This work takes human vulnerability, in a philosophical perspective, as the starting point for tracing the development of biolaw as an interdisciplinary field of knowledge. The first part reflects on the category itself of vulnerability, analyzing the term and similar terms, verifying the legitimacy of a generalization of this element of humans, and illustrating the reasons why the accusation of naturalistic fallacy is not decisive for finding the foundations of justifications and the obligatoriness of biolegal rules. The second part creates a link between the anthropological perspective and biolegal theory and practice, starting from vulnerability, and developing a critical analysis of some applications already operating in current positive regulations. In the context of a biolaw that sees itself as a protector of human rights related to the corporeity of every human being, these reflections provide a non-contingent anthropological reason that, applied to different situations, justifies existing rules or allows a reasoned and proactive criticism of them.
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