Paper 2025/495

A Security-Enhanced Pairing-Free Certificateless Aggregate Signature for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, Revisited

Zhengjun Cao
Lihua Liu
Abstract

We show that the aggregate signature scheme [IEEE Syst. J., 2023, 17(3), 3822-3833] is insecure against forgery attack. This flaw is due to that the ephemeral key or ephemeral value chosen in the signing phase is not indeed bound to the final signature. An adversary can sign any message while the verifier cannot find the fraud. We also suggest a revising method to frustrate this attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Certificateless public keyaggregate signatureforgery attackvehicular ad-hoc networkephemeral key.
Contact author(s)
liulh @ shmtu edu cn
History
2025-03-17: approved
2025-03-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/495
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/495,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A Security-Enhanced Pairing-Free Certificateless Aggregate Signature for  Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/495},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/495}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.