IACR Communications in Cryptology IACR CiC

Fherret: Proof of FHE Correct-and-Honest Evaluation with Circuit Privacy from MPCitH

Authors

Janik Huth, Antoine Joux, Giacomo Santato
Janik Huth ORCID
CISPA - Helmholtz Center for Information Security, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany
Saarland University, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany
janik dot huth at cispa dot de
Antoine Joux ORCID
CISPA - Helmholtz Center for Information Security, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany
joux at cispa dot de
Giacomo Santato ORCID
CISPA - Helmholtz Center for Information Security, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany
Saarland University, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany
giacomo dot santato at cispa dot de

Abstract

The major Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes guarantee the privacy of the encrypted message only in the honest-but-curious setting, when the server follows the protocol without deviating. However, various attacks in the literature show that an actively malicious server can recover sensitive information by executing incorrect functions, tampering with ciphertexts, or observing the client's reaction during decryption.

Existing integrity solutions for FHE schemes either fail to guarantee circuit privacy, exposing the server's computations to the client, or introduce significant computational overhead on the prover by requiring proofs of FHE operations on ciphertexts.

In this work, we present Fherret, a novel scheme leveraging the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm to provide a proof of correct-and-honest homomorphic evaluation while preserving circuit privacy. This proof guarantees that the client can safely decrypt the ciphertext obtained from the server without being susceptible to reaction-based attacks, such as verification and decryption oracle attacks. Additionally, this proof guarantees that the server's evaluation maintains correctness, thereby protecting the client from IND-CPA-D-style attacks.

Our solution achieves a prover overhead of approximately 110-170 homomorphic evaluations of random functions from the function space F, while retaining a competitive verifier overhead of approximately 58-93 homomorphic evaluations and a communication size proportional to approximately 40 times the size of a function from F.

Furthermore, Fherret is inherently parallelizable because its MPCitH views can be computed independently, achieving a parallel computation overhead similar to a homomorphic evaluation of a single random function from F for both the prover and the verifier.

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Adi Akavia and Margarita Vald. On the Privacy of Protocols based on CPA-Secure Homomorphic Encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2021/803. 2021.
[BBD+23]
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[BCC+24]
Dung Bui, Eliana Carozza, Geoffroy Couteau, Dahmun Goudarzi, and Antoine Joux. Faster Signatures from MPC-in-the-Head. In Kai-Min Chung and Yu Sasaki, editors, ASIACRYPT 2024, Part I, volume 15484 of LNCS, pages 396–428. December 2024. Springer, Singapore. DOI: 10.1007/978-981-96-0875-1_13
[BCFK21]
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[BFG+24]
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[BGV12]
Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. (Leveled) fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, ITCS 2012, pages 309–325. January 2012. ACM. DOI: 10.1145/2090236.2090262
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Dung Bui. Shorter VOLEitH Signature from Multivariate Quadratic. https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/465. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/465. 2024.
[CCC+25]
Ignacio Cascudo, Anamaria Costache, Daniele Cozzo, Dario Fiore, Antonio Guimarães, and Eduardo Soria-Vazquez. Verifiable Computation for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption Schemes. In Yael Tauman Kalai and Seny F. Kamara, editors, CRYPTO 2025, Part VII, volume 16006 of LNCS, pages 643–677. August 2025. Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-01907-3_21
[CCCM22]
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[CCP+24]
Jung Hee Cheon, Hyeongmin Choe, Alain Passelègue, Damien Stehlé, and Elias Suvanto. Attacks Against the IND-CPA$^{\text{D}}$ Security of Exact FHE Schemes. In Bo Luo, Xiaojing Liao, Jun Xu, Engin Kirda, and David Lie, editors, ACM CCS 2024, pages 2505–2519. October 2024. ACM Press. DOI: 10.1145/3658644.3690341
[CF13]
Dario Catalano and Dario Fiore. Practical Homomorphic MACs for Arithmetic Circuits. In Thomas Johansson and Phong Q. Nguyen, editors, EUROCRYPT 2013, volume 7881 of LNCS, pages 336–352. May 2013. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_21
[CGG16]
Ilaria Chillotti, Nicolas Gama, and Louis Goubin. Attacking FHE-based applications by software fault injections. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1164. 2016.
[CGGI20]
Ilaria Chillotti, Nicolas Gama, Mariya Georgieva, and Malika Izabachène. TFHE: Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption Over the Torus. Journal of Cryptology, 33(1):34–91, January 2020. DOI: 10.1007/s00145-019-09319-x
[CKP+24]
Sylvain Chatel, Christian Knabenhans, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. VERITAS: Plaintext Encoders for Practical Verifiable Homomorphic Encryption. In Bo Luo, Xiaojing Liao, Jun Xu, Engin Kirda, and David Lie, editors, ACM CCS 2024, pages 2520–2534. October 2024. ACM Press. DOI: 10.1145/3658644.3670282
[CLY+24]
Hongrui Cui, Hanlin Liu, Di Yan, Kang Yang, Yu Yu, and Kaiyi Zhang. $\mathsf{ReSolveD}$: Shorter Signatures from Regular Syndrome Decoding and VOLE-in-the-Head. In Qiang Tang and Vanessa Teague, editors, PKC 2024, Part I, volume 14601 of LNCS, pages 229–258. April 2024. Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-57718-5_8
[CSBB24]
Marina Checri, Renaud Sirdey, Aymen Boudguiga, and Jean-Paul Bultel. On the Practical $\text{CPA}^{D}$ Security of “exact” and Threshold FHE Schemes and Libraries. In Leonid Reyzin and Douglas Stebila, editors, CRYPTO 2024, Part III, volume 14922 of LNCS, pages 3–33. August 2024. Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68382-4_1
[DD22]
Nico Döttling and Jesko Dujmovic. Maliciously Circuit-Private FHE from Information-Theoretic Principles. In Dana Dachman-Soled, editor, ITC 2022, volume 230 of LIPIcs, pages 4:1–4:21. July 2022. Schloss Dagstuhl. DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.4
[DDA13]
Angsuman Das, Sabyasachi Dutta, and Avishek Adhikari. Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Verification Attack Revisited: The Complete Picture. In Willy Susilo and Reza Reyhanitabar, editors, ProvSec 2013, volume 8209 of LNCS, pages 104–120. October 2013. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_6
[DM15]
Léo Ducas and Daniele Micciancio. FHEW: Bootstrapping Homomorphic Encryption in Less Than a Second. In Elisabeth Oswald and Marc Fischlin, editors, EUROCRYPT 2015, Part I, volume 9056 of LNCS, pages 617–640. April 2015. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_24
[FGP14]
Dario Fiore, Rosario Gennaro, and Valerio Pastro. Efficiently Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Data. In Gail-Joon Ahn, Moti Yung, and Ninghui Li, editors, ACM CCS 2014, pages 844–855. November 2014. ACM Press. DOI: 10.1145/2660267.2660366
[FNP20]
Dario Fiore, Anca Nitulescu, and David Pointcheval. Boosting Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Data. In Aggelos Kiayias, Markulf Kohlweiss, Petros Wallden, and Vassilis Zikas, editors, PKC 2020, Part II, volume 12111 of LNCS, pages 124–154. May 2020. Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_5
[FV12]
Junfeng Fan and Frederik Vercauteren. Somewhat Practical Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/144. 2012.
[GBK+24]
Mariana Gama, Emad Heydari Beni, Jiayi Kang, Jannik Spiessens, and Frederik Vercauteren. Blind zkSNARKs for Private Proof Delegation and Verifiable Computation over Encrypted Data. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1684. 2024.
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History
Submitted: 2026-01-31
Accepted: 2026-07-08
Published: 2026-08-03
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Janik Huth, Antoine Joux, and Giacomo Santato, Fherret: Proof of FHE Correct-and-Honest Evaluation with Circuit Privacy from MPCitH. IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 3, no. 2, Aug 03, 2026, doi: 10.62056/av4fe0fgx.

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