The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor
of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether GSIS is entitled to receive the
CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when it (GSIS) became the owner of the subject property by
virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.

The rule in permissive counterclaims is
that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
This, GSIS did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay GSIS the
rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction
is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.

Petitioner further
argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the
same, considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees.

Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over it and, thus, there is no need to discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.


SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
32 SCRA 188

FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days
before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed
a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.

They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion. The respondents filed a MTD
claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become
academic.

Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings
is not a tribunal, or board, exercising judicial functions.

ISSUE:
Whether judicial function be exercised in this case

RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing
of something in the nature of the action of the court. It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring
therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that
law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of
their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for that matter, it would not
interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.



 DAZA VS SINGSON
180 SCRA 496

FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in
a political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party
to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by
withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including
therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a
TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed
that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE:
Whether the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court

RULING:
NO. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of
the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission
on Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.


 GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
191 SCRA 288

FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of
Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI it has its plant site for the products “naphta cracker” and “naphta”
to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation
applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from
petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that
the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital
for the project. 

ISSUE: 
Whether the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application
of the investors without considering the national interest

RULING: 
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained. 

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons
as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in
letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very
beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind
having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.


PACU VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
97 PHIL 806

FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the
Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also
gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools.
It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right,
amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU
also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.

ISSUE:
Whether Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional

RULING:
NO. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury
from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides
for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational
efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by
the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still
part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.


TAN VS MACAPAGAL
43 SCRA 678

FACTS:
Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the LAUREL LEIDO
RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to declare that it has no
power to consider and adopt proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the adoption of a new
form of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to propose amendments to the
Constitution, without altering the general plan. The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR.

The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial interest in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of the resolution of the Con-Con

RULING:
NO. The rule is, “Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”

However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds for purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds. Hence, it may be enjoined at the instance of taxpayers.

Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayer’s suit. In the Gonzales case, it was
held that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It was only
then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The
judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of powers).

Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still not acted upon by it, there is no room for judicial oversight.
Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.

Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts of the Con-Con. However, it
is a pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before court may inquire. What
the Con-Con did was merely to propose an amendment to the Constitution. There is no room for judicial review.





 DUMLAO VS COMELEC
95 SCRA 392

FACTS:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any
retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have
been 65 years of age at thecommencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision
amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the
offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of
conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission
of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence
of such fact.

ISSUE:
Whether the requisites of judicial review are complied with

RULING:
NO constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the requisites
of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) There must be an actual case or controversy; 2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and 4) The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.

As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. His
question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither
Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nordisqualified from being candidates for
local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have
institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, but the institution of a taxpayer’s suit per se is no assurance of judicial
review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue
of constitutionality is absent.



OPLE VS TORRES
293 SCRA 141

FACTS:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion. 

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE:
Whether Senator Ople has the standing to sue and the justiciability of the case at bar

RULING:
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed
on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for
the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a
notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.


KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA JR.
232 SCRA 110

FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in
operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator
Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship
requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by
selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President
Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however
the project pushed through.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi

RULING:
The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case
demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of
the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound
discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier











 KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ
its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as
the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's
charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is
advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further
their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have standing

RULING:
NO. Stare decisis cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from
the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF
THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties
are the same but the cases are not. Rule on conclusiveness cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different
contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
issue is whether the petitioners are real parties in interest.


IBP VS ZAMORA
GR NO 141284

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
Whether the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review



RULING:
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. 

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his
alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members,
whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint
visibility patrols. 

Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the
political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the
law and the Constitution.


JOYA VS PCGG
GR NO 96541

FACTS:
Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok, Polotan, Kasilag, Almario, et.
al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the Auction Sale by Christies of New York of Old Masters
Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang during people power. They claim that
the items are part of protected cultural properties and part of Filipino CULTURAL HERITAGE and hence cannot
be disposed. They contend that the items are PUBLIC PROPERTIES collectively owned by Filipinos.

They allege that some of the items were in fact donated by private persons, and that the real ownership of the
paintings belongs to the foundation or corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to view and
appreciate the items on exhibit.

The PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the consignment agreement between the
Philippines and Christies

COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was of doubtful legality, and that it was highly
disadvantageous to the Philippines. The Director of National Museum issued a certification that the items were
NOT part of protected cultural properties.

President Cory also approved it. The sale proceeded earning $13M.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi

RULING:
NO. The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter, the question must be raised by the proper
party, there must be an actual case or controversy, that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity and that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

The courts will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal
standing. LEGAL STANDING means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as the result of governmental act. INTEREST means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.
Moreover, it must be PERSONAL and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or
unrelated party.

It is not a taxpayers suit. A taxpayers suit can only propsper if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at the instance
of a taxpayer.

For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy, one which involves a
conflict of legal rights. The case must not be moot or academic. A case is moot and academic if the purpose has
become stale. Since the purpose of this petition is to enjoin the sale, the case has become moot since the sale
has long been consummated.

However, it should be emphasized that the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED.


CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
GR NO 133250

FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land.

On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom
Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.

The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are:
that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates
of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA.
The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in
the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as
blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain
to private corporations.


ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

RULING:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. These duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court considered that the petition
raised matters of transcendental importance to the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect
the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.

The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony.
The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation.
The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can resolve this
case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to
disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or constitutional question.


DAVID VS GMA
GR NO 171396

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) declaring a state of national emergency. On the
same day, the President issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017. The proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government
as a clear and present danger. All programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I are cancelled. Likewise, all permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments are
revoked. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced
that “warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.” During the
dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. 

Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency, the President lifted PP 1017 by issuing Proclamation No. 1021.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic


RULING:
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that
President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the
eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal
acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative.”

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights
to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.

DEMETRIA VS ALBA
GR NO 71977

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of
1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the
fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative
powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that
one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties
within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the
abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the
provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”

ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

RULING:
YES. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty
of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its
constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity.
In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the
public will.


GONZALES VS NARVASA
GR NO 140835

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only
the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of EO No. 43

RULING:
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter
by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. 

Neither does he claim
that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi
so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O.
No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses
“to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is
a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled
to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.


PIMENTEL VS ERMITTA
472 SCRA 587

FACTS:
Petitioners file for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano,
Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries of their respective
departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department
secretaries.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing

RULING:
The Solicitor General states that the present petition is a quo warranto proceeding because, with the exception
of Secretary Ermita, petitioners effectively seek to oust respondents for unlawfully exercising the powers of
department secretaries. The Solicitor General further states that petitioners may not claim standing as Senators
because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been “infringed upon or violated by the President.
If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may
possess standing in this case.” Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise
its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President. Petitioners further contend that they
possess standing because President Arroyo’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress.

On the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to
Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives
as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.


ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 148560

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress
upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law
that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these terms
are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity
of the mentioned law.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge

RULING:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot
be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.

 UMALI VS GUINGONA
GR NO 131124

FACTS:
Petition for review of dismissed the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner
against the respondents. On October 27, 1993, Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of
the BIR by then President Ramos. He was assigned in Manila, from Nov. 29, 1993 – Mar. 15, 1994, and in Makati,
from Mar. 16, 1994 – Aug. 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, the President received a confidential memorandum
against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his
incumbency as Regional Director. The day after the receipt of the confidential memorandum, Ramos authorized
the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint to the
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Umali was informed of the
charges, and was directed to provide answers to the inquiries, to which he did. After evaluating the evidence on
record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of Sept. 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the
twelve (12) charges against petitioner. Upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, Ramos issued Admin. Order
152, dismissing Umali from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits.

ISSUE:
Whether AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security of Tenure
Whether petitioner was denied due process of law
Whether PCAGC is a validly constituted govt. agency and petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality
belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision
Whether the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the
petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

RULING:
Claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden of proof was on Umali, but he failed to adduce
sufficient evidence.

Petitioner was not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show petitioner filed his answer
and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he
attended the hearings before the investigatory body

The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the
RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings

Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on
the criminal charges before the Ombudsman.

The issues posited do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning decision arrived at by the CA. Taking into
consideration that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and Commissioner’s office were no
longer interested in pursuing the case, and due to the position taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court hereby GRANTS
the petition. AO No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.






 HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC
GR NO 171101

FACTS:
In 1958, Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), assisted by the Central Bank of the Philippines, purchased
Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, from the Spanish owners
of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). Tadeco was then owned and controlled by the Jose
Cojuangco Sr. Group. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the
applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should
exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply with
this condition.

On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against Tadeco, et al., for them
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed
to farmers at cost. Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita is not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations
for it does not have tenants. The argument did not convince the Manila RTC, thus rendered judgment ordering
Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Tadeco appealed the case to the CA.

On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the government’s case against
Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed the case the Marcos government initially
instituted and won against Tadeco, et al. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by
Tadeco of the PARC’s approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such
approval shall have been secured. On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein
petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed
to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in
exchange for HLI shares of stock.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita
signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May
11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by
then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually
approved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117
FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.

On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to
industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject
to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with
its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions. On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for
subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of
the converted area to the latter. Consequently, HLI’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 287910 was canceled
and TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary. HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered
by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions in 1997 and 1998, both
uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300
hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an
industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) in payment of LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCO’s titles were cancelled and
new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from
Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex.
Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003. The first
was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in
the alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and
the distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda
Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of
HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA
6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution
No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be
forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP.

From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition
before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP
even before PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLI’s
motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional
Whether PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s
compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme
Whether PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCO’s and RCBC’s respective properties that once
formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of
Coverage

RULING:
NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. The Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional
question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis
mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the
modes of acquisition under RA 9700.

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21,
1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late already. The FARM
members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP without even a complaint on the alleged
unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into
resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the
occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional
legal provision. Furthermore, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. Any of these key issues may be resolved without
plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.

By virtue of Sec. 5 of RA 9700, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available
option under existing law; thus the question of unconstitutionality should be a moot issue.

NO, the PARC did not gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under
CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme. The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1)
the mechanics and timelines of HLI’s stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual
allocation of each original farm worker-beneficiaries (FWBs) of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the
use of “man days” and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock
transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.

As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes
entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The
number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in
one year. Worse, HLI hired farm workers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the
Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farm workers of HLI as of
said date stood at 10,502. All these farm workers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out
of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly,
the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of
“man days” and the hiring of additional farm workers.

Par. 3 of the SDOA expressly provides for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement
contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved
stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the
plan by PARC. Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost
of the land thus awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government.

DAO 10, having the force and effect of law, must be duly complied with; therefore, PARC is correct in revoking
the SDP.

YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO
and RCBC, adduced from their foregoing actions, are purchasers in good faith for value, so entitled to the
benefits arising from such status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land, there was no notice
of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other person has a right to or interest
in such property. The same is true with respect to RCBC. To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the
lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion
order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest belief
that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were
taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and hence, can be legally and validly
acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands
previously covered by CARP land acquisition “after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.” And second,
both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares
of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP 750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On
the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of
Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.

Both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are
industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely
abused its discretion when it placed LIPCO’s and RCBC’s property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita
under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme.

 SALVADOR ESTIPONA JR. VS LOBRIGO
GR NO 226679

FACTS: Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw
his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been
Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

It was argued that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

ISSUE:
Whether Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure

RULING
YES. The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government
has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

The court’s discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional independence.


PEOPLE VS MATEO
GR NO 147678-87

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to
indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed
the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death

RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favour of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence
would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor
General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which
the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly
been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.


VILLAVERT VS DESIERTO
GR NO 133715

FACTS:
An administrative charge for gravemisconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO
Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended the dismissal of the case. However, Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

ISSUE:
Whether decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the Supreme Court

RULING:
NO. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription
in Sec. 30, Art VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without
its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman


YAO VS CA
GR NO 132428

FACTS:
Petitioner George Yao was convicted for unfair competition for the sale of counterfeit General Electric (GE) lamp
starters. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
petitioner’s due process of law



RULING:
YES. Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is thus a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.


MACEDA VS VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464

FACTS:
Abrera was from the Public Attorney’s Office. He alleged that Maceda, the Judge of RTC-Antique, falsified his
certificate of service. Maceda was said to have certified all criminal and civil cases have been decided within a
period of 90 days.

Abrera claims that in truth and in fact, no decision has been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases.

Maceda’s defense is that he had been granted by the SC an extension of 90 days to decide the said cases. He
also argues that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over him since the offense charged arose from the
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether who has jurisdiction and what is scope of SC’s power of supervision

RULING:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
inefficiency, AS WELL AS criminally liable to the State under the RPC for felonious act.

However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the SC with regard to his certificate
of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The SC’s administrative supervision includes all courts and all court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
CA, down to the lowest MTC clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judge’s and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC for determination whether the said certificates
reflect the true status of his pending case load, since only the Court has the necessary records to make such
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter.

Should a judge, having been granted by the SC an extension of time, report these cases in his certificate of
service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by this Court, how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal case that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must DEFER ACTION on said complaint and REFER THE SAME to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.


NOBLEJAS VS TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405

FACTS:
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas
that are in excess of those covered by the title

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain.

Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended
and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be
investigated only by the Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)

Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court

RULING:
NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to Judges”, the
right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges
would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge
the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,
simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise
of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not
and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to
or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended
to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative
process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the
resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution
of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.


OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds
in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiffs have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing
TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court
Whether the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law
Whether petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
violates the requirements of due process

RULING:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. The case at bar is subject to
judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be
subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of
common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He
strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein.

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.









 IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS FROM BEING
ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN IBP ELECTION

FACTS:
This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the
disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the
16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of
the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two National
Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao
Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to
June 30, 2005. Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP
membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur, they add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds
had he not surrendered his California license to practice law.

Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during
the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. The respondent
asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the
Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization,
is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by
the IBP.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s contentions are premature

RULING:
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the
disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.

Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera
has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members
of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets
nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member
meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty
of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory
in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove
the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor.

On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in
the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to
substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.


MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS PASAY TRANS
57 PHIL 600

FACTS:
Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to
any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed
by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall
be final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig
bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by the petition. Opposition
was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.

ISSUE:
Whether the members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is
asked of them in this case

RULING:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government.
It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court,
as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or
by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.

It would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.











 SANGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG VS JUDGE ESTRELLA
AM NO. 01-1608-RJT

FACTS:
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr.
against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the
order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was better to have a
handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all the questions and objections
relative to the ballots. Complainants claim that: respondent gave unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on
the other hand, undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their
duly elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision and reports were prepared, issued, and
executed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that respondent
conspired, confederated, and confabulated with the NBI officials concerned and Papa to make the NBI Reports
and the decision favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to check the figures and to analyze the data
contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of said reports would have led to the discovery of
flaws and mistakes; and that the hasty transfer of ballot boxes from respondent's sala to that of Judge Vivencio
Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the examination and appreciation of
the ballots to be done by the judge himself rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Estrella acted in accordance with his duty

RULING:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts and without
the guidance of objections from revisors, the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and determination,
sorted out as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was done in a record time of less than
two (2) months, from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.

To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of ballots, is almost impossible to accomplish.
One would have to spread the 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a floor or table space
bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of ballots, pick at random groups
of ballots – six groups in all – and, by examining them, reach a conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups
were written by one person.

It is no doubt that this is simply an impossible procedure. And we are not convinced that through this method,
the NBI could correctly and with scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.

Indubitably, the foregoing has raised the suspicion of partiality on the part of respondent. Verily, a judge must
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are
intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable of dispensing impartial
justice in every issue in every trial.




 YNOT VS IAC
148 SCRA 659

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating EO no. 626-A
which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in
violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit and to deserving farmers as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit. This amended E.O. 626, the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of
carabaos of age. Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin. Petitioner appealed the decision to
the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts are prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law

RULING:
NO. The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme
Court. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the
highest tribunal.


CHAVEZ VS JBC
GR NO 202242

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided
to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the
two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
“Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members is unconstitutional



RULING:
YES. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially
when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees
with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee
for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi,
this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected
by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation
of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member
of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall
be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary
and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is
worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they
knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers
initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted
a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government
– to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in
the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding
its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid.


JARDELEZA VS SERENO
GR NO 213181

FACTS:
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening
for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General of
the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking
unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity
as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His
request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the
list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE:
Whether the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or
opposition to an application is raised

RULING:
YES. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s
entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a
class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.

In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfilment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion
in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding
the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted
to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation
by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed
to observe the minimum requirements of due process.


















 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS


CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

LEYSON VS OMBUDSMAN
GR NO 134990

FACTS:
The Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies failed to comply with its contract agreement with the
International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC) for the transport of coconut oil in bulk. ITTC Executive
Vice PresidentManuel Leyson, Jr. filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for breach of contract,
among others. The complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to further act on the complaint

RULING:
NO. All three corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF
owns 44.10% of the shares of Legaspi Oil, 91.24% of the shares of GranExport, and 92.85% of the shares of
United Coconut. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in Legaspi Oil removes it from the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation. There is no showing that GranExport and United Coconut was
vested with functions relating to publi cneeds whether governmental or proprietary in nature. Thus, the CIIF
companies are private corporations not within the scope of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.


MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
GR NO 95445

FACTS:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some
800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September
17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.

ISSUE:
Whether employees in the public service are prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes

RULING:
“These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially
economic reasons,” should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not
identical.








 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO 85279

FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers
and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to
work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the
strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS
deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination
and unfair labor practices.

ISSUE:
Whether employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike

RULING:
The 1987
Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the
framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service
are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
[NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the
SSS was illegal.












 BITONIO JR. VS COA
GR NO 147392

FACTS:
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting
Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board
meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions,
the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in
government was declared unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant
Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed
an MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.

The petitioner maintains that he is entitled
to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a
per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner
contends that this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains
in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a
mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A.
No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot just be repealed
or amended by the latter.

He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was
promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior
holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the
provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case.
Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to
receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still
entitled to receive the per diems.

ISSUE:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board
of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor

RULING:
YES. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional
office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is
likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a
better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of
Labor and Employment(DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment.
After all, the petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to
sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at
all.

There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by
the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The
payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the
petitioner is entitled to receive.

It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the
highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the
Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law,
courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law
must conform to the Constitution.

The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was
later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was increased
from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit
as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different
Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members
of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


CAYETANO VS MONSOD
201 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano
questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least 10 years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his
father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2
years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans, and
coordinating legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either
as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of various companies.



ISSUE:
Whether Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC

RULING:
YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court…In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.

A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty.
Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,
a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.


JAVIER VS COMELEC
144 SCRA 194

FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May
1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being
the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed,
allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for
these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints
were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE:
Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23,
1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election

RULING:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as
the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended
to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed
to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after
all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.


ARUELO JR. VS CA
227 SCRA 311

FACTS:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five
days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that
this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to
dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give
Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13,
Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

RULING:
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular
courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the
regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).


NPC VS COMELEC
144 SCRA 194

FACTS:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is
principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed
by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political
propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that
the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space
of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE: Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional

RULING:
YES. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may
be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period."
In our own society,equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the
State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication
and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible
bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article
IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11
(b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news
or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs
and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed
to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon
the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.


FLORES VS COMELEC
184 SCRA 484

FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for
kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent
Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after
deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged
decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first
name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner
and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced
by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review
the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In
his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679

RULING:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article
IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”.
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section.
Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the
COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision
of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.


GARCES VS CA
259 SCRA 99

FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to
replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte.

Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer
post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume
the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant.

Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover
for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile,
since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to
Liloy.

Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be
cancelled.

Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7
Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before
the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC
resolution contrary to Sec 7, Art IX-A.

RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and
(2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections. CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court

RULING:
NO. The case is cognizable in the RTC. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was
the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.

The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the
COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to
the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and
city officials.”

In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is
an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive,
not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated
before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.”








 COMMISSION ON AUDIT

LUEGO VS CSC
143 SCRA 327

FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino
Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the
new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well
as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s title.

ISSUE: Whether the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind
or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set
aside.


ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS


FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GR NO 160261

FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House
of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

ISSUE:
Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution
Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution

RULING:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of
the controversy.

The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.


GUTTIEREZ VS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
GR NO 193459

FACTS:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of public
trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of
Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative Committee on Justice issued
a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez
contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued the Resolution

RULING: 
NO. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The act of
initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary
to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period
ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee
on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution
when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed.

Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints sufficient in form
in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.







 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS MADRIAGA
GR NO 164316

FACTS:
The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging respondent
with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the rules implementing R.A. 6713.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials

RULING:
YES. Article XI, Section 13 of the Constitution grants petitioner administrative disciplinary powers to investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agent,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate actions against a public official or employee at fault and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and ensure compliance therewith.


UY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
248 SCRA 566

FACTS:
In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of
the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa
through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash,
arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.

The court ruled it is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he
was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of
War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the
Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines”

As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated
in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts
, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers
only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's
ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts

RULING:
NO. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal
cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but
those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by
law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.

The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the
most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.

Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of
theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before
the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.