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Source changed 2026-11-18 21:11:39 UTC · snapshot created 2026-11-18 21:12:35 UTC · last check 2026-11-18 22:15:20 UTC

ECO.5:11 - SoTA-Echoing

Akerlof (1970), §IV identifies guarantees as one possible response to hidden quality. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), §I.1, I.3 and I.6 examine how participants select from offered contracts. A contract intended for one type is also available to another, so evaluate both types’ choices. We adapt that comparison to the private-fact case. An insurance-market equilibrium result would require its own applicability grounds in procurement.

Holmström (1979), §2 and concluding remarks examines contract choice subject to participation and the participant’s choice of action, including information and risk sharing. The examples here use finite choices and risk-neutral participants to construct feasible terms. The paper’s risk-averse optimization problem has different assumptions.

An ordinary contract with direct observation can suffice when observation is informative and affordable. When observation is costly or incomplete, compare what feasible terms would induce under the stated conditions. Establish legal enforceability or field performance on the grounds those further claims require. Reassess the affected conclusion when participation, available actions, signal quality or enforcement changes.