FIN.10:5 - Archetypal Grounding
Two constructed one-year offers finance a net need of 100. A charges 8% interest on face value and withholds an issue fee of 2% of face value. B charges 9% and no fee. Assume no other cost, tax difference or contingent term and that A permits the necessary larger face amount. Under A the borrower must issue debt with face value 100/0.98 = 102.04 and repay 102.04×1.08 = 110.20. Its effective cost is 1.08/0.98−1 = 10.20%. Under B the borrower receives 100 and repays 109, so B is cheaper for this need despite its higher headline rate. If A is capped at face value 100, its net proceeds of 98 do not meet the need at all.
FIN.10:5.1 - The same rate can provide different payment capacity
A separate corporation must pay 100 for an investment now and retain its existing cash reserve of 10. Two loan offers each deliver 100 net now, with no fees, tax differences or other restrictions. Both charge 10% annually on outstanding principal. Loan A repays 50 of principal at each year end; its payments are 60 in year 1 and 55 in year 2. Loan B pays interest 10 in year 1 and principal plus interest 110 in year 2. The investment and the rest of the business together provide cash of 28 and 115 at those year ends after every nonfinancing requirement. No additional source is available and no earlier shortfall occurs.
Loan A would leave 10 + 28 − 60 = −22 in year 1. Its nominal interest total of 15 does not make it usable. Loan B leaves 28 after year 1 and 33 after year 2, so it preserves the reserve at both dates. At a 10% comparison rate, each payment schedule has present value 100: 60/1.10 + 55/1.10² equals 10/1.10 + 110/1.10². The difference is the timing of principal use, not a lower effective rate.
If operating receipts move so that available cash becomes 60 in year 1 and 83 in year 2, preserving the total 143, Loan A leaves 10 and then 38. Both schedules now fit. Comparing their remaining cash requires the use and return of any interim surplus; comparing the final balances alone ignores that Loan B leaves more cash available after year 1. A decision to prefer one must therefore state that use or the relevant flexibility, not merely count interest.
FIN.10:5.2 - The holder of a financing right changes the dependable horizon
In a separate constructed case, the company has cash 10, a required reserve of 5 and an investment payment of 100 now. Each offered loan supplies 100 net before that payment. The investment produces net cash 112 at month 12, with no interim receipt or other cash difference. Interest of 3 is payable at month 6; if the principal remains outstanding, another 3 is payable at month 12. Compare three stipulated versions, with no fees or other acceleration condition:
- The principal is due at month 6, but the borrower can extend it to month 12 by giving notice by the end of month 5. Timely notice is sufficient under the agreement; lender consent is not required.
- The same extension requires the lender’s affirmative consent by the end of month 5. The borrower’s request alone does not extend the loan.
- The stated maturity is month 12, but the lender may require repayment at month 6 by giving notice by the end of month 5.
After the initial draw and investment, cash remains 10. With the first version and a valid extension notice, the month-6 interest leaves 7. At month 12, cash becomes 7 + 112 − 100 − 3 = 16. The borrower’s exercisable right supplies the required horizon on the stated conditions.
For the second version without obtained consent, or the third after the lender’s call, month 6 requires principal and interest of 103. Preserving the reserve needs 103 + 5 − 10 = 98 of replacement net proceeds by that date. The positive month-12 investment return cannot pay this earlier maturity. Before committing, the company needs an arrangement that covers that branch, a different initial instrument or a changed investment plan. It cannot choose the lender’s future action as though that were its own extension option.
Suppose a separate replacement commitment is obtained by month 5 and supplies 98 net before the month-6 repayment, with conditions already satisfied and repayment of 103 at month 12. The month-6 account is 10 + 98 − 103 = 5; the final account is 5 + 112 − 103 = 14. This arrangement makes the early-repayment branch feasible on the given premises. If its proceeds instead settle after the old loan falls due, the arrangement does not repair the maturity gap.
These timelines establish dated availability and the resulting payments. Pricing the contingent rights is a further question requiring the qualified valuation grounds in FIN.8; the difference between final cash balances is not itself a price for an extension or call. FDM.3 supplies the actual notice, consent and claim events; FIN.2 tests their settlement order.
FIN.10:5.3 - Equity finance prices a transferred interest
In another constructed offer, the existing equity is worth 200 immediately before financing. A new investor supplies 100 net, with no fees or special rights, and the cash is added to the business without any other value change. Equal ordinary interests imply post-money equity value 300. Issuing one third of that equity to the investor leaves the old owners with two thirds worth 200. If the investor instead requires 40% on these same valuation grounds, the old owners retain 60% of 300, or 180: a transfer of 20 relative to their starting interest.
This is a valuation comparison of the offer, not a claim that an investor must accept one third. A changed business value, funding urgency, preference or control right changes the comparison. If the cash funds an investment with its own gain, first include that attainable gain consistently; do not credit it wholly to old owners and also use it to justify the new investor’s percentage.
FIN.10:5.4 - Construct a package that no participant offered alone
A manufacturer can complete an order for a cash payment of 100 on day 0 and deliver on day 90. It has no money available for that payment. The customer would otherwise buy equivalent delivery for 150 on day 90. The manufacturer also proposes 150, but cannot obtain an unsecured loan of 100. All quantities below are constructed negotiating inputs; there are no taxes, other payments or additional reserve requirements in this bounded case.
Discussions establish three constraints. With the specified customer contract and security, the bank is willing to fund at most 60 on day 0 for repayment of 64 on day 90, subject to its stated closing conditions. The customer can advance at most 40 and requires a total price reduction of at least 3 to compensate for the advance’s funding use and assessed exposure. The manufacturer requires at least 40 remaining cash after paying the production and financing costs. Those constraints came from the parties’ own comparisons; they are not inferred from a universal interest rate.
The bank limit requires at least 40 from another source. The customer’s limit makes an advance of 40 the candidate contribution. Let the price reduction be d. The customer then pays 40 now and 110 − d on delivery. After repaying the bank’s 64, the manufacturer retains 46 − d. Its requirement gives d ≤ 6, while customer participation requires d ≥ 3. The common interval is 3 through 6. A proposal with d = 4 provides the initial 100, leaves a delivery payment of 106 and manufacturer cash of 42, and gives the customer a price reduction of 4 against its required 3. This finds mutually compatible candidate terms; it does not establish that the parties have accepted them.
The package also needs a closing. Suppose the customer will release its 40 only when the bank’s 60 is committed, and the bank requires the customer contract and advance. The parties can propose a funded escrow that releases the combined 100 to production only when both contributions and the stipulated documentation are in place, with a specified return of funds if closing fails. They must obtain the agreements of the escrow provider, lender and customer. If that service adds cost, include it and recompute the interval. If it cannot settle before production must begin, the constructed amounts still do not fund the order.
The contract changes the original account: the manufacturer receives total 146, not 150, and owes financing service 64. The customer advance is counted once, against the reduced delivery payment. The bank’s 60 is a financing receipt and later principal obligation; it is not sales. FIN.4 preserves these meanings and FIN.2 tests the dates.
Now suppose the customer can pay only 80 on day 90, leaving the rest late. The manufacturer has 16 after bank repayment, below its required 40. If the entire receipt is late, the loan itself is unfunded at maturity. The contractual customer amount, the bank’s due date and the loss allocation do not change merely because the forecast did. Return to collection protection, a supported extension or bridge, different terms or a changed production commitment. The proposal’s original amounts fitted the stated requirements; its continuing feasibility depends on the credit and timing conditions.
FIN.10:5.5 - Finance a learning stage without inventing later capital
A development venture needs 20 for an independent technical trial and, if the result warrants continuation, 80 for deployment. It has no dependable cash from which to promise near-term debt service. A prospective investor can accept first-stage loss for an agreed equity interest, but requires an interpretable trial result before considering the larger exposure. The useful design question is which stage and claim can attract capital now, together with what remains possible later.
Construct the terms for the first 20 equity contribution: the interest it buys, the permitted use, the trial result needed for continuation and the consequences of stopping. Then compare two later-capital terms. In one, the investor may consider a further investment after the trial but makes no later funding commitment. In the other, an enforceable commitment supplies 80 when the stated, observable conditions are met, with the later price or share-allocation rule already specified. The second transfers more future funding exposure to the investor and may require different ownership or control terms. The venture must compare that cost with the useful continuation it obtains. Neither party can assume that the other will accept the more protective version at the first version’s price.
A successful technical trial does not establish demand or profitable deployment. Keep any remaining commercial conditions and the investor’s actual rights. With the first term, FIN.8 can value the venture’s opportunity to seek further finance, but FIN.2 cannot count the 80 as committed money. With the second, verify the commitment’s availability in the state where the trial passes and bring its resulting ownership and service conditions into FIN.7 and FIN.9. If no later financing is attainable, the first stage may still be worthwhile for its own reusable result or may be rejected. The full development plan remains conditional rather than silently financed by optimistic future receipts.