World War Two: 1942 and Hitler's Soft Underbelly

Interesting documentary.

A documentary that covers the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns of World War 2. The main question answered is why the Allies chose to fight there at all, when France presented the most direct, and potentially easier, gateway to Germany.

Militarily, much of what you get to learn is nothing new. The battles of the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns are well known and documented. However, the political, diplomatic and strategic sides are quite interesting and intriguing. The behind- the-scenes machinations explain well the bigger picture.

On the down side, the English narrator is ponderously slow in his delivery and it sometimes feels as if he trying to draw things out. Also, he should never try to mimic an American accent... Very irritating, and perhaps offensive to Americans, in that regard.

Our host, Professor David Reynolds, walks barefoot through the rippling waters of a beach and asks why, after the British were booted off the European continent at Dunkirk, the British and Americans didn't force their way back into France for another four years, opting instead, at Churchill's insistence, to fight in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the area Churchill called "the soft underbelly of Europe," and which turned out to be a pretty tough chaw.

Reynolds isn't too fond of Churchill but he does explain the logic behind Churchill's plans. There are also facts that aren't often mentioned because they would seem to taint the myth. Tobruk's 25,000 British and Colonials fell to a German force half that size, for instance. And I had no idea that many Egyptians wanted to shake off what they saw as the British yoke and were rooting for Rommel's Afrika Korps. In 1942, one in five Americans were willing to sign a peace treaty with Hitler in order to concentrate on the Japanese. There is some unusual footage. We get to see and hear Mussolini's announcement of the declaration of war, and the thousands of Italian in the square beneath him, cheering lustily.

In describing the two Allied principals, David Reynolds tries to do an impression of Churchill. He shouldn't have. His speech and demeanor already evoke the image of a television salesman describing the lethal consequences of too much cholesterol and pimping the herbal tea that will prevent those consequences.

He also, if my understanding is accurate, leaves out some of the context of Churchill's decisions. He observes, rightly, that the Balkans changed from a "diversion" in Churchill's mind to "a dark obsession." Churchill was intent on postponing the Normandy invasion in favor of the Italian-held Aegean Islands and Greece. "Ripe pickings," he thought -- and he was correct. The Italian garrison troops had sort of settled down after being repulsed and were not fully committed to the war. The problem was that Germany was fully committed. And when the Allies sent troops to clear and occupy the area, the Germans did the same thing they'd done in North Africa. They came to the rescue of their timorous allies.

The heart of the soft underbelly strategy was always Italy. That more than usually pointless and tragic story is already familiar. The plan itself was based on unsound premises and wasn't at all helped by the failure of American leadership. Shortly after American General Mark Clark's army took Rome -- the army he always saw to it that the press referred to as "Mark Clark's Fifth Army" -- the Allied invasion of Normady was launched. The soft underbelly, as Reynolds remarks, "had become a mere appendage." It's an informative and engaging documentary, and Reynold's perspective is a fresh one.