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14th WINE 2018: Oxford, UK
- George Christodoulou, Tobias Harks:
Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15-17, 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11316, Springer 2018, ISBN 978-3-030-04611-8
Regular Papers
- Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu:
Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions. 3-20 - Guy Avni, Thomas A. Henzinger, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen:
Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games. 21-36 - Moshe Babaioff, Sigal Oren:
Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models. 37-50 - Amir Ban:
Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictions. 51-65 - Shant Boodaghians:
Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rank. 66-79 - Shuchi Chawla, Joseph (Seffi) Naor, Debmalya Panigrahi, Mohit Singh, Seeun William Umboh:
Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games. 80-95 - Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang:
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer. 96-110 - Jen-Hou Chou, Chi-Jen Lu:
The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphs. 111-125 - Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos, Paul G. Spirakis:
Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals. 126-139 - Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-unit Markets. 140-153 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Keyu Zhu:
Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributions. 154-167 - Paul W. Goldberg, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío:
Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-Theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries. 168-187 - Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie, Ariel D. Procaccia:
The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy. 188-202 - Mohit Hota, Sanjiv Kapoor:
Equilibrium and Inefficiency in Multi-product Cournot Games. 203-217 - Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Christos Tzamos:
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization. 218-231 - Meena Jagadeesan, Alexander Wei:
Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets. 232-245 - Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi, Éva Tardos:
Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations. 246-263 - Ziwei Ji, Ruta Mehta, Matus Telgarsky:
Social Welfare and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences. 264-281 - Dimitris Fotakis, Anthimos Vardis Kandiros, Vasilis Kontonis, Stratis Skoulakis:
Opinion Dynamics with Limited Information. 282-296 - Zhentao Li, Adrian Vetta:
The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems. 297-311 - Kitty Meeks, Baharak Rastegari:
Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents. 312-326 - Darya Melnyk, Yuyi Wang, Roger Wattenhofer:
Byzantine Preferential Voting. 327-340 - Vijay Menon, Kate Larson:
Robust and Approximately Stable Marriages Under Partial Information. 341-355 - Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Prophet Inequalities vs. Approximating Optimum Online. 356-374 - Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Ger Yang:
Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-Loving Agents. 375-392 - Christian Saile, Warut Suksompong:
Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments. 393-407 - Robert Scheffler, Martin Strehler, Laura Vargas Koch:
Equilibria in Routing Games with Edge Priorities. 408-422 - Tami Tamir:
Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems. 423-437
Abstracts
- Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubinski:
How to Hide in a Network? 441-442 - Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets. 443 - Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Akihisa Tamura, Alexander Teytelboym:
Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts. 444 - Nikhil Garg, Ashish Goel, Benjamin Plaut:
Markets for Public Decision-Making. 445 - Chamsi Hssaine, Siddhartha Banerjee:
Information Signal Design for Incentivizing Team Formation (Extended Abstract). 446-447 - Vijay Kamble:
Revenue Management on an On-Demand Service Platform. 448 - Ashish Goel, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy:
Implementing the Lexicographic Maxmin Bargaining Solution. 449-450 - Ramesh Johari, Vijay Kamble, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Hannah Li:
Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation. 451
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