Supreme Court Digest: Oct. 15, 2025

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Civil

Attorney Discipline

Disbarment

Respondent Samuel A. McCloud has a long history of professional discipline and was currently suspended from the practice of law as a result of two prior disciplinary actions. This case arose out of his representation of a client charged with DWI. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility brought a petition for disciplinary action alleging that McCloud repeatedly neglected the matter; failed to communicate with his client, in part, by failing to inform him of plea offers; made a knowingly false statement to a court; and kept an unearned portion of a flat fee. The referee concluded that the Director proved that McCloud committed the misconduct alleged in the petition and that several aggravating factors were present. The only question before the Court was the appropriate discipline to impose.

The Supreme Court held that disbarment is the appropriate discipline for an attorney who repeatedly neglected a client matter; failed to communicate with the client, in part, by failing to inform his client of plea offers; made a knowingly false statement to a court; and kept an unearned portion of a flat fee; as well as when several aggravating factors are present, including an extensive history of professional discipline for similar misconduct. Disbarred.

A24-0509 In re McCloud (Original Jurisdiction)

Human Services Licensing

Abuse

In this case, the Minnesota Department of Human Services sought over $420,000 in monetary recovery from respondent/cross-appellant, a personal care assistance (PCA) provider agency, because of documentation deficiencies discovered in an audit. The case requires resolution of two questions. First, what facts DHS must prove to obtain monetary recovery from an individual or entity DHS paid under Minn. Stat. § 256B.064, subd. 1c(a). DHS argued that it may obtain monetary recovery because it proved respondent engaged in abuse, which is one of the grounds for sanctions set forth in § 256B.064, subd. 1a. Respondent argued that DHS must prove something more than engagement in abuse before obtaining monetary recovery. The second issue was whether, under § 256B.0659, respondent must keep a copy of PCA Choice care plans in its agency files, or whether it is sufficient for a copy of each PCA Choice recipient’s care plan to be kept in the recipient’s home.

The Supreme Court held that (1) to obtain monetary recovery under § 256B.064, subd. 1c(a), the DHS must prove either (A) that a vendor engaged in conduct identified in § 256B.064, subd. 1a, and that, had DHS known of the conduct before payment, it would have been legally prohibited from making payment based on a statute or valid regulation independent of § 256B.064, subd. 1a; or (B) that the payment resulted from an error, intentional or not, by DHS or the individual or entity submitting the claim such that the vendor received more money than authorized by law; and (2) care plans must be maintained in the provider agency file for all PCA services, including for PCA Choice recipients, under § 256B.0659, subd. 7(a). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A22-1688 In re SIRS Appeal by Best Care, LLC (Court of Appeals)

Criminal

Postconviction Relief

Evidentiary Hearings

This first-degree murder appeal primarily concerned whether the District Court abused its discretion when it summarily denied petitioner’s postconviction petition, which asserted a violation of his constitutional right to a panel drawn from a jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community. In support of his petition, petitioner submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined that obtaining race data relevant to a claim that the jury source list used to summon pools of prospective jurors systematically excludes Black people “is difficult.” Based on the data he was able to obtain, the expert posited that racial disparities in voter registration and driver’s licenses were among the factors causing an imbalance in the overall racial composition of the jury pools from which panels are drawn in the county. The District Court summarily denied the postconviction petition, concluding that the facts alleged in support of the petition failed to show that the underrepresentation of Black jurors was the result of systematic exclusion.

The Supreme Court held that (1) the District Court abused its discretion when it summarily denied petitioner’s postconviction petition because when the facts alleged in support of the petition are viewed in the light most favorable to petitioner, the petition and the files and records of the proceeding do not conclusively show that petitioner was entitled to no relief, as, among the disputed questions of material fact was whether it is reasonably possible to establish through independent studies or other government sources that Black persons were not fairly represented in the jury pool process and that the racial imbalance in the jury pool was not the result of alternative explanations, like hardship excusals and failures to respond to jury summon; and (2) the District Court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.04 when the court entered convictions on the offenses of first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder because the court entered a conviction on the greater offense of first-degree premeditated murder.

A22-1623, A24-1497 State v. Weeks (Dakota County)