Process Hazard Analysis

Palembang
4 – 6 Nov 2019

PT Synergy Risk Management Consultants

Wisma Tugu II, 4th Floor,
Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Kav C7-9, Jakarta Selatan.
Phone: (021) 520 8244
Fax: (021) 520 8243
 Agenda
Time Day-1
08:00 - 09:45 • Introduction to Risk Assessment and PHA Concept
09:45 – 10:00 • Morning Break
10:00 – 11: 00 • Introduction to Hazard Identification
11:00 – 12:00 • Exercise Bow Tie and Hazard Identification

12:00-13:00 Lunch and Pray

13:00-14:00 • (Cont) Exercise Hazard Identification
14:00-14:45 • Introduction to Hazard Operability Process (Method, Guideword)
14:45 – 15:00 • Afternoon Break
15:00 - 15:45 • (Cont) Introduction to Hazop
15:45 – 16:30 • Exercise Hazard Operability
 Agenda
Time Day-2
08:00 - 09:00 • Introduction to Fault Tree Analysis
09:00 – 09.30 • Exercise Fault Tree
09:30 – 09.45 • Morning Break
09:45 – 11:30 • Introduction to Event Tree
11:30 – 12:00 • Exercise Event Tree
12:00-13:00 Lunch and Pray
13:00-14:00 • Introduction to QRA
14:00-14:30 • Exercise QRA
14:30 – 14:45 • Afternoon Break
14:45-15:15 • Introduction to What If Analysis and Checklist Analysis
15:15 – 16:30 • Exercise What If Analysis / Checklist Analysis
 Agenda
Time Day-3
08:00 – 09:00 • Introduction to FMEA
09:00 – 09:45 • Exercise FMEA
09:45 – 10.00 • Morning Break
10:00 – 12:00 • Introduction to SIL / LOPA
12:00-13:00 Lunch and Pray
13:00 - 14:30 • (Cont) Introduction to SIL/LOPA, Exercise 1 - 4
14:30 – 14:45 • Afternoon Break
14:45 - 16:30 • Exercise 5 - 6
Agenda Day-1:
1. Introduction to Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment
2. Risk Matrix
3. Bow Tie
4. Hazid Technique
5. Hazop Technique
Objective

a) Provide basic knowledge of Process Safety Hazard Analysis concept and its
application in analyzing Plant Process Hazard and Industrial Work Activity
Hazard (Construction activity, Project Activity, and Operation Work
Activity).
b) Better understand the various standard PHA methodology as described above
that can be used to conduct a PHA and its appropriate application.
c) Enable the participant to plan a PHA session, appropriate member/resources
required, meeting, record and report the session including the recognizing the
gaps and providing recommendation(s).
Background of PHA

Key Provision of PSM (OSHA)

Process Hazard Analysis

“a careful review of what could go wrong

and what safeguards must be implemented
to prevent releases of hazardous
chemicals” (OSHA)
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT
References:

• ISO 17776 Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk
assessment.
• CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) – Guideline for Hazard Evaluation
Procedure 2nd Ed 1992.
• CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) – Evaluating Process Safety in the Chemical
Industry.
• IEC International Standard 61882, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) Application
Guide.
• OSHA 3132, Process Safety Management (PSM) Guideline, 2000.
• OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemical.
• CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) – Guideline for Chemical Process
Quantitative Risk Analysis.
• ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) United Kingdom 1960 – Hazop Guideword
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT
HAZARD

Source of HARM

HAZARDOUS EVENT CONSEQUENCE

Incident which occurs when a hazard is

Final Result of Hazardous Event
realized (transform as change of energy)

RISK

Combination of the Probability of a

Hazardous Event and its Consequence
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Risk Matrix
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Risk Assessment Matrix - Definition
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Risk Assessment Matrix - Definition
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Risk Assessment Matrix - Definition
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Risk Assessment Matrix - Definition
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
ILLUSTRATION IN BOW - TIE
Barrier Defense

Consequence
Series
Hazard

of
Event

Risk
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
EXERCISE
Barrier Defense

Consequence
Series
Hazard

of
Event

Risk
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Object for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment:

Task / Job Risk Plant Process Risk

for
Occupational Safety

Process Safety

This will be the scope of our course

INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Table Top Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment Processes:

Identification of the Hazard

Assessing of the Risk

Eliminating or Reduction of the Risk

INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Methodology for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment:
Structured Techniques* Checklist
a. Hazid a. Walkthrough Review
b. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA

c. Fault Tree Analysis

d. Event Tree Analysis

b. What-If
e. Hazard and Operability (Hazop)
Analysis

f. FMEA
g. SIL/LOPA
h. QRA and Cost Benefit Analysis c. Specific Hazard Identification Review

* For plant process system only not for Task or*Job

For plant process system only not for Task or J
INTRODUCTION TO HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT (ISO 17776)
Application of Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Technique:
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)

“HAZID is a technique for the identification of all

significant hazards associated with the particular
activity under consideration”
Character of HAZID Study: Qualitative and Prescriptive thru Hazard
Guideword

HAZID Application throughout Asset Life Cycle:

Production / Chemical Processing / Plant / Utility Facility Design HAZID
Facility Plant Construction HAZID
Normal Operation / Job or Physical Activity HAZID
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)

• Objective:

a) Identify and assess the major hazards & major accident

events (MAEs)

b) Identify prevention, detection, control, mitigation and

emergency measures in design.
c) Risk Rank qualitatively design (for Design Hazid) or
Construction (for Construction Hazid) hazards to personnel
safety, environment, assets or reputation
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)

• What Reference documents required for Hazid:

– Design Phase: Process Flow Diagram, Facility Layout (Preferable 3D
PDMS Plant Design Management System) , Equipment Data, MSDS,
Process Data (PVT, Component, and Composition)
– Operation / Physical Activity: Process Flow Diagram, Facility
Layout (Optional) , Equipment Data, MSDS, Process Data
(PVT, Component, and Composition), SOP

• Methodology is systematic brainstorming of potential

source/causes and consequences of the hazards using ISO 17776
prescriptive guideline
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)

“HAZID Format and Processess”

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Project Review Date

Facility Owner

System/Area Case/Phase

Drawing Ref
Haz Hazard Hazardous Risk Matrix Action
Consequence Safeguards Risk Recommendation
No Guideword Event Cons Freq Party
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)
“HAZID Guidewords”
No Potential Hazard Hazard Description
01 Hydrocarbons Oil under pressure Hydrocarbons in LPGs (e.g. LNGs Condensate, Hydrocarbon gas Oil at low Wax Coal
formation Propane) NGL press

02 Refined hydrocarbons Lube and seal oil Hydraulic oil Diesel fuel Petroleum spirit/
gasoline
         
03 Other flammable Cellulosic Pyrophoric
materials materials
materials etc
           
04 Explosives Detonators Conventional Perforating gun
explosive charges
material            
05 Pressure hazards Bottled gases Water under Non-hydrocarbon Air under high Hyperbaric Decompression Oil and HC
under pressure pressure in gas under pressure operations (diving) gas under
pipeworks pressure in (diving) pressure
pipeworks
   
06 Hazards associated Personnel at Personnel at Overhead Personnel
height >2 m height <2 m equipment under water
with differences in
height          
07 Objects under induced Objects under Objects under
tension compression
stress  
           
08 Dynamic situation On-water transport In-air transport Boat collision Equipment with Use of Use of knives, Transfer Land-transport
(boating) (flying) hazard to other moving or hazardous machetes and from boat to
hazards vessels and rotating parts hand tools other sharp offshore
offshore structures (grinding, objects platform
sawing)
 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)
“HAZID Guidewords (Cont)”
No Potential Hazard Hazard Description
09 Environmental Weather Sea state Tectonic Wildfire
hazards          
10 Hot surfaces Process piping and Process piping Engine and turbine Steam piping
equipment (60-150 and equipment exhaust systems
°C) over 150 °C          
11 Hot fluids Temperatures Temperatures
(100-150 °C) greater than 150
°C              
12 Cold surfaces Process piping (– Process piping Process piping (0
25 °C to – 80 °C less than – 80 °C to -25 °C)
range) °C            
13 Cold fluids Oceans, seas and
lakes less than 10
°C                
14 Open flame Heaters with fire Direct-fired Flares
tube furnaces            
15 Electricity Voltage > 50 V to Voltage > 50 V Voltage > 440 V Lightning Electrostatic
440 V in cables to 440 V in discharge energy
equipment        
16 Electromagnetic Ultraviolet radiation Infrared Microwaves Lasers E/M radiation:
radiation high voltage
Radiation AC cables
       
17 Ionizing radiation — Alpha, beta — Gamma rays — Neutron -— Open Naturally
Open source Open source source occurring
Open source ionizing
radiation
         
18 Ionizing radiation — Alpha, beta — Gamma rays — Neutron — Closed
Closed source Closed source source
Closed source
           
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)
“HAZID Guidewords (Cont)”
No Potential Hazard Hazard Description
19 Asphyxiates Insufficient oxygen Excessive CO2 Drowning Excessive N2 Halon Smoke
atmospheres
     
20 Toxic gas H2S (hydrogen Exhaust fumes SO2 (SOx), NOx Benzene, Chlorine Welding fumes Tobacco CFCs
sulfide, sour gas) Toluene, Xylene smoke
(BTX)
 
21 Toxic liquid Mercury PCBs Biocide Methanol Brines Glycols etc    
(gluteraldehyde)
22 Toxic solid Asbestos Man-made Cement dust Sodium Powdered Sulfur dust etc    
mineral fibre hypochlorite mud
additives
23 Corrosive substances Hydrofluoric acid Hydrochloric Sulfuric acid Caustic soda          
acid (sodium
hydroxide)

24 Biological hazards Food-borne Water-borne Parasitic insects Cold and flu Human Other
bacteria (e.g E. bacteria (e.g (pin worms, bed virus Immune communicable
coli) Legionella) bugs, lice, fleas) deficiency diseases
Virus (HIV)
     
25 Ergonomic hazards Manual materials Damaging noise Loud steady noise Heat stress Cold stress High humidity Vibration Illumination etc
handling > 85 dBA (high ambient (low ambient
temperatures) temperatures
)

26 Psychological hazards Living on the Working and Post traumatic Fatigue Shift work Peer pressure
job/away from living on a live stress
family plant
     
27 Security-related Piracy Assault Sabotage Crisis (military Theft,
action, civil pilferage
hazards disturbances,
terrorism)
       
28 Use of natural Water Air
resources              
29 Medical Medical unfitness Motion sickness
             
30 Noise High-level noise Intrusive noise
             
31 Entrapment Fire / explosion Mechanical Diving
damage
           
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)
“HAZID Exercise and Discussion”

• Identified Hazard at your Plant Process

• Define Potential Hazardous Event and Consequence
• Define Safeguarding *1) in Place and Initial Risk *2)
• Provide recommendation if Initial Risk is not acceptable or
can be further reduced to as low as reasonably practicable

Safeguarding is the in-place (existing) barrier to prevent or reduce likelihood for the
*1)

hazardous event to occur and/or the in-place barrier/defense to minimize the

consequence of a hazardous event.

*2)
Initial Risk is combination of the probability of hazardous event to occured and the
consequence of hazardous event assuming safeguard in place fails. While the probability
of hazardous event to occurred is counted with the likely of the safeguarding in place
fails.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE (ISO 17776)
“HAZID Exercise and Discussion”

WHAT WE CAN’T ACHIEVE FROM THIS

HAZID STUDY ONLY?
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)

Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a

structured and systematic technique for system
examination and risk management. In particular,
HAZOP is often used as a technique for identifying
potential hazards in a system leading to HSE issue,
and identifying operability problems likely to lead to
nonconforming products or process failure (i.e
unplanned shutdown, asset damage).
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
• To identify the reaction of the plant and equipment systems to
process perturbations and deviations.
• Assess whether the reaction of the system, or plant, or equipment
will produce detrimental effects to the public, personnel,
environment, asset production, bussinees continuity.
• Investigate the operability of the process,
• Identify availability and maintainability issues
• Recommend corrective actions which will mitigate or eliminate
detrimental effects
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
HAZOP application:
• Plant Process Facility Design:
– Assessing system design capability to meet user specifications and safety
standards
– Identifying weaknesses in systems

• Plant Process Facility Operation.

– Assessing facility operation to ensure it is appropriately supported,
serviced, contained, etc
– Process assessment includes healthy/abnormality of safety system in
different operation mode (start-up, shutdown, steady or transient,
change operation/design).
• Plant Operational Procedure
– Assessing engineered controls (ex: automation), sequences of operations,
procedural controls (ex: human interactions) etc
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
HAZOP TEAM:

• Hazop Leader: Facilitate and Lead the session through guideword

and provide recommendation when initial risk is not acceptable.
• Hazop Scribe: to note all the important information and decision
• Member: be the active resources for plant process
information and provide input as his/her experience for risk
mitigation
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
“Process Safety Information required for HAZOP Session ”
• Process Flow Diagram (PFD)
• Piping and Instrument Diagram (P&ID)
• Hazardous Area Classification (Electrical Classification)
• Cause & Effect Diagram / Safe Chart.
• Safe Operating Limit
• Engineering Data (Heat and Material Balance, Material Specification, Relief System
Design, Design Basis, Ventilation System Design, Safety System, Reactivity Data,
Corrosivity Data, etc).
• Incident Data from Internal and External.
• Standard Operating and Maintenance Procedure.
• Inspection and Testing Result (for Operation Hazop).
HAZOP TECHNIQUE – Hazop Approach

Analyze Guidewords
Deviations

Experience SOPs, SOCs

MSDSs, P&IDs
Brainstorm
Causes of the
Deviation

Brainstorm
Consequences of Safeguards
Deviation

Consider
Create an
Risk
Action List
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
“Defining Node”
Objective: to have proper focus, effective and efficiency of the
study
Criteria for Selecting Node:
• Design Intent
• Significant Change of State Occurred (process fluid phase)
• Piece of process equipment with different process parameters
(i.e multistage compressor)
• Each major piece of equipment and its associated piping.

The leader will facilitate the team to achieve agreement in selecting/defining node.
HAZOP TECHNIQUE (IEC-61882)
“Exercise Defining Node”

Tank Storage Plant

Truck Tank
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords
Parameter Operational Deviation
Guideword Flow No/More/Less /Reverse/Misdirected
- Flow
No, Not, None Pressure
More/Less - Pressure
Temperature
More/Less - Temperature
More Level
More/Less - Level
Composition – Change of Phase
Composition – Change of Phase
Less Liquid / Vapor Density
Liquid / Vapor Density
Reverse /
Misdirected + Abnormal Operation
Corrosion/Erosion/Fouling/
Abnormal Operation
Cavitation Corrosion/Erosion/Fouling/
As Well As Cavitation
Cold Spot, Freezing, Metal
Embritlement Cold Spot, Freezing, Metal
Part Of Embritlement
Control
Control
Contaminant
Other Than Contaminant
Maintenance
Ignition Maintenance
Etc, Ignition
Etc,
38
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords
Parameter Operational Deviation
Guideword Flow No/More/Less /Reverse/Misdirected
- Flow
No, Not, None Pressure
More/Less - Pressure
Temperature
More/Less - Temperature
More Level
More/Less - Level
Composition – Change of Phase
Composition – Change of Phase
Less Liquid / Vapor Density
Liquid / Vapor Density
Reverse /
Misdirected + Abnormal Operation
Corrosion/Erosion/Fouling/
Abnormal Operation
Cavitation Corrosion/Erosion/Fouling/
As Well As Cavitation
Cold Spot, Freezing, Metal
Embritlement Cold Spot, Freezing, Metal
Part Of Embritlement
Control
Control
Contaminant
Other Than Contaminant
Maintenance
Ignition Maintenance
Etc, Ignition
Etc,
39
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords Meaning
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords and Causes

Guideword Causes
No Flow Block valve closed, wrong line-up, slip blind, installed, incorrectly
installed check valve, valve fails to close or open (control valve,
shutdown valve, blowdown valve, etc), equipment failure/down
(pump, compressor, instrumentation, etc).

Reverse Flow Malfunction of omitted check valves (note that check valves are
not usually bubble tight or positive shut-off devices), siphon
effect, incorrect differential pressure, two-way flow, emergency
venting, wrong line-up, etc

More Flow Bypass valve open, increased pumping capacity, operation of

pump in parallel, reduced delivery head, change in fluid density,
exchanger tube cross connection of systems, control faults,
control pipe, large leak, wrong valve open, fugitive emission, slug
flow, etc
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords and Causes

Guideword Causes
Less Flow Line restriction - filter fouled - defective pumps - fouling of vessel
or lines, valves, orifice plates – density or viscosity changes,
competing pump heads and flows, in-advertently throttled valve,
etc

More Level Outlet isolated or blocked - inflow greater than outflow - control
failure - faulty level measurement – condensation in vapor line –
vessel overflow – deactivated level alarm – inadequate time to
respond - etc

Less Level Inlet flow stop – leak – outflow greater than inflow – faulty level
measurement – two phase flow – plugged instrument taps –
liquid control valve fails to open or stuck closed - inadequate
resident time (insufficient separator size) – inadequate mixing -
etc
HAZOP TECHNIQUE - Guidewords and Causes

Guideword Causes
More Pressure Design Pressure - Surge Problem - Leakeage from interconnected
high pressure system (i.e HE) – PCV fails closed or open – thermal
over pressure – positive displacement pumps – increased
centrifugal pump suction pressure – more reaction - etc

Less Pressure Generate vacuum condition – condensation – gas dissolving in

liquid- restricted pump / compressor suction line – undetected
leakage – vessel drainage procedure – blockage of blanket gas –
vacuum relief- etc

Other See handout

Guidewords
HAZOP TECHNIQUE – HAZOP WORKSHEET
HAZOP WORKSHEET
Node No.: PID No.:

Node Description: Design Intention:

DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFE RECOMMENDATIONS S L R REMARKS

GUARDS
HAZOP TECHNIQUE – Exercise Hazop

A Reactor mix substance A and B and react each other to form a new substance
C.
However, if any substance B more than A greater than it supposed to be, there
is potential for overpressure in the reactor.
END – DAY 1
1. Background
The key provision of PSM is process hazard analysis (PHA)—a careful review of what could go wrong and what
safeguards must be implemented to prevent releases of hazardous chemicals. (OSHA)
One or more of the following Process Hazard Analys methods, as appropriate, to determine and evaluate the hazards of
the process being analyzed: • What-if, • Checklist, • What-if/checklist, • Hazard and operability study (HAZOP), •
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), • Fault tree analysis, or • An appropriate equivalent methodology.
A discussion of these methods of analysis is contained in the companion publication, OSHA 3133, Process Safety
Management Guidelines for Compliance. Whichever method(s) are used, the process hazard analysis must address the
following: • The hazards of the process; • The identification of any previous incident that had a potential for
catastrophic consequences in the workplace; • Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and
their interrelationships, such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of
releases. Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and
detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors; • Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls;
• Facility siting; • Human factors; and • A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects on
employees in the workplace if there is a failure of controls.
4. Objective of the Course:
a) Provide basic knowledge of Process Safety Hazard Analysis concept and its application in analyzing Plant
Process Hazard and Industrial Work Activity Hazard (Construction activity, Project Activity, and Operation
Work Activity).
b) Better understand the various standard PHA methodology as described above that can be used to conduct a
PHA and its appropriate application.
c) Enable the participant to plan a PHA session, appropriate member/resources required, meeting, record and
report the session including the recognizing the gaps and providing recommendation(s).

5. Course Outline and Duration

d) Risk Assessment Concept & PHA Requirements (Day 1, 1 hours)
e) Hazard Identification: Standard, Process, Construction or Work Activity and Exercise, (Day 1, 3 hours)
f) HAZOP Methodology and Exercise (Day 1, 4 hours)
g) Bow Tie, Fault Tree, and Event Tree Analysis. (Day 2, 2 hours)
h) Introduction to Quantitative Risk Analysis (Day 2, 3 hours).
i) Checklist: What If, Walkthrough, API 14 C Checklist. (Day 2, 2 hours)
j) Failure Effect Mode Analysis and Excercise (Day 2-3, 2 hours)
k) Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and LOPA (Layer of Protection) Analysis ( Day 3, 7 hours)
6. Targeted Participants:
a) Engineer.
b) HSE Specialist/Profesionals.

7. Method of Training
c) Class Presentation
d) Discussion and Answer and Question.
e) Exercise each PHA methodology to fill the use of it.
f) Pre-Test and Post Test.
g) Example of Video/Lesson Learnt Demonstration and analysis what PHA should capture the hazard
beforehand.