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BQGT 2010: Newport Beach, California, USA
- Moshe Dror, Greys Sosic:
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory - Conference on Future Directions, BQGT '10, Newport Beach, California, USA, May 14-16, 2010. ACM 2010, ISBN 978-1-60558-919-0 - Matthew O. Jackson:
Games and social network structure. 1:1 - Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Aris L. Moustakas:
Balancing traffic in networks: redundancy, learning, and the effect of stochastic fluctuations. 2:1 - Emerson Melo:
Oligopoly pricing in congested networks. 3:1 - Martin Hoefer:
Coalitions and dynamics in network routing games. 4:1-4:2 - Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. 5:1 - Guni Orshan, Peter Sudhölter, José Manuel Zarzuelo:
The bilateral consistent prekernel for (boundary) balanced games and ordinal prekernels for economic environments. 6:1 - M. Josune Albizuri, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
:
Values and coalition configurations. 7:1 - Remco Heesen
How flow can you go?: a logistic management game and profit sharing. 8:1 - János Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers, Jeroen Kuipers, Koos Vrieze:
Subgame-perfection in positive recursive games. 9:1 - Frank H. Page Jr., Myrna Wooders:
Endogenous network dynamics. 10:1 - Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jurjen Kamphorst, Sudipta Sarangi:
Axiomatic characterization of Nash networks. 11:1 - Sunghoon Hong:
Strategic network interdiction. 12:1 - Edward J. Cartwright, Myrna Wooders:
Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping. 13:1 - Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, L. Beril Toktay:
Fair cost allocation mechanisms in electronic waste collection and recycling networks. 14:1 - William Martin Tracy:
Genetic drift resolves Selten's Chain Store Paradox. 15:1 - John Smith:
Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs. 16:1 - Stanley Reynolds, Jordi Brandts, Arthur Schram:
Pivotal suppliers and market power in experimental supply function competition. 17:1 - Garrett J. van Ryzin:
Game theory and the practice of revenue management. 18:1 - Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. 19:1 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Zhiyi Huang, Sanjeev Khanna:
Dynamic and non-uniform pricing strategies for revenue maximization. 20:1 - Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Truthfulness via smoothed complexity. 21:1 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. 22:1 - Lukasz Balbus, Kevin L. Reffett, Lukasz Wozny:
Stationary Markovian equilibrium in altruistic stochastic OLG models with limited commitment. 23:1 - Manjira Datta, Leonard J. Mirman, Olivier F. Morand, Kevin L. Reffett:
Which recursive equilibrium? 24:1 - Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal:
Rationalizability, adaptive dynamics, and the correspondence principle in games with strategic substitutes. 25:1 - Rabah Amir:
Discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities: theory and applications. 26:1 - Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler:
Iterated dominance revisited. 27:1 - Willemien Kets:
Bounded rationality in games. 28:1 - Jun Zhang:
Reflexive theory-of-mind reasoning in games: from empirical evidence to modeling. 29:1 - Olivier Bochet, Hervé Moulin, Rahmi Ilkiliç:
Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. 30:1 - Eran Hanany, Michal Tzur, Alon Levran:
The transshipment fund mechanism: coordinating the decentralized multi-location transshipment problem. 31:1 - Yick-hin Hung, Leon Y. O. Li, T. C. E. Cheng:
n-newsvendor biform game of trading capacity futures. 32:1 - Behzad Hezarkhani
Transshipment prices and pair-wise stability in coordinating the decentralized transshipment problem. 33:1-33:6 - Colin F. Camerer:
Cognitive hierarchy modelling of lab, field and neural data. 34:1 - Jason D. Hartline:
Approximation in mechanism design. 35:1 - Kenneth L. Judd, Sevin Yeltekin:
Computing equilibria of dynamic games. 36:1 - Rodney P. Parker, Tava Olsen:
Dynamic inventory competition with stockout-based substitution. 37:1 - Laurens G. Debo, Senthil K. Veeraraghavan:
Firm service rate selection when service rates are not observable and service value is unknown to the market. 38:1 - Che Lin Su, Kenneth L. Judd:
Structural estimation of discrete-choice games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria. 39:1 - Hao Zhang, Mahesh Nagarajan, Greys Sosic:
Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information. 40:1 - Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Symmetric games with piecewise linear utilities. 41:1 - Shuya Yin, James Cao, Rick So:
Implications of "online-to-store" on retailers' pricing strategy and consumers' demand allocation. 42:1 - James Wright:
Beyond equilibrium: predicting human behaviour in normal form games. 43:1 - Jingfeng Lu, Lixin Ye:
Efficient and optimal selling procedures with private information acquisition costs. 44:1 - René Kirkegaard:
Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps. 45:1 - Quazi Shahriar:
Common value auctions with buy prices. 46:1 - John Wooders:
An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values. 47:1 - Jiawei Li
Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: belief change and end-game effect. 48:1-48:5 - Messan Agbaglah, Lars Ehlers:
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks. 49:1-49:8 - Russell Golman:
Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents. 50:1 - Giuseppe Attanasi
Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in the trust game. 51:1 - Gérard P. Cachon:
Game theory and operations management. 52:1 - Eyran J. Gisches, Robin Lindsey, Terry Daniel, Amnon Rapoport:
Information paradoxes in traffic networks. 53:1 - Amnon Rapoport, William E. Stein, Vincent Mak, Rami Zwick, Darryl A. Seale:
Endogenous arrivals in batch queues with constant or variable capacity. 54:1 - Eyran J. Gisches, Amnon Rapoport:
Degrading network capacity may improve performance: information effects in the Braess Paradox. 55:1 - Sunanda Roy, Abhijit Chandra
On reducing the influence of Condorcet cycles from pairwise election data. 56:1 - Gary Charness, Chun-Lei Yang:
Endogenous group formation and efficiency: an experimental study. 57:1 - Sanjiv Erat, Uri Gneezy:
White lies. 58:1 - Taisuke Imai, Alec Smith, Stephanie Wang, Colin F. Camerer:
The power of foregone payoffs: a mousetracking study. 59:1 - Navin Kartik, Joel Sobel:
Effective communication in cheap-talk games. 60:1 - Xi Chen, Decheng Dai, Ye Du, Shang-Hua Teng:
On the complexity of equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities. 61:1 - Ning Chen:
Pareto stability in matching marketplaces. 62:1 - Shang-Hua Teng:
Beyond convexity: local search and equilibrium computation. 63:1 - Xiaotie Deng:
Competitive equilibrium computation at advertising marketplaces. 64:1 - Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu, Martin A. Lariviere:
Capacity allocation over a long horizon: the return on turn-and-earn. 65:1 - Bar Ifrach, Vivek F. Farias, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
A two tiered dynamic oligopoly model. 66:1 - Xiao Huang, Greys Sosic:
Industry equilibrium with sustaining and disruptive technology. 67:1 - Ramesh Johari, Sachin Adlakha, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Asymptotic analysis of large population stochastic games. 68:1 - Joseph Y. Halpern:
Beyond Nash equilibrium: solution concepts for the 21st century. 69:1 - Nimrod Megiddo:
Formation of preferences and strategic analysis. 70:1 - Federique Echenique, SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum:
Aggregate matchings. 71:1 - Jay Sethuraman:
Matching mechanisms and their application to school choice. 72:1 - Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver
Altruistic kidney exchange. 73:1 - Eric Budish:
The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. 74:1 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Anirban Kar:
On obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. 75:1 - Ana Meca, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Cost sharing in distribution problems for franchise operations. 76:1-76:3 - Francisco R. Fernández, Federico Perea
Avoiding unfairness of Owen solutions in linear production games. 77:1-77:7 - Justo Puerto
Some new cooperative coverage facility location games. 78:1-78:3 - Glenn W. Harrison, Theodore L. Turocy:
The games that experimental subjects play: the utility of payoffs. 79:1 - James C. Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj:
Revealed altruism without independence of irrelevant alternatives. 80:1 - Mikhael Shor:
Procedural justice in bargaining games. 81:1 - James C. Cox, Elinor Ostrom, James M. Walker:
Bosses and kings: asymmetric power in paired common pool and public good games. 82:1 - Christos Ioannou, Ioannis Nompel:
Algorithmic bounded rationality, optimality and noise. 83:1 - Tal Ben-Zvi:
Social networks analysis: a game experiment. 84:1-84:4 - David Ong:
Sorting with shame in the laboratory. 85:1-85:4 - Angelo Mele
Segregation in social networks: a structural approach. 86:1 - Martin Dufwenberg:
Psychological games: theory & experiments. 87:1 - Silvio Micali:
Perfect concrete implementation of arbitrary mechanisms: a quick summary of joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski. 88:1-88:5 - Rafael Pass, Joe Halpern:
Game theory with costly computation: formulation and application to protocol security. 89:1 - Peter Bro Miltersen, Jesper Buus Nielsen
Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography. 90:1 - Abhi Shelat:
Collusion-free protocols. 91:1 - José R. Correa, Roger Lederman, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
Pricing with markups under horizontal and vertical competition. 92:1-92:10 - Kostas Bimpikis, Daron Acemoglu, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Communication dynamics in endogenous social networks. 93:1 - Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Mechanism design and communication networks. 94:1 - Georgia Perakis, Wei Sun:
Loss of coordination in a competitive supply chain with pre-orders and endogenous pricing. 95:1-95:3 - Alistair Wilson, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Ayse Imrohoroglu, Leeat Yariv:
A field study on matching with network externalities. 96:1 - Jeremy T. Fox:
Identification in matching games. 97:1 - Onur Kesten, M. Utku Ünver
Lottery mechanism design for school choice. 98:1
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