Paper 2025/466

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Small-Scale Variants of Stream Cipher E0

Jan Dolejš, Czech Technical University in Prague
Martin Jureček, Czech Technical University in Prague
Abstract

This study explores the algebraic cryptanalysis of small-scale variants of the E0 stream cipher, a legacy cipher used in the Bluetooth protocol. By systematically reducing the size of the linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) while preserving the cipher’s core structure, we investigate the relationship between the number of unknowns and the number of consecutive keystream bits required to recover the internal states of the LFSRs. Our work demonstrates an approximately linear relationship between the number of consecutive keystream bits and the size of small-scale E0 variants, as indicated by our experimental results. To this end, we utilize two approaches: the computation of Gröbner bases using Magma’s F4 algorithm and the application of CryptoMiniSat’s SAT solver. Our experimental results show that increasing the number of keystream bits significantly improves computational efficiency, with the F4 algorithm achieving a speedup of up to 733× when additional equations are supplied. Furthermore, we verify the non-existence of equations of degree four or lower for up to seven consecutive keystream bits, and the non-existence of equations of degree three or lower for up to eight consecutive keystream bits, extending prior results on the algebraic properties of E0.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
E0small-scale variantsstream cipheralgebraic cryptanalysisGröbner basesSAT
Contact author(s)
dolejj13 @ fit cvut cz
martin jurecek @ fit cvut cz
History
2025-03-13: approved
2025-03-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/466
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/466,
      author = {Jan Dolejš and Martin Jureček},
      title = {Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Small-Scale Variants of Stream Cipher E0},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/466},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/466}
}
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