Existence of a feedback equilibrium for two-stage Stackelberg games | IEEE Journals & Magazine | IEEE Xplore

Existence of a feedback equilibrium for two-stage Stackelberg games


Abstract:

In this paper we consider a two-stage feedback game in which two players solve a Stackelberg problem at each stage and each player knows the state of the game at every le...Show More

Abstract:

In this paper we consider a two-stage feedback game in which two players solve a Stackelberg problem at each stage and each player knows the state of the game at every level of play. In this kind of game, the leader does not have the ability to announce his strategy at all levels of play prior to the start of the game. Without assuming that at each stage the Stackelberg problem has a unique solution, we define a concept of "feedback Stackelberg solution" and give sufficient conditions to get existence of such a solution.
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control ( Volume: 42, Issue: 11, November 1997)
Page(s): 1612 - 1614
Date of Publication: 06 August 2002

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