Paper 2025/494
Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis of PRESENT Lightweight Cipher
Abstract
Side-channel vulnerabilities pose an increasing threat to cryptographically protected devices. Consequently, it is crucial to observe information leakages through physical parameters such as power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiation to reduce susceptibility during interactions with cryptographic functions. EM side-channel attacks are becoming more prevalent. PRESENT is a promising lightweight cryptographic algorithm expected to be incorporated into Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices in the future. This research investigates the EM side-channel robustness of PRESENT using a correlation attack model. This work extends our previous Correlation EM Analysis (CEMA) of PRESENT with improved results. The attack targets the Substitution box (S-box) and can retrieve 8 bytes of the 10-byte encryption key with a minimum of 256 EM waveforms. This paper presents the process of EM attack modelling, encompassing both simple and correlation attacks, followed by a critical analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Electromagnetic side-channel analysisSEMACEMAPRESENTcryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
-
N Gunathilake @ napier ac uk
o lo @ napier ac uk
b buchanan @ napier ac uk
A Al-Dubai @ napier ac uk - History
- 2025-03-17: approved
- 2025-03-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/494
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/494,
author = {Nilupulee A Gunathilake and Owen Lo and William J Buchanan and Ahmed Al-Dubai},
title = {Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis of {PRESENT} Lightweight Cipher},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/494},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/494}
}