Communicating Climate Change: A Guide for Educators

5

IDENTITY

One of the authors of this book, Anne Armstrong, once participated in a two-day training session about the impacts of sea level rise on the Eastern Shore of Virginia. At the start of the training, a man raised his hand and said that he wanted to know what was causing sea level rise and that if he knew what was causing it, he would have a better idea of how to solve the problem. A local scientist explained the links between climate change and sea level rise, but the man did not accept his explanation. During the second day of the workshop, after several other presentations that connected climate change to sea level rise, the man repeated his question from the first day, insisting that if someone could just explain the cause of the problem to him, we would be better able to come to a conclusion about the best solutions. This man was a respected leader in the community, with a degree in civil engineering. He was as capable of understanding the science as Anne was, and yet they came to vastly different conclusions. What was going on?

Looking at Americans’ lack of climate change understanding, it is tempting to conclude that the problem is a deficit in the public’s climate change knowledge. In education and communication, this idea falls under what is called the science comprehension thesis or information deficit model¹—the idea is that the public lacks the information scientists have, and once they have it, they will be more likely to accept human-caused climate change and support policy change and other action² (table 5.1). This represents a very attractive proposition for communicators and educators alike because it is so simple. Unfortunately, research suggests that this model is far too simplistic and that additional factors besides knowledge influence the decisions that audiences make.³ Although knowledge is certainly a factor in people’s decision to act pro-environmentally (or toward climate change solutions), knowledge, like attitude, is not sufficient on its own for motivating behavior change.

Identity Theory

Identity plays an important role in how people engage with climate change information. Identity is “fundamentally a way of defining, describing, and locating oneself.”⁴ Humans have multiple identities. Environmental educators may be familiar with environmental identity, or “a sense of connection to some part of the nonhuman natural environment that affects the way we perceive and act toward the world; a belief that the environment is important to us and an important part of who we are.”⁵ Environmental identity can be a type of personal identity, connected to someone’s sense of who they are as an individual. It can also be a type of social identity that encompasses how people position themselves in relation to others.⁶ This section will focus primarily on different types of social identities and their association with climate change attitudes and behaviors.

Social identity represents one lens through which researchers have investigated attitudes toward and engagement with climate change information. As social animals, our identity is derived in part from the groups to which we belong.⁷ Group memberships range from those that are largely determined, such as citizenship or ethnicity, to those that reflect individuals’ values, interests, and skills (e.g., environmental educator, birder, Democrat). The norms, or expectations, of the groups we belong to influence our attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Moreover, although we typically think about identities as stable, research suggests that identities are dynamic; any one of our different identities can become activated or “salient,” and guide our behaviors in response to social and situational cues.⁸ Environmental educators, for example, may feel pressured to use a reusable water bottle or coffee mug because they perceive this behavior as normative within the group that defines their social identity—this may be especially true in contexts that cue this identity, such as attending an environmental education conference.

Social identity can affect the way people process information. In contrast to the science comprehension thesis, which suggests that people learn and act on facts, people often interpret new information in ways that align with and reinforce their group commitments. This process is known as motivated reasoning⁹ (table 5.1). Motivated reasoning affects which information people consider as they think about a given issue and how they use that information to make judgments or draw conclusions.¹⁰ Thus, someone who is alarmed about climate change and someone who dismisses climate change can attend the same climate-related program, yet they hear different things and come away with very different conclusions, based in part on their preexisting ideas and related group commitments and social identities.¹¹

Identity protective cognition is a type of motivated reasoning (table 5.1). When identity protective cognition is activated, people avoid beliefs that might alienate them from their chosen group as a means of protecting their sense of self. While denying that climate change exists might seem irrational to some people in the context of scientific consensus, it may be a perfectly rational conclusion from a social identity perspective if your peers and your group also deny climate change.¹² During Elena’s meeting (see chapter 4), John seems to ignore the evidence presented by Elena based in part on his perception of alarmism from the media and liberal politicians. This is an example of identity protective cognition—John doesn’t believe the facts that might alienate him from his conservative identity. In Will’s class, some students remain skeptical after having participated in classroom activities, suggesting that something other than an information deficit, perhaps their social identity as members of a conservative family or church, is keeping them from engaging fully in the topic.

Motivated reasoning and identity protective cognition can each contribute to confirmation bias, in which people look for information that confirms what they already know or think, leading them to dismiss ideas that might require them to change their behavior.¹³ In Elena’s case, John’s personal experience with cold weather confirmed his view that climate change was made up and disconfirmed Elena’s explanation of climate change. In a polarized media environment rife with opportunities for selective exposure—for instance, in which conservatives watch Fox News and liberals watch MSNBC—each faction is exposed to information that is likely to confirm and bolster its preexisting beliefs.¹⁴ In this way, viewers of Fox News and MSNBC may consider themselves just as knowledgeable about climate change, but this knowledge may lead the two groups to very different conclusions.

TABLE 5.1 Theories about how people assess climate change information

Identity and Climate Change Research

Identity protective cognition related to climate change has been closely linked to political affiliation.¹⁵ When faced with the same information about climate change, Republicans and Democrats polarize on their willingness to support climate policy.¹⁶ One study demonstrated that Republicans with higher education were less likely to say they were concerned about climate change. In contrast, education was positively correlated with climate change concern among Democrats.¹⁷ The study suggests that, in addition to providing individuals with greater knowledge about climate change, education gives people access to a wider set of information that can be used to argue for or against the problem’s existence or urgency in a motivated fashion that reinforces a social identity like political affiliation. Another study compared people’s science literacy with their belief in climate change and found a similar trend. For conservatives, higher levels of science literacy were negatively correlated with belief in climate change; for liberals, however, higher levels of science literacy were positively correlated with belief in climate change. When opinion surveys ask people if they “believe” in climate change, their answer may say more about their values and their social identity than their knowledge of climate science. Importantly, whereas much of the research on motivated reasoning in the context of climate change has focused on the biased interpretation of information among Republicans and conservatives compared to Democrats and liberals, recent evidence suggests that partisans on both sides are prone to engage in motivated reasoning about climate science.¹⁸

Will’s climate change lessons triggered some students to express their identities as climate change skeptics, and they sulked through his presentation. Whereas Jayla works mostly with visitors who believe in climate change, Elena and Will are challenged to handle identity-protective cognition during their programs. Elena seeks to find common ground with her audience by drawing attention to their shared sense of town identity and heritage and by emphasizing the co-benefits associated with her shoreline project. Co-benefits are the non-climate related benefits that arise from climate adaptation and mitigation projects. A co-benefit of Elena’s project is reduced erosion risk. Will assumes his students’ parents have distinct political identities that would make them opposed to his teaching climate change in the classroom. Will chooses an activity that requires students to reflect on their own and their peers’ attitudes toward climate change, which could assist in moderating extreme attitudes.

Although political orientation is a strong predictor of climate change belief in the United States,¹⁹ the influence of social identity on climate change views goes beyond political affiliation.²⁰ Racial and ethnic identity also predicts climate change attitudes and risk perceptions, and some studies have found that members of racial and ethnic (nonwhite) minority groups in the United States report higher levels of environmental concern and support for climate change policies relative to whites. When it comes to climate change, examining the interaction of political and racial/ethnic identity has revealed a more nuanced view of the factors that predict climate change attitudes in the United States, as survey data suggest that political orientation is a weaker predictor of public opinion on climate change among nonwhite minorities than among whites. This weaker association may be attributable, in part, to different levels of experience with environmental impacts across groups, given that minorities are disproportionately affected by environmental pollution and negative climate change impacts.²¹ For example, anthropologists documenting climate change adaptation priorities in two African-American communities on Maryland’s Eastern Shore that are vulnerable to sea-level rise faced no political opposition to their informational sessions on climate change science.²² The overall population in the counties in which these communities are located, however, exhibit lower-than-average rates of acceptance of anthropogenic climate change.²³ There is, in fact, a documented “white male effect” in risk communication literature whereby white males view environmental risks like climate change as less important than do white women and minorities.²⁴

These results have important implications for environmental educators. They point to the complex ways in which social factors shape how people engage with climate change as a uniquely global problem, one that has asymmetric causes and impacts across groups and that will require unprecedented cooperation both within and between nations—features with potentially rich implications that psychologists are only beginning to address.²⁵ Programs and messages that consider climate-related injustices faced by minorities and other groups will likely fare better than those that deal with climate change impacts in the aggregate.²⁶ Mainstream environmental organizations lack ethnic diversity throughout their ranks and do not often collaborate with ethnic minority or low-income organizations.²⁷ High minority participation in community gardening and environmental justice organizations²⁸ points to possibilities for building stronger and more diverse coalitions around climate change.

Identity and Climate Change Education

Climate change education is certainly not immune to the effects of identity on students and teachers and is subject to outside pressure from lobbying groups. In 2017, the Heartland Institute sent tens of thousands of science teachers its book, Why Scientists Disagree about Global Warming, and an accompanying DVD questioning the scientific consensus on climate change.²⁹ Classroom teachers like Will can find it challenging to overcome the effects of identity-based cognition in the classroom.³⁰ However, some good news is emerging from research on climate change education and identity.

Although past research on identity and environmental education centered primarily on environmental identity,³¹ a new body of research exploring social identity and climate change is emerging. A study in North Carolina revealed that high school students are less influenced by political polarization than adults are, and that increased climate knowledge correlated with increased acceptance of anthropogenic climate change regardless of political leanings. The researchers suggest that one reason for this difference is that high school students may hold less entrenched worldviews and values than adults.³² Researchers have also found that identity does not appear to drive the perception of climate change risk for nonhuman life. High school students in one study relied on mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to assess climate change risk to human society, and these shortcuts were determined in part by their political affiliation. When they assessed risk to wildlife, however, they relied on their knowledge of climate change.³³

Bottom Line for Educators

Acknowledging the role of identity in climate change attitudes and behaviors can help environmental educators in program planning, including developing suitable outcomes and tailoring messages for particular audiences. Environmental educators can key into particular social identities and connect climate change to these identities. They also may focus on “superordinate” identities, such as “coastal Virginian,” that cross political identity,³⁴ and choose outcomes, like replanting marshes, that appeal to all regardless of political identity. Jayla’s draft exhibit may appeal to her visitors’ environmental identity, but her focus group participants suggest that, given the typical visitors’ strong environmental identity, she could go further and include climate actions. Younger audiences may provide a window of opportunity for instilling positive climate change behaviors and attitudes, as their worldviews are not yet as entrenched as those of adults. Staunch climate change skeptics may be unlikely to change their opinions in part because climate change skepticism is linked to their identity.³⁵ Environmental educators may want to expend less energy trying to convince skeptics that climate change exists and more energy working with people who accept and are concerned about anthropogenic climate change but need assistance in deciding how to act on their concern. If educators work with climate change skeptics, they may want to take Elena’s approach: find areas of common ground that enable both groups to work toward solutions even as they disagree on causes of the problem.