The Republic of Türkiye and the United States of America established diplomatic relations in 1927. Relations after World War II evolved from the Second Cairo Conference in December 1943 and Turkey's entrance into World War II on the side of the Allies in February 1945. Later that year, Turkey became a charter member of the United Nations. Since 1945, both countries advanced ties under liberal international order, put forward by the US, through a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political, and economic liberalism. As a consequence relationships advanced under G20, OECD, Council of Europe, OSCE, WTO, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, IMF, the World Bank and Turkey in NATO.[1]
Turkey |
United States |
|---|---|
| Diplomatic mission | |
| Embassy of Turkey, Washington, D.C. | Embassy of the United States, Ankara |
| Envoy | |
| Turkish Ambassador to the United States Sedat Önal | Chargé d'affaires ad interim to Turkey Michael B. Goldman |
During the interwar period (1918-1939), Turkey-US laid the groundwork for cooperation without a defined strategic interest.[2] The US sent a Congressional delegation to emphasize trade and business, along with non-missionary philanthropy and other cultural enterprises.[2] Archaeological expeditions sponsored by American universities.[2]
During World War II, (1940-1945), the oil set to become increasingly important for American interests. President Roosevelt had a geo-strategic plan, Middle East, in mind at the Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement in 1944. Succeeding President Truman defined Turkey’s geo-strategic location as the "proximity to the great natural resources."[2] In the coming US engaged oil wars in the Middle East, Turkey supported the US in some capacity directly or indirectly by giving use authorization of the Incirlik Air Base. After World War II, the Mandate for Palestine, which was established from Ottoman Syria after the dissolution and the partition of the Ottoman Empire, was terminated by the result of the Israeli Declaration of Independence on 14 May 1948. Turkey in March 1949 and the US on January 31, 1949 de jure recognized Israel. On the other hand, at the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Turkey's recognition came on the same day, 15 November 1988. Before the Cold War, Turkey-US relations were already set to a course based on two dimensions. The first dimension was petroleum politics, and the second dimension was the fate of the Palestinians (Palestinian territories, Two-state solution).
During the Cold War (1945-1991), Turkish Straits crisis of 1945 developed over requested Russian military bases in the Turkish Straits as a part of Soviet territorial claims against Turkey, which prompted the United States to declare the Truman Doctrine in 1947.[3] In 1947, the Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey was established as part of United States Security Assistance Organizations to help in modernization, develop interoperability, promote cooperation, and integrate Turkey into the Western system. As a result of the integration, Turkey became part of the intelligence operations (1960 U-2), and the missile systems (1962 Missile Crisis). At the same time, the geopolitical strategic foreign policy, Containment, caused a response from the Soviet Union in the form of increased communist influence in Turkey. In 1964, President Johnson disclosed the reluctance among Western powers to defend Turkey (Johnson letter). The War on drugs created a backlash when farmers lost their jobs (opium ban). Anti-Americanism developed among left-wing extremists. In 1969, Ambassador Komer's car was set on fire by the Marxist-Leninist Dev-Genç during his visit of Kurdaş at the Middle East Technical University, in which the nascent institution was developed using the aid given by the US.[4] In the coming years, Turkey became a front as the political violence in Turkey (1976–1980) developed part of worldwide left-wing terrorism aimed at overthrowing the capitalist government of Turkey and replacing with a communist or socialist society. According to State Department, US has an interest in keeping Turkey anchored to the Euro-Atlantic community.[5] During cold war, U.S. supported the accession of Turkey to the European Union, as Turkey would be aligned with European norms and standards in many domains.[6]
Over the 2010s, Turkey has become a much more independent geopolitical player, but at the same time less predictable and does not correspond to the ideas of the United States in general about what kind of Turkey the US would like to see as a “model” for the Muslim countries of the Middle East. As the instability in the region increased, Turkey also no longer an “island of stability” for the US, but a source of new, often unexpected impulses on a regional scale.
Over the 2020s, Turkey was listed in "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act" and consequently TAF removed from NATO technology acquisitions. The source of the deterioration was not limited to the military, as evident in the dispute over the Armenian genocide, which the United States recognized in 2021. According to Department of State, 2023, Turkey has been a key partner for U.S. policy in the surrounding region.[5] Turkey partnered with the US for security in Afghanistan (ISAF), and serves as NATO’s vital eastern-southern anchor, controlling (international convention) the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Turkey contributes(ed) to international security alongside U.S. forces in Europe (Bosnia), and the seas bordering Somalia. Turkey borders Georgia (Russo-Georgian War), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), Iraq (Iraqi conflict), Syria (Syria civil war) and Iran (Hostile to America), conflicts in the above-mentioned countries have affected relations between the two countries.
Background
editAfter 1780, the United States began relations with North African countries and the Ottoman Empire.[7] In the early 1800s, the US fought the Barbary Wars against the Barbary states, which were under Ottoman suzerainty. The Ottomans severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 20, 1917, after the United States declared war against Germany on April 4, 1917, due to the Ottoman–German alliance. Normal diplomatic relations were re-established with the Ottoman Empire's successor state, Turkey, in 1927.[8]
The strategic partnership characterized the exceptionally close economic and military relations between 1952 and the 2010s. The 2010s were a period of deterioration over the US policies in Syria. In 2020, Turkey was added to CAATSA, and the partnership worsened from ambivalent allies of the 2010s to antagonists.[9]
Strategic partnership during Cold War (1946–1991)
editFrom 1952 to 1991, the relationship premised on a "mutuality of benefits".
| United States | Turkey |
|---|---|
|
|
After participating with United Nations forces in the Korean War, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.[11] The second-largest army belongs to Turkey in NATO and host of the Allied Land Command headquarters including the Incirlik (1955–present) and Konya Airbases (2000–present).
Turkey was one of the founding members of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which promoted shared political and military economic goals similar to and modeled like NATO. The US pressured and promised military and economic aid to be the founding member. The US was not a member. The defensive organization never became functional partly due to the lack of leadership as John Foster Dulles (United States Secretary of State) claimed that the administration could not obtain Congressional approval."[12]
The US actively supported Turkey's membership bid to join the European Union and frequently lobbied on behalf of Ankara through its diplomatic missions in EU capital cities.
Strategic partnership during War on Terror
editIn 2001, the relationship began with the premise of the United States fostering cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and military training and education.[13] Turkey remained a close ally of the United States and provided support in the War on Terror.
| Turkey | United States |
|---|---|
| Goal: Territorial Integrity | Goal: Achieve stability and a reduced threat of terrorism from Iraq and Afghanistan |
|
|
In 2013, the US and Turkey created a $200 million fund to help stem extremism by undercutting the ideological and recruiting appeal of jihadists in places like Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan.[14] It was the first global effort to support local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening democratic values, empathy towards the enemies and development of countering values to prevent violent extremism. When asked Kerry defined the strategic goal “It’s a different kind of challenge and we believe we need to intensify our efforts to address the underlying factors that lead down the path of violence, It’s about building foundational security, challenging the narrative of violence to refuse to justify the slaughtering of people.” [15] In short, the program was based on the role of education in preventing violent extremism and deradicalizing young people.
Deterioration of the strategic partnership
edit| United States | Turkey | |
|---|---|---|
| Gulf War | Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay resigned to prevent Turkey's active engagement.[16] | |
| Iraq War | The "hood event" was perceived as an act of U.S. hostility in Turkey. | Turkey denied opening of US ground front (northern front). |
| Syrian Civil War |
Armed People's Protection Units (YPG). |
Performed Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019 against YPG which Turkey accepts as the branch of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).[17] Determined to destroy 'Terror Corridor' (autonomous region)[18] |
US Congressional Research Service (CRS) stated that "Turkey’s relative importance for U.S. policymakers declined in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but focus remained on a number of regional developments involving Turkey."[19] According to CRS a "reassessment period" established between 1991 and 2002. CRS timeline for 1991-2002 showed that the US established a "No-Fly Zone" in the north of Iraq, and later withheld military loans to Turkey on alleged human rights violations in relation to PKK in 1994.[19] In 1997, the US designated the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization and PKK's activities stopped following its leader was captured with US assistance in 1999.[19] In 2003, the Turkish parliament didn't allow the US invasion of Iraq from Turkey, and the following year PKK resumed insurgency and attacks from northern Iraq.[19]
With President Obama, we had a mutual agreement about the PKK – but Obama deceived us. I don't believe the Trump administration will do the same.[20]
Since US President Barack Obama mediated tensions between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 31 May 2010, over the Gaza flotilla raid, some neoconservatives have called for Turkey's expulsion from NATO.[21] Tom Rogan from National Review promoted expelling Turkey from NATO as part of his broader efforts to reform the alliance.[22] Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, also proposed expelling Turkey from the Western alliance.[23] A breakpoint risen in 2015. While claiming Turkey turned a blind eye to ISIL and other jihadist networks on both sides of its border, US began openly arming the People's Protection Units (a militia related to Kurdistan Workers' Party).[24] However the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIL was on 15 June 2014, five months before Turkey performed the January 2014 Turkish airstrike in Syria. Another breakpoint had risen in 2016. Caused by the belief among most Turkish citizens that America had a hand in the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt. It was compounded by the fact that its suspected ringleader, the Islamic preacher Hoca Fethullah Gülen, lives in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania.[24] Shortly after the FETÖ's (the Gülen movement) purges and arrests (2016–present purges in Turkey), on October 4, 2016, Turkey moved to arrest Turkish nationals employed at American consulates (Metin Topuz on espionage and conspiracy charges), followed on the October 7, 2016, arrest of pastor and teaching elder Evangelical Presbyterian Andrew Brunson.[24] On October 10, 2016, in regards to John R. Bass, Turkey declared: “We do not consider the ambassador a representative of the United States” which was a step short of being an unwanted person.[24] The response came on May 16, 2017 John McCain and Claire McCaskill called for the expulsion (unwanted person) of the Turkish ambassador Serdar Kılıç,[25] following the 2017 clashes at the Turkish Ambassador's Residence in Washington, D.C.[24]
Vice president Fuat Oktay, “The United States must choose. Does it want to remain Turkey’s ally or risk our friendship by joining forces with terrorists to undermine its NATO ally’s defence against its enemies?” [26]
According to The Economist, Turkish-American relations sank to their lowest in over 40 years in October 2017.[24] Turkey moved to establish safe zone (Syria). Turkey performed the Operation Olive Branch (25 March 2018 – 9 August 2019) against the YPG. Turkey established the Northern Syria Buffer Zone. On Aug 10, 2018, Trump tweeted that he would double tariffs (Trump tariffs) on Turkish steel and aluminum using the "Section 232" which was imposed on countries whose exports threaten to impair national security. With both internal structural weaknesses and US sanctions, Economy of Turkey fall into Turkish economic crisis (2018–current). From October 9 to October 17, 2019, the Operation Peace Spring established the Second Northern Syria Buffer Zone. US lost trust in Turkey as the latter bombed its own military base at the Northern Syria Buffer Zone.[27] On February 5, 2020, the US halted a secretive military intelligence cooperation program with Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which was listed as a terrorist organization by the US and Turkey.[28] Turkey had observation posts in the Idlib demilitarization (2018–2019) zone which held more than 3,000,000 internally displaced Syrians (more than half of them children).[29] On February 27, 2020, Syrian forces attacked Turkish forces at the Idlib demilitarization (2018–2019) zone, and military separation between the forces became public after a senior US State Department official argued with the Pentagon over Turkey's request for two Patriot batteries on its southern border.[30] The request was confirmed by Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar.[31]
It is evident that the Turks do not want to be sidelined by the US or the West when it comes to their own national security concerns. Neither do they want to be hamstrung by easily severed logistics. Clearly, they want to be, and have been thinking about becoming, important players in regional politics, and their public national security policy says as much. They have become involved at every opportunity in multi-national military interventions. They have shown a willingness to defy the US. They have industrial and procurement plans aimed at strategic autonomy.[32]
From strategic partnership to adversary
editThe situation is set to deteriorate significantly after the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, with an amendment added by Senator John McCain requiring the Trump administration to submit a detailed report to Congress on the status of US–Turkey relations. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a mostly classified report to Congress in November 2018 followed by H.R. 648 which required the DOD report on the issue in 2019.[33] On 14 December 2020, the US listed Turkey as America's "Adversary" and consequently imposed restrictions against the Turkish Defence Industry Agency.[34] Before Turkey listed in CAATSA and barred from approaching new NATO technological development, Turkey was excluded from the joint F-35 project in Jul 17, 2019.[35] NBC reported that U.S. ejects Turkey from F-35 fighter jet program in the sign of worsening ties between Pentagon following Syria, Iraq wars.[36]
In 2018, the Council on Foreign Relations recommended “US needs to develop alternatives to Incirlik Air Base. The use of the base to advance U.S. interests is no longer assured.”[9] In 2019, US and Greece signed "Revised Defense Cooperation Agreement". The agreement was described as critical to responding to new security challenges in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In 2021, a new agreement the "Greek-American Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement" permitted the US military to use Georgula Barracks in Greece's central province of Volos, Litochoro Training Ground, and army barracks in the northeastern port city of Alexandroupoli apart from the naval base in Souda Bay in Crete which the US has been operating since 1969.[37] In short couple years, Turkey saw shifting NATO powers to its western neighbor. Anadolu Agency reported growing US military presence in Greece can lead to undesired scenarios in the Aegean ‘Deploying more US troops to Greece would disrupt NATO’s powers,’ [38] In 2021, Biden's recognition of the Armenian genocide reflects the dispensability of Turkey-US relations, on the other hand, Biden also emphasized the relations with Armenia.[39] After Azerbaijani blocking Zangezur corridor in 2023, American Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Rubin called Biden to act,[40] and talks with Armenia to establish a military base in the Zangezur corridor.[41] While Sep 11, 2023, a small contingent of US special forces trained Armenian soldiers during the "Eagle Partner" exercise in Armenia.[42]
On October 12, 2023, President Biden declared "particularly the actions by the Government of Turkey to conduct a military offensive into northeast Syria, undermines the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, endangers civilians, and further threatens to undermine the peace, security, and stability in the region". Following this declaration President Biden reestablished Executive Order 13894 which stated Turkey is an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to Syria.[43] Following the 2023 Ankara bombing, Turkish intelligence officials established that the assailants arrived from Syria by paraglider,[44] where they had been trained. Six days before the declaration, Turkey began bombing their facilities in Syria, October 2023 Northern Syria clashes.[45] CJTF–OIR downed a Turkish drone, while doing airstrikes on PKK militants around Hassakeh which came within 500 m of American troops.[46] A day before the executive order made public, Turkey declared to intensify strikes on PKK in Iraq and Syria.[47]
According to Council on Foreign Relations, the United States needs to adjust its expectations, ask for less, and develop other options because Turkey only remains formally a NATO ally but not a partner of the United States.[9] Since the deterioration of the relationship, there has been growing Turkish-Russian security cooperation.[24]
History
editTruman administration (1945–1953)
editOne of Turkey's most important international relationships has been with the United States since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. [citation needed]
Soviet Union (Straits crisis, Truman Doctrine, Korean war, NATO)
editIn 1945, Turkish Straits crisis developed over requested Russian military bases in the Turkish Straits as a part of Soviet territorial claims against Turkey. After World War II, Turkey was pressured by the Soviet government to allow Russian shipping to pass freely through the Turkish Straits. Turkish Straits connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Tensions arose in the region and led to a show of naval force from the Soviets after Turkey would not submit to the Soviet Union's requests.
In 1946, President Truman returned the body of Münir Ertegün, former Turkish Ambassador to Washington (2nd Ambassador of Turkey to the United States), back to Istanbul with the battleship Missouri. Missouri with her 1,515 officers and enlisted men honored the deceased between 21 March 1946 Washington to 5 April Istanbul, until his body was given to his family. It was a gesture not only to Turkish foreign service but also to demonstrate that the US was defending Turkey against Soviet threats.[48]
in 1947, British assistance to Turkey ended. The U.S. dispatched military aid to ensure that Turkey would retain chief control of the passage. Turkey began to associate with the United States in 1947 when the United States Congress designated Turkey, under the provisions of the "Truman Doctrine", as the recipient of special economic and military assistance intended to help it resist threats from the Soviet Union.[49]
The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy whose stated purpose was to counter Soviet geopolitical expansion during the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine used adherence to democracy in its strategic goals. Democracy was used to secure congressional aid for Turkey. Truman's strategic imperatives and democratic rhetoric against communist ideology held the position that because of US assistance against the Soviets, Turkey moved away from a single-party towards a multi-party system. There is no causal link between Turkey's democratization to either the Truman Doctrine or Turkey's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[50] In Atatürk's Reforms, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk envisioned a multi-party-based system. However, Turkey was a "de facto single-party state" (the correct term is one-party period of the Republic of Turkey) as the Republican People's Party effectively prevented the opposition from winning the elections. Turkey held the first multi-party elections in 1946. Multi-party period of the Republic of Turkey began with the Democratic Party government of Adnan Menderes.[50]
The U.S. sought the containment strategy at the beginning of the Korean War to defend Republic of Korea (ROK) from a communist invasion by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In support of the US' overall Cold War strategy, Turkey contributed to the United Nations forces in the Korean War (1950–53).[49] On October 19, 1950, with more than 4,500 troops Turkish Brigade attached to the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Turkish Brigade was the only foreign unit of its size permanently attached to a U.S. division (Brothers in Arms). Turkey replaced/replenished this Brigade each year (15,000 combat soldiers and a total of 21,212) until mid-summer of 1954. A mutual interest in containing Soviet expansion provided the foundation of US–Turkish relations for the next four decades.[49]
Turkey's admission to NATO, in February 1952, was preceded by extensive study and debate on extending eastern Mediterranean.[49] That created the new southern flank. Changes were needed in the wording of the treaty to expand its territorial reach.[49] The admission of Turkey gave NATO a much longer land frontier with the Warsaw Pact. As well as a treaty interest in Turkey's Black Sea coast and the straits through which the Soviet Union had access to the Mediterranean.[49] At the same time, Turkey brought to the alliance its second-largest body of military manpower after that of the United States, in addition to access to sites for forward deployment and intelligence gathering.[49]
Marshall Plan (economic recovery & industrial modernization)
editSince Atatürk's Reforms, Turkey wanted to be part of the Western alliance. Turkey also intended to enter into the Western economic structure. Truman Doctrine aimed to prevent the spread of communism in Turkey. It aimed to change Turkey's isolated economy (statist structure) to move into a liberal system. Marshall subsidies created economic added value in Turkey. The Marshal Plan also directed Turkey toward higher military spending (the second largest military in NATO) due to being seen mainly as a buffer state against the Soviet Union and the Middle East.[51]
Turkey received $111 million in economic and military aid and the U.S. sent the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt.[citation needed] Marshall Plan intended to direct Turkey towards developments in agriculture, mining, and tourism sectors. Tractors and agricultural equipment entered the country and created a boom in production. The aid to the Turkish military went back to the US military-industrial complex. .[52]
Eisenhower administration (1953–1961)
editSoviet Union (NATO, CENTO, U-2 incident)
editTurkey was a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) collective defense pact established in 1955, and endorsed the principles of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine.[49] In the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey generally cooperated with other United States allies in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Jordan) to contain the influence of countries (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) regarded as Soviet clients.[49] Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was the bulwark of NATO's southeastern flank and directly bordered Warsaw Pact countries.
1960 U-2 incident was a U-2 spy plane shot down by the Soviet Air Defence Forces while performing photographic aerial reconnaissance deep into Soviet territory. On April 28, 1960, a U.S. Lockheed U-2C spy plane, Article 358, was ferried from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to the US base at Peshawar airport by pilot Glen Dunaway. Fuel for the aircraft had been ferried to Peshawar the previous day in a US Air Force C-124 transport. A US Air Force C-130 followed, which carried the ground crew, mission pilot Francis Powers, and backup pilot Bob Ericson. On the morning of April 29, the crew in Badaber was informed that the mission had been delayed by one day. As a result, Bob Ericson flew Article 358 back to Incirlik, and John Shinn ferried another U-2C, Article 360, from Incirlik to Peshawar. On 30 April, the mission was delayed one more day because of bad weather over the Soviet Union.[53] On 1 May, Captain Powers left the base in Peshawar on a mission with the operations code word GRAND SLAM. Four days after Powers' disappearance, NASA issued a very detailed press release noting that an aircraft had "gone missing" north of Turkey.[54]
On May 13 the Soviet Union sent complaints to Turkey, who in turn protested to the United States. Turkey acquired assurances that no U.S. aircraft would be allowed for unauthorized purposes.
Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961–1969)
editSoviet Union (Missile Crisis)
editTurkey risked nuclear war on its soil during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was a 13-day confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union initiated by the American discovery of Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. In response to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 and the presence of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request to place nuclear missiles on the island to deter a future invasion. An agreement was reached between John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to avoid invading Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed that it would dismantle all US-built Jupiter MRBMs, which had been deployed in Turkey and Italy against the Soviet Union.[55]
In 2017, The Putin Interviews claimed that the placement of Russian missiles in Cuba was a Russian reaction to the earlier stationing of American missiles in Turkey in 1961–62; it was Khrushchev's attempt to achieve a balance of power.[56]
Greece (Cyprus, Johnson letter)
editThe Cyprus Emergency was a conflict fought in British Cyprus between 1955 and 1959. The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), a Greek Cypriot right-wing nationalist guerrilla organisation, began an armed campaign in support of ending British colonial rule and enabling the unification of Cyprus and Greece (Enosis) in 1955. Opposition to Enosis from Turkish Cypriots led to the formation of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) in support of the partition of Cyprus. In the mid-1960s relations worsened between Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus. Britain wanted to hand the crisis and a peacekeeping role to either NATO or UN forces. US President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and war between them. American diplomat George Ball found Archbishop Makarios, president of Cyprus, difficult to deal with, as he commonly rejected the advice.[citation needed]
The Americans secretly talked to General Georgios Grivas, leader of the EOKA guerrilla organization. While invasion and war did not occur, the U.S. alienated both the Greek and Turkish governments and drove Makarios closer to the Russians and Egyptians.[57][58] The Cyprus Emergency ended in 1959 with the signing of the London-Zürich Agreements, establishing the Republic of Cyprus as a non-partitioned independent state separate from Greece.
On June 5, 1964, President LBJ sent a letter to Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu. It is known since as the “Johnson letter.” The most important point was NATO would be reluctant to defend Turkey.[59]
Washington, June 5, 1964, 12:15 a.m.
Dear Mr Prime Minister:
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. ... (1) NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey. ... (2) your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. ... I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
— Lyndon B. Johnson, President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Inonu, The letter was released by the White House in January 1966 and printed in Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 386–393.
Item 1 was the critical American position toward Turkey. Item 2 was the wake-up call. Johnson revealed to Turkey's political elite that the TAF overly depended on the US.[60] Inonu knew that he would receive a strong message. The letter leaked to the press before messenger left the building. Inonu created a reference point for the nature and intention of American policy on Turkey.[60] In the following decades, Johnson's Letter became the first level reference when an American policy regarding Turkey was analyzed.[60] The unintended consequence of the Johnson letter showed in the public debates. What would the American assistance look like, assuming the US wanted to defend Turkey?
The US ordered the Sixth Fleet to Istanbul in August 1968. Turkish public perceived the visit as a follow-up to the Jonson letter. The labor federations and the other left-wing groups protested the fleet. Those were the same groups that presented a heartfelt welcome in the late 1950s.[60]
Nixon and Ford administrations (1969–1977)
editWar on Drugs
editThe war on drugs is the policy of a global campaign to reduce the illegal drug trade in the United States. Turkey signed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, ratified in 1967. In 1971, Turkey imposed a ban on opium production result of considerable USG pressure. USG granted a total of $35.7 million in support for the transitioning of 70,000 farm workers to the cultivation of new crops. The Turkish government implemented the program under pressure from farmers who claimed lost revenue and nationalists who claimed the program was imposed. During 1973 Turkish general election campaign all political parties expressed dissatisfaction. In 1974, Turkey moved to a system for licensing poppy production in which the state purchased all crops (no poppy market) and used them for legal production (no sale to private industry).[61]
Greece (Cyprus, Arms embargo)
editAfter the 1974 Cypriot coup d'état (backed by the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek military junta), on July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, claiming it was protecting the safety of Turkish Cypriots following the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish military occupied the northern third of Cyprus (Turkish invasion of Cyprus), dividing the island along what became known as the Green Line monitored by the United Nations, defying ceasefire.
Turkey repeatedly claimed, for decades before the invasion and frequently afterward, that Cyprus was of vital strategic importance to it. Ankara defied a host of UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal of its occupying troops from the island. About 142,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south, were forcibly expelled and were forbidden to return to their homes and properties. 109 Turkish villages were destroyed and 700 Turks were kept as hostages. Daily Telegraph described events as anti-Turkish pogrom.[62]
The United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in response and relations between the two countries suffered significantly.[63] Soviets saw the expansion of Warsaw Pact could have a chance in the region.[64]
Soviet Union (Cold War)
editIn the coming years, Turkey became a front as the political violence in Turkey (1976–1980) developed part of worldwide left-wing terrorism overthrowing the capitalist government of Turkey and replacing them with communist or socialist societies.
In 1969, Ambassador Komer's car was set on fire by the Marxist-Leninist Dev-Genç.[64] Ames decoded the organization as a part of the CIA activities in Turkey.[64]
NATO support manifested in the establishment of a clandestine stay-behind army, denoted the "Counter-Guerrilla", under Operation Gladio.
Carter administration (1977–1981)
editThe arms embargo was silently removed a few years later with the contribution of the geopolitical changes in the Middle East like the Iranian Revolution. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed with his staff a possible American invasion of Iran by using Turkish bases and territory if the Soviets decided to repeat the Afghanistan scenario in Iran, although this plan did not materialize.[65]
Reagan administration (1981–1989)
editDuring the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the United States gradually recovered.[49] In March 1980 Turkey and the US signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), in which the United States was granted access to 26 military facilities in return for Turkey's ability to buy modern military hardware and $450 million.[66] Although Ankara resented continued attempts by the United States Congress to restrict military assistance to Turkey because of Cyprus and the introduction of congressional resolutions condemning the Armenian genocide, the Özal government generally perceived the administration of President George H. W. Bush as sympathetic to Turkish interests.[49] At this time, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) was established and it started to build F-16 Fighting Falcon jets under license in Turkey.[citation needed] Washington demonstrated its support of Özal's market-oriented economic policies and efforts to open the Turkish economy to international trade by pushing for acceptance of an International Monetary Fund program to provide economic assistance to Turkey.[49] Furthermore, the United States, unlike European countries, did not persistently and publicly criticize Turkey over allegations of human rights violations,[49] nor did it pressure Özal on the Kurdish problem.[citation needed] By 1989 the United States had recovered a generally positive image among the Turkish political elite.[49]
George H. W. Bush administration (1989–1993)
editThe end of the Cold War forced Turkish leaders to reassess their country's international position.[49] The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from Europe created a sense of vulnerability with respect to Turkey's position in the fast-changing global political environment.[49] Turkey supported the Arab–Israeli peace process and expanded ties with the Central Asian members of the CIS.[49] Özal believed Turkey's future security depended on the continuation of a strong relationship with the United States.[49]
During the Gulf War, Özal modified the main principles of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which were non-interference in intra-Arab disputes and the Middle Eastern affairs. The role Turkey played during the Gulf War demonstrated to the public that it was one of the key actors in the region.[67]
Iraq (Gulf War and Northern Safe Zone)
editPresident Özal supported the United States' position during the Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 17 January 1991). Turkey's economic ties to Iraq were extensive and their disruption hurt the country.[49] Turkey lost approximately $60 billion by closing the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline during the conflict. Just before the war, Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Necip Torumtay resigned out of disagreement in involving Turkish ground forces with the conflict,[16] which prevented Turkey's active military engagement. Turkey allowed United Nations forces (UN SC Resolution 665) to fly missions from its air bases; by doing so Turkey remained a platform for the US attacks against Iraq for the rest of the conflict. Turkey played a role in the war by restraining a sizeable proportion of the Iraqi army on the Turkey–Iraq border.
After the war, Turkey continued to support major United States initiatives in the region, including the creation of a safe zone for Iraqi Kurds over northern Iraq. Turkey received heavy Iraqi Kurdish refugees following the 1991 uprisings in Iraq (1 March – 5 April 1991). The Iraqi no-fly zones were two no-fly zones (NFZs) that were proclaimed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France to create safe zones for the internally displaced people after the war. The US and the UK claimed authorization for the NFZ based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, though not in the text. The US stated that the NFZs were intended to protect the ethnic Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and Shiite Muslims in the south. Turkey opened its Incirlik and Diyarbakir air bases and became involved in the ground support and intelligence operations for the northern NFZ which was initially part of Operation Provide Comfort's relief operations before being succeeded by Operation Northern Watch.
NFZs also enabled a safe haven for PKK. Turkey performed cross-border operations into northern Iraq:
- Operation Northern Iraq: October 12 – November 1, 1992
- Operation Steel: March 20 – May 4, 1995
- Operation Hammer: May 12 – July 7, 1997
- Operation Dawn: September 25 – October 15, 1997
In September 1998, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani signed the US-mediated Washington Agreement and established a formal peace treaty. In the agreement, the parties agreed to share revenue, share power, and deny the use of northern Iraq to the PKK.[68] President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, providing for military assistance to Iraqi opposition groups, which included the PUK and KDP.
The United States' use of Turkish military installations during the bombing of Iraq in 1991 led to anti-war demonstrations in several Turkish cities, and sporadic attacks on United States facilities in 1992 and 1993.[49]
Clinton administration (1993–2001)
editIn January 1995, a consensus had emerged by among Turkey's political elite that the country's security depended on remaining a strategic ally of the United States.[49] For that reason, both the Demirel and Çiller governments made efforts to cultivate relations with the administrations of presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.[49]
Syria (terrorism)
editSyria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list's inception in 1979 and deems it to be a “safe haven” for terrorists. Turkey condemned Syria for supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations.
The Turkish government openly threatened Syria over its support for the PKK.[69] Turkey claimed that Syria employed former Schutzstaffel officer Alois Brunner to train militants.[70] Turkey and Syria nearly engaged in war when Turkey threatened military action if Syria continued to shelter Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus, his long-time safe haven. Öcalan was the leader and one of the founding members of the PKK. As a result, the Syrian government forced Öcalan to leave the country, who was captured in Kenya on February 15, 1999, while being transferred from the Greek embassy to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, in an operation by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) with the help of the CIA.[71]
George W. Bush administration (2001–2009)
editAccording to leaked diplomatic cables originating from 2004, then Prime Minister Erdoğan was described by U.S. diplomats as a "perfectionist workaholic who sincerely cares for the well-being of those around him".[72] He was also described as having "little understanding of politics beyond Ankara" and as surrounding himself with an "iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors". He is said to be "isolated", and that his MPs and Ministers feel "fearful of Erdogan's wrath". Diplomats state that "he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies".[73][74][75]
War on Terror
editTurkey had remained a close ally of the United States in the War on Terror after the September 11 attacks. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit condemned the attacks and the Turkish government then ordered all of its flags at half-mast for one day of mourning. Turkey participated in the International Security Assistance Force.
According to a report by the Open Society Foundations, Turkey participated at one point or another with the CIA's extraordinary rendition program.[76] U.S. ambassador Ross Wilson revealed the involvement of the Incirlik airbase in a diplomatic cable dated June 8, 2006, which described Turkey as a crucial ally in the "global war on terror" and an important logistical base for the US-led war in Iraq. On June 14, 2006, Turkish foreign ministry officials told reporters: "The Turkish government and state never played a part [in the secret transfers] ... and never will." According to evidence, the US base was a transit stop in taking detainees to secret prisons. The cable also stated: "We recommend that you do not raise this issue with TGS [Turkish general staff] pending clarification from Washington on what approach state/OSD/JCS/NSC [national security council] wish to take."[77]
Iraq (territorial integrity)
editTurkey is particularly cautious about a Kurdish state arising from a destabilized Iraq. Turkey has fought an insurgent war against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations. Iraq was a safe haven for PKK. The Iraqi Kurds were organized under the PUK and KDP, who later cooperated with American forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In 2002 Morton I. Abramowitz (1989–1991 US Ambassador) said, in regards to Turkey's involvement in an upcoming war: "It is hard to believe that in the end the Turks would not cooperate with the United States if war takes place, with or without UN blessing".[79] Vice President Dick Cheney's only trip abroad in his first three years at the office was a four-day trip to Ankara. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit welcomed Cheney to a working dinner on March 19, who offered $228 million to aid in military efforts provided that international military operations took command of the Afghanistan peacekeeping force.[80] Turkey's position on Iraq was presented to Cheney. In December 2002, Turkey moved approximately 15,000 soldiers to its border with Iraq.[81] The 2003 invasion of Iraq faced strong domestic opposition in Turkey: opinion polls showed that 80% of Turks were opposed to the war. The Turkish Parliament's position reflected the public's. The March 1, 2003, motion at the Turkish Parliament could not reach the absolute majority of 276 votes needed to allow US troops to attack Iraq from Turkey (62,000 troops and more than 250 planes), the final tally being 264 votes for and 250 against.[82] BBC's Jonny Dymond said the knife-edge vote is a massive blow to the government which has a majority in parliament. On March 11, Abdullah Gul resigned as Turkey's Prime Minister.[83] Chief of the General Staff of Turkey Hilmi Özkök said "Turkey would suffer the effects of the war [motion also included twice as many Turkish troops to be deployed to northern Iraq]." The US did not immediately re-deploy the forces intended for staging in Turkey and the State Department asked for "clarification" of the Turkish vote.[82] In the end, the US pulled the offer of $6 billion in grants and up to $24 billion in loan guarantees, which caused Turkey's stock market to plunge by 12%.[84]
In connection with its invasion of Iraq, the United States requested that Turkey allow 62,000 soldiers to deploy from its territory and that 9 Turkish air bases allow United States bombers to deploy.[85]: 37 Tension developed when the Turkish government agreed to the request, but parliament rejected it on March 1, 2003.[85]: 37 On 20 March 2003 following a visit by United States Secretary of State Colin Powell to Ankara, an agreement was consummated to allow the United States Air Force to use Turkish airspace.[85]: 37 Relations improved in 2009 following United States President Barack Obama's visit to Turkey.[85]: 37
On March 20, the 2003 invasion of Iraq began. On July 4, 2003, Turkish military personnel that were stationed in northern Iraq were captured from their station, led away with hoods over their heads, and interrogated; this later came to be known as the "hood event". Turkish military personnel had stationed military observers in "northern safe zone" after the 1991 Gulf War. The specific unit was stationed at Sulaimaniya after the civil war broke out in 1996 to monitor a ceasefire between the PUK and KDP.[86] The unit station was a historical Ottoman Empire facility (dwelling), which held the historical archives of the Ottoman Empire. Among the destroyed documents were the deed records of the region.[87] The hood event was strongly condemned by the Turkey's newspapers and referred to Americans as "Rambos" and "Ugly Americans".[88] Chief of the General Staff of Turkey Hilmi Özkök declared the incident as the sign of "crisis of confidence" between the US and Turkey.[88]
During the conflict, Ankara pressured the U.S. into subduing PKK training camps in northern Iraq. The U.S. remained reluctant due to northern Iraq's relative stability compared to the rest of the country. On October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament voted in favor of allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to take military action against the PKK based in northern Iraq.[89] In response, Bush stated that he did not believe it was in Turkey's interests to send troops into Iraq.[90] Operation Sun was executed 21 – 29 February 2008.
Russia (Dependence on Gas and Nuclear Energy)
editTurkey's fourth attempt at building a nuclear reactor, in 2002, was driven by concerns over dependence on Russian gas for electric generation. US companies did not produce any bids. In fact, Turkey received only bid—from Rosatom.[91] The bid was rejected partly due to defeating the dependency problem. Turkey's build-own-transfer approach failed.[91]
In June 2008, The United States and Turkey began to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a pact that aims for the transfer of technology, material, reactors, and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production in Turkey for an initial 15-year period followed by automatic renewals in five-year increments that provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two nations under the agreed non-proliferation conditions and controls. A parallel US bipartisan resolution highlighted the importance of the Turkish Republic's key role in providing its Western (EU and US) and regional allies Eurasian energy security.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies started a one-year initiative project to evaluate and enhance the Turkish Republic–United States strategic partnership, aiming for a plan of implementation of the concluded framework at the end of this phase.
After 8 years of failed attempts, due to being received as a possible nuclear proliferation front in the West (US), Turkey altered its strategy. Instead of owning a nuclear power plant, Turkey enabled vendors to own the plant. In 2010, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation.[91] From a Eurasian energy security perspective, US lost a NATO partner (in nuclear cooperation) as this nuclear deal did not solve Turkey’s dependence on Russia’s natural gas, but added a second dependence on nuclear technology.[91]
Gülen Movement (Ergenekon)
editThe Gülen movement is a self-described transnational social movement based on moral values and advocacy of universal access to education, civil society, and tolerance and peace, inspired by the religious teachings of Sunni cleric (mufti) Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish Islamic preacher based in the United States. The conflict between the Turkish government the Gülen movement is a major Turkey–United States relations issue.
Gülen movement's possible involvement in the Ergenekon plot (trials) is controversial.[92] The investigation claimed to study an organization compared to Counter-Guerrilla. Accused were claimed to be the "deep state." The Ergenekon trials were a series of high-profile trials that began on October 20, 2008, in which 275 people, including military officers, journalists, and opposition lawmakers, all alleged members of Ergenekon, were accused of plotting against the Erdogan government. The trials resulted in lengthy prison sentences for most of the accused. The US Secretary of State reported on the Turkish investigation into the Ergenekon network and concluded that “the details of the case were murky, however, and Ergenekon's status as a terrorist organization remained under debate at year's end”.[93]
Obama administration (2009–2017)
editOn 30 May 2009, A U.S. Democratic Party delegation group including U.S. Senators Robert Casey, Edward E. Kaufman, Frank Lautenberg and U.S. Congressman Timothy Walz met with Turkish officials in Ankara to confirm that “Turkey can always depend on the US, while the US can always rely on its close friendship with Turkey”.[94] Obama gave impassioned and eloquent speeches in Turkey (#2009 Obama visit) and Cairo (A New Beginning (speech)). They were seen as the advent of a new era. However, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that 2013 was the year that shaped the coming decades in Turkey–US relations. According to Davutoglu, Obama’s responses to the breach of his red lines (Ghouta chemical attack) and acceptance of the coup in Egypt (2013 Egyptian coup d'état) worked for the narratives of extremists, encouraged atrocities, also signaled to our (NATO) adversaries that they can count on the US’s inaction at places like Crimea.[95] Signs of strain were then displayed when Obama refused to have a formal meeting with Erdoğan when the latter visited the United States in March 2016.[96]
Iran (nuclear deal, arms embargo, oil trading controversy)
editIn May 2009, after parliamentary debates in Belgium and Germany called for the removal of nuclear weapons stationed, questions were subsequently raised over the continued presence of "reportedly" stationed at the Incirlik air base as part of the NATO nuclear sharing program. Bilkent University Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu speculates that if the Obama administration presses for the withdrawal of these weapons, which Turkey wishes to maintain, then Turkey-U.S. relations may be strained.[97] In October 2009, President Obama sent a proposal (nuclear deal framework) to Erdoğan during the heated US discussions on nuclear weapons in Turkey, however before the framework Turkish and Iranian diplomats were discussing a preliminary nuclear deal (will be named Tehran Declaration).[98] In April 2010, while Turkish and Iranian diplomats were working on a deal, Washington stepped up its efforts to impose a new round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010). Iran agreed to the "Tehran Declaration" after China and Russia were in accord with the prepared UN sanctions on Iran (declared as a ‘‘tactical move’’). In May 2010, non-permanent members of the Security Council Turkey and Brazil announced the "Tehran Declaration."[99] The Tehran Declaration is a fuel-swap deal. "Tehran Declaration" stipulated that medical isotopes (a humanitarian need of Iran) could be produced by 20-percent-enriched nuclear fuel which was to be provided to only one research reactor. The research reactor in question was the Tehran Research Reactor, which was supplied by the US under the Atoms for Peace program. In exchange, Tehran will transfer 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey.[100] On 17 May 2010, Brazil, Iran and Turkey signed a tri-partite Joint Declaration asserting that a nuclear fuel exchange could lead to peace.[101] The US discarded the agreement because “it did not address the continued production of uranium enriched to 20 percent inside Iranian territory.”[102]
Turkey, India, and China opposed the adoption of a new round of sanctions claiming the "Tehran Declaration" could be improved, rather than discarded.[103] Opposition developed heated condemnations in the US capital which claimed Turkey is not in the Western camp.[104] Turkey's objection to the US sanctions resulted in the US Congress delaying arms sales sought by the Turkish military.[105] On 17 August 2010, a separate report presented to Obama by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which had previously urged him to raise the subject of religious freedom during his 2009 presidential visit to Turkey, concluded that Turkey's interpretation of secularism “resulted in violations of religious freedoms for many of the country's citizens, including members of the majority and, especially, minority religious communities”.[106] Obama said that future arms sales would depend on Turkish policies.[107]
Following the discredited Tehran Declaration and sanctions on Turkey, the progress on the issue stopped until the change of government in Iran. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signaled a change and opened the way for nuclear talks.[108] On April 2, 2015, the Iran nuclear deal framework signed five years after the Tehran Deal. Instead of Turkey-Brazil of the "Tehran Deal" the pact signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries.
We urge both sides to continue their constructive approach which aims to carry the process forward. Our hope is that both sides will carry out the mutually agreed steps on the agreement, therefore resolving this issue permanently in such a way that will satisfy all the sides involved through diplomacy.[109]
Why were Turkey and Brazil involved in the Iranian Nuclear issues? The Turkish Energy, Nuclear and Mineral Research Agency managed the nuclear power in Turkey. In putting together the fuel-swap deal, Turkey was trying to defend the autonomy of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to enrich uranium for producing electricity and strengthen the right of NNWS to develop peaceful nuclear activities.[110] The Obama administration sanctioned Turkey albeit for different reasons than Iran. In 2013, Russian nuclear construction company Atomstroyexport and Turkey signed a construction agreement for the "Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant". Turkey did not fall into the Iranian situation. The whole operation is Russian built, owned, and operated (build–own–operate) such that even the spent fuel (high-level waste) returned to Russia.[111] Instead of the US partnering with Turkey, leaving Turkey to the Russia's help for the NNWS will affect Russia–Turkey relations by prolonging Turkey's dependence on Russian energy, beyond natural gas. It was a critical disconnect among NATO allies.
Before November 2013 US-led nuclear sanctions passed Halkbank between March 2012 and July 2013 purchased gold on the open market. November 2013 sanctions prevented Iran from being paid in dollars, but gold was never mentioned in the sanctions regime. Halkbank exchanged gold for Iranian oil (oil trading controversy). 18 October 2015, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action canceled the sanctions in question. In March 2017, the deputy head Halkbank, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, was arrested by the US government for conspiring to evade sanctions against Iran by helping Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Azeri businessman who had taken Turkish citizenship, "use U.S. financial institutions to engage in prohibited financial transactions that illegally funneled millions of dollars to Iran".[112] Zarrab was in Miami, Florida, in March 2016.[113] Atilla's trial commenced in New York City federal court in November 2017, with Zarrab agreeing to testify after reaching a plea deal with prosecutors.[114] In early 2018, Atilla was convicted on five of six counts against him, including bank fraud and conspiracies and acquitted on one count after four days of jury deliberation.
War on Terror
editThe 2009 U.S. Secretary of State's Country Report on Terrorism confirmed that cooperation against terrorism is a key element in America's strategic partnership with Turkey, before going on to praise Turkish contributions to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan and highlighting the strategic importance of the İncirlik Air Base used by both U.S. and NATO forces for operations in the region.[93] Turkey had opposed the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO secretary general due to his approach to the Muhammed carricaturs in Denmark until Obama assured a Turk would be one of Rasmussen deputies.[115]
The U.S. Secretary of State's report also contained information on the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in Turkey, whom the U.S. and Turkish authorities share intelligence on, highlighting the September 12, 2006, attack on Diyarbakır and the July 27, 2008, attack on Güngören.[93] In 2016, Vice President Joe Biden called the PKK a terrorist group "plain and simple" and compared it to the ISIL.[116]
Arab Spring (Turkish model)
editThe U.S. under President Obama was reluctant to get deeply involved in the Arab World and was generally supportive of Turkish efforts in the region.[117]
Syrian Civil War (territorial integrity, safe zone, Rat Line, YPG)
editTurkey was particularly cautious about a Kurdish state arising from a destabilized Syria. Turkey has fought an insurgent war against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations. Until 2011, Turkey's policy was trying to preserve a neutral but constructive position because civil war and sectarian conflicts would threaten Turkey's security.[118] Eventually war broke and Syria (refugees, spillover) impacted Turkey more directly than other actors in the conflict.
Between 2011 and 2012, Turkey absorbed 120,000 Syrian refugees, 90,000 of whom are in camps. In September 2012, Turkey asked from US to establish "safe zones" with Turkey in northern Syria to accommodate refugees and reduce the number of civilian casualties.[119] Gen. Philip Breedlove to United States Senate Committee on Armed Services said Syria was weaponizing migration.[120] In 2015, U.S. senators called for humanitarian safe zones in Syria, Obama administration declined.[121] In 2016, during the European migrant crisis, Merkel asked the same question. Obama said Syrian safe zones won't work.[122]
If we set up a no-fly zone or safe zones on the ground, we were buying a costly, dangerous, lengthy, and uncertain military commitment on top of Afghanistan and Iraq that put significant numbers of U.S. forces in harm’s way. Could we have protected civilians in safe zones? Yes, had we deployed thousands of U.S. troops to take and hold the ground and committed roughly 100 planes to provide air coverage.[123]
— Susan Rice (United States National Security Advisor), In Syria, America Had No Good Options, The Atlantic (October 7, 2019)
Beginning in 2012, Turkey and the US supported the "Syrian opposition" which held the idea of replacing the government and "holding accountable those responsible for killing Syrians, destroying [Syria], and displacing [Syrians]".[citation needed] In early 2012, Seymour Hersh reported that the CIA cooperated with Turkey in a covert operation named "the Rat Line", which obtained and transported armaments from Libya to rebel groups (later known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA)) in Syria via proxies and front organizations in southern Turkey. The CIA's involvement reportedly ended after the mass evacuation of CIA operatives from the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya, after the 2012 Benghazi attack.[124][125] In January 2014, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reported specifically on "the CIA annex at Benghazi", that "all CIA activities in Benghazi were legal and authorized. On-the-record testimony establishes that the CIA was not sending weapons ... from Libya to Syria, or facilitating other organizations or states that were transferring weapons from Libya to Syria."[126] While the Obama administration investigated the Benghazi attack in January 2014, the National Intelligence Organisation scandal in Turkey broke out. In May 2014, the editor-in-chief of the Cumhuriyet Can Dündar published pictures of agents and trucks, and was later sentenced for ″leaking secret information of the state″.[127]
In October 2014, Vice President Joe Biden accused Turkey of funding al-Nusra and al Qaeda (FSA-identified groups),[128] to which Erdoğan angrily responded, "Biden has to apologize for his statements" adding that if no apology is made, Biden would become "history to [him]". Biden subsequently apologized.[129] In 2015, the International Business Times wrote that the US sent weapons shipments to FSA-identified groups through a CIA program for years.[130] Timber Sycamore was a classified weapons supply and training program run by the CIA and supported by some Arab intelligence services, such as the security service in Saudi Arabia. It launched in 2012 or 2013 and supplied money, weaponry and training to rebel forces. According to US officials, the program has trained thousands of rebels.[131] In July 2017, H. R. McMaster, National Security Adviser to President Donald Trump and CIA Director Mike Pompeo, decided to terminate the program.[132]
In other words, this illegitimate regime (reference to President Obama's statement[133]) was the source of these challenges and threats for Turkey, yet the Obama administration was unwilling to recognize it as such and act upon it accordingly. On the contrary, at the end of the day, the Obama administration allowed Assad’s brutality to continue while supporting "his ally" Turkey’s foes, on the ground.[95]
— Ahmet Davutoglu (Minister of Foreign Affairs), "From Obama to Trump: Lessons and challenges", Al Jazeera English (Feb 3 2017)
Obama used the "red line" on August 20, 2012, in relation to chemical weapons.[134] On the one-year anniversary of Obama's red line speech, the Ghouta chemical attacks occurred. John McCain said the red line was "apparently written in disappearing ink," due to the perception the red line had been crossed with no action.[135] At the same time, United States Central Command (CENTCOMM) approached the YPG.
Early on, Obama saw Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West—but Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria.[136]
— Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctorine: The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world.", The Atlantic (April 2016)
Turkey-US relations began showing signs of deterioration, particularly over the handling of the YPG.[137] Some groups held the idea of "Syrian Balkanization" ("division of the country") in which they promoted federalizing Syria on ethnic and religious-sectarian lines, Constitution of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The American forces in the Syrian Civil War openly allied with the Kurdish YPG fighters and supported them militarily. The YPG was criticized by Turkey for its alleged support to the PKK, especially since a rebellion in southern Turkey began in 2015.[17] By early 2015, voices in the US foreign policy establishment pushed to abandon the rebels.[138] In early October 2015, shortly after the start of the Russian military intervention in Syria, Obama was reported to have authorized the resupply of 25,000 YPG militia.[139] Erdoğan stated that he had asked Obama not to intervene on the side of the YPG: "I told Mr. Obama, 'Don't drop those bombs [meaning weapons and other supplies]. You will be making a mistake.' Unfortunately, despite our conversation, they dropped whatever was needed with three C-130's and half of it landed in [IS'] hands. So who is supplying [ISIL], then?" Erdogan also opposed any arrangements in Syria that would mirror the Iraqi Kurds' de facto state in northern Syria. He told reporters on January 26, 2015: "What is this? Northern Iraq? Now [they want] Northern Syria to be born. It is impossible for us to accept this. ... Such entities will cause great problems in the future."[140]
According to General Raymond A. Thomas (at the time head of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)) at the Aspen Security Forum in July 2017, the SDF (established October 10, 2015) is a PR-friendly name for the YPG, which Thomas personally suggested because the YPG is considered an arm of the PKK.[141] On February 1, 2016, Brett McGurk officially visited SDF commander Ferhat Abdi Şahin (also known as General Mazloum Kobani), after the Siege of Kobanî. In response, Erdoğan said: “How can we trust you? Is it me that is your partner or is it the terrorists in Kobani?”[142] After Kobani, General Allen and Brett McGurk worked on Tal Abyad. Turkey did not permit flying off of a Turkish airbase. McGurk said: "So the picture that developed while General Allen and I were spending most of these months in Ankara is that something was not on the level [the U.S. allied with Turkey's enemy]."[143] Turkey overtly defied American orders of ceasing Turkey's military bombardment of the YPG fighters in their bid to take the town of Azaz in northern Syria.[144]
In summary, during the Obama years, Turkey developed its policy towards Syria in two stages. The first stage was by itself. The second stage was with the US, which was unsuccessful. However, during obama years, Turkey was unwilling to act unilaterally toward Syria.[145]
- Tried to persuade Assad to reform. Cut the diplomatic ties. Supported regional and international political solutions. Support and aid Syria’s political and armed opposition.
- Asked Obama in support of direct military intervention, such as a no-fly zone or humanitarian corridor for the refugees. (Obama administration rejected)
Obama administration did not respond to the idea that Rojava conflict, which the Obama administration associated itself with, provided a launch pad for Turkish Kurdish separatists toward Turkey and might raise questions about Turkey’s territorial integrity.[146]
Palestine (Davos incident - Gaza flotilla raid)
edit“Ottomanism" was primarily conceived as a reform and renewal project for the declining Ottoman Empire (Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire) in the 19th century. Ottomanism did not prevent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Neo-Ottomanism as associated with Ahmet Davutoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 May 2009 – 29 August 2014) and his foreign policy was to establish Turkey as an influential power within the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East.[147] 2009 Davos incident arrived on a radical domestic transformation in one member of a western alliance (NATO) and how this led to a revision of its international alliance preference. Erdogan’s outburst at the 2009 Davos Summit was a critical juncture that signaled the turn in Turkey’s national agenda and alignment policies.
The Gaza flotilla raid was a military operation by Israel against six civilian ships of the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" on 31 May 2010 in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea. Israel–Turkey relations reached a low point after the incident. Turkey recalled its ambassador, canceled joint military exercises, and called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. Erdoğan harshly referred to the raid as a "bloody massacre" and "state terrorism", and criticized Israel in a speech before the Grand National Assembly.[148] On March 22, 2013, Netanyahu apologized for the incident in a 30-minute telephone call with Erdoğan, stating that the results were unintended; the Turkish prime minister accepted the apology and agreed to enter into discussions to resolve the compensation issue.
It was Turkey that set the course for terminating the alliance with Israel.
Armenia (Genocide, Normalization)
editDuring his Ankara visit, Obama urged Turkey to come to terms with its past and resolve its Armenian issues. During the 2008 US presidential election, he had criticized former US President George W. Bush for his failure to take a stance and stated that the "Armenian genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence".[149] He responded positively to an announcement from sources in Ankara and Yerevan that a deal to reopen the border between the two states and exchange diplomatic personnel would happen, and indicated that although his own personal views on the subject remained unchanged, to avoid derailing this diplomatic progress, he would refrain from using the word "genocide" in his upcoming April 24 speech on the question.[150]
On April 22, 2009, shortly after Obama's visit, Turkish and Armenian authorities formally announced a provisional roadmap for the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two states.[151] The U.S. responded positively with a statement from the office of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden following a phone conversation with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, which stated that “the Vice President applauded President Sargsyan's leadership, and underscored the administration's support for both Armenia and Turkey in this process”.[152] Turkish columnists, however, criticized the timing of the announcement, and believed it to have been made to placate Obama in advance of his April 24 speech, with Fikret Bila writing in the Milliyet that “the Turkish Foreign Ministry made this statement regarding the roadmap before midnight”, as it would allow Obama to go back on his campaign promise to refer to the incident as genocide, which the Turkish government profusely denied, by pointing out to the Armenian diaspora that “Turkey reached a consensus with Armenia and set a roadmap” and “there is no need now to damage this process”.[153][154]
Gülen movement (coup d'état attempt)
editIn a speech on July 29, 2016, President Erdoğan accused CENTCOM chief Joseph Votel of "siding with coup plotters" after Votel accused the Turkish government of arresting the Pentagon's contacts in Turkey.[155][156] Yeni Şafak, a Turkish pro-government newspaper, claimed that the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, now-retired U.S. Army General John F. Campbell, was the "mastermind" behind the coup attempt in Turkey.[157] In late July 2016, Turkish prime minister Binali Yıldırım told The Guardian: "Of course, since the leader of this terrorist organisation is residing in the United States, there are question marks in the minds of the people whether there is any U.S. involvement or backing.[158]
Turkey’s Anadolu Agency report chief prosecutor’s office launched an investigation into 17 U.S.-based individuals, including Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer, former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara and ex-CIA director John Brennan, for their alleged links to cleric Fethullah Gulen.[161]
First Trump administration (2017–2021)
editDue to perceptions that former US Secretary of State and Democratic Party presidential nominee Hillary Clinton is friendly towards the Gülen movement, many Erdoğan supporters reportedly favored Republican Party presidential nominee Donald Trump in the United States' 2016 presidential election.[162]
The Turkish government had a generally warm relationship with the Trump administration,[163] backing the Trump administration's stance against Antifa groups during the George Floyd protests,[164] and condemning restrictions placed on Trump's social media accounts as "digital fascism".[165]
Qatar (diplomatic crisis)
editTurkey supported Qatar in its diplomatic confrontation with a Saudi and Emirati-led bloc of countries that severed ties with and imposed sanctions on Qatar on June 5, 2017. Erdoğan criticized the list of demands released by the countries on 22 June, stating that they undermine Qatar's sovereignty.
In December 2017, US national security advisor General H.R. McMaster said that Turkey had joined Qatar as a prime source of funding that contributes to the spread of extremist ideology of Islamism: "We're seeing great involvement by Turkey from everywhere from western Africa to Southeast Asia, funding groups that help create the conditions that allow terrorism to flourish."[166]
Saudi Arabia (Khashoggi)
editThe assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi dissident, journalist for The Washington Post, and former general manager and editor-in-chief of Al-Arab News Channel, occurred on October 2, 2018, at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, and was perpetrated by agents of the Saudi Arabian government.[167] Government officials of Turkey believe Khashoggi was murdered with premeditation. Anonymous Saudi officials have admitted that agents affiliated with the Saudi government killed him.[168]
CIA Director Gina Haspel traveled to Turkey to address the investigation. Haspel's visit came before a planned speech by Erdoğan. She listened to audio purportedly capturing the sound of saw on a bone.[citation needed] On November 20, US President Donald Trump rejected the CIA's conclusion that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had ordered the killing. He issued a statement saying "it could very well be that the Crown Prince had knowledge of this tragic event — maybe he did and maybe he didn't" and that "in any case, [their] relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia".[169]
Air Defense System (Patriot — S-400, F35, CAATSA)
editThe US had leverage with Turkey as Turkey's military security was largely dependent on its Western ally.[177] Turkey depended on the US for control of its airspace. Turkey has long pursued air control radars and missile defense systems.
US Patriots that were allocated to the defense of Turkey were removed on 16 August 2015[170] Turkey's lack of air defense system became an issue when 2015 Russian Sukhoi Su-24 shootdown by a patrolling Turkish Air Force F-16 on 24 November 2015. Turkey stated it has the right to defend its airspace.[178] Russia claimed U.S. knew the flight path of the Sukhoi Su-24 and it was an issue between two NATO partners, two U.S. officials claimed there was no such information.[179]
Turkey got serious about acquiring a missile defense system early in the first Obama administration. Turkey put up a bid, which included MIM-104 Patriot. Chinese air defense was the winning system in 2013.[180] In 2015, Turkey reversed its position to acquire China’s FD-2000 long-range air defense missile system. The Chinese reportedly refused Ankara’s technology transfer demands. In 2013, US did not part with valuable MIM-104 Patriot intellectual property. When Erdogan confronted (2017) “They give tanks, cannons and armored vehicles to the terror organization but we can’t procure some of our needs, although we want to pay the price.”[181] Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, reportedly saw that Russian technology transfer available. Turkey transferred the money for S-400 missile system on Sep 12, 2017.[182] Bloomberg reported "permission" of the sale of Patriot systems to Turkey as a breakthrough on Dec 18, 2018[183] Turkey received its first installment of the Russian S-400 missile defense system on 12 July 2019, just short of six months of the US breakthrough.[184] The patriots were offered to replace Russian ordinance was US$3.5 billion while Turkey paid US$2.5 billion for S-400m. In February 2019, Russia had an advance supply contract with Saudi Arabia for the S-400,[185] Qatar was in “advanced” talks with Russia for the S-400,[185] and India agreed to pay more than $5 billion for five S-400 squadrons to be delivered in 2023.[185]
On July 31, 2019, the United States decided to end the F-35 deal. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan had warned Turkey that such a deal with Russia risks undermining its ties to NATO.[186] The US threatened Turkey with CAATSA sanctions over Turkey's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.[187][188]
On July 22, 2019, Turkey claimed to retaliate against the “unacceptable” threat of US sanctions over Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 missile defenses.[189]
On February 5, 2020, the US halted a secretive military intelligence cooperation program with Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).[28] On 8 December 2020, the House of Representatives approved a sanctions package against Turkey due to its purchase of S-400 missile system from Russia. Trump administration said that the president will veto the bill. Trump had earlier worked to delay passing sanctions against Turkey, but he lost the 2020 United States presidential election.[190] On 14 December 2020, the US imposed Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. The sanctions included a ban on all U.S. export licenses and authorizations to SSB and an asset freeze and visa restrictions on Dr. Ismail Demir, SSB's president, and other SSB officers.[191]
Subsequently, doubts were raised by a number of international policy analysts that military sanctions on the NATO ally would weaken the alliance, effectively reducing Turkey's ability to obtain American technology for regional defense. For this reason, the incoming Biden administration would likely hold off on sanctions to normalize relations.[192][193][194]
Syrian Civil War (Clashes at the Turkish Ambassador's Residence, Refugees, Pull-out, Barisha raid)
editThe clashes at the Turkish Ambassador's Residence in Washington, D.C. broke out on May 16, 2017, between Turkey's Police Counter Attack Team and a crowd of protesters, some of whom carried flags of the Democratic Union Party (Syria) (a left-wing Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party).[195] On May 16, 2017 John McCain and Claire McCaskill called for the expulsion (unwanted person) of the Turkish ambassador Serdar Kılıç for the embassy brawl.[25]
The Turkey migrant crisis in the 2010s was characterized by high numbers of people arriving in Turkey. As reported by UNHCR in 2018, Turkey is hosting 63.4% of all the refugees (from Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan) in the world. As of 2019, refugees of the Syrian Civil War in Turkey (3.6 million) numbered highest as "registered" refugees (2011–2018: 30 billion on refugee assistance). As the war made the return of refugees to Syria uncertain, Turkey focused on how to manage their presence in Turkish society by addressing their legal status, basic needs, employment, education, and impact on local communities.[196] The Trump travel ban actions include two executive orders for restrictions on citizens of seven (first executive order) or six (second executive order) Muslim-majority countries.[197] A third action, done by presidential proclamation, restricts entry to the U.S. by citizens from eight countries, six of which are predominantly Muslim. During and after his election campaign Trump proposed establishing safe zones in Syria as an alternative to Syrian refugees' immigration to the US. In the past, "safe zones" have been interpreted as establishing, among other things, no-fly zones over Syria. During the Obama administration Turkey encouraged the U.S. to establish safe zones; the Obama administration was concerned about the potential for pulling the U.S. into a war with Russia.[198] In the first few weeks of Trump's presidency, Turkey renewed its call for safe zones and proposed a new plan for them. The Trump administration spoke with several other Sunni Arab States regarding safe zones, and Russia has asked for clarification regarding any Trump administration plan regarding safe zones.
In December 2018, Trump announced "We have won against ISIS," and ordered the withdrawal of all troops from Syria.[199] The next day, Mattis resigned in protest, calling his decision an abandonment of the U.S.'s YPG allies. In November 2018, Trump said he would not approve any extension of the American deployment in Syria.[200] House of Representatives condemned Trump's decision.[201]
October 23, 2019, Trump withdraws U.S. troops from Syrian-Turkish border to southeastern Syria for Turkey to set up a new “Buffer Zone”.[202]
According to two anonymous American officials, the Central Intelligence Agency obtained original intelligence on Baghdadi[clarification needed] following the arrests of one of his wives and a courier.[208] The arrest of al-Baghdadi's top aide Ismael al-Ethawi was the key: al-Ethawi was found and followed by informants in Syria, apprehended by Turkish authorities, and handed over to the Iraqi intelligence to whom he provided information in February 2018. In 2019, US, Turkish, and Iraqi intelligence conducted a joint operation in which they captured several senior ISIL leaders who provided the locations where they met with Baghdadi inside Syria.[209] According to Voice of America, the fate of al-Baghdadi "was sealed by the capture of his aide".[210] Turkish and US military authorities exchanged and coordinated information ahead of the attack in Barisha, Harem District, Idlib Governorate, Syria.[211] President Trump thanked Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq for aiding US operation, and praised Erdoğan, claiming that he is "a big fan", a "friend of [his]" and "a hell of a leader."[212]
Gülen Movement (extradition - Flynn - Brunson - Visa & Tariff)
editIn July 2016, after the failed coup attempt, Turkey demanded that the United States government extradite Fethullah Gülen, a cleric and Turkish national living in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. However, the US government demanded that Turkey had to produce evidence of Gulen's connection with the coup attempt. On 19 July, an official request was sent to the US for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen.[216] Senior U.S. officials said this evidence pertained to certain pre-coup alleged subversive activities.[217]
On November 8, 2016, The Hill published an op-ed by Flynn stating that US ally Turkey was in crisis and needed US support on the day of the 2016 United States presidential election. Flynn called for the US to back Erdoğan's government and alleged that the regime's opponent Fethullah Gülen, who is a Pennsylvania-based opposition cleric and the leader of the gulen movement whose members were purged in Turkey because of the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, headed a "vast global network" that fit "the description of a dangerous sleeper terror network".[218] Flynn, who was specialized in US counterterrorism strategy and dismantling insurgent networks, argued Gulen falls into radical Islamist groups aligned with Seyed Qutb and Hasan al Bana and he finished his article stating "running a scam". On March 8, 2017, four months after the publication, General Flynn filed documents with the Federal government indicating consulting work that might have aided the government of Turkey. The Crossfire Hurricane (FBI investigation) ("Crossfire Razor"[219] - a counterintelligence investigation on Flynn) was taken over by the Mueller special counsel investigation (May 17, 2017). Flynn was part of Mueller's special counsel investigation.
In 2017, the special counsel, Robert Mueller, began probing whether Michael Flynn was part of an alleged plot to kidnap the cleric for Turkey.[220] Michael Flynn's consulting company was hired by Inovo BV, a company owned by Kamil Ekim Alptekin. Alptekin also chairs the Turkish-American Business Council, an arm of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK).[223] Trump transition aide Bijan Kian played key role in Flynn's connection to the case[224] Federal investigators probing the lobbying work of national security adviser Michael Flynn are focused in part on the role of Bijan Kian.[225] In 2017, FBI investigated whether Fethullah Gulen skimmed money from charter schools in the US.[226] Gülen movement schools is a network of more than 150 U.S. charter schools (as of 2017). Gulen-linked educational institutions (schools in varying categories, and classifications) are sizable with 300 in Turkey and over 1,000 worldwide.[227]
Serkan Golge, a naturalized US citizen, was jailed in Turkey for three years on charges of participating in terrorism and conspiring against the government as a member of the Gülen movement. Metin Topuz, a US consulate employee, was charged with having links to Gülen and was arrested under "terror charges" by an Istanbul court. [citation needed] Topuz was the second US government employee in Turkey to be arrested in 2017. Pastor Andrew Brunson was charged with terrorism and espionage during the purges that followed the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt.[229] The U.S-based Christian group Voice of the Persecuted took up the Brunsons’ cause, as had opposition Parliament members in Turkey and other Protestant pastors in the largely Muslim nation.[230] Brunson's fate was determined at the Directorate General of Migration Management which gave the instruction for detention and deportation of Brunson.”[230] Selina Dogan, a member from the Republican People's Party, attempted to free Brunson.[230] The Turkish government said the post-coup crackdown was not just on Gulen movement but also (subversive activities) links to Kurdish militants and terror coming from Islamic State.[230]
The United States suspended all non-immigrant visas from Turkey "indefinitely" due to Topuz's arrest. Turkey retaliated against the US with suspensions of all US visas, including tourist visas, shortly after the US State Department made their announcement.[231] On August 1, 2018, the US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on Justice minister Abdulhamit Gül and interior minister Suleyman Soylu, who were involved in the detention of Brunson. Daniel Glaser, the former Treasury official under Obama, said: "It's certainly the first time I can think of" the U.S. sanctioning a NATO ally.[232] On August 10, 2018, Trump imposed punitive tariffs against Turkey after an impasse over Brunson's imprisonment and other issues.[233] On Aug 10, 2018, Trump tweeted that he would double tariffs (Trump tariffs) on Turkish steel and aluminum using the "Section 232" which was imposed on countries whose exports threaten to impair national security. Markets responded and the lira plunged. Depending on the calculation nearly 40% year to date or 20% just after the tweet.[234] Michael Klein said “It’s not like the United States caused this, but there’s probably some element of the trade spat [signaling to] investors and Turkish residents that things were not going to get better.”[235] With both internal structural weaknesses and US sanctions Turkey's economy fall into Turkish economic crisis (2018–current). Later in December 2022, the WTO ruled against the United States saying that there was no national security emergency that justified US invocation of the exception [236] The move prompted Erdoğan to say that the United States was "[ex]changing a strategic NATO partner for a pastor" and that the US' behavior would force Turkey to look for new friends and allies.[237]
The presidential spokesperson, İbrahim Kalın, tweeted that the US is losing Turkey, and that the entire Turkish public is against U.S. policies.[237] In addition, the Uşak Province decided to stop running digital advertisement on United States-based social media platforms like Facebook, Google, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, canceling all of their ads as a response to US sanctions on Turkey.[238] Turkey went on to say that it would retaliate against the raising of steel and aluminium tariffs by the U.S. administration[239] (The US had already imposed 10 percent and 25 percent additional tariffs on aluminum and steel imports respectively from all countries on March 23, 2018, but on August 13, 2018, it added additional tariffs on steel imports from Turkey).[240] Erdoğan said that Turkey will boycott electronic products from the US, using iPhones as an example.[241] The Keçiören Municipality in the Ankara decided not to issue business licenses to American brands including McDonald's, Starbucks and Burger King.[242] In addition, Turkey decided to increase tariffs on imports of a range of US products,[243]
The Turkish people expected the United States to unequivocally condemn the attack and express solidarity with Turkey’s elected leadership. It did not. The United States' reaction was far from satisfactory. Instead of siding with Turkish democracy, United States officials cautiously called for “stability and peace and continuity within Turkey.” To make matters worse, there has been no progress regarding Turkey’s request for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen under a bilateral treaty.[244]
— Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Erdogan: How Turkey Sees the Crisis With the U.S. (Aug. 10, 2018), The New York Times
On August 20, 2018, there were gunshots at the USA Embassy in Ankara. No casualties were reported and Turkish authorities detained two men as suspects.[245]
Palestine (Hamas)
editOn the same time, relations between Turkey and the United States also worsened after the Turkish government hosted two Hamas leaders, in a move that was believed to be in response to the Abraham Accord, in which Israel normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain; the Abraham Accord was opposed by Ankara.[247] Relations between Turkey and Israel, a major ally of the United States, have already gone low.[248] A new Pew Research poll shows that 85% of Turkish people are dissatisfied with the way the US president, Joe Biden, is handling Israel's war in Gaza.[249]
On September 6, 2024, Turkish-American human rights activist Ayşenur Ezgi Eygi was shot in the head by an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sniper during a protest against illegal Israeli settlements in Beita, Nablus, in the West Bank. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the killing by Israel as "barbaric".[250]
Greece (military bases)
editIn 2018, the CFR recommended “US needs to develop alternatives to Incirlik Air Base. The use of the base to advance U.S. interests is no longer assured.”[9] US and Greece signed "Revised Defense Cooperation Agreement". The agreement was described as critical to responding to new security challenges in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Pompeo said "We have told the Turks that illegal drilling is unacceptable, and we'll continue to take diplomatic action to make sure that we do as we do always: ensure that the lawful activity takes place in every space where international law governs. ... We're working to get ... everyone to de-escalate and find a set of outcomes that are mutually agreeable,"[251] In 2021, a new agreement the "Greek-American Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement" permitted the US military to use Georgula Barracks in Greece's central province of Volos, Litochoro Training Ground, and army barracks in the northeastern port city of Alexandroupoli apart from the naval base in Souda Bay in Crete which the US has been operating since 1969.[37] In short couple years, Turkey saw shifting NATO powers to its western neighbor. Anadolu Agency reported growing US military presence in Greece can lead to undesired scenarios in the Aegean ‘Deploying more US troops to Greece would disrupt NATO’s powers,’ [38]
Armenia (Genocide Recognition, Nagorno-Karabakh War)
editIn 2019, the United States Congress, with sponsors from Saudi Arabia, issued official recognition of the Armenian genocide, which was the first time the United States has officially acknowledged the genocide, having previously only unofficially or partially recognized the genocide.[252][253] Turkey, which has traditionally denied that such genocide existed, blasted the United States for inflaming tensions. Donald Trump has rejected the resolution by Congress, citing that his administration's stance on the issue had not changed.[254]
Eliot Engel, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the influence of third party actors like Turkey "troubling" at the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[255] In a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Bob Menendez, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, and several other lawmakers called for the Trump administration to "immediately suspend all sales and transfers of military equipment to Ankara."[256] As for the result, relations between the United States to Turkey and Azerbaijan further worsened, with Turkey accused the United States of sending weapons and supplies to Armenia, which Washington denied.[257]
On 15 October 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged both sides to respect the humanitarian ceasefire and stated, "We now have the Turks, who have stepped in and provided resources to Azerbaijan, increasing the risk, increasing the firepower that's taking place in this historic fight."[258]
Biden administration (2021–2025)
editIn October 2021, in the wake of the appeal for the release of Turkish activist Osman Kavala signed by 10 Western countries, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ordered his foreign minister to declare the US ambassador persona non grata, alongside the other 9 ambassadors.[259] However, the ambassadors did not receive any formal notice to leave the country and Erdoğan eventually stepped back.[260]
Election (2023 Turkish presidential election)
editBiden (2023 Turkish presidential election): “I look forward to meeting with you the next five years.”[261]
In August 2020, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden called for a new U.S. approach to the "autocrat" President Erdoğan and support for Turkish opposition parties.[262]
So I’m very concerned about it. I’m very concerned about it. But I’m still of the view that if we were to engage more directly like I was doing with them, that we can support those elements of the Turkish leadership that still exist and get more from them and embolden them to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.
— Joe Biden, "Interview Transcript: Joe Biden Says Age Is Just a Number - The New York Times", Biden, Joe. "Joe Biden Says Age Is Just a Number". NYT (Interview). Interviewed by Kathleen Kingsbury. The New York Times.
On May 22, 2022, after the US embassy issued a warning that police might respond violently to an opposition gathering in Istanbul, Turkey's foreign relations ministry summoned Ambassador Jeff Flake.[263]
Russo-Ukrainian War (Grain Deal, NATO expansion)
editIn Russo-Ukrainian War US supported Ukraine and sanctioned Russia; however, the conflict brought challenges to Turkey in balancing its relations with both Ukraine and Russia, with implications for US-Turkey ties.
Turkey in addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, and closing the Straits to belligerent warships (including US warships) supplied Ukraine with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles—as well as humanitarian assistance.[264] Turkey-Ukraine close ties was a response to mutual interests in countering Russian influence (they are also part of Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) in the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their respective defense industries.[264]
Turkey's basis for continued engagement with Russia, and desire to help mediate the conflict was based on minimizing spillover effects on Turkey’s national security and economy.[264] On March 5, 2022, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated after discussions with NATO partners' deputy foreign ministers that Turkey and the US will continue to work in "tight coordination" to find a diplomatic solution to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[265] On the other hand, Turkey rejected the US economic sanctions against Russia and did not close its airspace to Russian civilian flights.[266]
President Biden expressed consent for Turkey-United Nations to develop parallel agreements with Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports in solving the global supply concerns. Black Sea Grain Initiative was achieved by Turkey as it regulates access to the Straits through Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, so by the virtue of its strategic position has the power to mediate between the parties on various issues of contention.[266]
On June 28, 2022, US President Joe Biden thanked Turkey for the Finland-Sweden-Turkey trilateral memorandum at the NATO 2022 Madrid summit.[267]
Greece (military bases)
editDevlet Bahçeli claimed US bases pose "a threat to our security." "America is using the Greek side as a pawn ... The subject of 12 islands is our wound that has not yet healed. They have been unjustly usurped from Turkey by foot tricks," Bacheli reiterated.[268] Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress. In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey related to potential overflights of Greek territory.[266]
Armenia (Genocide Recognition, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)
editOn April 24, 2021, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, President Joe Biden referred to the massacre of the Armenians during the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as "genocide" in a statement released by the White House.[269] Turkey has long practiced a policy of denial against the Armenian Genocide, and Biden's move was refuted by President Erdogan as "groundless" and opening a "deep wound" in U.S.-Turkey relations.[270]
Presidential candidate and former Vice President Joe Biden demanded that Turkey "stay out" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which Turkey has supported the Azerbaijanis.[271]
Armenia–Turkey normalization process
editOn December 15, 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the U.S. supports the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey.[272]
Air Defense (S400, F-35, F-16C)
editOn March 19, 2022, the US has broached the unlikely option of delivering its Russian-made S-400 missile defence systems to Ukraine to assist it in fighting invading Russian forces, According to three sources acquainted with the situation.[274]
All existing F16s are Block 50+ 'Viper' configuration. Turkey's F16 needs an upgrade. Biden can't move forward without acceptance from the top senators on the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees. Senate Foreign Relations Chair Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), had longstanding concerns over Turkey’s aggression toward Greece and Cyprus. "If they can find a way to ensure that Turkey’s aggression against its neighbors ceases — which has been great, but that has to be a permanent reality,” Menendez said.[275]
Second Trump administration (2025–present)
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Economic relations
editThe United States and Turkey are both members in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G-20. The US and Turkey have had a Joint Economic Commission and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement for several years. In 2002, the two countries indicated their joint intent to upgrade bilateral economic relations by launching an Economic Partnership Commission.
Turkey is currently the 32nd-largest goods trading partner with $20.5 billion in total ($10.2 billion; imports $10.3 billion) goods trade during 2018. US' goods and services trade with Turkey totaled an estimated $24.0 billion (exports: $12.7 billion; imports: $11.2 billion) in 2017.[276] The trade deficit was $143 million in 2018.[276]
The US exports of goods and services to Turkey involved 68,000 jobs in 2015.[276]
Military relations
editFor the Anatolian Falcon 2012 joint exercises, the United States sent the 480th Fighter Squadron to train with Turkish pilots in the operation Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.[277]
Joint operations
editTurkey participated with the United States in the Korean War in 1950–53 and in missions in Somalia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–2004.[278]
Turkey has commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan twice since its inception.[279] 2,000 Mehmetçik concentrated on training Afghan military and security forces and provided security at ISAF's Regional Command-Capital stationed in Kabul.[279] An undisclosed number of Mehmetçik were deployed to the Wardak and Jawzjan provinces to give ground support to USA Air Force Operations.[279]
During the Iraq War, Turkey established the NATO Training Mission in 2005 and sponsored specialized training for hundreds of Iraqi security personnel in a secret facility in Turkey.[280]
Operation Gladio
editOperation Gladio is the codename for a clandestine "stay-behind" operation of armed resistance that was planned by the Western Union (WU) (and subsequently by NATO) for a potential Warsaw Pact invasion and conquest in Europe.[281]
Counter-Guerrilla is the branch of the operation. The operation's founding goal was to erect a guerrilla force capable of countering a possible Soviet invasion. The goal was soon expanded to subverting communism in Turkey. Counter-Guerrilla initially operated out of the Turkish Armed Forces' Tactical Mobilization Group (STK). In 1967, it was renamed to the Special Warfare Department before becoming Special Forces Command. Counter-Guerrilla's existence in Turkey was revealed in 1973 by then-prime minister Bülent Ecevit.[282]
Cooperation
editThe United States and Turkey share membership in NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and continue to cooperate in important projects, such as the Joint Strike Fighter program.
Bases and logistics
editSince 1954, Turkey has hosted the Incirlik Air Base, an important operations base of the United States Air Force, which has played a critical role during the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. Turkey routinely hosts the United States for Anatolian Falcon and (with Israel, before their relationship worsened) Anatolian Eagle exercises held at its Konya airbase.[283]
Turkish bases and transport corridors have been used heavily for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya as of 2011.[10]
In the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, some of the planes used at the operation and a fueling carrier took off from Incirlik base; in response, the Turkish government arrested several high-ranking Turkish military officers at Incirlik and cut power to the base for nearly a week.[284]
Nuclear warheads
editTurkey hosts U.S. controlled nuclear weapons as part of nuclear sharing policy. Its current arsenal is B61 nuclear bomb, while it formerly held MGR-1 Honest John, MIM-14 Nike Hercules, PGM-19 Jupiter, W33 and W48 artillery shells.
Turkey does not have dedicated nuclear-capable fighter aircraft that can deliver the weapons and does not train its pilots to fly nuclear missions.[284]
Industrial cooperation
editThe defense industry of Turkey is growing. Turkey's 240 Lockheed Martin General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons were co-produced in Turkey by one of Turkish Aerospace Industries' predecessors (TAI). The United States and Turkey signed an FMS contract in 2009 for 30 F-16 Block 50s to be co-produced by TAI.[285]
Turkey reportedly wanted to purchase drone aircraft from the United States to assist in its counterterrorism efforts against the PKK before its request was denied.[285] Turkey produced Bayraktar Tactical UAS.
F-35s
editTurkey is one of eight countries—along with the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Australia—partnering with the United States on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.[286] Turkey plans to purchase up to 116 F-35s, 90 for delivery over an estimated 10-year period (2014–2023), that are jointly assembled and/or developed by firms from the various JSF partners. The cost is estimated to be at least $11 billion and could exceed $15 billion, given continued cost inflation on the program. The Pentagon decided to end the F-35 deal by July 31, 2019, as a result of Turkey, as a NATO partner, purchasing S400 missiles from Russia.
Alleged cable leaks highlighted Turkish concerns that upgrades to General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons had "precluded Turkish access to computer systems and software modification previously allowed".[287]
Radar and signal analysis
editTo have the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense be approved, Turkey received two conditions:[288] Iran or Syria should not be named as a threat to Turkey, and Turkey's territory was to be protected by the system (as a national defense requirement). According to U.S. officials, the AN/TPY-2 radar was deployed at Turkey's Kürecik Air Force base and activated in January 2012.[289][290]
Military aid
edit| Table 1. U.S. Military and Security Assistance to Turkey (historical $ in millions) Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. State Department.[291] | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fiscal Year(s) | Foreign Mil. Fin. | Excess Defense Articles | Int’l Mil. Ed. and Training | NADR | INCLE | Other Grants | Total Grants | Loans |
| 1948-1975 | — | 869.0 | 111.8 | — | — | 3,406.0 | 4,386.8 | 185.0 |
| 1976-1981 | — | — | 3.4 | — | 1.0 | 10.5 | 14.9 | 952.9 |
| 1982-1992 | 1,884.0 | — | 36.4 | — | 6.7 | 1,362.1 | 3,289.2 | 2,769.1 |
| 1993-2001 | — | 205.1 | 14.0 | 0.1 | 3.2 | — | 222.4 | 1,678.1 |
| 2002-2008 | 170.0 | 21.1 | 23.7 | 8.6 | 0.1 | — | 223.5 | — |
| 2009 | 1.0 | — | 3.2 | 1.9 | 0.5 | — | 6.6 | — |
| 2010 | — | — | 5.0 | 3.0 | — | — | 8.0 | — |
| 2011 | — | — | 4.0 | 1.4 | 0.5 | — | 5.9 | — |
| 2012 | — | — | 4.0 | — | 0.5 | — | 4.5 | — |
| TOTAL | 2,055.0 | 1,095.2 | 205.5 | 14.0 | 12.5 | 4,778.6 | 8,160.8 | 5,585.1 |
U.S. equipment in Turkey
editRegional problems in the 1960s, Cyprus crises in 1963 and 1967, Cyprus invasion in 1974, and the arms embargo by the US in 1975–1978 following the invasion necessitated Turkey developing a defense industry based on national resources.[292]
Milestones
edit- 1954: United States and Turkey sign first status of forces agreement.[293]
- 1980: US–Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.[293]
- 1999: PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan captured MIT/Pentagon operation;[293]
- 2003: Turkish Parliament denies invasion (ground forces) of Iraq from Turkey and permits use of Turkish bases for overflight[293]
- 2003: U.S. detain Turkish special forces troops in Suleimaniyah, Iraq.[293]
- 2011: "Operation Unified Protector”.[293]
Public relations
editCultural exchanges
editThe 1978 American semi-biographical film Midnight Express was banned in Turkey under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which caused a strain on US–Turkish relations.
In late 2007, Turkey recalled its ambassador to the United States after the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a US resolution on the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in a delay of a full House vote on Resolution 106. Speaker Nancy Pelosi pledged to bring the resolution to a full vote, but pressure from the White House and Turkey kept her from doing so.[294]
American international schools in Turkey
edit- Bursa American College for Girls (1854–1928)
- Robert College (founded 1863), in Istanbul
- Talas American College (1871–1968), in Talas
- Üsküdar American Academy (founded 1876), in Istanbul
- American Collegiate Institute (founded 1878), in İzmir
- Anatolia College in Merzifon (1886–1924)
Turkish schools in the United States
editTurkey does not currently have any international schools operating within the United States.[295]
Opinion Surveys
editAccording to a survey conducted in the spring of 2017 and released in August, 72% of Turks see the United States as a threat to Turkey's security. Furthermore, the US was perceived as a greater threat to security than Russia or China.[296] According to PBS, opinions of the US dropped steadily from 1999/2000 (52% in Turkey in 1999/2000) and in 2006, favorable opinions dropped significantly in predominantly Muslim countries, which ranged from 12% in Turkey to 30% in Indonesia and Egypt.[297] A 2019 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 73% of Turks had a negative view of the United States, with only 20% having a positive view, the lowest among countries polled.[298] The same study also showed only 11% of Turks had confidence in the US leader at the time of the survey, President Donald Trump, with 84% having no confidence in him.[298] A 2024 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed only 8% of Turks had confidence in US President Joe Biden.[299]
The following histogram shows the percentage of Turks that viewed the United States favorably according to the PEW Global Attitudes Survey:[298]
Results of 2017 BBC World Service:
| Country | Positive | Negative | Neutral | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| -44 |
Lobbying & think tanks
editThe Turkish lobby in the United States is a lobby that works on behalf of the Turkish government to promote the nation's interests with the US government. The Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) is an educational, congressional advocacy, and charitable organization that was incorporated in February 2007.
The Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey is a United States Security Assistance Organization working on issues related to Turkey.
| Research, Advocacy, and Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Turkish Think Tanks | US Think Tanks |
|
|
| Turkish University & Special programs | US University & Special programs |
| |
| Turkish Journalist | US Journalist |
| |
Diplomatic exchanges
editDiplomacy & embassies
editThe United States has sent many ambassadors to Turkey since October 12, 1927. Turkey has maintained many high-level contacts with the United States.
| Diplomatic | |
|---|---|
| Missions of the United States | Missions of Turkey |
|
|
The Embassy of the United States is located in Ankara, Turkey, while the Embassy of Turkey is located in Washington, D.C., United States.
State and official visits
editSince the relations established there were 15 official visits.
- 12/07/59, Çankaya Mansion, President of Turkey Celal Bayar, President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower
- June 22–23, 1964, White House, President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson, Prime Minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü
- 05/31/78, White House, President of the United States Jimmy Carter, Prime Minister of Turkey Bülent Ecevit
- July 20–22, 1991, Ankara and Istanbul, President of Turkey Turgut Özal, President of the United States George H. W. Bush
- 09/27/99, White House, President of the United States Bill Clinton, Prime Minister of Turkey Bülent Ecevit
- 11/15/99, Çankaya Köşkü, Ankara, President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel, President of the United States Bill Clinton
- 09/04/00, White House, President of the United States Bill Clinton, President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer
- June 27–30, 2004, Ankara and Istanbul, President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President of the United States George W. Bush
- 01/08/08, White House, President of the United States George W. Bush, President of Turkey Abdullah Gül
- April 6–7, 2009, Ankara and Istanbul, President of Turkey Abdullah Gül, President of the United States Barack Obama
- 05/16/13, White House, President of the United States Barack Obama, Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- 08/24/16, Çankaya Köşkü, Ankara, Prime Minister of Turkey Binali Yıldırım, Vice President of the United States Joe Biden
- 05/16/17, White House, President of the United States Donald Trump, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- 11/09/17, White House, Washington, D.C., Vice President of the United States Mike Pence, Prime Minister of Turkey Binali Yıldırım
- 11/13/19, White House, Washington, D.C., President of the United States Donald Trump, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
1999 Clinton visit
editPresident Bill Clinton visited Ankara, İzmit, Ephesus, and Istanbul November 15–19, 1999. It was a State visit where he also attended the Organization for Security and Cooperation's Europe Summit meeting.
2009 Obama visit
editRelations between Turkey and the United States markedly improved during the Obama administration's first term, but the two countries were nevertheless unable to reach their ambitious goals.[301] Obama made his first official visit to Turkey at Ankara and Istanbul April 6–7, 2009. There US critics who claimed that Turkey should not be rewarded by an early presidential visit as its government had been systematically reorienting foreign policy onto an Islamist axis. Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Mark Parris remarked: “Whatever the merits of this argument, the Obama administration, by scheduling the visit, have decisively rejected it.”[302]
Turkish President Gül later referred to the visit as “evidence of a vital partnership between Turkey and the US,” whilst Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu pointed out that they were "changing the psychological atmosphere” of what was before “seen as a military relationship”.[303] Obama clarified: “We are not solely strategic partners, we are also model partners.” With this change in terminology, “The President wanted to stress the uniqueness of this relationship. This is not an ordinary relationship, it's a prototype and unique relationship.”[304] A US House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, The United States and Turkey: A Model Partnership, chaired by Head of the Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler was convened after “the historic visit that Obama paid to Turkey”, and concluded that "this cooperation is vital for both of the two states in an environment in which we face serious security issues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucuses and the Middle East, besides a global financial crisis”.[305]
After Obama's visit, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Chief of the Turkish General Staff İlker Başbuğ hosted US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen in Ankara. During the closed-door meeting, they discussed the pledging of further Turkish support troops to Afghanistan and Pakistan where Turkish authorities have influence, the secure transport of troops and equipment from the port of İskenderun during the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the pro-Kurdish terrorists operating in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq.[306]
2013 Erdoğan visit
editIn May 2013, Erdoğan visited the White House and met with Obama, who said the visit was an opportunity "to return the extraordinary hospitality that the Prime Minister and the Turkish people showed [him] on [his] visit to Turkey four years ago".[307] During their joint press conference, both Obama and Erdoğan stressed the importance of achieving stability in Syria. Erdoğan said that during his time with Obama, "Syria was at the top of [their] agenda" and Obama repeated the United States plan to support the Assad-opposition while applying "steady international pressure".[307] When they were not discussing national security threats, Obama and Erdoğan discussed expanding economic relations between the two countries; Turkey had received over $50 billion in foreign investments, $20 billion of which came from the United States.[308] In 2003, there was only $8 billion in U.S. investment in Turkey; both Erdoğan and Obama praised this recent increase and agreed to continue expanding the trade and investment agreements between the two countries.[307][308] Erdoğan's visit culminated with talks of stability in the region. Obama stressed the importance of normalizing relations between Turkey and Israel and praised the steps Erdoğan had taken in that process. The process normalizing the Turkish-Israeli relationship had begun and Erdoğan stated that he would continue this process: "We don't need any other problems, issues in the region."[307][309]
2019 Erdoğan visit
editIn November 2019, Erdogan visited the White House and held meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump.[310]
See also
edit- Foreign relations of Turkey
- Turks in the United States
- Turkish House
- Turkey in NATO
- U.S.-Turkey Business Council
- Great Famine of Mount Lebanon
- Human rights in Turkey
- Human rights in the United States
- Turkish invasion of Cyprus
- Clashes at the Turkish Ambassador's Residence in Washington, D.C.
- United States recognition of the Armenian genocide
- CIA activities in Turkey
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Die türkisch-israelischen Beziehungen sind nach der Militäraktion Israels auf dem Tiefpunkt. 'Staatsterrorismus' warf der türkische Ministerpräsident Erdogan Israel vor und sagte in einer Rede vor Parteifreunden voraus: 'Ab heute ist nichts mehr wie es war.' Von antisemitischen Tönen distanzierte er sich klar. [After Israel's military action, the Turkish-Israeli relations have reached a low. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan accused Israel of 'state terrorism' and predicted in a speech to party members: 'From today on, nothing is anymore as it used to be.' He distanced himself clearly from antisemitical tones.]
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Further reading
edit- Aslan, Omer. The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). online
- Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. Strategic Relations between the US and Turkey 1979-2000: Sleeping with a Tiger (Routledge, 2014).
- Baran, Zeyno (May 11, 2005) “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations”, United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats.
- Barlas, Dilek, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz. "Managing the transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana: Turkey's relations with Britain and the US in a turbulent era (1929–47)." Turkish Studies (2016): 1-25.
- Brands, H.W., Jr. "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle 1964," Middle Eastern Studies 23#3 (1987), pp. 348–362.
- Camp, Glen D. "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus." Political Science Quarterly 95.1 (1980) 95#1: 43–70. online
- Coufoudakis, Van. "Turkey and the United States: The Problems and Prospects of a Post-War Alliance." JPMS: Journal of Political and Military Sociology 9.2 (1981): 179–196.
- Harris, George Sellers, and Bilge Criss, eds. Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: the American dimension (Brill, 2009).
- Howard, Harry N. "The bicentennial in American-Turkish relations." Middle East Journal 30.3 (1976): 291–310. online
- Kara, Mehtap (2022). "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 23 (2): 431–451. doi:10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081. S2CID 249691457.
- Karpat, Kemal H., ed. Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974 (Leiden, Brill, 1975)
- Kubilay Yado Arin: The AKP's Foreign Policy, Turkey's Reorientation from the West to the East? Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, Berlin 2013. ISBN 9 783865 737199.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future," ORBIS (Summer 1983 27#2, pp. 421–445.
- Kunihoim, Bruce R. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton UP, 1980)
- Laipson, Helen. "US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974." in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) pp. 164–182.
- Laipson, Ellen B. "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy." in John T.A. Koumouljdes,(ed.), Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985 (London: Trigraph, 1986).
- McGhee, George. The U.S. - Turkish- NATO- Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (Macmillan, 1990).
- Magalhaes, Margaux. "Congress and US-Turkey relations." Journal of Transatlantic Studies 19.4 (2021): 494–516.
- Miller, James E.; Douglas E. Selvage; Laurie Van Hook, eds. (2007). "Turkey" (PDF). Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Vol. 29. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. pp. 1036–1132.
- Simavoryan, Arestakes. (2020). The Controversy of Ankara-Washington under Trump. https://orbeli.am/en/post/483/2020-06-29/The+Controversy+of+Ankara-Washington+under+Trump
- Nash, Philip. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (1997) online
- Olson, Robert W., Nurhan Ince, and Nuhan Ince. "Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923-1960: Kemalism and Its Legacy, a Review and a Critique." Oriente Moderno 57.5/6 (1977): 227–241. in JSTOR
- Sanberk, Özdem. "The Importance of Trust Building in Foreign Policy, a Case Study: The Trajectory of the Turkish-American Relations." Review of International Law and Politics 12 (2016): 13+
- Rustow, Dankwart A. Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally (Council on Foreign Relations, 1987).
- Seydi, SÜleyman. “Turkish—American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63.” Middle Eastern Studies 46#3 (2010), pp. 433–455. online
- Stearns, Monteagle. Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).
- Thomas, Lewis V. and Frye, Richard N. The United States and Turkey and Iran (Harvard University Press, 1951).
- Trask, Roger R. The United States response to Turkish nationalism and reform, 1914-1939 (U of Minnesota Press, 1971).
- Trask, Roger R. "The" Terrible Turk" and Turkish-American Relations in the Interwar Period." Historian 33.1 (1970): 40-53 online covers chapter 4.
- Uslu, Nasuh. "Turkey's relationship with the United States 1960-1975". (PhD Diss. Durham University, 1994) online
- Uslu, Nasuh. The Cyprus question as an issue of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American relations, 1959-2003 (Nova Publishers, 2003).
- Uslu, Nasuh. The Turkish-American relationship between 1947 and 2003: The history of a distinctive alliance ( Nova Publishers, 2003).
- Yilmaz, Şuhnaz. Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent (Routledge, 2015).
- Yilmaz, Şuhnaz. "Challenging the stereotypes: Turkish–American relations in the inter-war era." Middle Eastern Studies 42.2 (2006): 223–237.