default search action
Amy Greenwald
Amy R. Greenwald
Person information
- affiliation: Brown University, Providence, USA
Refine list
refinements active!
zoomed in on ?? of ?? records
view refined list in
export refined list as
showing all ?? records
2020 – today
- 2024
- [c73]John Randolph, Amy Greenwald, Denizalp Goktas:
Banzhaf Power in Hierarchical Games. AAMAS 2024: 2432-2434 - [c72]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald, Sadie Zhao, Alec Koppel, Sumitra Ganesh:
Efficient Inverse Multiagent Learning. ICLR 2024 - [c71]Yasser Mohammad
, Shinji Nakadai, Amy Greenwald
Automated Negotiation in Supply Chains A Generalist Environment for RL/MARL Research. PRIMA 2024: 19-24 - [i27]Denizalp Goktas, Arjun Prakash, Amy Greenwald
Convex-Concave Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2401.12437 (2024) - [i26]Michael P. Wellman
Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis: A Survey. CoRR abs/2403.04018 (2024) - 2023
- [c70]Jiayi Zhao, Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald:
Fisher Markets with Social Influence. AAAI 2023: 5900-5909 - [c69]Rigel Galgana, Takehiro Oyakawa, Amy Greenwald:
Computing Boundary Crossing Probabilities of General Empirical Processes. ACDA 2023: 237-246 - [c68]Cyrus Cousins, Bhaskar Mishra, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald:
Learning Properties in Simulation-Based Games. AAMAS 2023: 272-280 - [c67]Denizalp Goktas, Arjun Prakash, Amy Greenwald:
Convex-Concave Zero-Sum Stochastic Stackelberg Games. NeurIPS 2023 - [c66]Denizalp Goktas
Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets. EC 2023: 760-781 - [i25]Jiayi Zhao, Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald
Fisher Markets with Social Influence. CoRR abs/2303.06307 (2023) - [i24]Denizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald:
Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets. CoRR abs/2306.04890 (2023) - 2022
- [c65]Denizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald:
Robust No-Regret Learning in Min-Max Stackelberg Games. AAMAS 2022: 543-552 - [c64]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald:
Exploitability Minimization in Games and Beyond. NeurIPS 2022 - [c63]Denizalp Goktas, Sadie Zhao, Amy Greenwald:
Zero-Sum Stochastic Stackelberg Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [i23]Denizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald
Robust No-Regret Learning in Min-Max Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2203.14126 (2022) - [i22]Dustin Morrill, Esra'a Saleh, Michael Bowling, Amy Greenwald
Interpolating Between Softmax Policy Gradient and Neural Replicator Dynamics with Capped Implicit Exploration. CoRR abs/2206.02036 (2022) - [i21]Cyrus Cousins, Bhaskar Mishra, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald
Computational and Data Requirements for Learning Generic Properties of Simulation-Based Games. CoRR abs/2208.06400 (2022) - [i20]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald
Gradient Descent Ascent in Min-Max Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2208.09690 (2022) - [i19]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald
Exploitability Minimization in Games and Beyond. CoRR abs/2210.10207 (2022) - [i18]Denizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald
Zero-Sum Stochastic Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2211.13847 (2022) - [i17]Bhaskar Mishra, Cyrus Cousins, Amy Greenwald
Regret Pruning for Learning Equilibria in Simulation-Based Games. CoRR abs/2211.16670 (2022) - 2021
- [c62]Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Reca Sarfati, Marc Lanctot, James R. Wright, Amy R. Greenwald, Michael Bowling:
Hindsight and Sequential Rationality of Correlated Play. AAAI 2021: 5584-5594 - [c61]Rigel Galgana, Cengke Shi, Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa:
A Dynamic Program for Computing the Joint Cumulative Distribution Function of Order Statistics. ACDA 2021: 160-170 - [c60]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Amy Greenwald:
Learning Competitive Equilibria in Noisy Combinatorial Markets. AAMAS 2021: 1446-1448 - [c59]Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot, James R. Wright, Michael Bowling, Amy R. Greenwald:
Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games. ICML 2021: 7818-7828 - [c58]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald:
Convex-Concave Min-Max Stackelberg Games. NeurIPS 2021: 2991-3003 - [c57]Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald
A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria. WINE 2021: 334-351 - [i16]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Amy Greenwald:
Learning Competitive Equilibria in Noisy Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/2101.09551 (2021) - [i15]Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot, James R. Wright, Michael Bowling, Amy Greenwald:
Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2102.06973 (2021) - [i14]Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald:
Tâtonnement Beyond Constant Elasticity of Substitution. CoRR abs/2107.08153 (2021) - [i13]Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald:
Convex-Concave Min-Max Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2110.05192 (2021) - [i12]Dustin Morrill, Amy R. Greenwald, Michael Bowling:
The Partially Observable History Process. CoRR abs/2111.08102 (2021) - [i11]Rigel Galgana, Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa:
A Dynamic Programming Algorithm to Compute Joint Distribution of Order Statistics on Graphs. CoRR abs/2111.10939 (2021) - 2020
- [c56]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Amy Greenwald:
Improved Algorithms for Learning Equilibria in Simulation-Based Games. AAMAS 2020: 79-87 - [c55]Yasser Mohammad, Shinji Nakadai, Amy Greenwald
NegMAS: A Platform for Automated Negotiations. PRIMA 2020: 343-351 - [i10]Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Reca Sarfati, Marc Lanctot, James R. Wright, Amy Greenwald, Michael Bowling:
Hindsight and Sequential Rationality of Correlated Play. CoRR abs/2012.05874 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c54]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald, Cyrus Cousins, Eli Upfal:
Learning Simulation-Based Games from Data. AAMAS 2019: 1778-1780 - [c53]Yasser Mohammad
Supply Chain Management World - A Benchmark Environment for Situated Negotiations. PRIMA 2019: 153-169 - [c52]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Yasser Mohammad, Amy Greenwald:
Empirical Mechanism Design: Designing Mechanisms from Data. UAI 2019: 1094-1104 - [i9]Gregory D. Hager, Ann W. Drobnis
Artificial Intelligence for Social Good. CoRR abs/1901.05406 (2019) - [i8]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Eli Upfal, Amy Greenwald:
Learning Equilibria of Simulation-Based Games. CoRR abs/1905.13379 (2019) - 2018
- [c51]Amy Greenwald
Fast Algorithms for Computing Interim Allocations in Single-Parameter Environments. PRIMA 2018: 194-209 - [c50]Amy Greenwald
On Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms Assuming Convex Costs. SAGT 2018: 113-124 - [c49]Amy Greenwald
Simple vs Optimal Contests with Convex Costs. WWW 2018: 1429-1438 - 2017
- [j26]Michael P. Wellman
Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 339-372 (2017) - [c48]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy:
On Approximate Welfare- and Revenue-Maximizing Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders. AAMAS 2017: 1466-1468 - [i7]Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Simple vs Optimal Mechanisms in Auctions with Convex Payments. CoRR abs/1702.06062 (2017) - [i6]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy:
On Approximate Welfare- and Revenue-Maximizing Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders. CoRR abs/1708.03097 (2017) - 2016
- [c47]Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald
On Revenue-Maximizing Walrasian Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders. AMEC/TADA 2016: 19-34 - [c46]Mark K. Ho, James MacGlashan, Amy Greenwald, Michael L. Littman, Elizabeth Hilliard, Carl Trimbach, Stephen Brawner, Josh Tenenbaum, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Joseph L. Austerweil:
Feature-based Joint Planning and Norm Learning in Collaborative Games. CogSci 2016 - [i5]Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments. CoRR abs/1601.07163 (2016) - 2014
- [j25]Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald
Destroy to save. Games Econ. Behav. 86: 392-404 (2014) - [c45]Amy Greenwald
An Empirical Analysis of QuiBids' Penny Auctions. AMEC/TADA 2014: 56-69 - [c44]Elizabeth M. Hilliard, Amy Greenwald
An Algorithm for the Penalized Multiple Choice Knapsack Problem. ECAI 2014: 1025-1026 - [i4]Amy Greenwald, Seong Jae Lee, Victor Naroditskiy:
RoxyBot-06: Stochastic Prediction and Optimization in TAC Travel. CoRR abs/1401.3829 (2014) - 2013
- [c43]Amy Greenwald, Eric Sodomka, Eric Stix, Jeffrey Stix, David Storch:
Empirical Analysis of Auctioneer Profitability in QuiBids Penny Auctions. AAAI Workshop: Trading Agent Design and Analysis 2013 - [c42]Brandon A. Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald, Michael P. Wellman:
Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions. AAAI Workshop: Trading Agent Design and Analysis 2013 - [c41]Brandon A. Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald:
The price of independence in simultaneous auctions. AAMAS 2013: 1227-1228 - [c40]Eric Sodomka, Elizabeth Hilliard, Michael L. Littman, Amy Greenwald:
Coco-Q: Learning in Stochastic Games with Side Payments. ICML (3) 2013: 1471-1479 - [c39]Brandon A. Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald, Michael P. Wellman:
Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions. EC 2013: 679-696 - 2012
- [c38]Thomas Goff, Amy Greenwald
JACK: A Java Auction Configuration Kit. AMEC/TADA 2012: 45-60 - [c37]Amy Greenwald, Jiacui Li, Eric Sodomka:
Approximating Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information and Multi-Unit Demand. NIPS 2012: 2330-2338 - [c36]Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald:
Self-Confirming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions. UAI 2012: 893-902 - [i3]John R. Wicks, Amy Greenwald:
An Algorithm for Computing Stochastically Stable Distributions with Applications to Multiagent Learning in Repeated Games. CoRR abs/1207.1424 (2012) - [i2]Amy Greenwald, Justin A. Boyan:
Bidding under Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments. CoRR abs/1207.4108 (2012) - [i1]Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald:
Self-Confirming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions. CoRR abs/1210.4915 (2012) - 2011
- [c35]Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald
Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond. WINE 2011: 158-169 - 2010
- [j24]Amy Greenwald
On Evaluating Information Revelation Policies in Procurement Auctions: A Markov Decision Process Approach. Inf. Syst. Res. 21(1): 15-36 (2010) - [c34]Jordan Berg, Carleton Coffrin, Amy Greenwald
Rank and Impression Estimation in a Stylized Model of Ad Auctions. AMEC/TADA 2010: 1-18 - [c33]Jordan Berg, Amy Greenwald
A Knapsack-Based Approach to Bidding in Ad Auctions. ECAI 2010: 1013-1014
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j23]Amy Greenwald
RoxyBot-06: Stochastic Prediction and Optimization in TAC Travel. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 36: 513-546 (2009) - [c32]Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald
Destroy to save. EC 2009: 207-214 - 2008
- [j22]Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone:
Book announcement: autonomous bidding agents. SIGecom Exch. 7(2) (2008) - [c31]Amy Greenwald
Bidding Heuristics for Simultaneous Auctions: Lessons from TAC Travel. AMEC/TADA 2008: 131-146 - [c30]Amy Greenwald, Zheng Li, Warren Schudy:
More Efficient Internal-Regret-Minimizing Algorithms. COLT 2008: 239-250 - [c29]Geoffrey J. Gordon, Amy Greenwald
No-regret learning in convex games. ICML 2008: 360-367 - 2007
- [b2]Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone:
Autonomous bidding agents - strategies and lessons from the trading agent competition. MIT Press 2007, ISBN 978-0-262-23260-9, pp. I-XI, 1-238 - [j21]Martin Zinkevich, Amy Greenwald
A hierarchy of prescriptive goals for multiagent learning. Artif. Intell. 171(7): 440-447 (2007) - [j20]Ashish Arora
Effects of Information-Revelation Policies Under Market-Structure Uncertainty. Manag. Sci. 53(8): 1234-1248 (2007) - [j19]Amy Greenwald
Introduction to the special issue on learning and computational game theory. Mach. Learn. 67(1-2): 3-6 (2007) - [c28]Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald:
Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions. AAAI 2007: 1894-1895 - [c27]Amy Greenwald
Marginal Bidding: An Application of the Equimarginal Principle to Bidding in TAC SCM. AMEC/TADA 2007: 217-239 - [c26]Seong Jae Lee, Amy Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy:
RoxyBot-06: An (SAA)2 TAC Travel Agent. IJCAI 2007: 1378-1383 - [c25]John R. Wicks, Amy Greenwald
More efficient parallel computation of pagerank. SIGIR 2007: 861-862 - [c24]John R. Wicks, Amy Greenwald
Parallelizing the Computation of PageRank. WAW 2007: 202-208 - 2006
- [j18]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 5(5) (2006) - [j17]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 6(1) (2006) - [j16]Amy Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy:
Heuristics for the deterministic bidding problem. SIGecom Exch. 6(1): 35-44 (2006) - [c23]Amy Greenwald, Zheng Li, Casey Marks:
Bounds for Regret-Matching Algorithms. AI&M 2006 - [c22]John R. Wicks, Amy Greenwald:
A Quotient Construction on Markov Chains with Applications to the Theory of Generalized Simulated Annealing. AI&M 2006 - 2005
- [j15]Mary Ellen Zurko, Amy Greenwald
Foreword. Electron. Commer. Res. 5(1): 5-6 (2005) - [j14]Peter Stone, Amy Greenwald
The First International Trading Agent Competition: Autonomous Bidding Agents. Electron. Commer. Res. 5(2): 229-265 (2005) - [j13]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 5(3) (2005) - [c21]Amy Greenwald
Scaling Up the Sample Average Approximation Method for Stochastic Optimization with Applications to Trading Agents. AMEC@AAMAS/TADA@IJCAI 2005: 187-199 - [c20]Martin Zinkevich, Amy Greenwald, Michael L. Littman:
Cyclic Equilibria in Markov Games. NIPS 2005: 1641-1648 - [c19]John R. Wicks, Amy Greenwald:
An Algorithm for Computing Stochastically Stable Distributions with Applications to Multiagent Learning in Repeated Games. UAI 2005: 623-632 - 2004
- [j12]Michael Benisch, Amy Greenwald, Ioanna Grypari
Botticelli: a supply chain management agent designed to optimize under uncertainty. SIGecom Exch. 4(3): 29-37 (2004) - [j11]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 4(3) (2004) - [j10]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 5(1) (2004) - [j9]Amy Greenwald:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 5(2) (2004) - [c18]Michael Benisch, Amy Greenwald, Ioanna Grypari, Roger Lederman, Victor Naroditskiy, Michael Carl Tschantz:
Botticelli: A Supply Chain Management Agent. AAMAS 2004: 1174-1181 - [c17]Michael Benisch, Amy Greenwald
A stochastic programming approach to scheduling in TAC SCM. EC 2004: 152-159 - [c16]Amy Greenwald, Justin A. Boyan:
Bidding under Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments. UAI 2004: 209-216 - 2003
- [j8]Amy Greenwald:
The 2002 Trading Agent Competition: An Overview of Agent Strategies. AI Mag. 24(1): 83-91 (2003) - [j7]Joan Morris DiMicco, Pattie Maes, Amy Greenwald:
Learning Curve: A Simulation-Based Approach to Dynamic Pricing. Electron. Commer. Res. 3(3-4): 245-276 (2003) - [j6]Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone, Peter R. Wurman:
The 2001 Trading Agent Competition. Electron. Mark. 13(1): 4-12 (2003) - [j5]Amy Greenwald
Guest Editors' Introduction: Agents and Markets. IEEE Intell. Syst. 18(6): 12-14 (2003) - [c15]Amy Greenwald
A General Class of No-Regret Learning Algorithms and Game-Theoretic Equilibria. COLT 2003: 2-12 - [c14]Amy Greenwald, Karthik N. Kannan, Ramayya Krishnan:
A Computational Approach to Compare Information Revelation Policies. ICIS 2003: 706-719 - [c13]Amy Greenwald, Keith Hall:
Correlated Q-Learning. ICML 2003: 242-249 - [c12]Amy Greenwald:
Bidding Marginal Utility in Simultaneous Auctions. IJCAI 2003: 1463-1464 - 2002
- [j4]Jeffrey O. Kephart, Amy Greenwald
Shopbot Economics. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 5(3): 255-287 (2002) - [c11]Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone, Peter R. Wurman:
The 2001 Trading Agent Competition. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 935-942 - 2001
- [j3]Amy Greenwald
Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations. Games Econ. Behav. 35(1-2): 80-123 (2001) - [j2]Amy Greenwald
Autonomous Bidding Agents in the Trading Agent Competition. IEEE Internet Comput. 5(2): 52-60 (2001) - [c10]Amy Greenwald
Probabilistic pricebots. Agents 2001: 560-567 - [c9]Amir Jafari, Amy Greenwald, David Gondek, Gunes Ercal:
On No-Regret Learning, Fictitious Play, and Nash Equilibrium. ICML 2001: 226-233 - [c8]Joan Morris DiMicco, Amy Greenwald
Dynamic pricing strategies under a finite time horizon. EC 2001: 95-104 - [c7]Amy Greenwald
Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions. EC 2001: 115-124 - [c6]Justin A. Boyan, Amy Greenwald:
Bid determination in simultaneous actions an agent architecture. EC 2001: 210-212 - 2000
- [j1]Jeffrey O. Kephart, James E. Hanson, Amy Greenwald
Dynamic pricing by software agents. Comput. Networks 32(6): 731-752 (2000)
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [b1]Amy Greenwald:
Learning to Play Network Games. New York University, USA, 1999 - [c5]Jeffrey O. Kephart, Amy Greenwald
Shopbot Economics. Agents 1999: 378-379 - [c4]Jeffrey O. Kephart, Amy Greenwald
Shopbot Economics. ESCQARU 1999: 208-220 - [c3]Amy Greenwald, Jeffrey O. Kephart:
Shopbots and Pricebots. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop) 1999: 1-23 - [c2]Amy Greenwald, Jeffrey O. Kephart:
Shopbots and Pricebots. IJCAI 1999: 506-511 - [c1]Amy Greenwald
Strategic pricebot dynamics. EC 1999: 58-67
Coauthor Index
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
Unpaywalled article links
Add open access links from to the list of external document links (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of unpaywall.org to load hyperlinks to open access articles. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Unpaywall privacy policy.
Archived links via Wayback Machine
For web page which are no longer available, try to retrieve content from the of the Internet Archive (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of archive.org to check for archived content of web pages that are no longer available. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Internet Archive privacy policy.
Reference lists
Add a list of references from ,
, and
to record detail pages.
load references from crossref.org and opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the APIs of crossref.org, opencitations.net, and semanticscholar.org to load article reference information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Crossref privacy policy and the OpenCitations privacy policy, as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
Citation data
Add a list of citing articles from and
to record detail pages.
load citations from opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of opencitations.net and semanticscholar.org to load citation information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the OpenCitations privacy policy as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
OpenAlex data
Load additional information about publications from .
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of openalex.org to load additional information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the information given by OpenAlex.
last updated on 2024-12-23 20:33 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: