Paper 2026/1477

PERSEPHONE: Zero-Knowledge Multiplicative Non-Negative Proof for Sequential Private Range Verification

Ivan Tjuawinata, Nanyang Technological University
Yann Fraboni, Ant International, Ant Group
Jun Jie Sim, Ant International, Ant Group
Darian Gunamardi, Nanyang Technological University
Zhenghao Wu, Ant International, Ant Group
Hasventhran Baskaran, Ant International
Chi-Hung Chi, Nanyang Technological University
Yujing Sun, Nanyang Technological University
Pu Duan, Ant International, Ant Group
Kwok-Yan Lam, Nanyang Technological University
Abstract

Privacy is a fundamental requirement of modern digital payment systems, which process highly sensitive financial data, including account balances and transaction amounts. Unauthorized disclosure of this information can compromise users’ financial privacy and expose them to fraud or other forms of financial abuse. A key challenge in this setting is to verify that a payment amount does not exceed the payer’s available balance without revealing either the payment amount or the balance. A common approach is to employ zero-knowledge range proofs (ZKRPs). However, because conventional ZKRPs require public bounds, verifying a private value against private bounds requires multiple ZKRP instances, resulting in substantial computational and communication overhead that can increase latency and lead to cascading failures at scale. Motivated by the sequential nature of transactions in real-world payment systems, we formalize the problem of Sequential Private Range Verification (SPRV) and propose a framework, Persephone, that exploits the sequential structure of linked verifications rather than treating each verification independently. Within Persephone, we design and leverage a novel zero-knowledge proof primitive, ZK-MultNNP, to solve SPRV efficiently. Experimental results demonstrate that Persephone reduces total proving time by at least 3× compared to a ZKRP-based baseline. Furthermore, in a digital payment scenario, Persephone completes all transaction verifications within the 400 ms Doherty threshold, compared to only 30% of verifications for the ZKRP-based baseline.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Zero-knowledge proofPedersen Commitment Scheme
Contact author(s)
ivan tjuawinata @ ntu edu sg
yann fraboni @ ant-intl com
junjie sim @ ant-intl com
darian gunamardi @ ntu edu sg
wuzhenghao wzh @ ant-intl com
hasventhran baskaran @ ntu edu sg
chihung chi @ ntu edu sg
yujing sun @ ntu edu sg
p duan @ ant-intl com
kwokyan lam @ ntu edu sg
History
2026-08-31: revised
2026-07-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1477
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1477,
      author = {Ivan Tjuawinata and Yann Fraboni and Jun Jie Sim and Darian Gunamardi and Zhenghao Wu and Hasventhran Baskaran and Chi-Hung Chi and Yujing Sun and Pu Duan and Kwok-Yan Lam},
      title = {{PERSEPHONE}: Zero-Knowledge Multiplicative Non-Negative Proof for Sequential Private Range Verification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1477},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1477}
}
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