

# Evaluating the security of CRYSTALS-Dilithium in the quantum random oracle model

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## Abstract

In the wake of recent progress on quantum computing hardware, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is standardizing cryptographic protocols that are resistant to attacks by quantum adversaries. The primary digital signature scheme that NIST has chosen is CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The hardness of this scheme is based on the hardness of three computational problems: Module Learning with Errors (MLWE), Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS), and SelfTargetMSIS. MLWE and MSIS have been well-studied and are widely believed to be secure. However, SelfTargetMSIS is novel and, though classically as hard as MSIS, its quantum hardness is unclear. In this paper, we provide the first proof of the hardness of SelfTargetMSIS via a reduction from MLWE in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM). Our proof uses recently developed techniques in quantum reprogramming and rewinding. A central part of our approach is a proof that a certain hash function, derived from the MSIS problem, is collapsing. From this approach, we deduce a new security proof for Dilithium under appropriate parameter settings. Compared to the previous work by Kiltz, Lyubashevsky, and Schaffner (EUROCRYPT 2018) that gave the only other rigorous security proof for a variant of Dilithium, our proof has the advantage of being applicable under the condition  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ , where  $q$  denotes the modulus and  $n$  the dimension of the underlying algebraic ring. This condition is part of the original Dilithium proposal and is crucial for the efficient implementation of the scheme. We provide new secure parameter sets for Dilithium under the condition  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ , finding that our public key size and signature size are about  $2.9\times$  and  $1.3\times$  larger, respectively, than those proposed by Kiltz et al. at the same security level.

## 1 Introduction

Quantum computers are theoretically capable of breaking the underlying computational hardness assumptions for many existing cryptographic schemes. Therefore, it is vitally important to develop new cryptographic primitives and protocols that are resistant to quantum attacks.

The goal of NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project is to design a new generation of cryptographic schemes that are secure against quantum adversaries. In 2022, NIST selected three new digital signature schemes for standardization [Ala+22]: Falcon, SPHINCS+, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Of the three, CRYSTALS-Dilithium [Bai+21], or Dilithium in shorthand, was identified as the primary choice for post-quantum digital signing.

To practically implement post-quantum cryptography, users must be provided with not only assurance that a scheme is secure in a post-quantum setting, but also the means by which to judge parameter choices and thereby balance their own needs for security and efficiency. The goal of the current work is to provide rigorous assurance of the security of Dilithium as well as implementable parameter sets. A common model for the security of digital signatures is existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks, or EUF-CMA. In this setting, an adversary is allowed to make sequential queries to a signing oracle for the signature scheme, and then afterwards the adversary attempts to forge a signature for a new message. We work in the setting of *strong* existential unforgeability (sEUF-CMA) wherein we must also guard against the possibility that an adversary

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could try to forge a new signature for one of the messages already signed by the oracle. (See [Section 2](#) for details.)

Additionally, we utilize the quantum random oracle model (QROM) for hash functions. We recall that when a hash function  $H : X \rightarrow Y$  is used as a subroutine in a digital signature scheme, the random oracle model (ROM) assumes that one can replace each instance of the function  $H$  with a black box that accepts inputs from  $X$  and returns outputs in  $Y$  according to a uniformly randomly chosen function from  $X$  to  $Y$ . (This model is useful because random functions are easier to work with in theory than actual hash functions.) The random oracle model needs to be refined in the quantum setting because queries to the hash function can be made in superposition: for any quantum state of the form  $\sum_{x \in X} \alpha_x |x\rangle$ , where  $\forall x \in X, \alpha_x \in \mathbb{C}$ , a quantum computer can efficiently prepare the superposed state  $\sum_{x \in X} \alpha_x |x\rangle |H(x)\rangle$ . The quantum random oracle model (QROM) therefore assumes that each use of the hash function can be simulated by a black box that accepts a quantum state supported on  $X$  and returns a quantum state supported on  $X \times Y$  (computed by a truly random function from  $X$  to  $Y$ ) [[Bon+11](#)]. While no efficient and truly random functions actually exist, the QROM is generally trusted and it enables the application of a number of useful proof techniques.

## 1.1 The Dilithium signature scheme

We give a brief description of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. (The reader is invited to consult [[Bai+21](#)] for a full version of the protocol and a more detailed explanation of the design.) Dilithium is based on arithmetic over the ring  $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ , where  $q$  is an odd prime and  $n$  is a power of 2. Similar to other Dilithium literature, we generally leave the parameters  $q, n$  implicit. For any non-negative integer  $\eta$ , let  $S_\eta \subseteq R_q$  denote the set of all polynomials with coefficients from  $\{-\eta, -\eta + 1, \dots, \eta\}$ . For any positive integer  $\tau \leq n$ , let  $B_\tau \subseteq R_q$  denote the set of all polynomials  $f$  such that exactly  $\tau$  of the coefficients of  $f$  are in  $\{-1, 1\}$  and the remaining coefficients are all zero.

Dilithium is an instance of a general family of lattice-based signature schemes (see [[Pei16](#), Subsection 5.6.2]) that are obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to lattice-based interactive proofs-of-knowledge. Neglecting some optimizations that are present in the full version of the scheme, we can concisely express Dilithium as in [Fig. 1](#). The parameters  $k, \ell, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \tau, \beta$  are positive integers, and  $H$  denotes a hash function which maps to the set  $B_\tau$ . A signature for a message  $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$  takes the form of an ordered pair  $\sigma = (z, c)$ , where  $z \in R_q^\ell$  and  $c \in B_\tau$ .




Figure 1: A simplified description of the key generation algorithm (Gen), signature verification algorithm (Verify) and signing algorithm (Sign) for Dilithium.

The algorithms in [Fig. 1](#) make use of the subroutines HighBits and LowBits which separate an  $R_q$ -vector

into two parts. For any vector  $x \in R_q^\ell$ , the vectors  $x_{\text{high}} := \text{HighBits}(x, 2\gamma_2)$  and  $x_{\text{low}} := \text{LowBits}(x, 2\gamma_2)$  satisfy  $x = (2\gamma_2)x_{\text{high}} + x_{\text{low}}$ , and the polynomial coefficients in  $x_{\text{low}}$  are all from the set  $\{-\gamma_2, -\gamma_2 + 1, \dots, \gamma_2\}$ .

## 1.2 Known security results for Dilithium

The security analysis for Dilithium in [Bai+21] is based on three computational problems. The first two are standard problems (Definitions 1 and 2) but the third problem is non-standard (Definition 3). The first problem is the Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) problem. Assuming that a matrix  $A \in R_q^{m \times k}$  and short vectors  $s_1 \in S_\eta^k$  and  $s_2 \in S_\eta^m$  are chosen uniformly at random, the MLWE problem is to distinguish the matrix-vector pair  $(A, t := As_1 + s_2)$  from a uniformly random matrix-vector pair.

**Definition 1** (Module Learning with Errors (MLWE)). Let  $m, k, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$ . The advantage of an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving  $\text{MLWE}_{m,k,\eta}$  is defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{m,k,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{A}) := |\Pr[b = 0 \mid A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times k}, t \leftarrow R_q^m, b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(A, t)] - \Pr[b = 0 \mid A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times k}, (s_1, s_2) \leftarrow S_\eta^k \times S_\eta^m, t := As_1 + s_2, b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(A, t)]|. \quad (1)$$

Here, the notation  $\mathcal{A}(x)$  denotes  $\mathcal{A}$  taking input  $x$ . We note that the MLWE problem is often phrased in other contexts with the short vectors  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  coming from a Gaussian, rather than a uniform, distribution. The use of a uniform distribution is one of the particular features of CRYSTALS-Dilithium.

The second problem, MSIS, is concerned with finding short solutions to randomly chosen linear systems over  $R_q$ .

**Definition 2** (Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS)). Let  $m, k, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ . The advantage of an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving  $\text{MSIS}_{m,k,\gamma}$  is defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{m,k,\gamma}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr[[I_m | A] \cdot y = 0 \wedge 0 < \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma \mid A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times k}, y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(A)]. \quad (2)$$

The third problem is a more complex variant of MSIS that incorporates a hash function  $H$ .

**Definition 3** (SelfTargetMSIS). Let  $\tau, m, k, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ , where  $B_\tau \subseteq R_q$  is the set of polynomials with exactly  $\tau$  coefficients in  $\{-1, 1\}$  and all remaining coefficients zero. The advantage of an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving  $\text{SelfTargetMSIS}_{H,\tau,m,k,\gamma}$  is defined as<sup>1</sup>:

$$\text{Adv}_{H,\tau,m,k,\gamma}^{\text{SelfTargetMSIS}}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr\left[H([I_m | A] \cdot y \parallel M) = y_{m+k} \wedge \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma \mid A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times k}, (y, M) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{(H)}(A)\right]. \quad (3)$$

The security guarantee for CRYSTALS-Dilithium is given in [KLS18, Section 4.5] by the inequality<sup>2</sup>

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Dilithium}}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{k,l,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{B}) + \text{Adv}_{H,\tau,k,l+1,\zeta}^{\text{SelfTargetMSIS}}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{k,l,\zeta'}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{D}), \quad (4)$$

where all terms on the right-hand side of the inequality depend on parameters that specify Dilithium, and sEUF-CMA stands for strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks. The interpretation of Eq. (4) is: if there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that attacks the sEUF-CMA-security of Dilithium, then there exist quantum algorithms  $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}$  for MLWE, SelfTargetMSIS, and MSIS that have advantages satisfying Eq. (4) and run in time comparable to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Eq. (4) implies that breaking the sEUF-CMA security of Dilithium is at least as hard as solving one of the MLWE, MSIS, or SelfTargetMSIS problems. MLWE and MSIS are known to be no harder than LWE and SIS, respectively. However, there are no known attacks taking advantage of their module structure so it is generally believed that they are as hard as their unstructured counterparts [LS15]. In turn, LWE and SIS are at least as hard as the (Gap) Shortest Vector Problem, which is the underlying hard problem of lattice cryptography [Ajt96; Reg09; Pei16].

<sup>1</sup>  $\parallel$  denotes string concatenation.  $\mathcal{A}^{(H)}$  denotes  $\mathcal{A}$  with quantum query access to  $H$  — a formal definition can be found in Definition 4.

<sup>2</sup>Strictly speaking, there should be two other terms ( $\text{Adv}_{\text{Sam}}^{\text{PR}}(\mathcal{E})$  and  $2^{-\alpha+1}$ ) on the right-hand side of Eq. (4). However, we ignore them in the introduction as it is easy to set parameters such that these terms are very small. We also mention that the original proof of this inequality uses a flawed analysis of Fiat-Shamir with aborts. The flaw was found and fixed in [Bar+23; Dev+23].

However, the final problem, `SelfTargetMSIS`, is novel and so its difficulty is an open question. The problem is known to be as classically hard as `MSIS` since there exists a reduction from `MSIS` to `SelfTargetMSIS` in the ROM [KLS18; BN06]. The reduction uses the following “rewinding” argument. Any randomized algorithm can be specified by a deterministic circuit with auxiliary random bits. Therefore, given a randomized algorithm for `SelfTargetMSIS`, we can run its deterministic circuit with some randomly chosen bits to obtain one solution and then rewind and run it again using the same bits chosen from before, while at the same time reprogramming the random oracle at the query corresponding to the output of the first run, to obtain a second solution. Subtracting these two solutions to `SelfTargetMSIS` yields a solution to `MSIS`. However, the argument fails for the following reasons in the QROM (where a quantum algorithm can make queries in superposition to a quantum random oracle):

1. The randomness in a quantum algorithm includes the randomness of measurement outcomes. We cannot run a quantum algorithm twice and guarantee that the “random bits” will be the same in both runs because we cannot control measurement outcomes. More generally, we cannot rewind a quantum algorithm to a post-measurement state.
2. Since a quantum algorithm can make queries in superposition, it is no longer clear where to reprogram the random oracle.

Currently, the only explicit rigorous proof of Dilithium’s security based on conventional hardness assumptions [KLS18] requires modifying the parameters to be such that  $q = 5 \bmod 8$  and  $2\gamma < \sqrt{q/2}$  (but  $n$  must remain a power of 2), where  $\gamma$  is a length upper bound on vectors corresponding to valid signatures. This ensures that all non-zero vectors in  $S_{2\gamma}$  are invertible which equips Dilithium with a so-called “lossy mode”. This variant is called Dilithium-QROM. [KLS18] then proves that a signature scheme with such a lossy mode is EUF-CMA. However, the Dilithium specification [Bai+21] uses a value of  $q$  satisfying  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$  which is incompatible with the assumption that  $q = 5 \bmod 8$  and  $n > 2$  is a power of 2.<sup>3</sup> The fact that  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$  is central to claims about the speed of the algorithms in [Bai+21]: this condition implies that  $R_q$  is isomorphic to the direct product ring  $\mathbb{Z}_q^{\times n}$  (or  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  in shorthand) via the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT), which allows for fast matrix multiplication over  $R_q$ . Therefore, it is highly desirable to find a security proof that works under the assumption that  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$ . Moreover, when  $q = 5 \bmod 8$  (and  $n$  is a power of 2), the ring  $R_q$  is *structurally* different from when  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$ , since in the former case  $R_q$  is isomorphic to  $\mathbb{F}_{q^{n/2}} \times \mathbb{F}_{q^{n/2}}$  [LN17, Lemma 2.1]. Therefore, it may be imprudent to translate any claims of security in the case  $q = 5 \bmod 8$  to the case  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$ .

### 1.3 Overview of main result

The main result of our paper is the first proof of the computational hardness of the `SelfTargetMSIS` problem, presented in Section 3. This hardness result implies a new security proof for Dilithium which, unlike the previous proof in [KLS18], applies to the case  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$ . Specifically, we reduce MLWE to `SelfTargetMSIS`. By Eq. (4), our result implies that the security of Dilithium (with parameters that are not too far from the original parameters) can be based on the hardness of MLWE and `MSIS`.

**Theorem 1** (Informal version of Theorem 2). *Let  $m, k, \tau, \gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$ . Suppose  $q \geq 16$ ,  $q = 1 \bmod 2n$ , and  $2\gamma\eta n(m+k) < \lfloor q/32 \rfloor$ . If there exists an efficient quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that solves `SelfTargetMSIS` <sub>$H, \tau, m, k, \gamma$</sub>  with advantage  $\epsilon$ , under the assumption that  $H$  is a random oracle, then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm for solving `MLWE` <sub>$m+k, m, \eta$</sub>  with advantage at least  $\Omega(\epsilon^2/Q^4)$ . Here,  $Q$  denotes the number of quantum queries  $\mathcal{A}$  makes to  $H$ .*

We now give a high-level overview of the proof. The first step is to define two experiments: the *chosen-coordinate binding* experiment CCB and the *collapsing* experiment Collapse. These experiments are interactive protocols between a verifier and a prover. The protocols end with the verifier outputting a bit  $b$ . If  $b = 1$ , the prover is said to *win* the experiment. The reduction then proceeds in three steps: (i) reduce winning CCB to solving `SelfTargetMSIS`, (ii) reduce winning Collapse to winning CCB, and (iii) reduce solving MLWE to winning Collapse. Combining these steps together gives a reduction from MLWE to `SelfTargetMSIS`. The reduction can

<sup>3</sup>The parameter  $n$  should not be 1 or 2, as that would significantly degrade Dilithium’s efficiency and defeat the purpose of its use of  $R_q$ .

be illustrated as

$$\text{SelfTargetMSIS} \xleftarrow{(i)} \text{CCB} \xleftarrow{(ii)} \text{Collapse} \xleftarrow{(iii)} \text{MLWE}, \quad (5)$$

where the left arrow means “reduces to”.

**Step (i):**  $\text{SelfTargetMSIS} \leftarrow \text{CCB}$ . In the CCB experiment, the prover is first given a uniformly random  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$  which it uses to send the verifier some  $z \in R_q^m$ , the verifier then sends the prover a challenge  $c$  chosen uniformly at random from  $B_\tau$ , and finally the prover sends the verifier a response  $y \in R_q^l$ . The prover wins if  $Ay = z$ ,  $\|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ , and the last coordinate of  $y$  is  $c$ .

We directly apply the main result of [DFM20] to reduce winning CCB when  $l = m + k$  to solving  $\text{SelfTargetMSIS}_{H,\tau,m,k,\gamma}$  when  $H$  is a random oracle. In more detail, the result implies that an efficient algorithm that wins  $\text{SelfTargetMSIS}$  using  $Q$  queries with probability  $\epsilon$  can be used to construct another efficient algorithm that wins CCB with probability at least  $\Omega(\epsilon/Q^2)$ .

**Step (ii):**  $\text{CCB} \leftarrow \text{Collapse}$ . In the Collapse experiment, the prover is first given a uniformly random  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$  which it uses to send the verifier some  $z \in R_q^m$  together with a quantum state that must be supported only on  $y \in R_q^l$  such that  $Ay = z$ ,  $\|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ . Then, the verifier samples a uniformly random bit  $b'$ . If  $b' = 1$ , the verifier measures the quantum state in the computational basis, otherwise, it does nothing. The verifier then returns the quantum state to the prover. The prover responds by sending a bit  $b'$  to the verifier and wins if  $b' = b$ . The advantage of the prover is  $2p - 1$  where  $p$  is its winning probability.

By using techniques in [DS23; Unr16], we reduce winning Collapse to winning CCB. More specifically, we show that an efficient algorithm that wins CCB with advantage  $\epsilon$  can be used to construct another efficient algorithm that wins Collapse with advantage at least  $\epsilon(\epsilon - 1/|B_\tau|)$ , which is roughly  $\epsilon^2$  since  $1/|B_\tau|$  is very small for the values of  $\tau$  we will consider. We generalize techniques in [DS23; Unr16] to work for challenge sets of size  $> 2$ , which is necessary since the challenge set in the CCB experiment,  $B_\tau$ , generally has size  $> 2$ . The key idea of first applying the quantum algorithm for winning CCB to the uniform superposition of all challenges remains the same.

**Step (iii):**  $\text{Collapse} \leftarrow \text{MLWE}$ . We build on techniques in [LMZ23; LZ19] to reduce winning Collapse to winning MLWE. More specifically, we show that an efficient algorithm that wins Collapse with advantage  $\epsilon$  can be used to construct another efficient algorithm that solves  $\text{MLWE}_{l,m,n}$  with advantage at least  $\epsilon/4$ . Given a quantum state supported on  $y \in R_q^l$  with  $Ay = z$  and  $\|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ , as promised in the Collapse experiment, [LMZ23; LZ19] considers the following two measurements. Sample  $b \in R_q^l$  from one of the two distributions defined in MLWE (see Eq. (1)), compute a rounded version of  $b \cdot y$  in a separate register, and measure that register. When  $n = 1$ , [LMZ23] shows that the effect of the measurement in one case is close to the computational basis measurement and in the other case is close to doing nothing. Therefore, an algorithm for winning Collapse can be used to solve MLWE. Our work extends [LMZ23] to arbitrary  $n$  provided  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . The extension relies on the fact that each coefficient of  $b \cdot \Delta$ , where  $0 \neq \Delta \in R_q$  and  $b$  is chosen uniformly at random from  $R_q$ , is uniformly random in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . (This is despite the fact that  $b \cdot \Delta$  is generally not uniformly random in  $R_q$ .) We establish this fact using the explicit form of the isomorphism between  $R_q$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  when  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ .

Finally, in Section 4, we propose explicit sets of parameters using  $n = 512$  and  $q \approx 2^{43.5}$  such that  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . These sets of parameters achieve different security levels based on Theorem 1. We compare our sets of parameters with sets proposed by the Dilithium specifications [Bai+21] and the Dilithium-QROM construction of [KLS18]. We also compute the differences in the number of  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ -operations caused by using the NTT on  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$  for ring element multiplication compared to a Hybrid-NTT on  $q = 5 \pmod{8}$ . We find that our public key and signatures sizes are  $\approx 11.4\times$  and  $\approx 3.2\times$  larger, respectively, than the heuristically chosen parameters in the original Dilithium [Bai+21]. Compared to [KLS18], our parameters yield an increase in public key size and signature size of  $\approx 2.9\times$  and  $\approx 1.3\times$ , respectively, while yielding a significant decrease (because of the different structure of  $R_q$ ) in the number of  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ -operations used in key generation, signing, and verification.

Theorem 1 proves security for Dilithium in a range of parameters that preserves the algebraic structure of the original protocol [Bai+21]. Future work could explore how to optimize our approach to obtain provably secure parameters that are closer to those proposed in [Bai+21] for practical use. We also seek to generalize these results to other signature schemes that utilize the Fiat-Shamir transform.

## 2 Preliminaries

$\mathbb{N}$  denotes the set of positive integers. For  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $[k]$  denotes the set  $\{1, \dots, k\}$ . An alphabet refers to a finite non-empty set. Given an alphabet  $S$ , the notation  $s \leftarrow S$  denotes selecting an element  $s$  uniformly at random from  $S$ . Given two alphabets  $A$  and  $B$ , the notation  $B^A$  denotes the set of functions from  $A$  to  $B$ . We write the concatenation of arbitrary strings  $a, b$  as  $a \parallel b$ . Given matrices  $A_1, \dots, A_n$  of the same height,  $[A_1|A_2|\dots|A_n]$  denotes the matrix that consists of the  $A_i$  matrices placed side by side.  $\log$  refers to the base-2 logarithm.

We always reserve the symbol  $q$  for an odd prime and  $n$  for a positive integer that is a power of 2.  $R_q$  denotes the ring  $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$  (following the convention in other Dilithium literature [Bai+21; KLS18], we leave the  $n$ -dependence implicit). For  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , a primitive  $k$ th root of unity in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is an element  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  such that  $x^k = 1$  and  $x^j \neq 1$  for all  $j \in [k-1]$ ; such elements exist if and only if  $q = 1 \pmod k$ . Given  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , we define  $r \pmod{\pm q}$  to be the unique element  $r' \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $-(q-1)/2 \leq r' \leq (q-1)/2$  and  $r' = r \pmod q$ . For any  $r = a_0 + a_1X + \dots + a_{n-1}X^{n-1} \in R_q$ , we define  $|r|_i := |a_i \pmod{\pm q}|$  for all  $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$  and  $\|r\|_\infty := \max_i |r|_i$ . For  $r \in R_q^m$ , we define  $\|r\|_\infty := \max_{i \in [m]} \|r_i\|_\infty$ . For  $\eta \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $S_\eta$  denotes the set  $\{r \in R_q \mid \|r\|_\infty \leq \eta\}$ . For  $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $B_\tau$  denotes the set of all elements  $r \in R_q$  such that  $\|r\|_\infty = 1$  and  $r$  has exactly  $\tau$  nonzero coefficients. We note that  $|B_\tau| = 2^\tau \binom{n}{\tau}$ .

### 2.1 Quantum computation

A (quantum) state, or density matrix,  $\rho$  on  $\mathbb{C}^d$  is a positive semi-definite matrix in  $\mathbb{C}^{d \times d}$  with trace 1. A pure state is a state of rank 1. Since a pure state can be uniquely written as  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  where  $|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^d$  and  $\langle\psi| := |\psi\rangle^\dagger$ , we usually refer to a pure state by just  $|\psi\rangle$ . A (projective) measurement is a set  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_k\} \subseteq \mathbb{C}^{d \times d}$  such that  $\sum_{i=1}^k P_i = 1$  and the operators  $P_i$  satisfy  $P_i = P_i^\dagger = P_i^2$  and  $P_i P_j = 0$  for any  $j \neq i$ . The effect of performing such a measurement on a quantum state  $\rho$  is to produce the density matrix  $\sum_{i=1}^k P_i \rho P_i$ .

A register is either (i) an alphabet  $\Sigma$  or (ii) an  $m$ -tuple  $X = (Y_1, \dots, Y_m)$  where  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $Y_1, \dots, Y_m$  are alphabets.

Case (i) The size of the register is  $|\Sigma|$ , a density matrix on the register refers to a density matrix on  $\mathbb{C}^{|\Sigma|}$ , and the computational basis measurement on the register refers to the measurement  $\{|x\rangle\langle x| \mid x \in \Sigma\}$ , where  $|x\rangle$  denotes the vector in  $\mathbb{C}^{|\Sigma|} \cong \mathbb{C}^{|\Sigma|}$  that is 1 in the  $x$ th position and zero elsewhere.

Case (ii) The size of the register is  $|Y_1| \times \dots \times |Y_m|$ , a density matrix on the register refers to a density matrix on  $\mathbb{C}^{|Y_1|} \otimes \dots \otimes \mathbb{C}^{|Y_m|}$ , and the computational basis measurement on the register refers to the measurement  $\{|y_1\rangle\langle y_1| \otimes \dots \otimes |y_m\rangle\langle y_m| \mid y_1 \in Y_1, \dots, y_m \in Y_m\}$ .

A quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  is specified by a register  $X = (Y_1, \dots, Y_m)$  where  $|Y_i| = 2$  for all  $i$  and a sequence of elementary gates, i.e.,  $2^m \times 2^m$  unitary matrices that are of the form

$$T := \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\pi/4} \end{pmatrix}, \quad H := \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{or} \quad \text{CNOT} := \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad (6)$$

tensored with  $2 \times 2$  identity matrices.<sup>4</sup> The unitary matrix  $U$  associated with  $\mathcal{A}$  is the product of its elementary gates in sequence. The time complexity of  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ , is its number of elementary gates. To perform a computation given an input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^k$  where  $k \leq m$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  applies  $U$  to the starting state  $|\psi_0\rangle := |x_1 + 1\rangle \otimes \dots \otimes |x_k + 1\rangle \otimes |1\rangle^{\otimes (m-k)}$  and measures all registers in the computational basis. We also need the definition of a quantum *query* algorithm.

**Definition 4** (Quantum query algorithm). Let  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ . A quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  using  $t$  queries is specified by registers  $X, Y, Z$  and a sequence of  $t+1$  quantum algorithms  $\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_t$ , each with register  $(X, Y, Z)$ . The time complexity of  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ , is  $t + \sum_{i=0}^t \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_i)$ .

Let  $U_i$  denote the unitary associated with  $\mathcal{A}_i$ ,  $\gamma := |Y|$ , and  $\phi: Y \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_\gamma$  be a bijection. Given  $H: X \rightarrow Y$ , let  $O^H$  denote the unitary matrix defined by  $O^H |x\rangle |y\rangle |z\rangle = |x\rangle |\phi^{-1}(\phi(y) + \phi(H(x)))\rangle |z\rangle$  for all  $(x, y, z) \in X \times Y \times Z$ . Then:

<sup>4</sup>When we later consider a quantum algorithm on a register of size  $d \in \mathbb{N}$ , we mean a quantum algorithm on a register  $(Y_1, \dots, Y_m)$  where  $|Y_i| = 2$  for all  $i$  and  $m$  is the smallest integer such that  $2^m \geq d$ .

1.  $\mathcal{A}^{(H)}$  denotes the algorithm with register  $(X, Y, Z)$  that computes as follows. Apply  $U_0$  to the starting state  $|\psi_0\rangle$ . Then, for each  $i = 1, \dots, t$  in sequence, apply  $O^H$  then  $U_i$ . Finally, measure all registers in the computational basis.
2.  $\mathcal{A}^H$  denotes the algorithm with register  $(X, Y, Z)$  that computes as follows. Apply  $U_0$  to the starting state  $|\psi_0\rangle$ . Then, for each  $i = 1, \dots, t$  in sequence, measure register  $X$  in the computational basis and apply  $O^H$  then  $U_i$ . Finally, measure all registers in the computational basis.

In the definitions of  $\mathcal{A}^{(H)}$  and  $\mathcal{A}^H$ , we have described what it means for a quantum algorithm to make quantum and classical queries to a function  $H$ , respectively. Under this description, we can naturally define quantum query algorithms that make classical queries to one function and quantum queries to another. Such algorithms are relevant in the security definition of Dilithium as described in the next subsection.

## 2.2 Digital signature schemes

Let  $\text{par}$  be common system parameters shared by all participants. For  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  we define  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  as some function such that  $\text{negl}(\lambda) \leq 1/\eta^c$  for all constants  $c$  and large enough values of  $\lambda$ .

**Definition 5** (Digital signature scheme). A digital signature scheme is defined by a triple of randomized algorithms  $\text{SIG} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$  such that

1. The key generation algorithm  $\text{Gen}(\text{par})$  outputs a public-key, secret-key pair  $(pk, sk)$  such that  $pk$  defines the message set  $\text{MSet}$ .
2. The signing algorithm  $\text{Sign}(sk, m)$ , where  $m \in \text{MSet}$ , outputs a signature  $\sigma$ .
3. The verification algorithm  $\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma)$  outputs a single bit  $\{0, 1\}$ .

We say  $\text{SIG}$  has correctness error  $\gamma \geq 0$  if for all  $(pk, sk)$  in the support of  $\text{Gen}(\text{par})$  and all  $m \in \text{MSet}$ ,

$$\Pr[\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) = 0 \mid \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m)] \leq \gamma. \quad (7)$$

**Definition 6** (EUF-CMA and sEUF-CMA). Let  $\text{SIG} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$  be a signature scheme. Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a quantum query algorithm. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}}^{\text{EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &:= \Pr[\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) = 1, m \notin \text{SignQ} \mid (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{par}), (m, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}(pk)], \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &:= \Pr[\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) = 1, (m, \sigma) \notin \text{SignQR} \mid (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{par}), (m, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}(pk)], \end{aligned}$$

where  $\text{SignQ}$  is the set of queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  to  $\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)$  and  $\text{SignQR}$  is the set of query-response pairs  $\mathcal{A}$  sent to and received from  $\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)$ .

When  $\text{par}$  is a function of  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , we say that  $\text{SIG}$  is (s)EUF-CMA-secure if for every poly( $\lambda$ )-time quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , we have  $\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}}^{(\text{s})\text{EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .

In this paper, we use the definition of the Dilithium signature scheme as specified in [Bai+21]. In the concrete parameters section, Section 4, we adopt the same notation as in [Bai+21]. The definition of Dilithium involves a function  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$  that is classically accessible by its Sign and Verify algorithms. In the definitions of EUF-CMA and sEUF-CMA security of Dilithium, we assume that the quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  has classical query access to  $\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)$  and quantum query access to  $H$ . Our proof of Dilithium’s security will assume that  $H$  can be modeled by a random oracle.

## 2.3 Cryptographic problems and experiments

We now give the formal definitions of the chosen-coordinate binding and collapsing experiments mentioned in the introduction. More general versions of these definitions can be found in, e.g., [Unr12; DS23].

In Section 1.2 we defined the SelfTargetMSIS problem (Definition 3). Now we define a “plain” version of SelfTargetMSIS, where the input matrix is not given in Hermite Normal Form. First reducing SelfTargetMSIS from Plain-SelfTargetMSIS will be convenient later on.

**Definition 7** (Plain-SelfTargetMSIS). Let  $\tau, m, l, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ . The advantage of a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving Plain-SelfTargetMSIS $_{H, \tau, m, l, \gamma}$  is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{H, \tau, m, l, \gamma}^{\text{Plain-SelfTargetMSIS}}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr \left[ H(Ay \parallel M) = y_l \wedge \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma \mid A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times l}, (y, M) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{H}(A) \right]. \quad (8)$$

**Definition 8** (Chosen-Coordinate Binding (CCB)). Let  $\tau, m, l, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ . The advantage of a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  for winning CCB $_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$ , denoted  $\text{Adv}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}^{\text{CCB}}(\mathcal{A})$ , is defined as the probability that the experiment below outputs 1.

**Experiment CCB $_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$ .**

1. Sample  $A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times l}$ .
2.  $(z, T) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(A)$ , where  $z \in R_q^m$  and  $T$  is an arbitrary register.
3. Sample  $c \leftarrow B_\tau$ .
4.  $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(T, c)$ , where  $y \in R_q^l$ .
5. Output 1 if  $Ay = z$ ,  $\|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ , and  $y_l = c$ .

When  $\tau, m, l, \gamma$  are functions of  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , we say that the MSIS hash function is chosen-coordinate binding (CCB) if for every poly( $\lambda$ )-time quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}^{\text{CCB}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 1/|B_\tau| + \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .

**Definition 9** (Collapsing (Collapse)). Let  $m, l, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ . The advantage of a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  for winning Collapse $_{m, l, \gamma}$ , denoted  $\text{Adv}_{m, l, \gamma}^{\text{Collapse}}$ , is defined as  $2p - 1$  where  $p$  is the probability the experiment below outputs 1.

**Experiment Collapse $_{m, l, \gamma}$ .**

1. Sample  $A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times l}$ .
2.  $(Y, Z, T) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(A)$ , where  $Y$  is a register on  $R_q^l$ ,  $Z$  is a register on  $R_q^m$ , and  $T$  is an arbitrary register.
3. Sample  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 1$ , measure  $Y$  in the computational basis.
4.  $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(Y, Z, T)$ .
5. Output 1 if  $b' = b$ .

We say  $\mathcal{A}$  is valid if the state on the register  $(Y, Z)$  output by  $\mathcal{A}_1$  in step 2 is supported on elements  $(y, z) \in R_q^l \times R_q^m$  such that  $Ay = z$  and  $\|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ . When  $m, l, \gamma$  are functions of  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , we say that the MSIS hash function is collapsing if for every poly( $\lambda$ )-time quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{m, l, \gamma}^{\text{Collapse}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .

### 3 Security proof for SelfTargetMSIS

The main result of this subsection is the following theorem which follows from [Propositions 1 to 4](#).

**Theorem 2** (SelfTargetMSIS security). *Let  $m, k, \tau, \gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$ . Suppose  $q \geq 16$ ,  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ , and  $2\gamma\eta n(m+k) < \lfloor q/32 \rfloor$ . Suppose that there exists a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving SelfTargetMSIS $_{H, \tau, m, k, \gamma}$  using  $Q$  queries with expected advantage  $\epsilon$  over uniformly random<sup>5</sup>  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ . Then, for all  $w \in \mathbb{N}$ , there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that solves MLWE $_{m+k, m, \eta}$  with advantage at least*

$$\frac{\epsilon - nq^{-k}}{4(2Q + 1)^2} \left( \frac{\epsilon - nq^{-k}}{(2Q + 1)^2} - \frac{1}{|B_\tau|} \right) - \frac{1}{4} \frac{1}{3^w}. \quad (9)$$

Moreover,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + \text{poly}(\log |B_\tau|, w, n, \log q, m, k)$ .

<sup>5</sup>Let  $U \subset \{0, 1\}^*$  be the query set of  $\mathcal{A}$ , i.e., the finite subset of elements in  $\{0, 1\}^*$  that  $\mathcal{A}$  could possibly query (in particular  $|U| \leq 2^{O(\text{Time}(\mathcal{A}))}$ ). By uniformly random  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ , we mean that  $H$  restricted to domain  $U$  is uniformly random.

Assuming that the choice of parameters as functions of the security parameter  $\lambda$  is such that  $nq^{-k} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ ,  $1/|B_\tau| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , and  $w = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ , [Theorem 2](#) shows that the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  is roughly  $\Omega(\epsilon^2/Q^4)$ .

The proof of [Theorem 2](#) proceeds by the following sequence of reductions, which we have labeled by the number of the section in which they are proven:

$$\text{SelfTargetMSIS} \xleftarrow{3.2} \text{Plain-SelfTargetMSIS} \xleftarrow{3.3} \text{CCB} \xleftarrow{3.4} \text{Collapse} \xleftarrow{3.5} \text{MLWE}.$$

First, we establish some properties of  $R_q$  that will be used in [Sections 3.2](#) and [3.5](#).

### 3.1 Properties of $R_q$

**Lemma 1.** *Suppose  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . Let  $w$  be a primitive  $(2n)$ -th root of unity in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . Then for all  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $0 \neq |m| < n$ , the following equation holds in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ :  $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} w^{2mj} = 0$ .*

*Proof.* Consider the following equation in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ :  $(1 - w^{2m}) \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} w^{2mj} = 1 - w^{2mn} = 0$ , where the first equality uses a telescoping sum and the second uses  $w^{2n} = 1$ . But  $1 - w^{2m} \neq 0$  since  $0 \neq |m| < n$  and  $w$  is a primitive  $(2n)$ -th root of unity in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . Therefore, since  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is an integral domain when  $q$  is prime,  $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} w^{2mj} = 0$  as required.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.** *Suppose  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . Then,  $R_q \cong \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  as algebras over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .<sup>6</sup>*

*Proof.* For  $q$  prime, the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  of non-zero elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is cyclic. Let  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Let  $w := g^{(q-1)/(2n)}$ , which is well-defined since  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . Define the mapping  $\phi: R_q \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  by:

$$\phi(p(x)) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & w & \dots & w^{n-1} \\ 1 & w^3 & \dots & w^{3(n-1)} \\ \vdots & & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & w^{(2n-1)} & \dots & w^{(2n-1)(n-1)} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ \vdots \\ a_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (10)$$

where  $p(x) := a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1}$ . It is clear that  $\phi$  is a linear map. To see that  $\phi$  is homomorphic with respect to multiplication, observe that for any  $\tilde{p}(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$  such that  $p(x) = \tilde{p}(x) \pmod{(x^n + 1)}$ , we have

$$\phi(p(x)) = (\tilde{p}(w^1), \tilde{p}(w^3), \dots, \tilde{p}(w^{(2n-1)})), \quad (11)$$

since  $(w^{2k-1})^n + 1 = 0$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  for all  $k \in [n]$ .

To see that  $\phi$  is bijective, observe its explicit inverse  $\phi': \mathbb{Z}_q^n \rightarrow R_q$ , defined by

$$\phi'(c_0, \dots, c_{n-1}) = a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1}, \quad \text{where} \quad (12)$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ \vdots \\ a_{n-1} \end{pmatrix} := n^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ w^{-1} & w^{-3} & \dots & w^{-(2n-1)} \\ \vdots & & \ddots & \vdots \\ w^{-(n-1)} & w^{-3(n-1)} & \dots & w^{-(2n-1)(n-1)} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ \vdots \\ c_{n-1} \end{pmatrix} \quad (13)$$

and  $n^{-1}$  denotes the multiplicative inverse of  $n$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ , which exists since  $q = 1 \pmod{2n} \implies n < q$ . Since  $w$  is a primitive  $(2n)$ -th root of unity in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ , [Lemma 1](#) implies that the matrices corresponding to  $\phi$  and  $\phi'$  multiply to the identity in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . Therefore,  $\phi'$  is the inverse of  $\phi$ .  $\square$

### 3.2 Reduction from Plain-SelfTargetMSIS to SelfTargetMSIS

**Proposition 1.** *Suppose  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ . Let  $m, k, \gamma, \tau \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ . Suppose that there exists a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  using  $Q$  queries that solves  $\text{SelfTargetMSIS}_{H, \tau, m, k, \gamma}$  with advantage  $\epsilon$ , then there exists a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  using  $Q$  queries for solving  $\text{Plain-SelfTargetMSIS}_{H, \tau, m, m+k, \gamma}$  with advantage at least  $\epsilon - n/q^k$ . Moreover,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + O(n \log(q) \cdot mk \min(m, k))$ .*

<sup>6</sup>To be clear, the algebra  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  refers to the set  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  equipped with component-wise addition and multiplication, and scalar multiplication defined by  $\alpha \cdot (c_0, \dots, c_{n-1}) := (\alpha c_0, \dots, \alpha c_{n-1})$ , where  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $(c_0, \dots, c_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ .

*Proof.* The probability that a uniformly random  $B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (m+k)}$  has row-echelon form  $[I_m | B']$  (i.e., rank  $m$ ) is at least  $(1 - 1/q^k)$ . Therefore, by [Lemma 2](#), the probability that a uniformly random  $A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times (m+k)}$  does not have row-echelon form  $[I_m | A']$  is at most  $1 - (1 - 1/q^k)^n \leq n/q^k$ . When  $A$  has row-echelon form  $[I_m | A]$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  first performs row reduction and then runs  $\mathcal{A}$ . Since the time to perform row reduction on  $A$  is  $O(n \log(q) \cdot mk \min(m, k))$ , the proposition follows.  $\square$

### 3.3 Reduction from CCB to Plain-SelfTargetMSIS

Let  $S, U, C, R$  be alphabets,  $V: S \times U \times C \times R \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$  be a quantum algorithm. We define the  $\Sigma$ -experiment by:

<p><b><math>\Sigma</math>-experiment.</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <math>s \leftarrow S</math>.</li> <li>2. <math>(u, T) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1(s)</math>, where <math>u \in U</math> and <math>T</math> is an arbitrary register.</li> <li>3. <math>c \leftarrow C</math>.</li> <li>4. <math>r \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_2(T, c)</math>.</li> <li>5. Output 1 if <math>V(s, u, c, r) = 1</math>.</li> </ol>
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The advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  for winning the  $\Sigma$ -experiment is the probability of the experiment outputting 1.

In this subsection, we use the following theorem from [\[DFM20\]](#).

**Theorem 3** (Measure-and-reprogram [\[DFM20, Theorem 2\]](#)). *Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a quantum query algorithm using  $Q$  queries that takes input  $s \in S$  and outputs  $u \in U$  and  $r \in R$ . Then, there exists a two-stage quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$  (not using any queries) such that the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  in the  $\Sigma$ -experiment is at least*

$$\frac{1}{(2Q+1)^2} \Pr \left[ V(s, u, H(u), r) \mid H \leftarrow C^U, s \leftarrow S, (u, r) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{(H)}(s) \right]. \quad (14)$$

Moreover,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_1) + \text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_2) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ .

In the original statement of the theorem,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_1) + \text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_2)$  is upper bounded by  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) - Q + \text{poly}(Q, \log(|U|), \log(|C|))$ . (The  $-Q$  is because our definition of  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$  includes a  $+Q$  term.) The term  $\text{poly}(Q, \log(|U|), \log(|C|))$  accounts for the cost of instantiating  $Q$  queries to a  $2(Q+1)$ -wise independent hash function family from  $U$  to  $C$ . By the well-known Vandermonde matrix method (see, e.g., [\[Zha12, Section 6\]](#)), this cost can be upper bounded by  $O(Q^2 \cdot \log(|U|) \cdot \log(|C|))$ . However, we follow the convention in [\[KLS18, Section 2.1\]](#) and equate this cost to  $Q$  under the fair assumption that  $\mathcal{B}$ , like  $\mathcal{A}$ , can also query a random oracle at unit cost.

**Proposition 2.** *Let  $m, l, \gamma, \tau \in \mathbb{N}$ . Suppose there exists a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for solving Plain-SelfTargetMSIS $_{H, \tau, m, l, \gamma}$  using  $Q$  queries with expected advantage  $\epsilon$  over uniformly random  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow B_\tau$ . Then there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$  for winning CCB $_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  with advantage at least  $\epsilon/(2Q+1)^2$ . Moreover  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_1) + \text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_2) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ .*

*Proof.* The quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for Plain-SelfTargetMSIS $_{H, \tau, m, l, \gamma}$  takes input  $A$  and outputs  $(y, M)$ . So there exists another quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}'$  using  $Q$  queries that outputs  $((Ay \parallel M), y)$ .

The first part of the proposition follows from applying [Theorem 3](#) to  $\mathcal{A}'$  with the following parameter settings which make the  $\Sigma$ -experiment identical to the CCB $_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  experiment:

1. Set  $S = R_q^{m \times l}$ ,  $U$  to be the query set of  $\mathcal{A}'$ ,  $C = B_\tau$ , and  $R = R_q^l$ .
2. Set  $V: R_q^{m \times l} \times U \times B_\tau \times R_q^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  by

$$V(A, u, c, y) = \mathbb{1}[z = Ay, \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma, y_l = c], \quad (15)$$

where  $u \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is parsed as  $u = (z \parallel M)$  with  $z \in R_q^m$  and  $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .  $\square$

### 3.4 Reduction from Collapse to CCB

In this subsection, we will use the following lemma, which can be found as [DS23, Proposition 29].

**Lemma 3.** *Let  $P, Q$  be projectors in  $\mathbb{C}^{d \times d}$  and  $\rho$  be a density matrix in  $\mathbb{C}^d$  such that  $\rho Q = \rho$ . Then  $\text{tr}(QP\rho P) \geq \text{tr}(P\rho)^2$ .*

The following proposition is similar to [Unr16, Theorem 32] and [DS23, Theorem 28] except the size of the challenge set in the CCB experiment (in step 3 of Definition 8) is not restricted to being 2.

**Proposition 3.** *Let  $m, l, \gamma, \tau \in \mathbb{N}$ . Suppose that there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  that succeeds in  $\text{CCB}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  with advantage  $\epsilon$ , then there exists a valid quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$  that succeeds in  $\text{Collapse}_{m, l, \gamma}$  with advantage at least  $\epsilon(\epsilon - 1/|B_\tau|)$ . Moreover,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_1) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_1) + \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_2) + O(ml \log(q) \log(|B_\tau|))$  and  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_2) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_2) + O(\log(|B_\tau|))$ .*

*Proof.* We assume without loss of generality (wlog) that the arbitrary register in step 2 of the  $\text{CCB}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  experiment (Definition 8) is of the form  $(Y, T')$ , where  $Y$  is a register on  $R_q^l$  and  $T'$  is an arbitrary register. We assume wlog that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  prepares a state  $|\phi\rangle$  on register  $(Y, Z, T')$ , where  $Z$  is a register on  $R_q^m$ , and measures  $Z$  in the computational basis to produce the  $z$  in step 2 of the  $\text{CCB}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  experiment. We also assume wlog that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  acts on its input register  $(Y, T', C)$ , where  $C$  is a register on  $B_\tau$  that contains the  $c$  from step 3 of the  $\text{CCB}_{\tau, m, l, \gamma}$  experiment, as follows:

1. Apply a unitary  $U$  of the form  $\sum_{r \in B_\tau} U_r \otimes |r\rangle\langle r|$  on  $(Y, T', C)$ .
2. Measure  $Y$  in the computational basis.

We proceed to construct  $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$  for the  $\text{Collapse}_{m, l, \gamma}$  experiment (Definition 9). We first construct  $\mathcal{B}_1$ , given input  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$ , as follows:

1. Run  $\mathcal{A}_1(A)$  to prepare state  $|\phi\rangle$  on register  $(Y, Z, T')$ .
2. Prepare state  $|\psi\rangle := |B_\tau|^{-1/2} \sum_{r \in B_\tau} |r\rangle$  on register  $C$  in time  $O(\log(|B_\tau|))$ . The current state on register  $(Y, Z, T', C)$  is  $\sigma := |\phi\rangle\langle\phi| \otimes |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$ . Apply  $U$  on register  $(Y, T', C)$  and then measure register  $(Y, Z, T', C)$  with the projective measurement  $\{\Pi, 1 - \Pi\}$ , where  $\Pi$  is defined by

$$\Pi := \sum_{r \in B_\tau} \sum_{\substack{(y, z) \in R_q^l \times R_q^m : \\ \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma, Ay = z, y_i = r}} |y, z\rangle\langle y, z| \otimes 1_{T'} \otimes |r\rangle\langle r|. \quad (16)$$

This measurement can be implemented by computing a bit indicating whether the constraints defining  $\Pi$  are satisfied into a separate register and then measuring that register, which takes time  $O(ml \log(q) + \log(|B_\tau|))$ .

3. Let  $B$  be a bit register. If  $\Pi$  is measured, set the bit stored in  $B$  to 1. If  $(1 - \Pi)$  is measured, replace the state on register  $(Y, Z)$  with  $|0^l\rangle \otimes |0^m\rangle$ , set the bit stored in  $B$  to 0. Then output the register  $(Y, Z, T', C, B)$ .

Let  $T := (T', C, B)$ . We construct  $\mathcal{B}_2$ , given input register  $(Y, Z, T)$ :

1. If  $B$  contains 0, output a uniformly random bit  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ .
2. Else apply  $U^\dagger$  on register  $(Y, T', C)$ . Then measure  $C$  with the projective measurement  $\{|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, 1 - |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|\}$  using (the inverse of) the preparation circuit for  $|\psi\rangle$  in time  $O(\log(|B_\tau|))$ . If the outcome is  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$ , output 0; else output 1.

It is clear that  $\mathcal{B}$  is valid by definition. Moreover,

$$\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_1) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_1) + \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_2) + O(ml \log(q) \log(|B_\tau|)), \quad (17)$$

$$\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}_2) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_2) + O(\log(|B_\tau|)). \quad (18)$$

We proceed to lower bound the success probability of  $\mathcal{B}$ . We analyze the probabilities of the following disjoint cases corresponding to  $\mathcal{B}$  being successful.

1. Case 1: In this case,  $1 - \Pi$  is measured and  $b' = b$ . The probability that  $1 - \Pi$  is measured is  $(1 - \epsilon)$ . Conditioned on  $1 - \Pi$  being measured,  $b'$  is a uniformly random bit so the probability  $b' = b$  is  $1/2$ . Therefore, the overall probability of this case is  $(1 - \epsilon)/2$ .

2. Case 2: In this case,  $\Pi$  is measured,  $b = 1$ , and then  $1 - |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  is measured. The probability that  $\Pi$  is measured is  $\epsilon$  and the probability that  $b = 1$  is  $1/2$ . We now condition on these two events happening. Since  $b = 1$ , the state of register  $C$  in the input to  $\mathcal{B}_2$  is a mixture of states of the form  $|r\rangle\langle r|$  where  $r \in B_\tau$ . This is because  $b = 1$  means that register  $Y$  is measured in the computational basis and conditioned on  $\Pi$  being measured, the  $C$  register is also measured in the computational basis (see the form of  $\Pi$  in Eq. (16)). Therefore, the probability of  $\mathcal{B}_2$  measuring  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  is  $1/|B_\tau|$ . Therefore, the overall probability of this case is  $\epsilon \cdot (1/2) \cdot (1 - 1/|B_\tau|)$ .
3. Case 3: In this case,  $\Pi$  is measured,  $b = 0$ , and then  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  is measured. The probability that  $b = 0$  is  $1/2$ . Conditioned on  $b = 0$ , Lemma 3, applied with projectors  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  and  $U^\dagger\Pi U$  and state  $\sigma$ , shows that the probability of measuring  $\Pi$  and then  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  is least  $\epsilon^2$ . Therefore, the overall probability of this case is at least  $\epsilon^2/2$ .

Summing up the probabilities of the above cases, we see that the success probability of  $\mathcal{B}$  is at least

$$\frac{1-\epsilon}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\left(1 - \frac{1}{|B_\tau|}\right) + \frac{\epsilon^2}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\left(\epsilon - \frac{1}{|B_\tau|}\right). \quad (19)$$

Therefore, the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  is at least  $\epsilon(\epsilon - 1/|B_\tau|)$ , as required.  $\square$

### 3.5 Reduction from MLWE to Collapse

The proof structure of the main result of this subsection, Proposition 4, follows [LMZ23, Theorem 1]. We need to modify a number of aspects of their proof since it applies to the SIS hash function whereas here we consider its module variant, i.e., the MSIS hash function.

We will use a rounding function  $[\cdot]_t: \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, t-1\}$ , where  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , that is defined as follows. For  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, t-1\}$ , define

$$I_j := \begin{cases} \{j\lfloor q/t \rfloor, j\lfloor q/t \rfloor + 1, \dots, j\lfloor q/t \rfloor + \lfloor q/t \rfloor - 1\} & \text{if } j \in \{0, 1, \dots, t-2\}, \\ \{(t-1)\lfloor q/t \rfloor, (t-1)\lfloor q/t \rfloor + 1, \dots, q-1\} & \text{if } j = t-1. \end{cases} \quad (20)$$

(Note that  $I_j$  contains exactly  $\lfloor q/t \rfloor$  elements for  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, t-2\}$  and at least  $\lfloor q/t \rfloor$  elements for  $j = t-1$  with the constraint that  $q/t \leq |I_{t-1}| \leq q/t + t - 1$ .) Then, for  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , define  $[a]_t$  to be the unique  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, t-1\}$  such that  $a \in I_j$ .

We will also use the following convenient notation. Let  $Y$  and  $Z$  be registers and  $f: Y \rightarrow Z$ . The measurement  $y \mapsto f(y)$  on register  $Y$  refers to the measurement implemented by computing  $f(y)$  into a separate register  $Z$ , measuring  $Z$  in the computational basis, and discarding the result.

Finally, we will use the following lemma.

**Lemma 4.** *Let  $0 \neq \Delta \in R_q^l$  and  $\alpha \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ . If  $b \leftarrow R_q^l$ , then  $(b \cdot \Delta)_\alpha$  is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .*

*Proof.* Writing  $b = (b_1, \dots, b_l)$  and  $\Delta = (\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_l)$ , we have

$$(b \cdot \Delta)_\alpha = (b_1 \Delta_1)_\alpha + \dots + (b_l \Delta_l)_\alpha. \quad (21)$$

Since  $\Delta \neq 0$ , there exists an  $i \in [l]$  such that  $\Delta_i \neq 0$ . To prove the lemma, it suffices to prove that  $(b_i \Delta_i)_\alpha$  is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

Let  $\phi, \phi'$  be as defined in the proof of Lemma 2. Write  $\phi(\Delta_i) = (c_0, \dots, c_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . Since  $\Delta_i \neq 0$  there exists  $j \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$  such that  $c_j \neq 0$ . Since  $b_i$  is a uniformly random element of  $R_q$ ,  $\phi(b_i)$  is a uniformly random element of  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . Therefore, the distribution of  $(b_i \Delta_i)_\alpha = \phi'(\phi(b_i)\phi(\Delta_i))_\alpha$  (where we used Lemma 2 for the equality) is the same as the distribution of

$$\phi'(d_0 c_0, \dots, d_{n-1} c_{n-1})_\alpha, \quad \text{where } d_0, \dots, d_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q. \quad (22)$$

By the linearity of  $\phi'$ ,

$$\phi'(d_0 c_0, \dots, d_{n-1} c_{n-1})_\alpha = d_j c_j \phi'(e_j)_\alpha + \sum_{j' \neq j} d_{j'} c_{j'} \phi'(e_{j'})_\alpha, \quad (23)$$

where  $e_j$  denotes the  $j$ th standard basis vector of  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

But  $\phi'(e_j)_\alpha = n^{-1} \cdot w^{-(2j+1)\alpha} \neq 0$  (see Lemma 2). Therefore  $d_j c_j \phi'(e_j)_\alpha$  is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  if  $d_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ . Hence  $(b_i \Delta_i)_\alpha$  is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  as required.  $\square$

The main result of this subsection is the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** *Let  $m, l, \gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$ . Suppose  $q \geq 16$  and  $2\gamma\eta nl < \lfloor q/32 \rfloor$ . Suppose there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that succeeds in  $\text{Collapse}_{m,l,\gamma}$  with advantage  $\epsilon$ . Then, for all  $w \in \mathbb{N}$ , there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that solves  $\text{MLWE}_{l,m,\eta}$  with advantage at least  $(\epsilon - 3^{-w})/4$ . Moreover,  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + \text{poly}(w)$ .*

Before proving this proposition, we first prove two lemmas. Let  $Y$  be a register on  $R_q^l$  and  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$ . For  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , we define the following measurements on  $Y$ :

- $M_0$ : computational basis measurement.
- $M_1^t$ : sample  $e_1 \leftarrow S_\eta^m$ ,  $e_2 \leftarrow S_\eta^l$ , set  $b := e_1^\top A + e_2^\top \in R_q^l$ , sample  $s \leftarrow R_q$ , then perform measurement  $y \mapsto \lfloor (b \cdot y + s)_0 \rfloor_t$ .
- $M_2^t$ : sample  $b \leftarrow R_q^l$ ,  $s \leftarrow R_q$ , then perform measurement  $y \mapsto \lfloor (b \cdot y + s)_0 \rfloor_t$ .

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $t \in \mathbb{N}$  be such that  $2\gamma\eta nl < \lfloor q/t \rfloor$ . For all  $y, y' \in R_q^l$  with  $Ay = Ay'$  and  $\|y'\|_\infty, \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma$ ,*

$$M_1^t(|y\rangle\langle y'|) = \left(1 - \frac{t}{q} \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[\lfloor e \cdot (y - y') \rfloor_0 \mid e \leftarrow S_\eta^l\right]\right) |y\rangle\langle y'|. \quad (24)$$

*Proof.* We have

$$M_1^t(|y\rangle\langle y'|) = \Pr\left[\lfloor (b \cdot y + s)_0 \rfloor_t = \lfloor (b \cdot y' + s)_0 \rfloor_t \mid e_1 \leftarrow S_\eta^m, e_2 \leftarrow S_\eta^l, b := e_1^\top A + e_2^\top, s \leftarrow R_q\right] \cdot |y\rangle\langle y'|. \quad (25)$$

Writing  $z := Ay = Ay'$ , we have

$$b \cdot y + s = (e_1 \cdot z + s) + e_2 \cdot y \quad \text{and} \quad b \cdot y' + s = (e_1 \cdot z + s) + e_2 \cdot y'. \quad (26)$$

The result follows by observing that  $\lfloor e_2 \cdot (y - y') \rfloor_0 \leq \|e_2\|_\infty \cdot \|y - y'\|_\infty \cdot nl \leq 2\gamma\eta nl < \lfloor q/t \rfloor$  and  $(e_1 \cdot z + s)$  is a uniformly random element of  $R_q$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 6.** *Let  $t \in \mathbb{N}$  be such that  $t^2 \leq q$ . Then there exists  $0 \leq p_t \leq 2/t$  such that for all  $y, y' \in R_q^l$  with  $y' \neq y$ , we have*

$$M_2^t(|y\rangle\langle y|) = |y\rangle\langle y| \quad \text{and} \quad M_2^t(|y\rangle\langle y'|) = p_t |y\rangle\langle y'|. \quad (27)$$

*Proof.* The first equality is clearly true. For the second, observe that

$$M_2^t(|y\rangle\langle y'|) = \Pr[\lfloor (b \cdot y + s)_0 \rfloor_t = \lfloor (b \cdot y' + s)_0 \rfloor_t \mid b \leftarrow R_q^l, s \leftarrow R_q]. \quad (28)$$

Write  $y' = y + \Delta$  for some  $0 \neq \Delta \in R_q^l$ . Then,  $(b \cdot \Delta)_0$  is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  by [Lemma 4](#). Therefore, writing  $p_t := \Pr[\lfloor u \rfloor_t = \lfloor u + v \rfloor_t \mid u, v \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q]$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\lfloor (b \cdot y + s)_0 \rfloor_t = \lfloor (b \cdot y' + s)_0 \rfloor_t \mid b \leftarrow R_q^l, s \leftarrow R_q] \\ = p_t = 1 - \left( \frac{(t-1)\lfloor q/t \rfloor}{q} \cdot \frac{q - \lfloor q/t \rfloor}{q} + \frac{|I_{t-1}|}{q} \cdot \frac{q - |I_{t-1}|}{q} \right) \leq \frac{1}{t} + \frac{t}{q} \leq \frac{2}{t}, \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

where the last inequality uses  $t^2 \leq q$ .  $\square$

Combining [Lemmas 5](#) and [6](#) gives the following corollary.

**Corollary 1.** *Let  $t, d \in \mathbb{N}$  be such that  $2\gamma\eta nl < \lfloor q/(td) \rfloor$  and  $t^2 \leq q$ . Let  $\rho$  be a density matrix on register  $Y$ . Suppose there exists  $z \in R_q^m$  such that  $\rho$  is supported on  $\{y \in R_q^l \mid Ay = z, \|y\|_\infty \leq \gamma\}$ . Then*

$$M_1^t(\rho) = \frac{1}{d} M_1^{td}(\rho) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d}\right) \rho, \quad (30)$$

$$M_2^t(\rho) = \frac{1}{d} M_0(M_1^{td}(\rho)) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d} - p_t\right) M_0(\rho) + p_t \rho, \quad (31)$$

where  $p_t$  is as defined in [Lemma 6](#).

*Proof.* The first equality is immediate. The second equality follows from the observation that  $M_0(M_1^{td}(\rho)) = M_1^{td}(M_0(\rho))$  since  $M_0$  and  $M_1$  both act on  $\rho$  by entry-wise multiplication.  $\square$

Given the above lemmas, **Proposition 4** follows from the proof of [LMZ23, Theorem 1]. The high-level idea of the proof is that  $M_1^t$  is close to the identity operation while  $M_2^t$  is close to  $M_0$ . Therefore, if the identity operation can be efficiently distinguished from  $M_0$ , then  $M_1^t$  and  $M_2^t$  can be efficiently distinguished, which solves the MLWE problem. For completeness, we give the details below.

*Proof of Proposition 4.* Let  $t := 4$  and  $d := 8$  so that  $g := 1 - 1/d - p_t \geq 3/8$  and  $dg \geq 3$ , where  $p_t$  is as defined in **Lemma 6**. Let  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  be a valid algorithm for the  $\text{Collapse}_{m,l,\gamma}$  experiment (**Definition 9**) with advantage  $\epsilon$ .

Fix  $w \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$ . Let  $T := \sum_{j=0}^{w-1} (dg)^{-j}$  and let  $\mathcal{B}$  be the quantum algorithm defined on input  $b \in R_q^l$  as follows:

1. Create state  $\rho$  on register  $(Y, Z, T)$  by running  $\mathcal{A}_1(A)$ .
2. Sample  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, w-1\}$  with probability  $(dg)^{-j}/T$ .
3. Apply  $M_1^{td}$  to  $\rho$  on the  $Y$  register for  $j$  times. Call the resulting state  $\rho_j$ .
4. Sample  $s \leftarrow R_q$  and apply the measurement  $x \mapsto [(b \cdot x + s)_0]_t$  to  $\rho_j$  on the  $Y$  register to give state  $\rho'_j$ .
5. Compute bit  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$  by running  $\mathcal{A}_2(\rho'_j)$ .
6. Output  $b'$  if  $j$  is even and  $1 - b'$  if  $j$  is odd.

For  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, w-1\}$ , let  $\epsilon_j$  denote the signed distinguishing advantage of  $\mathcal{A}_2$  on inputs  $\rho_j$  versus  $M_0(\rho_j)$ , i.e.,  $\epsilon_j := \Pr[\mathcal{A}_2(\rho_j) = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}_2(M_0(\rho_j)) = 0]$ , and let  $\delta_j$  denote the signed distinguishing advantage of  $\mathcal{A}_2$  on inputs  $M_1^t(\rho_j)$  versus  $M_2^t(\rho_j)$ . Then the signed distinguishing advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  on input distributions  $[e_1 \leftarrow S_\eta^m, e_2 \leftarrow S_\eta^l, b := e_1^\top A + e_2^\top]$  versus  $[b^\top \leftarrow R_q^l]$  is

$$\delta := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{j=0}^{w-1} (-dg)^{-j} \delta_j, \quad (32)$$

because  $\rho'_j = M_1^t(\rho_j)$  if  $b$  is sampled according to  $[e_1 \leftarrow S_\eta^m, e_2 \leftarrow S_\eta^l, b := e_1^\top A + e_2^\top]$  and  $\rho'_j = M_2^t(\rho_j)$  if  $b$  is sampled according to  $[b^\top \leftarrow R_q^l]$ .

By **Corollary 1** (which applies by the assumptions in the proposition and the validity of  $\mathcal{A}$ ), we have  $\delta_j = \frac{1}{d}\epsilon_{j+1} + g\epsilon_j$  for all  $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, w-2\}$ . Therefore,

$$\epsilon_i (-dg)^{-i} = \epsilon_0 - \frac{1}{g} \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} (-dg)^{-j} \delta_j \quad \text{for all } i \in \{0, 1, \dots, w-1\}. \quad (33)$$

Then,

$$\delta = \frac{g}{T} (\epsilon_0 - \epsilon_w (-dg)^{-w}). \quad (34)$$

We now unfix  $A \in R_q^{m \times l}$  and take the expectation of **Eq. (34)** over  $A \leftarrow R_q^{m \times l}$  to see that

$$|\mathbb{E}_A[\delta]| = \frac{g}{T} \left| \mathbb{E}_A[\epsilon_0 - \epsilon_w (-dg)^{-w}] \right| \geq \left( g - \frac{1}{d} \right) (\epsilon - (dg)^{-w}) \geq \frac{1}{4} \left( \epsilon - \frac{1}{3w} \right), \quad (35)$$

where the first inequality uses  $T \leq dg/(dg-1)$ ,  $|\epsilon_w| \leq 1$ , and  $\epsilon = |\mathbb{E}_A[\epsilon_0]|$ .

Since  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + \text{poly}(w)$  and  $|\mathbb{E}_A[\delta]|$  is the advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  for solving  $\text{MLWE}_{l,m,\eta}$ , the proposition follows.  $\square$

## 4 Concrete parameters

In this section, we describe how to adjust the parameter settings of Dilithium using [Theorem 2](#) to achieve security levels comparable to those considered in the Dilithium specifications [\[Bai+21\]](#), Dilithium-QROM [\[KLS18\]](#), and the relevant NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) [\[NIST23, Appendix A\]](#).

We will use the same notation as in the Dilithium specification, [\[Bai+21\]](#). [\[Bai+21\]](#) specifies Dilithium in terms of the variables

$$q, n, k, l, H, \tau, d, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \eta, \beta. \quad (36)$$

Except for the variable  $d$ , these variables roughly specify Dilithium according to the simplified version given in [Fig. 1](#). The variable  $d$  specifies a further compression of the public key. To see how these variables precisely specify the full version of Dilithium, we refer the reader to [\[Bai+21\]](#).

The security analysis of CRYSTALS-Dilithium in [\[KLS18\]](#) leads to [\[KLS18, Eqs. \(10\) and \(11\)\]](#) which shows the following. Given a quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for breaking the sEUF-CMA-security of Dilithium, there exist quantum algorithms  $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E}$  and quantum query algorithm  $\mathcal{C}$  such that  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{C}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$  and  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{D}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$  with

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Dilithium}}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2^{-\alpha+1} + \text{Adv}_{k,l,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{B}) + \text{Adv}_{H,\tau,k,l+1,\zeta}^{\text{SelfTargetMSIS}}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{k,l,\zeta'}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{D}) + \text{Adv}_{\text{Sam}}^{\text{PR}}(\mathcal{E}) \quad (37)$$

where  $\zeta, \zeta'$  are functions of parameters  $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \beta, d, \tau$  defined as follows:

$$\zeta := \max(\gamma_1 - \beta, 2\gamma_2 + 1 + 2^{d-1}\tau) \quad \text{and} \quad \zeta' := \max(2(\gamma_1 - \beta), 4\gamma_2 + 2). \quad (38)$$

$\text{Adv}_{\text{Sam}}^{\text{PR}}(\mathcal{E})$  is the advantage of any algorithm distinguishing between the pseudorandom function used by Dilithium and a randomly selected function; and  $\alpha$  is a min-entropy term that can be bounded using [\[KLS18, Lemma C.1 of ePrint version\]](#) by

$$\alpha \geq \min\left(-n \log\left(\frac{2\gamma_1 + 1}{2\gamma_2 - 1}\right), -kl \log(n/q)\right). \quad (39)$$

In the QROM, we can construct an optimal pseudorandom function using a random oracle such that  $\text{Adv}_{\text{Sam}}^{\text{PR}}(\mathcal{E})$  is asymptotically negligible and can be neglected.

[Theorem 2](#) shows that the hardness of SelfTargetMSIS in the QROM is at least that of MLWE. Therefore, [Theorem 2](#) and [Eq. \(37\)](#) rigorously imply the asymptotic result that, under suitable choices of parameters as functions of the security parameter  $\lambda$ , if there are no poly( $\lambda$ )-time quantum algorithms that solve MLWE or MSIS then there is no poly( $\lambda$ )-time quantum algorithm that breaks the sEUF-CMA security of Dilithium. This is a very positive sign for the security of Dilithium as MSIS and MLWE are far better-studied problems and there is substantial support for the assumption that they are hard problems.

We proceed to give concrete estimates of the Core-SVP security of Dilithium under several choices of parameters using [Theorem 2](#) and [Eq. \(37\)](#). These estimates rely on some heuristic assumptions that we will clearly state. We remark that the concrete security estimates appearing in [\[KLS18; Bai+21\]](#) use similar heuristic assumptions.

We begin by dividing both sides of [Eq. \(37\)](#) by  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ . Using  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{C}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ , assuming the approximation in  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{D}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$  can be replaced by equality, and using our work's parameters in [Tables 2 to 4](#) for which  $\alpha \geq 257$ , we obtain

$$S(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2^{-256} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{B})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{H,\tau,k,l+1,\zeta}^{\text{SelfTargetMSIS}}(\mathcal{C})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{C})} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\zeta'}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{D})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{D})}, \quad (40)$$

where  $S(\mathcal{A}) := \text{Adv}_{\text{Dilithium}}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A})/\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ .

By [Theorem 2](#), for any  $\eta' \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $\eta' < \lfloor q/32 \rfloor / (2\zeta n(k+l+1))$ , there exists a quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{C}'$  for  $\text{MLWE}_{k+l+1,k,\eta'}$ , such that

$$S(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2^{-256} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{B})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{8Q^2 \sqrt{\text{Adv}_{k+l+1,k,\eta'}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{C}')}}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{C})} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\zeta'}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{D})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{D})}, \quad (41)$$

where  $Q$  is the number of queries  $\mathcal{C}$  uses and we assume that Eq. (9) is well-approximated by  $\epsilon^2/(64Q^4)$ , in particular, that  $\tau$  is sufficiently large.

Also by Theorem 2, we have  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{C}')$  is at most  $\text{Time}(\mathcal{C})$  plus polynomial terms. Heuristically assuming that we can neglect the polynomial terms and using  $Q \leq \text{Time}(\mathcal{C})$ , we obtain

$$S(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2^{-256} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\eta}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{B})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{B})} + 8Q^{3/2} \sqrt{\frac{\text{Adv}_{k+l+1,k,\eta'}^{\text{MLWE}}(\mathcal{C}')}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{C}')}} + \frac{\text{Adv}_{k,l,\zeta'}^{\text{MSIS}}(\mathcal{D})}{\text{Time}(\mathcal{D})}. \quad (42)$$

Now, for NIST security level  $l \in [5]$ , we upper bound  $Q$  by  $B_l$ , where  $B_l$  is given in Table 1.

NIST Security Level (SL $l$ )	SL1	SL2	SL3	SL4	SL5
Upper bound on $Q$ ( $B_l$ )	$2^{64}$	$2^{86}$	$2^{96}$	$2^{128}$	$2^{128}$

Table 1: Upper bounds on  $Q$  for NIST security levels 1 to 5. These numbers are based on [NIST23, Appendix A] together with well-known quantum query complexity results if we model the block ciphers and hash functions used in [NIST23, Appendix A] as random functions.<sup>7</sup>

From the third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (42), we see that the Quantum Core-SVP security of SelfTargetMSIS can be estimated by

$$\frac{z}{2} - \frac{3}{2} \log(B_l) - 3, \quad (43)$$

where  $z$  is the Quantum Core-SVP security of the associated MLWE problem.

Having reduced the sEUF-NMA security of Dilithium to the security of standard lattice problems MLWE and MSIS, we proceed to estimate their security. Following the analysis in the Dilithium specifications [Bai+21], we perform our security estimates via the Core-SVP methodology introduced in [Alk+16]. In the Core-SVP methodology, we consider attacks using the Block Khorkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm [SE94; CN11]. The BKZ algorithm with block size  $\mu \in \mathbb{N}$  works by making a small number of calls to an SVP solver on  $\mu$ -dimensional lattices. The Core-SVP methodology conservatively assumes that the run-time of the BKZ algorithm is equal to the cost of a single run of the SVP solver at its core. The latter cost is then estimated as  $2^{0.265\mu}$  since this is the cost of the best quantum SVP solver [Bai+21, Section C.1] due to Laarhoven [Laa16, Section 14.2.10]. Therefore, to estimate the security of an MLWE or MSIS problem, it suffices to estimate the smallest  $\mu \in \mathbb{N}$  such that BKZ with block-size  $\mu$  can solve the problem. Then we say  $0.265\mu$  is the *Quantum Core-SVP* security of the problem.

To describe how the block-size can be estimated, it is convenient to define the function  $\delta: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,

$$\delta(\mu) := \left( \frac{(\mu\pi)^{1/\mu} \mu}{2\pi e} \right)^{\frac{1}{2(\mu-1)}}. \quad (44)$$

## 4.1 Concrete security of MLWE

Our security analysis of MLWE generally follows the Dilithium specifications, [Bai+21, Appendix C.2]. For  $a, b, \epsilon \in \mathbb{N}$ , we first follow [Bai+21, Appendix C.2] and assume that  $\text{MLWE}_{a,b,\epsilon}$  is as hard as the Learning With Errors problem  $\text{LWE}_{na,nb,\epsilon}$ . Then, for  $a', b' \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\text{LWE}_{a',b',\epsilon}$  is defined to be the same as  $\text{MLWE}_{a',b',\epsilon}$  with  $n$  set to 1 so that  $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q$ .

Then, as done in [Bai+21, Appendix C.2], we follow the security analysis in [Alk+16]. [Alk+16] considers two attacks based on the BKZ algorithm, known as the primal attack and dual attack. The block-size is then taken as the minimum of the block-sizes for the primal and dual attacks. These attacks are analyzed as follows.

1. Primal attack [Alk+16, Section 6.3]. Let  $c := na + nb + 1$ . Then, to solve  $\text{LWE}_{na,nb,\epsilon}$ , we set the BKZ block-size  $\mu$  to be equal to the smallest integer  $\geq 50$  such that:<sup>8</sup>  $\xi\sqrt{\mu} \leq \delta(\mu)^{2\mu-c} \cdot q^{na/c}$ .
2. Dual attack [Alk+16, Section 6.4]. Let  $c' := na + nb$ . Then to solve  $\text{LWE}_{na,nb,\epsilon}$ , we set the BKZ block-size  $\mu$  to be equal to the smallest integer  $\geq 50$  such that  $-2\pi^2\tau(\mu)^2 \geq \ln(2^{-0.2075\mu/2})$ , where  $\tau(\mu) := \delta(\mu)^{c'-1} q^{nb/c'} \epsilon/q$ .

<sup>7</sup>Given a random function  $f: [N] \rightarrow [N]$ , the number of quantum queries to  $f$  needed to find a preimage of 1 is  $\Theta(N^{1/2})$  [Gro96] and the number of quantum queries to  $f$  needed to find a collision, i.e.,  $i \neq j$  such that  $f(i) = f(j)$ , is  $\Theta(N^{1/3})$  [Zha15]. (We ignore the constants hidden in the  $\Theta$ -notation; more detailed analysis is possible, see, e.g., [Jaq+20].)

<sup>8</sup>In [Alk+16, Section 6.3], the exponent on  $\delta(\mu)$  is given as  $2\mu - c - 1$ , but it was later corrected to  $2\mu - c$  by [Alb+17, Section 3.2]. There can be spurious solutions with  $0 < \mu < 50$  for which the approximations leading to the inequality break down.

## 4.2 Concrete security of MSIS

Our security analysis of MSIS uses heuristics in the Dilithium specifications [Bai+21, Appendix C.3] and [Lyu12] (which is in turn based on [MR09]).<sup>9</sup> For  $a, b, \xi \in \mathbb{N}$ , we first follow [Bai+21, Appendix C.3] and assume that  $\text{MSIS}_{a,b,\xi}$  is as hard as the Short Integer Solutions problem  $\text{SIS}_{na,nb,\xi}$ . Then, for  $a', b' \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\text{SIS}_{a',b',\xi}$  is defined to be the same as  $\text{MSIS}_{a',b',\xi}$  with  $n$  set to 1 so that  $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q$ . Following [Lyu12], we estimate the security of  $\text{SIS}_{na,nb,\xi}$ , by considering the attack that uses the BKZ algorithm with block-size  $\mu$  to find a short non-zero vector in the lattice

$$L(A) := \{y \in \mathbb{Z}^{na+nb} \mid [I_{na} \mid A] \cdot y = 0 \pmod{q}\}, \quad (45)$$

where  $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{na \times nb}$ . Following [Lyu12, Eq. (3) of ePrint version], the BKZ algorithm is expected to find a vector  $v \in L(A)$  of Euclidean length<sup>10</sup>

$$2^{2\sqrt{na \log(q) \log(\delta(\mu))}}. \quad (46)$$

We assume that the entries of  $v$  have the same magnitudes since a similar assumption is made in [Bai+21, Appendix C.3]. Then, to solve  $\text{SIS}_{na,nb,\xi}$ , we set the BKZ block-size  $\mu$  to be the smallest positive integer such that

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{na+nb}} \cdot 2^{2\sqrt{na \log(q) \log(\delta(\mu))}} \leq \xi. \quad (47)$$

## 4.3 Parameter sets for different security levels

To set Dilithium parameters, we also require  $q = 1 \pmod{2\gamma_2}$ ,  $q > 4\gamma_2$  (see [Bai+21, Lemma 1] or [KLS18, Lemma 4.1]), and  $\beta = \tau\eta$  (see [Bai+21, Table 2]). Moreover, we set parameters to minimize the following metrics [KLS18]:

1. the public key size in bytes:  $(nk(\lceil \log(q) \rceil - d) + 256)/8$ ;
2. the signature size in bytes:  $(nl\lceil \log(2\gamma_1) \rceil + nk + \tau(\log(n) + 1))/8$ ;
3. the expected number of repeats to sign a message:  $\exp(n\beta(\frac{l}{\gamma_1} + \frac{k}{\gamma_2}))$ .

In Tables 2 to 4, we give parameter sets achieving different levels of security that we calculated using the methodology described above. In all tables, we use:

$$q_0 := 12439554041857 = 2^{11} \cdot 3 \cdot 19 \cdot 1447 \cdot 73643 + 1 \approx 2^{43.5}. \quad (48)$$

In particular,  $q_0 = 1 \pmod{2n}$ .

Having established our attack model, we quantify the security provided by the proposed parameter sets for both Dilithium [Bai+21] and Dilithium-QROM [KLS18] using our model in Tables 2 and 3. In those tables, we also provide new parameter sets that guarantee the same security if we analyzed the security of SelfTargetMSIS using Theorem 2, in particular, Eq. (43). The new parameter sets are chosen in a way that minimizes their corresponding public key and signature sizes, as well as the expected number of repeats in Sign. In Table 4, we provide our recommended parameter sets at the five security levels specified by NIST.<sup>11</sup>

Compared to the original Dilithium at “SL3”, we find an increase in public key size of  $\approx 11.4\times$  and an increase in signature size of  $\approx 3.2\times$  [Bai+21]. However, our results are provably secure based on conventional hardness assumptions for the MSIS and MLWE problems, whereas Dilithium must also assume that SelfTargetMSIS is hard for the parameters that they set. (See the discussion in Section 1.2.) Therefore, the main advantage of our parameters compared to Dilithium is that ours are based on rigorous reductions from hard lattice problems, whereas Dilithium’s are based on highly heuristic reductions. We note that the heuristic reduction from SelfTargetMSIS to (a variant of) MSIS given in [Bai+21, End of Section 6.2.1] has been recently challenged [Wan+22].

<sup>9</sup>We were unable to completely reuse the analysis in [Bai+21, Section C.3] as it is not completely described. Comparing the estimates for  $\mu$  obtained by the method here with that in [Bai+21, Table 1], we find our estimates are consistently around 4/5 times that given in [Bai+21, Table 1]. Therefore, our estimates underestimate the security of MSIS compared to [Bai+21].

<sup>10</sup>Compared to [Lyu12, Eq. (3) of ePrint version], we do not take the min of Eq. (46) with  $q$  since “trivial” vectors of the form  $q$  times a standard basis vector have too large of an infinity-norm to be a solution to  $\text{SIS}_{na,nb,\xi}$  when  $\xi < q$ , as will be the case for our parameter choices.

<sup>11</sup>The headings “SL” appearing in Table 2 follow the headings used in [Bai+21, Table 2]. Under our attack model, they do not exactly correspond to the desired security of NIST’s SL. This explains the need for Table 4 and why Table 4 differs from Table 2.

	Dilithium [Bai+21]			Our work		
	SL2	SL3	SL5	SL2	SL3	SL5
$q$	$2^{23} - 8191$	$2^{23} - 8191$	$2^{23} - 8191$	$q_0$	$q_0$	$q_0$
$n$	256	256	256	512	512	512
$(k, l)$	(4, 4)	(6, 5)	(8, 7)	(10, 4)	(12, 8)	(16, 13)
$d$	13	13	13	15	15	15
$\tau$	39	49	60	40	40	40
$\gamma_1$	$2^{17}$	$2^{19}$	$2^{19}$	220929	370432	555648
$\gamma_2$	95232	261888	261888	441858	740864	1111296
$\zeta$	350209	724481	769537	1539077	2137089	2877953
$\zeta'$	380930	1048184	1048336	1767434	2963458	4445186
$\eta$	2	4		2	2	2
$\eta'$	N/A	N/A	N/A	8	4	2
$pk$ size (bytes)	1312	1952	2592	18592	22304	29728
$\sigma$ size (bytes)	2476	3448	4804	5554	11058	18546
Expected Repeats	4.25	5.10	3.85	5.30	4.70	4.70
LWE BKZ Block-Size	448	669	911	605	1205	2111
Quantum Core-SVP	118	177	241	160	319	559
“SelfTargetMSIS” BKZ Block-Size	N/A	N/A	N/A	1753	2177	3025
Quantum Core-SVP	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	141	205
SIS BKZ Block-Size	363	533	773	4942	5644	7423
Quantum Core-SVP	96	141	204	1309	1495	1967

Table 2: We give parameter sets that matches the quantized security of those proposed in the Dilithium specifications [Bai+21].  $q_0$  is defined in Eq. (48). The “SelfTargetMSIS” block-size should be understood as the block-size of the LWE problem reduced to via Theorem 2 and Section 4.1.

Compared to Dilithium-QROM at its recommended security level, we find an increase in public key size of  $\approx 2.9\times$  and an increase in signature size of  $\approx 1.3\times$  [KLS18]. However, while both parameter sets produce schemes that can be proven secure under the assumptions that MSIS and MLWE are hard, our parameter sets allow the use of the NTT and are therefore more efficient to implement than those of Dilithium-QROM. We analyze this difference in greater detail below.

The main reason why we must increase the public key and signature sizes is due to the loss in the reduction from MLWE to SelfTargetMSIS, as stated in Theorem 2. Concretely, the loss manifests as Eq. (43), which we used to calculate the Quantum Core-SVP numbers for the SelfTargetMSIS-based MLWE problem. An interesting open question is to understand whether this loss is intrinsic.

Next, we quantitatively compare the efficiency of ring multiplication for the parameter sets in Table 3. Our work uses  $q = q_0$  and  $n = 512$ . Since  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ , we can multiply two elements in  $R_q$  using the NTT, which uses  $\frac{3}{2}n \log(n) + 2n = 7936$  multiplications in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $3n \log(n) = 13824$  additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  [Lia+21, Section 2.2].

Dilithium-QROM uses a  $q$  such that  $q = 5 \pmod{8}$  and we can no longer use the NTT to multiply elements in  $R_q$ . Instead, we consider the Hybrid-NTT (H-NTT) [Lia+21, Section 5]. When  $q = 1 \pmod{(n/2^{\alpha+\beta-1})}$ , where  $\alpha, \beta$  are non-negative integer parameters, and  $n$  is a power of 2, H-NTT can multiply two elements in  $R_q$  using

$$\frac{3}{2}n \log(n) + \left(3 \cdot 2^{\alpha+\beta-3} + 2^{\alpha-2} + 3 \cdot 2^{\beta-3} + 2^{\alpha-\beta-2} - \frac{3}{2}(\alpha + \beta) + \frac{5}{4}\right)n \quad (49)$$

multiplications in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ , and

$$3n \log(n) + \left(5 \cdot 2^{\alpha+\beta-2} + 5 \cdot 2^{\beta-2} + 5 \cdot 2^{\alpha-2} - 3(\alpha + \beta) - \frac{15}{4}\right)n \quad (50)$$

additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . Dilithium-QROM uses  $q = 2^{45} - 21283$  and  $n = 512$  so the condition  $q = 1 \pmod{(n/2^{\alpha+\beta-1})}$  requires  $\alpha + \beta \in \{8, 9, 10\}$ .<sup>12</sup> The number of multiplications and additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is minimized by setting  $\alpha = \beta = 4$ . Therefore, H-NTT uses  $\frac{3}{2}n \log(n) + 95.5n = 55808$  multiplications and  $3n \log(n) + 332.25n = 183936$  additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  per ring element multiplication.

We proceed to count the number of ring element multiplications and additions used by Dilithium’s algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) when Sign involves  $r \in \mathbb{N}$  repeats. For the count, we use the simplified descriptions of these

<sup>12</sup>Note that  $2^{\alpha+\beta-1}$  needs to be  $n$ ,  $n/2$ , or  $n/4$  for  $q = 1 \pmod{(n/2^{\alpha+\beta-1})}$  to be compatible with  $q = 5 \pmod{8}$ . This means H-NTT would use  $\Omega(n^2)$  multiplications and additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  when multiplying elements of  $R_q$  in Dilithium-QROM.

	Dilithium-QROM [KLS18]		Our work	
	recommended	very high	recommended	very high
$q$	$2^{45} - 21283$	$2^{45} - 21283$	$q_0$	$q_0$
$n$	512	512	512	512
$(k, l)$	(4, 4)	(5, 5)	(12, 5)	(13, 8)
$d$	15	15	15	15
$\tau$	46	46	40	40
$\gamma_1$	905679	905679	279949	370432
$\gamma_2$	905679	905679	555648	740864
$\zeta$	2565023	2565023	1766657	2137089
$\zeta'$	3622718	3622718	2222594	2963458
$\eta$	7	3	2	2
$\eta'$	N/A	N/A	5	4
$pk$ size (bytes)	7712	9632	22304	24160
$\sigma$ size (bytes)	5690	7098	7218	11122
Expected Repeats	4.29	2.18	5.03	4.97
LWE BKZ Block-Size	499	620	794	1232
Quantum Core-SVP	132	164	210	326
“SelfTargetMSIS” BKZ Block-Size	N/A	N/A	2118	2374
Quantum Core-SVP	N/A	N/A	133	167
SIS BKZ Block-Size	N/A	N/A	5910	6197
Quantum Core-SVP	N/A	N/A	1566	1642

Table 3: We give parameter sets that match the quantized security of those proposed in Dilithium-QROM [KLS18].  $q_0$  is defined in Eq. (48). In the “Our work” columns, we assume  $Q$  is bounded by  $2^{96}$ , which corresponds to NIST Security Level 3. The “SelfTargetMSIS” block-size should be understood as the block-size of the LWE problem reduced to via Theorem 2 and Section 4.1.

algorithms given in Fig. 1.

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{Multiplications} & \text{Gen: } kl, \quad \text{Sign: } (kl + k + l)r, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Verify: } kl + k \\
 \text{Additions} & \text{Gen: } kl, \quad \text{Sign: } (kl + l)r, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Verify: } kl
 \end{array}$$

Note that adding two ring elements requires  $n$  additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

Now, in Table 5, we compare the number of multiplications and additions in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  used by Dilithium when instantiated with the parameter sets in Table 3.

Table 5 shows that Dilithium-QROM at its recommended security level would require approximately the following increases in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ -operation counts when compared to our work:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{Multiplications} & \text{Gen: } 1.9\times, \quad \text{Sign: } 1.9\times, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Verify: } 2.0\times \\
 \text{Additions} & \text{Gen: } 3.4\times, \quad \text{Sign: } 3.4\times, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Verify: } 3.6\times
 \end{array}$$

We therefore identify a cost-benefit trade-off between the two provably secure formulations of Dilithium, our work and Dilithium-QROM, at the recommended security level. Our work’s public key and signature sizes are  $2.9\times$  and  $1.3\times$  larger than Dilithium-QROM’s, respectively. However, our scheme requires  $1.9\times$  to  $3.6\times$  fewer  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ -operations to implement. Moreover, unlike Dilithium-QROM, our work proves security on Dilithium’s native ring where  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$ .

We make a final remark on the concrete security analysis of our work as well as those originally done for Dilithium and Dilithium-QROM: no analysis accounts rigorously for potential differences in the hardness between LWE with a uniform error distribution and SIS under the  $\ell_\infty$  norm as compared to the better-studied versions of these problems which employ a Gaussian error distribution and the  $\ell_2$  norm, respectively. However, the hardness of the former problems is comparable to the hardness of the latter problems over parameter regimes that are polynomially related in the security parameter [Pei07; MP13]. Therefore, like the original analyses of Dilithium and Dilithium-QROM, we assume that the differences in hardness are not significant enough to seriously threaten security.

	SL1	SL2	SL3	SL4/5
$q$	$q_0$	$q_0$	$q_0$	$q_0$
$n$	512	512	512	512
$(k, l)$	(7, 7)	(9, 9)	(10, 10)	(13, 13)
$d$	15	15	15	15
$\tau$	40	40	40	40
$\gamma_1$	277824	329916	370432	555648
$\gamma_2$	555648	659832	740864	1111296
$\zeta$	1766657	1975025	2137089	2877953
$\zeta'$	2222594	2639330	2963458	4445186
$\eta$	2	2	2	2
$\eta'$	7	5	4	2
$pk$ size (bytes)	13024	16736	18592	24160
$\sigma$ size (bytes)	9458	12146	13490	18354
Expected Repeats	4.70	5.34	5.25	4.21
LWE BKZ Block-Size	967	1325	1509	2079
Quantum Core-SVP	256	351	399	550
“SelfTargetMSIS” BKZ Block-Size	1252	1665	1866	2454
Quantum Core-SVP	66	88	100	130
SIS BKZ Block-Size	3100	4064	4525	5822
Quantum Core-SVP	821	1076	1199	1542

Table 4: We give parameter sets that most closely match the security levels requested by NIST [NIST23, Appendix A].  $q_0$  is defined in Eq. (48). The “SelfTargetMSIS” block-size should be understood as the block-size of the LWE problem reduced to via Theorem 2 and Section 4.1.

	Dilithium-QROM [KLS18]		Our work	
	recommended	very high	recommended	very high
Multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}_q$				
Gen	892928	1395200	476160	825344
Sign	5745992	4258150	3073692	4930240
Verify	1116160	1674240	571392	928512
Additions in $\mathbb{Z}_q$				
Gen	2951168	4611200	860160	1490944
Sign	18981980	14067802	5521572	8873160
Verify	3686912	5530880	1026048	1670656

Table 5: The number of  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  additions and  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  multiplications required to implement the ring operations performed by the Gen, Sign, and Verify algorithms of Dilithium. These numbers are calculated using the parameters in Table 3 and the analysis from [Lia+21].

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