Handler on Duty: Jan Kopriva
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Thursday, June 11th, 2026: Framing Protections; npm improvements; Adobe Patches; New Defender 0-day
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How has use of framing protection security headers changed in the past 3 years?
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/How%20has%20use%20of%20framing%20protection%20security%20headers%20changed%20in%20the%20past%203%20years%3F/33068
Preparing for npm v12: install scripts and non-registry sources become opt-in
https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/198547
Adobe Patches
https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html
Rogue Planet new Microsoft Defender Vulnerability
https://github.com/MSNightmare/RoguePlanet
My Upcoming Classes
https://www.sans.org/profiles/dr-johannes-ullrich
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| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
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| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Nov 9th - Nov 14th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Dec 14th - Dec 18th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Thursday, June 11th, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. This episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Industrial Control System Security. Jan today published a diary on Content security Policy and how the XFrame Options header is sort of starting to get replaced, supplemented with the Frame Ancestor property in CSP. This is something that Jan looked first at three years ago, so what he published today was an update essentially to what was going on more recently. Now the XFrame Options header still works, so and so far there's nothing really wrong with it. However, officially it got now replaced with Content-Security Policy. And what Jan found is actually over the last years, over the last three years, there was a significant increase in the uptake of Content-Security Policy and the Frame Ancestor directive when it comes to Content-Security Policy. So it's overall a good thing that this has been improving. I would still kind of leave the XFrame Options header in place personally. Yes, it sort of does the same thing as Frame Ancestors. I find that with Content-Security Policy it's easier to sort of get lost the complexity and maybe have a syntax error or something like this. So the Frame Ancestor directive may not work as expected. And as far as I know, all existing browsers still support XFrame Options. So kind of a nice backup, I guess, in this case. And in a blog post, NPM did announce some changes in the upcoming NPM 12 release, which is expected in July. These changes are changes to default behaviors that are not really new features that are supposed to combat some of the attacks that we have seen recently. Now, probably the most significant change here is that install scripts will be turned off by default. Install scripts are often used for Cogniz integration, for CI, CD kind of pipelines and the like. But not really used that much. And of course, giving an attacker the ability to run arbitrary code, that's what has been abused heavily in recent attacks. So now by default, these scripts will not run. You can still allow them to run if you want to, or you can allow them just to run for specific repositories. Have to see how it all works out. The second part is that allow git and allow remote will no longer be enabled by default. This was usable by installers then to basically refer to specific URLs and such, and the load code from there versus via the normal sort of repository and the npm .js path. So that was also used in recent attacks. The blog post also points out while these default settings will change in version 12, if you want, you can already enable them in the current version. They're just not default settings at this point. So 11.16 does have the features. They're just not enabled by default, or the features are not disabled by default is probably a better way of putting it. The blog post also goes over some techniques and such you can use to allow some of these scripts, for example, to run and basically how to get ready for this change. And then we got a little bit patch Tuesday cleanup. First of all, Adobe did also publish updates yesterday for 11 different products. Two of the products that I'm usually watching here are Acrobat Reader and ColdFusion. Acrobat Reader fixes a couple of remote code execution vulnerabilities, only CVSS score of 7.8. ColdFusion does also publish a remote code execution vulnerability and for it the CVSS score is 9.8. So definitely take a look at these and these are definitely vulnerabilities you want to address. For the Acrobat Reader, I believe the CVSS score is lower because essentially the user has to open a file. So it's not sort of a real remote code execution other than that the file of course typically arrives from a remote source. And following patch Tuesday, we now got well, certainly Wednesday, thanks to Nightmare Clips, we got another vulnerability in Microsoft Defender. It's yet another one of those Burge escalation vulnerabilities where Microsoft Defender essentially overwrites its own files. In this particular case, it does require that the victim is mounting a disk image from an SMB share. So the attacker would have to trick the victim somehow into doing this. They also point out that this does not work by default on Windows Server because on Windows Server, normal users don't have the ability to mount disk images. So that way the exploit doesn't work. Well, and this is it for today. So thanks for listening. Thanks for liking. Thanks for subscribing to this podcast. And as always, talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.