Major trends affecting families: South America in perspective

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Introduction

The family is a universal social institution, whose members share a social space based on kinship relations, conjugality and parental ties[1]. Family relations are the basic criterion for the formation of households and the performance of tasks linked to biological and social reproduction in everyday life. In modern times, ties within the family are expected to be based on affection and mutual care, yet they involve instrumental, strategic and interest-based considerations, both in the short (everyday) life and in longer intergenerational perspectives.

The family is never an isolated institution, but rather part and parcel of wider societal processes, including productive and reproductive dimensions of societies, cultural patterns and political systems. Households and family organizations are linked to the labor market and the organization of social networks; socio-demographic trends such as fertility rates, divorce rates, and processes of ageing are part of wider social and cultural processes; and as a basic societal institution, the family is enmeshed in issues of basic cultural values and in political processes.

An overview of recent trends of change within families in South America involves considering the changes in family and household organization. Rather than assuming the prevalence of one specific form of the family –the patriarchal nuclear one - one has to ask about the diversity of forms of family organization, patterns of family formation and of reproduction. Not only do its forms change, but what societies expect from the institution, and what people expect and have in mind when they enter new family arrangements, also shift in time. In this respect, changes in subjective evaluations and understandings involve a "revolution in expectations", which may be diversely focused on the satisfaction of basic material and affective needs (CEPAL, 1993). What should be stressed is that in the context of the deep difficulties and crisis situations that the countries of the region have experienced in the last decade, the family has gained salience in social discourse as the basic unit of subsistence and reproduction. The family is seen as an important resource for its members and as a refuge for those who live in conditions of social exclusion, insecurity and violence. Yet this centrality is not translated into an explicit consideration of its role and its diverse forms for public policy planning and implementation (CEPAL, 2001). Furthermore, the family should not be seen just as a refuge and a place of protection from a hostile outside world, since it is never isolated, and indeed reflects and contributes also to violence, exclusion and social neglect.

Countries in the region vary greatly in territorial and population size (Brazil in one extreme with more than 170 million people; Uruguay on the other, with 3.3 million). They also vary in terms of their economic performance and in the prevalence of indigenous populations. The report is organized in four sections. In the first, some contextual data are presented regarding major developments of the region in the last decades. The second presents some significant socio-demographic trends to be considered in terms of household size and composition, and trends in conjugality, fertility, and the ageing process. The next section deals with some emerging significant issues in the region - the AIDS pandemic, the concern for domestic violence, and new trend in

economic and political migration. Finally, the concluding section looks at the trends towards the democratization of the family and of the relationship between families and the state, in the context of a changing world.

Existing quantitative and qualitative data vary from one country to another, and thus not all information is equally available for all countries in the region. Most of the comparable quantitative data are based on household surveys conducted regularly by Census Bureaus, and the sample design varies from one country to the next. In most cases, surveys include only the urban population, and in some case only the large cities. Furthermore, data from the most recent census counts (circa 2000) are not available with all details necessary to draw clear trends. The lack of comparability and availability of adequate country-by-country data will involve resorting to results of case studies.

In general, population statistics are based on household counts. It is easy to conflate the concept of the family with that of the household, taking data available for the latter as indicators of the former. For many purposes related to everyday life, to the satisfaction of basic needs such as food and shelter, households are actually an appropriate unit of analysis. However, for analyzing the dynamics of family and kinship ties, especially at times of high divorce rates and of diversified migratory patterns, special emphasis should be given to the lack of correspondence between households and families. Under such conditions, family responsibilities and obligations can be met by members who do not share a household. Love and care can be exchanged on a non-daily basis. And these are issues that will have to be raised to fully understand contemporary family trends.

The social and economic context

During the period 1950-2000, major structural transformations affected the organization of society and family patterns. Latin America underwent a fast process of urbanization and internal rural to urban migration. If in the 1950's the majority of the population of six out of ten countries lived in rural areas, by the year 2000 the countries have urbanized considerably, if not almost completely (Table 1). During the same period, labor force participation of women increased considerably, from around 20% of the female adult population to almost 40% (Table 2). In all cases, participation rates of women are higher in urban than in rural areas.

During the initial decades, economic growth promised a steady improvement in the level of living. Yet the last twenty years witnessed a deterioration of the labor market, with a major increase in the levels of unemployment and precarious positions (Table 3). Urban poverty levels, as measured by CEPAL (the proportion of the urban population below the poverty line) are very high, reaching in several cases more than half of the population. Poverty decreased in most countries of the region during the period 1990 – 1997. This decline was especially large and significant in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. From then on, however, the decline of poverty stopped and there has been an increase in poverty in several countries (Table 4). The Argentine crisis involved a sharp increase in the proportion of poor people in the period 1997 – 2001, from 19,7 to 30,3% of the population of

[1] The conceptual framework behind the ideas presented in this paper is to be found in Jelin, 1998.

Greater Buenos Aires. Estimates for 2002 indicate a further dramatic growth, reaching 54,3% of the population (INDEC, 2003). The Uruguayan crisis has gone in the same direction, although the figures are not so high.

Historically, an unequal income distribution has been the mark of Latin American societies. With the exception of Colombia and Uruguay, income distribution has been worsening (Table 5). Brazil, which concentrates almost 50% of the population of South America, is among the countries with the worst income distribution in the world. At the other end, Uruguay, a small and more homogeneous country, has a more egalitarian income structure. In 1999, the richest 10% of the Brazilian population received 47.1% of total income, while in Uruguay 27% of total income went to the richest 10% of the population (CEPAL, 2001).

During this same period, the region experienced significant political changes. From the prevalence of dictatorship and authoritarian political regimes, most countries experienced a political transition to democracy in the eighties. Political violence and repression implied severe disruptions in everyday life and in family bonds. In the cases of Peru (in the eighties and early nineties), and of Colombia (up to the present), political violence led to major population displacements. During the nineties, the prevalence of constitutional governments and functioning democratic political institutions created the appropriate scenario to advance legislation and public policies concerning human rights and social protection. Thus, legal and policy issues related to the family (from divorce laws to the rights of children, from reproductive rights to the recognition of non-conventional family forms) have increasingly been the subject of public debate leading, in most cases, to a liberalization of norms and practices and an increase in legal protection. Yet, as the structural neoliberal reforms implemented in the nineties involved a shift in governmental spending, the actual welfare benefits were drastically reduced in several countries.

Changes in family structure and dynamics

Household size and composition

The average size of urban households decreased during the nineties in all countries in South America (Table 6). Household size is strongly and systematically associated with income level, as Table 6 shows. The data indicate a growing income differential: low-income households reduce their average size at a smaller rate than high-income households, or even increase their average size (in urban Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay).

The study of household composition is not an easy matter. Normatively, households are formed by family members, yet the dynamics of the family and the transitions in the life course of its members involve movements in and out of households. The composition of households at any specific point in time is the result of all the family-related processes that occurred in the past. Yet these processes are hidden and masked by the static way household data is collected in surveys and census forms.

Usually, household composition is classified in the following way[2]:

1) Single person
2) Conjugal household
   - Nuclear household
     - Couple with no children
     - Lone parent with children
     - Couple with children
   - Extended (nuclear plus other relatives)
   - Composed (nuclear or extended plus non-kin members)
3) Non-conjugal nuclear composition (kin based or not)

This classification has two major difficulties: first, it hides histories of divorce, new conjugal couples, and non co-residential parenthood. Second, it is assumed that co-residential patterns involve strong links of shared domesticity, shared budgets and responsibilities. Yet this is increasingly called into question, as adult family responsibilities extend to kin who do not live together – both of the older and the younger generations.

Clearly, nuclear households are the most widespread form of residence (Table 7). Of the other types of households, the incidence of single-person households is on the increase in all countries. In the period 1986-1999, it grew from 11,3% to 15,5% in Argentina, from 11,9 to 16,6 in Uruguay, from 6,9 to 8,7 in Brazil and from 6,4 to 7,5 in Chile (CEPAL, 2001). Single person households are more prevalent in Argentina and Uruguay – countries where, there is a higher percentage of older persons than in other countries.

The increase in the number of single-person households in urban areas reflects in part the process of ageing of the population, and will probably increase in the future. It also reflects other incipient cultural and social trends: a growing dissociation between leaving the parental household and establishing a conjugal union on the part of the young, and increasing divorce rates – which mean that one of the partners (mostly the male) establishes a new household by himself. Traditionally in urban areas the young left the parental home upon marriage or starting a consensual union; now the young look for their autonomy independently from the process of family formation. This trend is incipient, and affects only upper income sectors, given the costs involved in living alone. It is still more prevalent among young men than among young women[3].

Extended households have been the ideal type of the patriarchal family. Yet the data are not easy to interpret. Variations among countries are large: 11,7 % of households in Argentina and 31,8% in Venezuela are extended households. In some countries, such as Brazil and Colombia, their proportion has increased in the last decade (from 11,2% of Brazilian households in 1986 to 16,8%

[2] For a full presentation of the definitions of household structures, see Torrado 2003.
[3] Thus, among the young, single-person households are mostly of single men; in adulthood, divorced men prevail; among the older ones, it is widowed women (for Argentina, Torrado 2003).

in 1999; from 18,8% to 25,2% in Colombia in the same period). In others, their proportion is declining (Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay) (CEPAL, 2001). It is likely that as a response to processes of impoverishment and unemployment in urban areas, extended family household arrangements have been on the rise among lower-income families as a strategy to pool resources and to face their unmet needs, especially regarding shelter. Often these extended households incorporate close relatives with their children (for instance, daughters and grandchildren) who are unable to establish independent households due to economic hardship. Yet there are no in-depth studies of these issues, studies that would allow a deeper understanding of the links between family responsibilities and everyday domestic arrangements in times of crisis.

Within the category of nuclear households, there has been an increase in the proportion of "incomplete nuclear" households, which in most cases consist of a woman and her children. The incidence of this type of household is more significant among economically disadvantaged sectors, and its existence tends to compound other difficulties these groups face. If women are the only financial and affective pillars in their families, and do not have any further assistance (income supplementation, child care and school support, among others) they have to carry the double (or even triple) responsibility – being in charge of economic support, of domestic activities, and of emotional care of their children, a situation that involves an excessive load for the woman and often exposes her and her children to high risk.

There is a clear class difference in the prevalence of one or another form of household. Single-person households are a chosen form for the upper strata and are almost non-existent among the poorest sectors of society. In Uruguay, 32,4% of the households among the higher income groups are single-person, while only 2,7% among the low-income quintile are. Likewise, married couples with no children (probably the elderly couples and young recently established couples) are also much more prevalent among the rich than among the poor (again Uruguay is the extreme case, with 22,2% of households in the highest quintile and 4,4% in the lowest income quintile being couples living alone). With the exception of Bolivia, extended and composed forms of households, on the other hand, are more prevalent among low-income households (Table 8, a. and b.). This type of household requires further analysis and research.

Usually, census and survey data provide information about "female-headed" households, and there is an implicit assumption on the part of those who analyze this information that they correspond to "incomplete nuclear" households. Yet it is important to realize that, in line with the overdue revision of the category of "head of household" (Arriagada, 2001), "female" heads can be in all categories of households, and not only among the single-parent incomplete nuclear one. Further studies of this subject are needed.

Yet no study of households can proceed without mentioning the increase in "female-headed" households in the region, and its association with poverty. During the 1990s the number of female-headed households increased in all countries (Table 9). This type of household exists in all strata (Table 10), reflecting, however, different social processes: for the higher income sectors, it is a result of higher divorce rates and of the process of ageing (the highest proportion of female-headed

households among the non-poor is in Uruguay). For the poorest or "indigent" sectors of the population (where the proportion of female-headed households is the highest), it reflects the fact that this type of unit is in fact unsustainable without outside support. Evidence of this kind points toward the issue of the feminization of poverty. Poor women who head a household have either never married, are divorced or live separated, or are widowed. Given the pattern of gender discrimination in the labor force and the domestic burden on women, the double/triple responsibility of poor women is both socially unviable and morally incorrect. Yet public policies have not sufficiently addressed the issue.

A counterpoint to the increase in female-headed households is one type of household that is growing very fast, but was almost absent in statistical terms - the single-parent male-headed household. Fathers who live with and raise their children alone are a new phenomenon, linked to transformations in concepts of masculinity. In this case, however, they tend to be middle and upper income households, and thus there can be household help. Longer-term effects of children being raised in different types of households have not been analyzed yet.

With rising instability of conjugal unions and patterns of remarriage and formation of new unions, there is a large increase in "re-assembled" households – those made up by a (new) couple and children from previous unions. Current statistical data gathering techniques, however, are not prepared to sort out different types of family processes in household formation. They capture synchronic data, and not the history of family formation behind it, and thus they appear under the "complete" nuclear or extended categories. Such households - and the family links that are created by the new unions - are still not framed within legal bodies, and the relationships they produce among their members (beyond the traditional image of the "step-relative") have not yet been typified legally or even in terms of social norms and habits.

Finally - although still not recognized in most countries and affecting only a small percentage of the population - the increasing display of sexual orientation implies the slow emergence and recognition of same-sex couples, with or without children, in a new "same sex nuclear family" form. In some countries, the recognition of same sex bonds has led to the recognition of social security rights. There have also been some advances regarding adoption rights. In Brazil and in Argentina, legislation has been proposed to legitimate civil unions of homosexual couples, with similar rights and obligations as marriage between heterosexual partners.

Changes in conjugality, nuptiality and divorce

One of the most important trends regarding family formation in the last decades is linked to the change in the patterns of formation and dissolution of conjugal couples. Lower marriage rates and higher cohabitation rates have been observed in the majority of the countries of the region (for Argentina, Torrado, 2003; for Chile, INE, 2000a). At the same time, there is an increase in divorce

rates (Table 11)[4]. This set of phenomena has been interpreted as an indication of weakening of conjugal relations or of a crisis in the conjugal couple. Yet when considering the quality of the bonds, it could also be seen as an indication of increasing freedom to exit unsatisfying relationships and of a process leading towards the constitution of new family forms.

Cohabitation and consensual unions existed in rural areas of the region since early times as a popular practice, at times followed after some years of cohabitation by civil or religious marriage. This practice began to decline statistically with the process of urbanization and modernization. In countries where divorce was not legalized, *de facto* separations and new conjugal bonds did not involve marriage but rather consensual unions. But cohabitation without formal marriage has grown in numbers during the last decades among urban and middle class social sectors. It has to be recognized as a new type of conjugal arrangement. There are two variants: consensual unions as a trial stage that will be followed by a legal union (mostly when children are born), and consensual unions as an alternative to the legal bond. Stable consensual unions can be a chosen option, both in the case of the first union and more often in successive ones.

In Argentina, consensual unions have grown steadily from the 1960s, and more rapidly since 1980. This kind of union represented 7% of the total in 1960 and 18% in 1991. The figures for the city of Buenos Aires are more impressive: 1.5% in 1960, 13.6% in 1991 and 21% in 2001. In this last year, the Population Census in Buenos Aires revealed that 116 thousand unions out of the 548 thousand recorded were consensual. Exclusive for lower-income sectors in past times, this arrangement has been adopted by the urban middle classes (Torrado, 2003). Information from the last Brazilian Population Census supports the same trend towards the increase in consensual unions: they rose from 18% in 1991 to 28.3% of the total unions in the country in the year 2000 (IBGE, 2002).

The increase in divorce rates and separation should be examined in light of complex socio-cultural processes linked to individuation. The spread of modern values of personal autonomy, free choice of a partner based on romantic love, the growing social expectation of being able to act on one's wishes and feelings – all these have their counterpart in the freedom to sever ties when there is no more love, when the costs of maintaining a conflictual relationship exceed those of ending the conjugal bond. Up until recent decades, separation carried a strong social stigma for women, who were blamed for the failure of their marriages. Married status and motherhood were the "natural" condition of "decent" women. Nowadays, changes in the cultural models that govern conjugal relationships towards greater gender equality involve greater freedom to choose. Furthermore, increasing financial autonomy through their incorporation into the labor market provides women with the possibility of choosing to exit unsatisfying (and at times even violent) marriages.

[4] Changes in legislation undoubtedly affect the statistical information. Only in 1987 did divorce (and the legal capacity to remarry) become legal in Argentina. This was followed by five years in which there was a "boom" in divorces and a sharp growth of marriages, involving mostly the legalization of *de facto* conditions (Torrado, 2003, analyzes data for the city of Buenos Aires). in divorces and a sharp growth of marriages, involving mostly the legalization of *de facto* conditions (Torrado, 2003, analyzes data for the city of Buenos Aires).

Trends in fertility, sexuality and reproductive behavior

Fertility rates have consistently been declining in the countries of the region (Table 12). There is a strong relationship between the social position of women and fertility rates. This can be measured in terms of educational levels: highly educated women have significantly fewer children than less educated ones (Table 13). Furthermore, insofar as educational opportunities for women in the region have been increasing (Valdes, et al., 1995), the decline in fertility followed.

Yet the relationship between educational levels of women and fertility does not provide the total explanation and the total picture. The rise in the educational level of women affects the age at first union and delays the arrival of the first child, thereby broadening women's horizons and expectations outside family boundaries and providing women with information needed to decide when and how many children to have. In the transition towards new female identities, the value of children and family life gradually drops from the central position it used to have, especially for highly educated women. Still, the values associated with marriage and motherhood are extremely strong in the region.

In a more direct way, reproductive behavior of men and women is linked to the advance in reproductive technologies, and in public policies related to sexuality and reproduction. In the last decades, various international conferences and treaties have established the bases for the recognition of reproductive rights, providing legitimacy to appropriate initiatives for the definition of policies in this field[5]. Opposition to these principles by international and local actors (i.e., the Catholic Church) has been very strong, trying to limit or obstruct their application.

A broad definition of reproductive health involves recognizing the condition by which each person can enjoy a safe and satisfactory sexual life, enjoy his/her reproductive capacity and her/his freedom to decide how and when to perform it. A free sexual and reproductive life requires cultural changes, institutional support and resources. Public policies vary in the different countries of the region, involving some recent legal changes regarding reproductive health and rights. Legal change is slow, and strong institutional forces oppose it.

Country	Year	Legislation	Scope
Argentina	2003	Sexual health and responsible parenthood	Access to information and provision of health services. Improve women's capacity to make informed reproductive and sexual decisions
Brazil	1996	Family planning	Access to information about contraceptive techniques
Chile	2003	Law proposal	Recognition of sexual and reproductive rights through public policies that promote a non-sexist culture and education
Colombia	2000	Resolution 412	Establishment of technical norms for family planning services

[5] The International Conference of Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) recognized and incorporated sexual and reproductive rights in the international agenda. The IV International Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) extended the proposals to guarantee these rights.

Peru	1985	National Population Policy	Promotion and guaranteeing free and responsible decision about number and spacing of children
Uruguay	2002	Protection of reproductive health	Promotion and defense of sexual rights and reproductive health. Decriminalization of abortion.

Within each couple, more democratic relationships imply the recognition of the needs and wishes of the partners, and sharing hopes and visions of their life. This requires health services that provide information and means to implement the desired reproductive behavior. There is still a wide unattended population with regards to contraceptive techniques (Table 14). The gap between ideal family size and actual number of children is a clear indication of the unmet needs. A high percentage of women did not want to have an additional child when they became pregnant (Table 15), and the percentage varies according to the level of education of the women: close to half of the uneducated women in Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia had unwanted births, while among the higher educated women the number drops to 12 to 22%.

Adolescent and child fertility require special attention. Adolescent boys and girls tend to initiate their sexual life earlier than in previous decades (for Chile, Golstain et al., 2000; for Brazil, Gupta, 2000; for Paraguay, Pantelides and Binstock; for Peru, INEI, 1998). The pattern of fertility among the young (ages 15 to 19, Table 16) shows that their contribution to total births has increased in some countries (more notably in Brazil and Venezuela), which implies that the decline in fertility that the countries experienced was mostly due to older women and not to a sharp decline in adolescent fertility. Data on child fertility (age group 10 to 14) are not available.

Health services usually neglect the needs of the boys and girls in these age groups. This involves not only the young themselves, but also those who can orient and help them in their decision making process regarding sexual behavior - particularly parents and other family members (ONU, 1994). Families play a significant role in this area. The type of family and household structure, as well as the sexual history of the mother, is important. On the one hand, adolescents living in households with only one parent (the mother, most often) are more prone to have an early sexual initiation. Parents and other family members who accompany the process of growing up can orient the young towards patterns of behavior that avoid risks of unwanted pregnancies, unsafe and illegal abortions, and sexually transmitted diseases. On the other hand, many studies have shown a strong relationship between the age when the mother had her first child and the age of the first pregnancy of the daughter. Early motherhood, still quite high in the countries of the region, is to be considered a risk factor. It involves higher rates of maternal mortality and of child mortality and morbidity. Early childbirth is more common among poorer and less educated people. The experience of early motherhood incorporates the young mothers into the circle of intergenerational reproduction of poverty. Assuming childrearing responsibilities narrow educational and occupational opportunities, thus compromising their own and their offspring's future.

There is a further important consideration, implying a significant social problem: children's sexual abuse and resulting pregnancies. Young 10 to 14 year old girls' pregnancies are not, and should not

be considered as, indications of an early voluntary sexual initiation. They are often rather the result of rape and incestuous sexual molestation. Secrecy and 'blaming the victim' are usual practices in these cases. There is little systematic research on the subject in the region. Knowledge about this phenomenon, and denunciation of the crimes involved, should be a priority of any action programme.

Emerging issues

The process of ageing

The countries of South America vary considerably in their ageing processes. Argentina and Uruguay, which experienced the first demographic transition earlier than other countries, have a higher proportion of elderly persons. Chile is undergoing a clear process of ageing of its population (the proportion of 60 and over grew from 8,1 in 1980 to 10,2 in 2000). The other countries have a relatively young population, although the proportion of older people is growing (Table 17).

What are the implications on family dynamics of an increasing proportion of older and very old (over 80) people in a population? First, the increase in life expectancy of around three years in the last decade (linked to the decline in fertility and in mortality) implies a continuing increase in the potential duration of marital relationships (the age at first union did not increase by the same extent).

Second, the increase in the proportion of older people impacts on household composition. Traditionally, the extended three-generational household was the expression of the patriarchal structure based on intergenerational transmission of power and wealth. It was also the way in which the older widows and widowers were taken care of by their children. But increasingly there are other choices of household arrangements. Older couples can continue living by themselves, with no children. Widows[6] can live alone (if they can afford it) or in non-nuclear households (elderly sisters living together, for instance). The difference by social class is very significant here. In fact, the pattern of extended three-generational households is probably the result of two contradictory trends: on the one hand, the persistence of the "traditional" household structure, in which the elderly share the household with their offspring, and a new form of intergenerational pooling of resources linked to poverty.

Third, the process of ageing implies an increasing need for financial aid, care and attention to others, which becomes acute for the very old (over 80). Who is to provide such care? Traditionally, it was daughters and other relatives (mostly females) who used to take care of the ailing elders. The growth of welfare services by the state - pensions and retirement benefits as well as health services - implied a shift of responsibilities, decreasing the financial and domestic burden on the family. Although the governmental provision of welfare services varies considerably among countries

[6] Widowhood is more frequent among women than among men. The difference in life expectancy between men and women has been constant in the last decade: 6 years, varying from 8 years in Brazil to 3 years in Bolivia (Arriagada, 2001).

(Uruguay having the most universal and complete system, followed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile), the economic crisis and the breakdown of state services during the last decade involved a substantial impoverishment of older persons and an increasing burden on the family. Yet, given the rise in unemployment and poverty, when the older generation has access to pensions or have a house the flow of help can go in the opposite direction - from older persons to the younger generations.

In fact, intergenerational family networks of support are a very important resource under different conditions. Family ties are always the "last resort" when an emergency or crisis arises. For the rich, family ties are important in terms of economic, cultural and social capital. Family networks can compensate for the lack or insufficiency of monetary resources or of access to social services, through monetary transfers or domestic care. On the other end, older adults can help and care for their children and grandchildren when divorce, separation or other difficulties affect the younger generation. It has been estimated that one-third of income of households shared by older adults and younger generations are generated by older persons (Guzmán, 2002).

HIV/AIDS in South America

The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) causing AIDS has unleashed a world-scale epidemic that has exceeded the estimations of only a decade ago. It is estimated that by the end of 2001, 40 million people were affected worldwide. There are approximately one million affected persons - children and adults - in the countries of South America (Table 18). Among these, 300 thousand are adult women and 22 thousand, 14 year-olds and younger (ONUSIDA, 2003). The numbers are significant and growing, although they are proportionally much smaller that in other regions of the world.

Although during the eighties and nineties the disease affected mostly males, there is a steady increase in the proportion of infected women. In Brazil in 1980-1990, there were 6,5 men for each infected woman (Programa Nacional de DST e AIDS, 2002). This ratio declined to 2,4 in the nineties, and among adolescents there is almost as many infected women as men. In the city of Buenos Aires, which concentrates a high proportion of the registered cases in Argentina, there were 21,8 men for each woman in 1989, and 2,9 in 2000 (Programa Nacional de Lucha contra los retrovirus del humano, SIDA y ETS, 2002).

How do families experience the spread of the disease? First, there have been changes in the patterns of sexual behavior, although the spread of preventive measures is not progressing with the necessary speed, especially among the young. The strength of the Catholic Church in several countries has implied the lack of governmental action in the area of sexual education and in the availability of preventive health services for sexual and reproductive behavior. In general, and with the exception of Brazil, policies regarding AIDS have been lacking in the region (Bronfman and Herrera, 2002).

When the infection is already present, the uncertainties faced by infected men and women concerning decisions about their sexuality and reproductive behavior are multiple. In all cases where there is awareness, the need to avoid the transmission of the virus and new reinfections implies negotiating with partners the sexual care practices to be implemented. If a couple wants to have a child, risks multiply, insofar as the probability of intergenerational transmission of the virus is high and affects decisions concerning fertility. In fact, most HIV children below age 13 have been infected through their mothers. A study carried out in Brazil indicates that while in the period 1984-1987 22% of the cases of AIDS among infants were due to maternal transmission, 87% of the cases in 1996-1997 could be traced to this origin (Goncalves Veloso, 1998).

HIV infected pregnant women face special difficulties. Health services are usually not prepared to deal with them. They are defined as "risk population" in a double meaning of the word: women at risk because of their infection and the need to protect the unborn child from infection and health workers at risk because they have to deal with HIV patients. Often there is a reluctance to treat HIV patients which can lead to stigmatization. Images of motherhood that are usually conveyed to pregnant women (such as the value of breast-feeding as the utmost expression of maternal care) have to be reinterpreted by HIV infected women, often with little support on the part of health workers.

An ethnographic study of motherhood and AIDS developed in Buenos Aires in 1995 followed the difficult trajectory of infected pregnant women in the labyrinths of the public health services. Health workers construct a stigmatized identity of the "infected pregnant woman", combining beliefs about irresponsible and shameful life styles. If motherhood implies a responsible commitment to caring, women at risk are suspected as irresponsible. When delivery takes place, stigmatization may be extreme and put to practice (Dominguez Mon, 1996).

At another level, families in which one or more members suffer from this disease experience a critical situation. From the financial point of view they have to face rapidly growing medical expenses, for which they do not always have coverage; they can see their income diminish due to discrimination, facing even job dismissal or serious limitations to find a position once their health status becomes public. For the carrier, the likelihood of dying is high, and infecting of other members of the family is quite probable. Given the probability of death of young men and women (although death rates are declining because of improvement in treatment of the illness), there is a new category of orphaned children, the children of AIDS (208 thousand children in the countries considered here).

Domestic Violence: The hidden face of family relations

Hidden and silenced in the family realm, domestic violence has started to gain social visibility and legal attention during the last two decades. In their struggle for gender equality and for the spread of an ethic of human rights, the women's movement has taken up the issue and has been engaged in an effort to better understand the phenomenon and to act for its eradication.

At the international level, domestic violence was established as a priority during the First Women's Decade (1975-1985). During the nineties, it became a central theme in international fora. The Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 recognized that violence against women, even inside the private sphere of the family, entails a violation of their human rights. The Belem do Pará Convention of the OAS (Organization of American States) in 1994 established the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Courts for victims of violence.

These international treaties have fostered the introduction of legal mechanisms to deal with domestic violence in most of the South American countries[7]. However, the analysis of institutional responses shows clear shortcomings and limitations. In Venezuela, for instance, it is only recognized when there is a stable cohabitation. Brazil recognizes the "aggravated" nature of a crime when it is committed against ascending or descending kin relations, siblings and spouses, but does not recognize it when concubines and unmarried partners are the victims. In fact, there is controversy regarding the best approach to the issue of domestic violence. Criminal prosecution implies high costs for everybody involved. Mediation and counseling may at times be the preferred strategy. Yet the exposure it involves combined with the lack of punishment may lead to reoccurrence. In many cities, there are societal initiatives to help the women in the short run, such as shelters for battered women, but they are not sufficient to meet the demand, and they cannot offer a lawful and enduring solution (CLADEM, 2000).

Although the academic and policy communities are increasingly aware of the issues involved, there is not much systematic accumulation of information about the incidence of domestic violence. The nature of the phenomenon makes it difficult to expose. Silence and covering up are the rule. Blaming the victim, victims' shame, fear, and guilt usually accompany domestic violence.

Family violence is gender-related: victims tend to be female partners in a conjugal relationship and young girls. To a lesser extent, there are boys (sons) and older persons. Physical violence, psychological and economic violence, sexual abuse, rape and incest, and neglect are the most common manifestations of abuse. Contrary to common belief, it is a significant theme not only for low income or low educational sectors of the population, since it cuts across all social classes.

Although quantitative research is scarce, there are some research results that can help determine the modalities of the problem. In Argentina, a Family Violence Monitoring System implemented in two municipalities of the province of Mendoza[8], showed the high incidence of the phenomenon: 80% of the women registered by the system reported that they had been victims of physical or emotional violence in their lives, while 62% reported that they were experiencing violence at the time of the

[7] New constitutional norms emerging from recent reforms in Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), Ecuador (1993) and Venezuela (1999) recognize the right of women to live a life free of violence. In 2000, with the exception of Brazil and Paraguay, all the countries in the region had some kind of specific legislation dealing with domestic violence (CLADEM, 2002).

[8] Carried out within the framework of a Pilot Program on Prevention of Domestic Violence, sponsored by the Inter American Development Bank.

report. In 70% of the cases, the perpetrator was the current husband/partner (Garrido, 2001). In Perú, a survey research project dealing with sexual and physical violence against women showed that half of the interviewed women in Metropolitan Lima experienced at some time in their lives physical or sexual violence exerted by their partners, while 28% reported some physical violence exerted by another person. These figures grow to close to 70% and 32% in the Department of Cuzco, where the survey included rural areas. Half of the Lima women who experienced violence were from low-income sectors, 36% were of middle and lower middle sectors, and 13% were from upper middle and upper sectors of the population[9] (Gueznes, et al, 2002). A similar distribution was found in a study conducted in Uruguay: violence was an everyday affair among close to 40% of upper class families, more than 50% of middle class families, and close to 50% of lower income families (Traverso, 2000).

Not much is known about the profile of perpetrators. In a sample of the telephone calls to the *Línea Telefónica de Violencia Familiar* in Buenos Aires, it was found that in 93% of the reported cases, the aggressor was the conjugal partner (husbands or concubines, and 3% of previous partners) and in 85% of the cases the woman calling lived in the same household as her aggressor (Chitarroni, 2002).[10]

Violence against women is usually a cycle of abuse, which extends throughout the life course. Before birth, the future child may suffer the mistreatment of his/her mother during pregnancy; during childhood, s/he may be vulnerable to physical, sexual and psychological violence, incest, prostitution and child pornography; during adolescence and adulthood, people may suffer aggression in the context of intimate and family relations; and later on in life, older persons may be abandoned or neglected by their families (UNICEF, 2000a).

Family violence is undoubtedly a pattern of learned behavior, rooted in unequal relationships between men and women, in sexual hierarchy and in a representation of masculinity that is exerted through the domination of women. In other words, in traditional patriarchal family organizations, the power of the man is expressed in different ways, including physical and sexual violence, and is taken to be *natural* in traditional gender relations. Many people do not know otherwise, since violent men and victimized women were mostly raised in families where violence was the rule. Thus, the *naturalization* of domestic violence occurs.

Violence is often seen as a legitimate means to solve conflicts, and may even be highly valued as a mechanism of socialization of children (Traverso, 2000). The Uruguayan study shows that 40% of households had some history of previous violence; yet the figure was almost 80% among the households where there was a condition of physical violence present.

[9] A study carried out with the sponsorship of the World Health Organization, focused on conjugal violence and women's health. Other South American countries covered by the study are Peru and Brazil.

[10] The sample included 367 cases selected among the telephone denunciations during the period 1993 – 2001 received by the *Línea Telefónica de Violencia Familiar* of the *Dirección de la Mujer* of the government of the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Besides conjugal and love-related violence,[11] child beating and child abuse are very widespread. A study carried out by UNICEF in Chile shows the high incidence of violence on children: close to 75% of the children experienced some type of violence; more than half referred to physical violence, and 25% were cases of acute physical violence (UNICEF, 2000b).[12] Psychological violence affected almost 20% of the cases. Acute violence was more significant among lower income sectors, while psychological violence was more prevalent among upper income level boys and girls.

One of the most severe forms of child neglect is the phenomenon of street children. Often, these children are on the streets to earn a living, and even contributing to their family income for survival. Other times, the connection with their families is severed or lost. Neither their families nor other institutions take care or meet the needs of these children. Under these conditions, the children may be exploited by rings of adults, converted into drug-dealers or induced into committing criminal acts under the control of others. Child prostitution and *sicarios* (children who are informal "soldiers" of drug rings or of paramilitary forces in Colombia and among the drug-rings of Brazil, for instance) are perhaps the most horrifying scenes of life in several South American cities (testimonies for Colombia in González Uribe, 2002). It is estimated that there are between 15,000 and 30.000 children in the streets of Colombia, and in Brazil the number reaches 200,000 (UNICEF, 2000a, and www.unicef.org.co/03c_d).

Older persons are also victims of mistreatment and violence in the family. In a study conducted among older persons in Argentina, 51% of the respondents informed that they have been subject to verbal aggressions, and 11% (mostly women) reported physical aggression on the part of family members. The study did not find significant differences by socioeconomic level (Oddone, 2001). Given the fact that older persons are not prone to inform on situations of violence, statistics about this issue are very scarce. The *Defensoría del Pueblo* (office of the ombudsperson) of Colombia has received a large number of reports of isolation, insecurity, family and social mistreatment, and neglect. Such cases can be interpreted as violations of the human rights of older persons, and the condition becomes more acute as a consequence of the prevailing social violence and forced displacements in Colombia (Luna Torres, 2002).

In general, explanations about domestic violence and its persistence point to cultural, economic, legal and political dimensions. Strongly established gender stereotypes and inequalities shape the phenomenon. Domestic isolation of women and a strong image of women's identity shaped by their family roles (the trilogy of mother, housewife and spouse) help in the survival and reproduction of the phenomenon. However, as more women get more education and enter the labor force - thus increasing their financial and psychological sense of agency and autonomy - they gain resources to push for societal change. Yet there is an irony, because as patriarchal domination is called into

[11] In fact, the family should be seen as a paradoxical space. It is the space of intimacy and love. It is also the prime space for violence. It is estimated that one third of homicides in the world are family related (including "passionate" crime) (Chesnais, 1992).

[12] The study was based on a self-administered questionnaire in a sample of eighth grade boys and girls (1525 cases).

question by modernization and urbanization, and as men's position in society becomes less clear and the bases of their authority erode, resorting to domestic violence may become for some men a kind of "last resort" of traditional masculinity fighting against change. There is evidence showing that domestic violence is more prevalent in families where working women become the main source of income for family support (Geldstein, 1994). More studies of masculinity are needed to understand and explain more fully patterns of violence, and therefore provide the tools for better policy interventions in this field.

New trends in migration

Migratory processes imply always the fragmentation of family units, whether temporarily or in more permanent ways. It affects both the organization of families and households in the communities of origin and in the receiving areas - usually activating multi-sited kinship and community networks. Both internal (rural to urban) and international migration have been significant in the region during the whole of the twentieth century, varying in magnitude and in timing in the different countries (Roberts, 1995). Urbanization processes in the region, which started in the 1930's, gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century, involving massive rural to urban migratory flows. During the last decades, when the great majority of the population was already urban, other migratory flows (urban to urban, new international flows) gained visibility and impacted family structure and processes in different ways.

Undoubtedly, most migratory moves (temporary or permanent, internal or international) are economically driven. People leave places where economic difficulties are paramount and look for opportunities elsewhere, in their own countries or across borders. When economic stagnation and crisis hit the region in the eighties, a double process unfolded: more people were prepared to move, while poverty, lack of resources and international barriers to migration implied that many could not do it.

Economic conditions are not the only motors of migration. Political conditions may lead to exile and displacement. Thus, the dictatorships of the Southern Cone during the seventies and eighties created considerable numbers of political exiles. Political violence in Peru during the eighties and ongoing violence in Colombia generate internal and international displacement of significant numbers of people. The effects of economic and political migration and displacement on the family will be considered separately.

a. Economic migration and family responsibilities

Very often, migration is part of a family-based economic strategy. The decisions regarding who, when and where to move are made considering gender and generational criteria. Young adults, both males and females, have moved from the countryside to the cities throughout the twentieth century - males for unskilled construction and industrial work, women predominantly for domestic service, to

help their rural families. Informal remittances to their families of origin, and the eventual move of more family members to the city, have been well-established patterns. Internal migration has usually been related to job search for the men and single women, while married women and children tend to move accompanying their husbands-fathers. Increasing levels of education among women and the increase in their professional skills are creating conditions for less family-motivated migration of women towards migration linked to professional opportunities.

In general, migratory flows are embedded in kinship networks and family relations. Single young men and women who move to the city in search of work usually are part of such kinship networks, having relatives in the city who will act as buffers in their adaptation to city life. When men move by themselves, leaving their wives and children behind, it is likely that they will either return to their communities of origin or eventually bring their families to their new places of residence. Kinship networks are a reinforcing factor. The probability of a more definitive move to the city is linked to the existence of a kinship network there. An in-depth case study of Paraguayan migration to Argentina shows that Paraguayan men who migrate to Argentina with their wives tend to remain for longer periods in the receiving society. They also tend to become permanent residents. Having kin in the area of destination (brothers and sisters, for instance) increased the chances of longer or permanent stays (Parrado and Cerrutti, 2001).

Family migratory flows have usually been in stages. Different family members move at different times, involving often “chain migration” or multi-sited family networks. In both cases, what is significant is that family responsibilities become detached from day-to-day interaction and cohabitation. This phenomenon seems to be increasing, and the distance of places of destination seems to grow as a result of the changes in communications and transportation technologies. From the point of view of the economic strategy of the multi-sited family or kinship network, the crucial bond is financial. Remittances are important economically; they also are important as links that tie together members of families that do not live in the same place.

Although it is impossible to estimate the magnitude of remittances within countries, there are some quantitative indications regarding international migration (usually underestimated because of the use of informal channels rather than bank transactions). Given the growing significance of the phenomenon - “a critical flow of foreign currency to the majority of countries” according to a recent IDB report (IDB, 2001) - the issue of remittances is attracting attention in the international financial community.

International migration involves often movements to neighboring countries: Paraguayans tend to move to Argentina and Brazil, Ecuadorians to Colombia, Bolivians to Argentina and to a lesser extent to Chile and Brazil, Chileans to Argentina, Uruguayans to Argentina (ECLAC-CELADE, 2000). During the 1990s, however, migratory flows have increasingly gone to the United States and the European Union (and to a lesser extent Japan). In all cases, but more so when the migratory flow is to the economic North, remittances are part of the picture, although among the countries in South America, the economic significance of remittances is not as high as in Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. Yet it is quite important in some countries: in Ecuador, remittances from

abroad amount to 10% of GNP.[13] IDB estimates that remittances in Latin America grew 17,6% during 2002, and will continue to grow in the future (IDB, 2003).

An interesting case is Argentina. During the nineties, because of the fixed exchange rate and overvaluation of the peso, Argentina attracted workers from neighboring countries - Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay - who sent money back to their families in the communities of origin. As the Argentine crisis deepened and the peso was devalued in early 2002, the flow changed direction: many migrants returned to their countries, Argentines increased their out-migration, and remittances to Argentina increased enormously. It has been estimated that U$S 300 millions were sent from abroad to relatives in Argentina during 2002 (*Clarín*, February 23, 2003).

The significance of international migration and of the multi-sited family and community networks has been extensively studied in Europe and in the northern part of Latin America (Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America). Increasingly, the phenomenon is extending to South America, calling for additional research. Although difficult, it is possible to measure the flows of economic resources. It is harder to measure the flows of people: given the migratory restrictions of the receiving countries, the numbers of illegal migrants is very large and hard to estimate with precision. Even less studied are the subjective, affective and cultural dimensions of the issues involved in these "families at a distance" in an age of virtual communications.

b. Politically motivated migration - exile and displacement

Political exile is not a new phenomenon in the region, with its history of high political instability and recurrent authoritarianism. As a result, people have moved across boundaries searching for personal safety and for a place to organize opposition and resistance. It is well known that political exile disrupts family organization and family life in several ways. Fear, insecurity in everyday life, uncertainties, and sudden changes break the "normal" life and the timing of family events. Given the gender differences in terms of political and public activity, it has usually been the men who have needed to abandon involuntarily their country. Women and children either accompany the men in their search for personal safety, or are left behind to fend for themselves. It always involves disruption and stress.

Political violence has also other implications for everyday family life. At times, sustained politically motivated violence disrupts everyday life in such a way that it produces flight, refugee camps and other forms of displacements. The case of Peru is significant in this respect. Peru experienced political violence during the nineteen eighties, linked to the conflict between the guerrilla group *Sendero Luminoso*, military repression and civilian "self-defense" and paramilitary forces. Estimates of the consequences of this violence reach approximately 30.000 deaths and between 450.000 and 600.000 displaced persons. In the early nineties, the Fujimori government implemented

[13] The figures are usually underestimated, because only formal money transfers are considered. Neither in kind transfers nor money carried by travelers are considered. Also, remittances are especially significant for the poorest workers. ILO has estimated that remittances imply an improvement of 7% of the income of the poorest sectors of Latin America and the Caribbean.

a programme of resettlement and return, leading to hundreds of thousands of highland peasants going back to their villages (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2001).

A study of a Quechua-speaking community in the highlands of Peru (Uccuracay) can serve as a painful example of this type of violence and displacement. Political violence in the region during the early eighties hit the community in full. The actions of *Sendero Luminoso*, of the military, and of the *Rondas Campesinas* involved deaths, disruption of productive activities, political rifts within the community, fear and flight. The population, some hiding in caves in the mountains, abandoned the community, some went to nearby towns and cities, and others looked for work in the lowlands of the *Selva.* Orphans and widows spread across the country. In the early nineties, when violence subsided and a return policy was implemented by the government, community members gathered and decided to return and rebuild. The economic basis of life was to be the same as before: individual small plots of land (at 4.000 meters of altitude) and family owned small herds of cattle. Self-sufficient production and barter are complemented by seasonal out-migration of the men to work in the agricultural sector. This organization of subsistence requires a certain type of division of labor within the household: men working the land and doing seasonal work in the lowlands; women and children caring for the animals. This tightly knit productive/reproductive unit is anchored in a complete nuclear household. In consequence, households of the widows of political violence are not viable units. Widows are the poorest of the community, and their subsistence (and that of their offspring) is in constant jeopardy (Del Pino, 2003)[14].

Political exile is usually an experience of people involved in political action in the public sphere (typically in middle class metropolitan educated populations, but also trade union and peasant leaders among the working classes), while displacement occurs more often among the rural and often remote population. It involves everybody - women and children, the elderly and the infirm. Colombia is a country that has been in a state of enduring political violence during decades, and in the nineties displacement, exile and refugee flows were massive. It is estimated that more than two million persons were displaced during the last fifteen years in Colombia because of political conflict. The intervention of the military, paramilitary forces, armed guerrillas and drug-related armed groups extends currently through several regions of the country.

Displacement includes women and children, and it affects particularly the black and indigenous population. Displaced children do not go to school and families have no housing and no access to health services. The result is a lack of life perspective - it is flight without any hope for a future. Governmental programs are inefficient and cannot cope with the conditions of violence and displacement (Cubides and Domínguez, 1999, among others). Although other areas of the world have seen this happen in recent decades and in current times, the South American cases are less publicized, and require urgent research and attention.

[14] This type of issues are the ones that the Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación of Peru (in the midst of preparing its final report as this paper is being written in April 2003) has to face when trying to recommend reparation policies.

Concluding remarks: Global trends and families

Changes in family roles: towards the democratization of families?

The last decades have brought fundamental changes in family members' roles, strongly influenced by social and political institutions and by shifts in the dominant ideals and ideas. The desire for smaller families and, the realization that there are ways to control and plan reproductive behaviour, are modern notions, spread directly through the media, and indirectly by schools and other institutions. The sharp decline of fertility in Brazil from the nineteen seventies to the eighties, for instance, has been linked to the national expansion of TV during the same period, and the type of images of the family that the soap operas and other fiction and nonfiction programmes were conveying (Fadul, 2000, and the references cited in that paper). It is not a question of assigning causal links, but rather to show that reproductive and family behavior is subject to change and is linked to the sphere of ideals and models.

The 1960s marked the beginning of a time of major changes in the region, which included not only an increase in participation in the labor force by young, single women, but also of married women and married women with children. The moment of establishing a new household through marriage or cohabitation used to be a turning point in the work history of women, who then became housewives and spouses, and then mothers. Recent trends show that workforce participation rates of women increase in all age groups, and that women tend not to leave the labor force when they marry or have children. This means a shift in the organization of complete nuclear households, towards situations where both members of the conjugal couple work (Arriagada, 2001; for a detailed study in Argentina, Wainerman, 2003). This tends to be more common among higher educated social groups, and involves a higher income (which may be in part the result of more adult members of the household working).

A shift towards women participating in the labor force, however, does not entail a parallel change in the sharing of household and domestic responsibilities, which remain predominantly in the hands of women. Changes in this regard are very slow, although there are increasing pressures on men to participate more actively in domestic tasks. Younger cohorts probably will show signs of change in this direction.

One prevailing trend in the last two decades in the region has been the impoverishment of broad sectors of the population as a consequence of economic recession or very slow growth, and of the crisis in the labor market. The difficulties faced by males in the labor market, associated with a strong expectation of being the main economic support and the "head of the family", have been reflected in the family sphere. The obstacles faced in trying to satisfy this role expectation have put pressure on couples, and challenged them to develop new strategies. Sometimes, this failure to meet social expectations has led to a higher rate of dissolution of the conjugal union. Other times, families have faced these critical situations by developing strategies where additional members

participate in the labor market. These additional members are primarily married women and children.

In this general context, there have been some discussions claiming that we are witnessing a process of family "disintegration". Actually, what is going on is a process of crisis of the patriarchal model of the family, a model that involved strong authoritarian tendencies. From the perspective of the patriarchal nuclear family, the decline in nuptiality and the increase in divorce rates, as well as the increase in the labor force participation of women - with the "danger" that they abandon their traditional ("naturalized") roles of housewives, wives and mothers - can be interpreted as abnormal and expressing a situation of crisis. In such a situation, some voices express the urgency to intervene and "save" the family from the crisis. These voices are usually those of tradition and religion, with a strong sense of morally policing private life, and asking for ways to "strengthen" the family. For these voices, there is only one family to be strengthened: the monogamous heterosexual couple and their children, established once and for all. Other models of families are seen as deviations that point to the crisis. Such a simplified view of reality, however, has to be changed. New family forms are to be seen in part as the expression of choice and of more freedom on the part of the traditionally subordinate members of families, and it is their freedom and principles of democratic equality that have to be strengthened.

The family, the state and public policies

The social organization in which we live is based on the existence and functioning of households and families. If principles of democracy and equality are to be supported, state interventions have to be guided by several basic principles: gender and generational equality and equity, the defense of human rights for all, and interventions towards greater equity and social equality (the redistributive function of the state).

Most of the time, action consistent with these three principles involve going against the grain, and confronting strong forces of tradition. It implies unavoidable tensions and contradictions, such as defending the right to privacy and being able to condemn and act in cases of domestic violence and intra-family sexual molestation; or counteracting the intergenerational transmission of privilege at one end of the social scale and of disadvantages and risk at the other. Only active policies on the part of other institutions can help in redressing the transmission of inequalities that involve families.

Yet, the nineties were a decade of neo-liberal policies based on principles of privatization of social security and of social services. Furthermore, in several countries the economy has been in crisis, with the state unable to fulfill basic social tasks. The financial crisis of the state - deepened by the requirements of servicing the foreign debt - complicates matters even further. There is neither political will nor economic resources to provide basic social services. In such a context, family and kin networks have to provide the care and the resources for survival, under conditions of poverty and unemployment. The often heard call for "strengthening" the family without the social support that such a call should entail is, in fact, an expression of social cynicism and irresponsibility.

Table 1
Urban population. South American countries, 1950-2000

Country	1950*	1970**	1990**	2000**
Argentina	62,5	78,4	86,9	89,6
Bolivia	33,9	36,2	55,7	64,6
Brasil	36,5	55,6	74,7	79,9
Chile	60,7	73,0	82,8	85,7
Colombia	42,7	57,5	69,3	74,5
Ecuador	28,5	39,5	55,4	62,7
Paraguay	34,6	37,1	48,6	56,1
Perú	35,3	58,1	68,7	71,9
Uruguay	78,0	82,0	90,6	92,6
Venezuela	53,7	71,8	83,9	87,4

Source:*ECLAC-CELADE (2001) **ECLAC-CELADE (2002)

Table 2
Female activity rates.* Selected countries, 1950-2000

Country	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Argentina	22,3	22,0	24,5	24,1	35,3	38,4
Brazil	14,5	16,4	18,4	34,0	36,7	41,0
Chile	25,0	19,8	18,1	20,4	25,4	34,1
Colombia	17,6	17,1	20,2	26,3	32,4	37,1
Perú	34,3	30,0	26,0	29,5	33,5	38,1

Source: Weller (1998).
*refined activity rates=economically active population/population aged 10 years and over x100

Table 3
Urban unemployment rates, 1990-1999.

Country	1990	1999
Argentina a/	5,9	14,7
Bolivia	9,4	7,1
Brasil	4,5	11,4
Chile	8,7	10,1
Colombia	9,3	19,2
Ecuador	6,1	14,2
Paraguay	6,3	10,1
Uruguay	8,9	11,2
Venezuela b/	10,2	14,5

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001)
a/ Only Greater Buenos Aires.
b/ Total Population.

Table 4
Urban poverty in South America, 1990-2001
(Percentage of population under Poverty Line)

Country	1990	1997	1999	2001
Argentina a/	21,2	17,8	19,7	30,3
Bolivia b/	53,1c/	62,1	60,6	61,2
Brasil	48,0	35,8d/	37,5	36,9
Chile	38,6	21,7e/	20,6f/	20,0
Colombia	56,1g/	50,9	54,9	54,9
Ecuador	62,1	56,2	63,6	60,2
Paraguay h/	42,2	46,3d/	60.6	61,8
Perú	--	--	48.6	49.0
Uruguay	17,8	9,5	9,4	11,4
Venezuela	40,0	48,1	49,4	48,5

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002).
a/ Greater Buenos Aires.
b/ Eight departmental capitals plus city of El Alto.
c/ 1989 data.
d/ 1996 data.
e/ 1998 data.
f/ 2000 data.
g/ 1991 data.
h/ Asunción Metropolitan area.

Table 5
Income concentration. Gini Index a/
South America 1990 –1999

Country	1990	1999
Argentina b/	0,501	0,542
Bolivia	0,538 c/	0,586
Brasil	0,627	0,640
Chile	0,554	0,559 d/
Colombia	0,601 e/	0,572
Ecuador f/	0,461	0,521
Paraguay	0,447g/	0,565
Uruguay	0,492	0,440
Venezuela	0,471	0,498

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001).
a/ Includes persons with no income.
b/ Greater Buenos Aires.
c/ Eight departmental capitals plus city of El Alto.
d/ 2000 data.
e/ 1994 data.
f/ Total Urban.
g/ Asunción Metropolitan Area.

Table 6
Average household size by income level, 1986-1999

Country	Year	Average n° of members	Income level a/	
			Quintil 1	Quintil 5
Argentina b/	1986	3,5	4,2	2,9
	1999	3,3	4,7	2,6
Bolivia c/	1989	4,7	4,9	4,0
	1999	4,3	5,2	3,4
Brasil	1987	3,9	4,4	3,2
	1999	3,6	4,7	2,9
Chile	1987	4,2	5,0	3,4
	1998	3,9	4,7	3,1
Colombia d/	1986	4,6	5,2	3,6
	1999	4,1	4,8	3,2
Ecuador	1990	4,7	5,3	3,7
	1999	4,4	5,0	3,4
Paraguay e/	1986	4,6	5,5	3,7
	1999	4,3	5,4	3,1
Uruguay	1986	3,4	4,5	2,9
	1999	3,2	4,6	2,3
Venezuela	1986	5,1	6,1	3,7
	1999	4,7	5,3	3,7

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001)
a/ Quintile 1 includes the 20% poorest households; quintile 5 refers to the richest.
b/ Greater Buenos Aires
c/ Eight departmental capitals and the city of El Alto.
d/ Eight largest cities.
e/ Asunción Metropolitan Area.

Table 7
Urban household types, 1999

Country	Types of households					
	Single person	Nuclear	Extended	Composed	Non-nuclear	Total
Argentina	15,5	67,2	11,7	0,4	5,2	100,0
Bolivia	8,7	71,5	15,4	0,3	4,1	100,0
Brasil	9,2	69,2	16,8	0,8	4,0	100,0
Chile	7,5	65,1	22,1	1,1	4,2	100,0
Colombia	6,7	60,1	25,2	2,3	5,7	100,0
Ecuador	6,0	63,0	22,9	3,5	4,6	100,0
Paraguay	8,8	57,7	24,2	3,7	5,6	100,0
Uruguay	16,6	62,7	14,5	1,2	5,0	100,0
Venezuela	5,2	56,2	31,8	2,2	4,6	100,0

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001).

Table 8
Types of urban households by level of household income, 1999

8a. Quintile 1 (20% poorest households)

Country	Types of households					
	Total	Single person	Couple with children	Lone parent with children	Couple no children	Extended / composed
Argentina a/	100,0	8,4	46,6	9,7	11,7	23,6
Bolivia	100,0	4,5	58,0	13,9	2,7	20,8
Brasil	100,0	3,2	53,0	13,7	4,9	25,2
Chile	100,0	3,2	54,5	9,8	2,3	30,2
Colombia	100,0	3,7	44,8	12,6	3,1	35,8
Ecuador	100,0	3,6	50,0	11,0	2,2	33,3
Paraguay	100,0	2,8	43,7	8,6	4,0	40,9
Uruguay	100,0	2,7	48,7	10,9	4,4	33,3
Venezuela b/	100,0	1,8	49,0	11,0	2,1	36,1

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001)
b/ Greater Buenos Aires
c/ Total population of the country

8b. Quintile 5 (20% richest households)

Country	Types of households					
	Total	Single person	Couple with children	Lone parent with children	Couple no children	Extended / composed
Argentina a/	100,0	26,0	35,2	8,7	18,1	12,0
Bolivia	100,0	18,7	42,2	10,2	8,0	20,9
Brasil	100,0	14,3	44,7	8,4	16,5	16,0
Chile	100,0	13,7	44,0	9,3	13,9	18,9
Colombia	100,0	13,5	40,3	10,6	12,1	23,4
Ecuador	100,0	13,4	42,8	7,6	10,5	25,8
Paraguay	100,0	17,4	34,3	9,0	12,7	26,5
Uruguay	100,0	32,4	25,5	8,1	22,2	11,8
Venezuela b/	100,0	9,2	42,5	9,8	10,2	28,4

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001)
b/ Greater Buenos Aires
c/ Total population of the country

Table 9
Female headed households, 1990-1999.

Country	1990	1999
Argentina	21,0	27,0
Bolivia	17,0	21,0
Brasil	20,0	25,0
Chile	21,0	24,0
Colombia	24,0	29,0
Ecuador	17,0	20,0
Paraguay	20,0	27,0
Uruguay	25,0	31,0
Venezuela	22,0	27,0

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001).

Table 10
Female headed households, by poverty condition, 1999

Country	Indigent	Poor (non indigent)	Non poor
Argentina	37	28	27
Bolivia	24	19	21
Brasil	24	24	26
Chile	28	23	24
Colombia	31	27	29
Ecuador	23	21	18
Paraguay	30	23	29
Uruguay	29	26	31
Venezuela	34	27	25

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2001).

Table 11
Gross Divorce Rates. Selected countries. 1966-1995.

	Years					
Country	**1966**	**1971**	**1976**	**1980**	**1985**	**1995**
Brazil	---	---	---	---	0,26	0,63
Chile	---	0,11	---	0,27	0,38	0,45
Ecuador	0,20	0,21	0,30	0,34	0,42	0,63
Uruguay	1,06	1,02	1,28	1,55	1,38	1,77
Venezuela	0,25	0,27	0,46	0,31	1,15	0,65

Source: United Nations (2000).

Table 12
Total fertility rates, 1970-2005

Country	1970/1975	1990/1995	2000/2005
Argentina	3,1	2,8	2,4
Bolivia	6,5	4,8	3,9
Brasil	4,7	2,5	2,1
Chile	3,6	2,5	2,4
Colombia	5,0	3,0	2,6
Ecuador	6,0	3,5	2,8
Paraguay	5,7	4,6	3,8
Perú	6,0	3,7	2,9
Uruguay	3,0	2,5	2,3
Venezuela	4,9	3,3	2,7

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002).

Table 13
Total fertility rates by mother's level of education
Selected countries, circa 2000

Country	Year	Level of Education			
		No education	Low	Medium	High
Bolivia	1998	7,1	5,8	4,6	2,7
Brazil	1996	5,0	3,3	2,4	1,6
Colombia	2000	4,0	3,6	2,4	1,5
Ecuador	1999	5,6	4,2	2,9	1,9
Paraguay	1998	6,2	5,8	5,0	3,0
Perú	2000	5,1	4,1	2,4	1,8

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002)
The levels of education for each country are:
Bolivia: no education; basic; intermediate; medium or higher
Brazil: no education; 1-4 years of study; 5-8; 9 or higher
Colombia: no education; primary; secondary; university.
Ecuador: no education; secondary; university/postgraduate
Paraguay: 0-2 years of study; 3-5 years; complete primary; secondary or higher.
Peru: no education; primary; secondary; higher.

Table 14
Women in unions using contraceptive methods, by area of residence (%).

Country	Year	Place of residence	
		Urban	Rural
Bolivia	1998	57,6	30,1
Brazil	1996	78,7	69,2
Colombia	2000	77,6	75,2
Ecuador	1999	71,2	57,5
Paraguay	1998	65,4	49,3
Peru	2000	73,0	61,5

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002).

Table 15
Unwanted fertility by mother's level of education (%)
Selected countries, circa 2000.

Country	Year	Total	Level of Education			
			No education	Low	Medium	High
Bolivia	1998	40,5	46,5	46,6	39,1	22,2
Brazil	1996	28,0	46,0	36,4	25,0	12,5
Colombia	2000	30,8	50,0	36,1	25,0	13,3
Ecuador	1999	21,2	30,4	24,4	17,2	10,5
Peru	2000	37,9	41,2	43,9	29,2	16,7

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002).
The levels of education for each country are:
Bolivia: no education; basic; intermediate; medium or higher
Brazil: no education; 1-4 years of study; 5-8; 9 or higher years of study
Colombia: no education; primary; secondary; university.
Ecuador: no education; secondary; university/postgraduate
Paraguay: 0-2 years of study; 3-5 years; complete primary; secondary or higher.
Peru: no education; primary; secondary; higher

Table 16
Births of adolescent mothers (ages 15 to 19) (% of total births)

Country	1970-1975	1980-1995	2000-2005
Argentina	12,8	15,2	13,7
Bolivia	11,0	12,4	12,6
Brasil	10,9	19,0	17,6
Colombia	14,5	18,9	16,8
Ecuador	15,5	15,1	14,2
Paraguay	14,9	12,6	13,5
Perú	10,9	12,9	11,7
Uruguay	12,5	16,1	15,5
Venezuela	15,4	18,6	20,6

Source: ECLAC-CELADE (2002)

Table 17
Population 60 years and over, 1980-2000

Country	1980	1990	2000
Argentina	12,7	13,1	13,3
Bolivia	5,2	5,8	6,2
Brasil	6,1	7,1	5,2
Chile	8,1	8,9	10,2
Colombia	4,9	6,1	6,9
Ecuador	5,3	5,7	6,9
Paraguay	5,5	5,4	5,3
Perú	5,2	5,9	7,1
Uruguay	14,8	16,5	15,5
Venezuela	5,2	5,7	6,6

Source: United Nations (2000).

Table 18
AIDS incidence in sectors of the population
World total, Latin America and selected countries, 2001

Country	People living with HIV/AIDS					AIDS Orphans	AIDS deceases, 2001	Incidence
	Adults and children	Adults (15-49)	Adult rates (%)	Women (15-49)	Children (0-14)	Orphans (0-14)	Cumulative Adults and children	HIV population
World Total	**40.000.000**	**37.100.000**	**1,2**	**18.500.000**	**3.000.000**	**14.000.000**	**3.000.000**	**0,65**
Latin America and the Caribbean	**1.500.000**	**1.400.000**	**0,5**	**430.000**	**40.000**	**330.000**	**60.000**	**0,31**
Argentina	130.000	130.000	0,7	30.000	3.000	25.000	1.800	0,35
Bolivia	4.600	4.500	0,1	1.200	160	1.000	290	0,05
Brasil	610.000	600.000	0,7	220.000	13.000	130.000	8.400	0,35
Chile	20.000	20.000	0,3	4.300	<500	4.100	220	0,13
Colombia	140.000	140.000	0,4	20.000	4.000	21.000	5.600	0,33
Ecuador	20.000	19.000	0,3	5.100	660	7.200	1.700	0,16
Perú	53.000	51.000	0,4	13.000	1.500	17.000	3.900	0,20
Uruguay	6.300	6.200	0,3	1.400	100	3.100	<500	0,19
Venezuela		62.000	0,5					

Source: ONUSIDA (2003)

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