default search action
3rd SAGT 2010: Athens, Greece
- Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. Spirakis:
Algorithmic Game Theory - Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6386, Springer 2010, ISBN 978-3-642-16169-8 - Amos Fiat, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers. 1-14 - Paul W. Goldberg
:
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? 15-17 - Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets. 18-29 - Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market. 30-41 - Elliot Anshelevich
Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games. 42-53 - Vincenzo Auletta
Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics. 54-65 - Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:
Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games. 66-77 - Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet, Santosh S. Vempala:
On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games. 78-89 - Vittorio Bilò
Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games. 90-101 - Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play. 102-113 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael M. Frongillo
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria. 114-125 - Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard
On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games. 126-137 - Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium. 138-149 - Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Responsive Lotteries. 150-161 - Dimitris Fotakis
On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users. 162-173 - Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani
Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games. 174-185 - Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It. 186-197 - Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements. 198-209 - Noam Hazon
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting. 210-221 - Rajgopal Kannan, Costas Busch:
Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy. 222-233 - Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang:
Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations. 234-245 - Volodymyr Kuleshov, Adrian Vetta:
On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms. 246-261 - Martin Macko, Kate Larson
Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time. 262-275 - Matús Mihalák, Jan Christoph Schlegel
The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant. 276-287 - Elchanan Mossel
Truthful Fair Division. 288-299 - Uri Nadav, Georgios Piliouras:
No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand. 300-311 - Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria. 312-322 - Vijay V. Vazirani:
2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties. 323-334 - Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis:
On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. 335-346 - Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. 347-358
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-12-26 00:59 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: