

An Approach to Evaluate the Reliability of Web Applications in Cloud Computing Using Dynamic Fault Tree

Elinda Kajo Meçe
Department of Computer Engineering
Polytechnic University of Tirana
Tirana, Albania
ekajo@fti.edu.al

Eneida Driza
Department of Computer Engineering
Polytechnic University of Tirana
Tirana, Albania
eneidadriza@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Nowadays, one of the main challenges in developing different systems is obtaining reliable ones. So, preliminary studies of problematic atomic components which convert the system from reliable to unreliable need to be done. This paper is focused in evaluating one of the nonfunctional characteristics like the reliability of web applications in cloud environment. Nonfunctional characteristics such as reliability, security and availability of a web service application and hence its service components play an important role in evaluating the system performance of the web application. The paper proposes a Dynamic Fault Tree analysis of applications ran on cloud platform. As a case study in order to demonstrate the feasibility of this approach is used online payment system in e-commerce hosted on a cloud platform. The results obtained reveal that this is a good way in studying the reliability of the systems. Under specific system conditions with minimal functional resources on the cloud platform, cloud impact on system unreliability is nearly twice the impact of application type.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

C.4 [Computer Systems Organization]: Performance of systems - modeling techniques, performance attributes, reliability, availability and serviceability

General Terms

Measurement, Performance, Design, Reliability, Experimentation, Standardization, Verification

Keywords

Web Application, Cloud Computing, Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT), Reliability, E-Commerce

1. INTRODUCTION

Deployed applications on cloud environment show a high level of complexity, since the problems are not only related to the well-functioning of the application but also to the Cloud platform, that gives the illusion of infinite computing resources available on demand [1].

So, we aim to specify and detect the undesired behaviors of such system in order to evaluate how specific failure events or combination of failure events relative to the system components can cause the failure of subsystems or of the whole system [9]. The main goal of the paper consists in evaluating the reliability level of cloud applications focusing on the fault tree usage.

The system will be modeled using Dynamic Fault Tree technique. This technique graphically represents logical relationship of system failures [14]. System analysis will be performed based on a dynamic model, using constant failure rates of the components [7], which at certain time intervals make faulty a specific component. The reliability of the application can be calculated, once modeling the system and evaluating each component reliability level using DFT. This analysis aims to detect the most problematic and the most vital components, and sorting them out based on their unreliability level on the system.

According to technical definition, the term reliability means:

“The ability of an item (system, subsystem that can be considered an entity by itself) to perform a required function, under given environmental and operational conditions and for a stated period of time (ISO8402¹)” [7]

System designers pay importance to system reliability. A system is considered fully-functional if it guarantees fault tolerance and failure avoidance. Failure avoidance is attained by using high quality and reliable components, meanwhile fault tolerance is assured using redundancy, which sometimes causes design complexities and can be cost-expensive. So, in cases when it's needed to be specified how to improve system reliability, either by using fault tolerance or failure avoidance, the reliability of each atomic component needs to be evaluated.

Two types of results are available in a fault tree evaluation: qualitative and quantitative results. Qualitative assessments give a qualitative ranking of each component in regard to its contribution

¹ Standard: **ISO8402** Quality Management and Quality Assurance - Quality Vocabulary

to system failure [11], while quantitative assessments determine if reliability requirements of the component are fulfilled or not. It is suggested to find out which component or module mostly contributes in system unreliability in order to provide a solution in improving its reliability. So, reliability is a nonfunctional characteristic and a term that is focused in the ability of a product to fulfill a certain function. This product can be a hardware or software product, a system or a service. The paper looks into evaluating the level of unreliability, where as a real model will be used E-Commerce applications deployed on a cloud environment.

The paper is organized as follows. The introduction section reveals the necessity reasons of this paper theme, the main issues and what is aimed to be achieved. The second section describes the Cloud platform chosen, the hosted applications and DFT technique for system modeling. The third section is focused on hosting E-Commerce application on cloud while the fourth part gives details about system modeling using DFT. An evaluation of reliability, graphical representations and the interpretation of results are given in the fifth and sixth section, while in the last part are given the conclusions of the paper.

2. DFT TECHNIQUE IN WEB APP

As a case study, for demonstrating the feasibility of DFT technique is chosen two E-Commerce applications, Cyclos Open Source Online Banking and JadaSite E-Commerce Solution. The Cloud Platform where these applications are deployed is Jelastic Java Cloud (dogado Host Europe v.1.8.2) [15].

E-Commerce applications provide services on the Software as a Service (SaaS) layer of the cloud. SaaS is based on licensing software use on demand, which is already installed and running on a cloud platform [2]. E-Commerce applications have a high level of complexity and are prone to failure considering some criteria such as: high load on the web server, dynamic resource necessities (CPU, memory, I/O, etc), support for objects that are dynamically created etc. They also have strict requirements related to response time, transactions or storage capacity [3].

Assuring reliability in such complex systems requires preliminary identifications of the components and subsystems with the major impact on system reliability. A fault tree provides a conceptually simple modeling framework to represent the system-level interactions between component reliabilities [4]. Dynamic fault trees are shown particularly useful for reliability analysis [4]: a logic evaluation of system components and their escalation until a final evaluation.




Figure 1. Success and failure space concepts

2.1 System Analysis Using DFT Technique

Fault trees were developed to facilitate unreliability analysis. They provide a compact, graphical, intuitive method to analyze system reliability [8], and evaluating the ways that cause a system failure, proving also the mechanisms for risk detection. Once FTA was created, mathematical methods and computational codes have been developed for fault trees, while the main goal of FTA is fault tree design. The operation of a system can be considered from two points of view: the ways that lead a system towards a failure and the ways that lead it towards success.

It is interesting to note that certain identifiable points on success space coincide with certain analogous points in failure space (see Figure 1) and is generally easy to attain occurrence on what constitutes failure than it is to agree on what constitutes success [12]. Success is related with the efficiency of a system, the amount of output, the degree of usefulness and production and marketing features [12], characteristics that are describable by continuous variables, not easily modeled in terms of simple discrete events.

Dynamic fault tree analysis pays importance, identifies and handles only the elements that can lead the system towards a failure. It is a deductive analysis focused in a specific undesired event and provides a method in determining the cause of such event. The main undesired event is considered as a TOP event in the system fault tree. It leads the system in a total failure. TOP event has to be chosen carefully, because it is fundamental in the success of the analysis. If this event is too general, the analysis can be unmanageable and if the event is too specific, then the analysis does not give a general overview of the system [12]. So, it is necessary to be cured till the proper level.

2.2 Fault Tree Model

The fault tree is a graphical model of parallel and sequential fault combinations that will result in the occurrence of a predefined undesired event [10]. So, its usage is based on failures.

Failures are events associated with hardware component failures, human mistakes or other events, which can lead to the undesired event. The fault tree depicts the logical interrelationships of these basic events that lead to the undesired event, which is the TOP event of the tree [12]. The TOP event (named based on its position on the tree) corresponds to a whole system failure. So, the tree is composed of all the components that cause this event. Fault trees are not a quantitative model, but they are a qualitative model that can be evaluated quantitatively [12]. They include a set of entities, known as “gates” that allow or prevent logic flow in the tree. Gates show the relations between the necessary entities, which cause another event higher in the tree to happen. This event is considered to be the gate output, while the other events are gate inputs. The symbol of the gate specifies the relation type between the necessary inputs for a certain output.

The symbols that compose the fault tree include: basic events, external events, undeveloped events, conditional events, intermediary events (see Figure 2), which describe specific cases of failures. There are also 2 main types of gates: OR gate, AND gate and transfer symbols (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Basic designing elements of the fault tree

The fault tree requires prior steps to be performed until a final outcome. There are 8 main steps that need to be fulfilled in order to create a successful FTA. The interrelationship of the eight steps is illustrated in Figure 3 and it includes: [12]

1. Identify the *objective* for the FTA.
2. Define the *top event* of the FT.
3. Define the *scope* of the FTA.
4. Define the *resolution* of the FTA.
5. Define *ground rules* for the FTA.
6. *Construct* the FT.
7. *Evaluate* the FT.
8. *Interpret* and present the results.




Figure 3. The main steps of the fault tree analysis

The idea of the fault tree is to hypothesize possible failure flaws, and then check whether these hypotheses are true. Figure 4 illustrates an example of a fault tree [6].




Figure 4. Example of a fault tree

2.3 Evaluation Techniques of Fault Trees

Once the fault tree is constructed it can be evaluated to obtain qualitative and/or quantitative results [11]. The qualitative assessments include: a) minimal cut sets in a fault tree, b)

qualitative essentials of the components and c) most common minimal cut sets that can cause failures.

Cut sets give all the possible unique combinations of components failures [11] that affect the whole system failure. Common mode failures identify those cut sets which cause the failure of a set of components from a single failure.

The evaluation of the quantitative assessments include: a) absolute probabilities, b) quantitative essentials of the components and minimal cut sets and c) evaluation of relative probabilities.

Regarding the qualitative assessments, the minimal cut sets are taken from the Boolean reduction of the fault tree [11]. They are also used in all the quantitative assessments. The minimal cut sets M_j are a combination of primary failures, which are the smallest combination of failures that cause a system failure.

$$T = M_1 + M_2 + M_3 + \dots + M_n$$

The information of cut sets can be used directly for controlling the design criteria. The minimal cut sets may not individually fail the whole system. Quantitative evaluations measure the importance of each cut set. If the failure rates of the components are considered as random variables, then random variable distribution techniques can be used to estimate the variability in system results, which result from the failure rate variations [11]. In our case, failure probability model that will be applied is constant failure rate per hour. When we use the constant failure rate per hour model, we assume that failure probabilities are directly related to component (basic primary event) exposure time. The longer the exposure time period the higher the probability of failure [11].

According to the technical definition, component reliability $R(t)$, is the probability of not having any failure during the time interval t and is evaluated with the below formula: [11]

$$R(t) = 1 - F(t)$$

$$F(t) = 1 - e^{-\lambda t} \rightarrow R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

Component unreliability $F(t)$ thus is the probability of having at least a failure, during a time interval t . This means that there is also the possibility of having more than one failure, if the component failure is recoverable.

System unavailability $Q_s(t)$ is determined as the probability that the system is unable to operate during a time interval t and does not respond on calling it. If Q_i is the unavailability of a cut set, then the unavailability of the whole system $Q_s(t)$ can be approximated as the sum of the minimal cut sets unavailability $Q_i(t)$.

$$Q_s(t) = \sum_{i=1}^N Q_i(t)$$

For systems that operate online, the system failure occurrence rate [11] on the system is signed as $W_s(t)$, while $W_s(t)\Delta t$ is the probability that system fails at a certain time. If the failure rate of the minimal cut sets is $W_i(t)$, then the system failure rate $W_s(t)$ is:

$$W_s(t) = \sum_{i=1}^N W_i(t)$$

The system unavailability $Qs(t)$ and the system failure occurrence rate $Ws(t)$ give comprehensive information on the probabilistic description of system failure [11].

3. APPLICATIONS DEPLOYMENT

Testing of system reliability is achieved by deploying E-Commerce applications in cloud environment. The Cloud platform used is Jelastic Java Cloud. It supports every application JVM-based, including Java, JRuby, Groovy and ColdFusion/CFML [15].

E-Commerce applications that will be deployed are: Cyclos-Open Source Online Banking and Jadasite-E-Commerce Solution. The source code of both applications can be downloaded for free on the Internet. Jelastic cloud supports application deployment in .war archived form. These types of files are zipped files (Web Archive), which can be used for hosting Servlets including EE (Enterprise Edition) and JSP (Java Server Page). The .war files are similar with .jar files used by Servlets. They can include different types of files such as: *.java, *.jsp, *.xml, *.css, *.ejb, *.gif, *.html, *.png, *.sql, *.xsl, *.xtp [16].

For the deployment process of each application, the environment will use Tomcat Server 6 and MySQL 5.5. The environments give the opportunity to use the below capacities for free: 3 environments for each account, 4 application servers per environment, 16 cloudlets for the application servers and also 1GB storage dedicated to them [15]. However the deployment process includes a large number of problems, cloud platform gives the opportunity of managing and solving them.

4. SYSTEM MODELING

After the deployment process on cloud environment, we ran both the applications as an administrator and also as a simple user. We interfere in the application codes, in order to detect some possible failures. Cloud provides also some data regarding application usage, which will be used in constructing the fault tree.

Failure reasons of E-Commerce applications on cloud are numerous, starting with the simplest issues related to human mistakes, up to the most complex problems that may require external interventions (e.g., an overall blockage of the hosting platform).

Fault Tree + Analysis Tool will be used for constructing the system fault tree. This is a framework for system modeling based on system points of failure. Quantitative assessments of these failures can also be evaluated using Fault Tree +. This approach is based on reasoning from individual failures to an overall conclusion.

Reliability Workbench v.11 incorporating Fault Tree + is executed under Microsoft .NET Framework [14]. This is a single powerful integrated environment for reliability and safety analysis. The fault tree is constructed based on the failures that affect the general functionality of the deployed applications on cloud environment.

4.1 Failures Detection

The identification of system failures is necessary, prior constructing the fault tree. First of all, the environment taken as a reference point may be a bit disappointing, because we used the cloud platform with its minimal available resources. Normally, it

is expected to have high rates of failures but we decided to perform worst-case analysis in order to identify most of cloud failures and to evaluate their impact. The platform is fault tolerant from failures related to servers or database because it provides new elements and it also stores logs operation history on the platform. Continuous monitoring of its capacities (CPU, RAM, HDD, Network), can also be provided. These values are used when applying failure models to the components.

Second, we interfered in the application codes. We performed some changes at administrator level in order to generate several errors, for example: deleting all the data by mistake, resetting the system by mistake, putting incorrect numeric values and in the wrong format etc. We also used the application at user level, for example: performing incorrect navigations, using the wrong type of browser, completing the wrong fields with the wrong information etc. Some other failures are also taken from similar studies of these systems.

We have determined the main functional elements of our system, which can probably be points of failures. These elements included cloud elements (e.g., servers, databases etc.) or application elements (e.g., human mistakes, third party software etc.).

These failures include: database server failures, web server failures, hardware failures, third-party software failures, browser failures, network failures, hosting problems, memory leakage, human mistakes and bad planning capacity problems etc [13]. Each of these main failures is caused by other failures. For example, the browser is the most vulnerable piece of software of the entire e-commerce system. It acts as a window for information transaction and management for the whole system. So, if the browser crashes and its window closed, it also closes all the possibilities for a successful e-commerce transaction. In this case, a user will think twice prior using the site again. The evaluated browser failures in our case include factors such as: blockage (browser blockage due to its components failures) and closure (browser closure by mistake). Blockage can be caused due to incompatibility problems (content - browser incompatibility or browser - plug-in incompatibility), and issues due to memory leaks.

We inspect all the main failure components of the system, for finding out the failure reasons for each of them, the same way. After failures are detected, the fault tree can be constructed.

4.2 Fault Tree Construction

A well constructed fault tree requires some forethought. Things done in early phase of the fault tree construction can impact later phases of the analysis [5]. It is difficult to make construction changes at a later development stage if the fault tree is very large.

Fault Tree + tool, is a deductive analysis tool that provides a way to logically combine all the failures that can lead to the occurrence of the undesired event (TOP event). The process of system modeling starts with the TOP event. A TOP event is fundamental in the success of the analysis, so it has to be chosen carefully. In our case, the fault tree construction starts with the TOP event called *Unreliable Application* and scales down in creating a hierarchical structure (see Figure 5). The two main failure areas are related to the applications and cloud platform. In the fault tree, they are labeled as: *Application* and *Cloud* (see Figure 5). The construction of a complete fault tree (including main failures, sublevels or initial events) will present all the evaluated failures.

There are evaluated 12 main failure components. These failures are related to the usage of the deployed applications, also to the cloud environment. After evaluations, there are assessed 35 basic initial events of failure for the application and 64 for the cloud, in a total of 99 basic initial events. So, continuing the example of the browser (as explained in Section 4.1), browser failure is a main failure component classified under *Application* sub-tree. Failures of the first sublevel are browser blockage and browser closure (see Figure 6).




Figure 5. Initial modeling of the system fault tree (TOP event and 2 main failure components)




Figure 6. Example of how the fault tree is constructed (browser failure)

Browser closure is also considered as a basic initial event because it does not include any other reasons of failures, except its closure by mistake. The blockage of the browser is related either to the incompatibility problems with the application content and the plug-ins or problems with memory leakage. So, incompatibility and memory leakage are considered as basic initial events.

We depict the basic initial events even for the other components, the same way.

The entire fault tree is entitled “*Unreliability*”, since it is the nonfunctional characteristic to be evaluated. It is composed of a total of 23 sub-trees. Two general structures of application and cloud sub-trees are illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8. These sub-trees give the idea how the failures are spread across the fault tree.




Figure 7. General structure of application fault tree




Figure 8. General structure of cloud fault tree

4.3 Failure Models

Failure models provide a quantitative assessment of failures related to a specific component or related to the primary event on the fault tree [11]. They can be local failure models or global failure models. The difference between them stands on the fact that local failure models can be assigned to only one component, while global failure models can be assigned to a set of components.

It is necessary to determine a failure model, for each of the initial basic events. The failure model requires assuming some failure characteristics for the components. These characteristics include MTTF (Mean time to failure) and MTTR (Mean time to repair). So, for each initial failure, we specify a possible failure time and a possible repair time. This model also assumes a constant failure rate and an exponential distribution of these failures.

The failure models are added to each of the 99 initial basic events. These models are unique because it is supposed that the failure time varies for each of the components. System evaluation begins the same time of system operation and is done during 1 and 24 hours.

The evaluation of the modeled system begins with the evaluation of the initial basic events. The reliability evaluation for higher

events positioned on the fault tree, up to the TOP event is done based on the logic functions of the gates.

After a complete system analysis, Fault Tree + provides the possibility of taking graphical results. The graphical results include: system unreliability values depending on time, problematic system components depending on their critical level to the system, failure frequencies of the components and their unavailability depending on time.

5. RELIABILITY EVALUATION AND GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS

Reliability evaluation is performed, once the system is modeled using Fault Tree + Analysis Tool. This tool requires some failure specifications in regard to the failure components such as: MTTF and MTTR values. The existence of such specifications is necessary for the real evaluation of system unreliability.

Advance detections and evaluations of the unreliability of each failure component, helps finding out that certain items are major contributors to system unreliability compared with others, so they should be the ones to be addressed.

The graphical representations are also based on MTTF and MTTR values. Mathematic models use these values for calculating components unreliability, failure frequency and failure/repair rates. RWB performs data calculation based on the below formulas:

$$Q(t) = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \mu} (1 - e^{-(\lambda + \mu)t})$$

$$\omega(t) = \lambda (1 - Q(t))$$

$$\lambda = \frac{1}{MTTF} \quad \mu = \frac{1}{MTTR}$$

Q(t) - component unavailability

$\omega(t)$ - failure frequency of the component

λ - failure rate of the component

μ - repair rate of the component

For each main failure (as explained in Section 4.1), which causes a certain substantial impact on system reliability are taken some graphical results (see Figure 9). Regardless the complexity of modeling the system, RWB provides graphical illustrations of the calculated unreliability indices for the main failure components. The unreliability values for each main component such as: application server, cache server, database server, network, hardware, capacity, hosting problems, web server, human mistakes or the browser are calculated on developing them further by finding the initial basic events unreliability values which may contribute to them. The graphical representations do not include the hardware component, since it is dependable from the capacity component. The hardware component includes issues related to CPU/RAM, source conflicts or server hardware that somehow can be evaluated as part of capacity component.

Thus, as illustrated in Figure 9, the affect of cloud components on system unreliability is higher than the application components. This relates to the fact that, while application issues are somehow repairable and not quite problematic to the whole system, cloud issues are more numerous and can lead to a total system failure that require some time to be repaired. The number of initial basic

events (35 for the application and 64 for the cloud environment) also indicates the higher impact of cloud on system unreliability.




Fig 9. Graphical representations of system unreliability based on main failure components depending on time (1 hour and 24 hours)

Calculated through RWB, the below graphical representation (see Table 1 and Figure 10) gives the percentages of components unreliability.

Table 1. Unreliability results of the main failure components

Rank	Component	Unreliability (%)
1	Human Mistakes	97.91%
2	Browser	16.68%
3	Third Party	83.33%
4	Memory	94.49%
5	Application Server	80.83%
6	Web Server	96.67%
7	Database Server	99.23%
8	Network	99.44%
9	Hosting	99.65%
10	Capacity (+ Hardware)	99.86%
11	Cache Server	79.58%




Figure 10. Graphical representation of unreliability values of the system in % depending on the main components

The evaluation with RWB also provides component classification depending on their severity. The severities are in the range from 1 to 4, so each component based on the RWB results is classified under a certain severity level (see Figure 11). Components distribution among the different levels is as below:

- 16 events with severity **I**
- 46 events with severity **II**
- 25 events with severity **III**
- 12 events with severity **IV**




Figure 11. The distribution of 99 initial basic events depending on their severities and critical level on the system

The basic feature that constitutes the severity levels is the unavailability value. So, if the values are in the range from 0.0 - 0.25, the component is classified under the severity IV and if they belong to the range from 0.25 - 0.50, severity III is attached to them. Higher values of unavailability, such as the range from 0.50 - 0.75 are related to severity II, while severity I includes the values from 0.75 - 1.00. Unavailability is the quality of a component not being available when needed, and it's fully related to failure frequencies and unreliability values.

6. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

The results provided from the system by RWB are in accordance with the failure model attached to each failure component independently. The failure model chosen for system studying is MTTF (Mean Time to Failure). This model assumes a constant failure rate and an exponential distribution of these failures. According to this fact, the graphical results related to system unreliability are in the form of an exponential graph, where the highest value of system unreliability is 1.

The previous section illustrated the graphical representations of system unreliability depending on time (1 hour and 24 hours) based on the main failure components, after studying the E-Commerce applications on the cloud environment. The system observation time assumes a system that operates continuously with certain specific failures based on the failure model of each component. During the functioning of the system under modeling, the components are assumed to fail in regard to the MTTF value depicted in the model. The model states that failure probability values are related to exposure time, so the higher the exposure time the higher the failure rates and as a fact also the unreliability values.

The results indicated that the highest value of system unreliability caused by the application components is 97.91%. This value is related to human mistakes because of their higher frequency of occurrence. From the other side, the lower value of system

unreliability is 16.68% due to browser problems which are easily recoverable.

As noticed in the graphical representations, cloud components provide higher values on system unreliability and the system becomes obsolete. The highest value of unreliability is caused by bad planning of capacity and hardware problems with a value of 99.86%, while the component that among others causes the lower unreliability value is cache server 79.58%.

According to usage time of the system, if all the problematic application issues are generated, the system becomes unreliable after 20 minutes, while if all the problematic cloud issues are generated, the system becomes unreliable after nearly 5 minutes. Thus, the fastest time of reaching the value 1 of system unreliability is 2 minutes caused by the capacity component, and the slowest time is 20 hours caused by browser problems.

Regarding components distribution, based on their severity and criticality level on the system, the results show that the major part of cloud components have the severities II, III and IV, while application components have the severities I, II and III.

After evaluating specific components unreliability and their critical level on the system, we can get the conclusions how the system reacts against components failures over time.

The results taken from the system (E-Commerce on Cloud) are under the minimal functional conditions of the cloud, which means minimal conditions and resources provided by the cloud platform. So on one side, however cloud resulted not a good way on hosting applications due to the high level of unreliability it causes, from the other side it offers different recovering possibilities of the raised problems. It assures fault tolerance, load balancing and replication by making available a large number of servers etc.

The cloud platform functionality also depends on the deployed application type. So, application issues can cause cloud issues. E-Commerce sites are sites with a high load on the web server. They support objects dynamically created and have dynamic requirements for resources such as: CPU, memory and I/O, requiring much more time in making them available due to the high costs of the transactions with the database. E-Commerce systems have strict requirements related to: response time that must be rapid; transactions that must be safe or storage space that must be consistent etc.

Regardless the complexity of E-Commerce applications, the software itself is a vital contributor in the system operation, so it is assumed that it will function normally as intended. Software includes a set of instructions set to the hardware or to the entire system for correct operation. Software events do not fail in the physical sense, unless assumptions are made. So, attempting to predict software faults or coding errors with any reliability or accuracy is relatively difficult, so it may also need some assumptions. Predicting and assigning human error rates for example, is not the primary intent of a fault tree analysis, but it is used to gain some knowledge of what happens with improper human input or intervention at the wrong time.

7. RELATED WORKS

The increasing complexity of the e-business systems urges the improvement of existing methods of system analysis in order to reduce the likelihood that important threats remain unidentified

[6]. The CORAS approach provides one way of increasing trust and confidence in information and communication systems based on the integration of security risk management and graphical semiformal modeling. The risk assessment process consists of steps: identify context, identify risk, analyse risks, evaluate risks, and treat risks [17]. Another paper, presents a component oriented development approach to e-business applications that is strongly architecture-centric. The component oriented architecture provides a set of rules and structure for managing complexity which provides flexibility and a framework for reuse and integration of components to support e-business evolution [18]. Except the other methods applied in studying risk analysis, we chose Fault Tree. The benefits of this approach is that it can easily include design flaws, human and procedural errors which are sometimes difficult to quantify. It is considered an excellent tool for studying complex systems.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The main goal of the paper consisted on developing a dynamic model for the evaluation of web application's reliability using DFT technique. After introducing the success and failure space concepts, we focused on building the system fault tree by identifying two main components that affect system reliability, 1) application and 2) cloud. The system under modeling included a complete system fault tree of 99 initial basic events of failure. In our case but also in similar systems, the opportunities for the system to become unreliable from cloud issues are nearly twice the opportunities of the application based on the number of failure events (35 application/64 cloud) and unreliability values. The average sum of unreliability values for cloud components is nearly twice the average sum of unreliability values for application components. The question raised is that we all use cloud computing nowadays, but do not see such high rates of failures. The results are related to the environment taken as a reference point, because we decided to perform worst-case analysis, leading to very high unreliability results, in order to generate and detect the majority of failures on the system. The Fault Tree usage answers the question of what can go wrong by identifying these failure scenarios.

Advance studies can be done on the aspect of system unreliability including E-Commerce systems on cloud environment, changing cloud specifics that can reduce system unreliability, such as load balancing, replication etc, in order to check how system unreliability will change in such cases.

9. REFERENCES

- [1] Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy Katz, Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica, and Matei Zaharia, "Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing", Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2009-28, UC Berkeley Reliable Adaptive Distributed Systems Laboratory, February 10, 2009
- [2] N. Ram Ganga Charan, S. Tirupati Rao, Dr .P.V.S Srinivas, "Deploying an Application on the Cloud", *The International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications*, (IJACSA) , Vol. 2, No. 5, 2011
- [3] Marisa A. S´anchez, Juan Carlos Augusto, and Miguel Felder, "Fault-based Testing of E-Commerce Applications", *The 2nd Workshop on Verification and Validation of Enterprise Information Systems* , 2004, Porto, Portugal
- [4] Ragavan Manian, Joanne Bechta Dugan, David Coppit, Kevin Sullivan, "Combining Various Solution Techniques for Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis of Computer Systems", *Third IEEE International High-Assurance System Engineering Symposium*, 1998, Washington DC., DOI=<http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HASE.1998.731591>
- [5] Clifton A. Ericson II, "Fault Tree Analysis By Design", *Proceedings of the 16th International System Safety Conference*, 1998
- [6] Wang Chu, Yanli Feng, "Fault Tree Based Architectural Analysis for E-Business Systems", *Proceedings of the Second Symposium International Computer Science and Computational Technology* (Huangshan, P. R. China, 26-28, Dec. 2009), ISCSCT '09, pg. 052-057
- [7] Marvin Rausand, Arnljot Hoyland, "System Reliability Theory - Models, Statistical Methods and Applications", 2nd edition, 2004
- [8] Joanne Bechta Dugan, Fellow, Kevin J. Sullivan, and David Coppit, "Developing a Low-Cost High-Quality Software Tool for Dynamic Fault-Tree Analysis", *Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE'99)* DOI=<http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/24.855536>
- [9] Daniele Codetta-Raiteri, "Extended Fault Trees Analysis supported by Stochastic Petri Nets", Doctoral Thesis, 15 November 2005, Torino, Italy
- [10] Robert Apthorpe, "A Probabilistic Approach to Estimating Computer System Reliability", *Proceedings of the 15th USENIX Conference on Systems Administration* (San Diego, California, USA, December 2-7, 2001), LISA 2001
- [11] United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Fault Tree Handbook", NUREG - 0492, 1993
- [12] Michael Stamatelatos, William Vesely, Joanne Dugan, Joseph Fragola, Joseph Minarick III, Jan Railsback, "Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications", Version 1.1, August 2002, Washington
- [13] Giridharan Vilangadu Vijayaraghavan, "A Taxonomy of E-Commerce Risks and Failures", Master Thesis, May 2003, Melbourne, Florida,
- [14] *Isograph – Reliability Workbench with Fault Tree+ Integrated - Documentation*
<http://www.isograph-software.com/>
- [15] *Jelastic Java Cloud Computing - Documentation*
<http://www.jelastic.com/documentation/>
- [16] WAR file: Java Glossary
<http://mindprod.com/jgloss/warfile.html>
- [17] T.Dimitrakos, B.Ritchie, D.Raptis, K.Stolen, "Model based Security Risk Analysis for Web Applications: The CORAS Approach", *Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on EuroWeb*, EuroWeb'02, UK 2002
- [18] Wang Chu, Depei Qian. "A Component-Oriented Development Approach to E-Business Applications", *Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on eBusiness Engineering*, October 22-24, 2008, Xi'an, China, IEEE Press. pp.45-52. DOI = <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICEBE.2008.23>