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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 114
Volume 114, Number 1, January 2004
- Andrea Moro, Peter Norman:
A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination. 1-30 - Dana Heller:
An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment. 31-55 - Igal Milchtaich:
Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. 56-87 - Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder:
A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. 88-103 - Dino Gerardi:
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. 104-131 - Archishman Chakraborty, Bilge Yilmaz:
Informed manipulation. 132-152 - Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo Hopenhayn:
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. 153-169 - Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues:
All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. 170-177
Volume 114, Number 2, February 2004
- Colin M. Campbell:
Blackwell's ordering and public information. 179-197 - Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Martin Uribe:
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices. 198-230 - Juan Delgado, Diego Moreno:
Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly. 231-254 - Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal:
Local coordination and market equilibria. 255-279 - Jason M. Shachat, Mark Walker:
Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. 280-309 - Assaf Ben-Shoham, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij:
The evolution of exchange. 310-328 - Pablo F. Beker:
Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market? 329-344 - Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Rabee Tourky:
Non-marketed options, non-existence of equilibria, and non-linear prices. 345-357 - Lars Ehlers:
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. 358-369 - Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo Hopenhayn:
Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169]. 370-371
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