About
I am a Ph.D. student in Cyberspace Security at the School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University. I received my Master of Information Security degree from the School of Computer Science, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), in July 2026, and my Bachelor of Information Security degree from Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications in July 2023. During my master's studies, I was advised by Chi Cheng. I am now pursuing my Ph.D. under the supervision of Hao Cheng, and I also benefit from the guidance of Weijia Wang. My research interests focus on post-quantum cryptography, hardware security, and side-channel attacks.
Education
Sept 2026 – Present
Sept 2023 – July 2026
Sept 2019 – July 2023
Research Interests
- Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Hardware-Security
- Side-Channel Attack
Publications
- [Inscrypt 2026] “Extending multiple-valued plaintext-checking side-channel attacks to higher-order masked software implementations of Kyber.” Jinnuo Li, Hao Cheng, and Chi Cheng. Accepted
- [ESORICS 2026] “Prune to grow: A pruning-driven framework for MV-PC side-channel attacks against Kyber.” Jinnuo Li, Hao Cheng, and Chi Cheng. Accepted
- [IEEE TC] “Uncover secrets through the cover: A deep learning-based side-channel attack against kyber implementations with anti-tampering covers.” Peng Chen, Jinnuo Li, Wei Cheng, and Chi Cheng. Published
- [DATE] “Grafted trees bear better fruit: An improved multiple-valued plaintext-checking side-channel attack against kyber.” Jinnuo Li, Chi Cheng, Muyan Shen, Peng Chen, Qian Guo, Dongsheng Liu, Liji Wu, and Jian Weng. Published
- [Inscrypt] “A novel checking scheme for parallel key recovery side-channel attack against kyber.” Du Qian, Jinnuo Li, and Chi Cheng. Equal contribution · Published
- [ISPEC] “Enhancing portability in deep learning-based side-channel attacks against kyber.” Peng Chen, Chi Cheng, Jinnuo Li, and Tianqing Zhu. Published
Academic Service
- External Reviewer, IACR Communications in Cryptology, 2026.
Misc
I identified and reported the following vulnerabilities in candidates submitted to the NGCC competition:
- Amoeba: incomplete FO ciphertext verification. The Fujisaki–Okamoto check compares only every fourth ciphertext byte, enabling chosen-ciphertext key recovery when a plaintext-checking oracle is available. Report (September 2026)
- Lore: BCH decoding timing side channel. Secret-dependent timing in the BCH decoder enables key recovery. I reported full recovery of the Lore-L2 secret key on an STM32F4 using decapsulation timing measurements. Report (October 2026)