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
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NOTES

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. In this book, I use *excess* in the Marxian, not psychoanalytic or poststructuralist, sense. While in psychoanalysis and poststructuralism, *excess* means the unruly and potentially progressive undisciplined aspects of reality or language, here I use *excess* as the accumulation of surplus political value. In this tradition, *excess* leads to abuses of power.
2. For an elaboration of ethno-racialization of Latinas/os, see Aparicio (1994) and Molina-Guzmán (2010, 4–7). For a fascinating example of its complexity, see Frances Negrón-Muntaner (2002).
3. I am particularly indebted to the following: Rodolfo Acuña, Tomás Almaguer, Linda Bosniak, Wendy Brown, Nicholas De Genova, Enrique Dussel, Lisa Flores, Ian Haney-López, Cheryl Harris, Bonnie Honig, Engin Isin, Walter Mignolo, Toby Miller, David Montejano, Armando Navarro, Chon Noriega, Michael Omi, Aihwa Ong, Anibal Quijano, América Rodríguez, George Sanchez, Otto Santa Ana, Rogers Smith, Howard Winant, and Aristide Zolberg. Others play a very important role, in particular in the developing of cases, but these scholars are this book's theoretical and historical DNA.
4. I use the term *Latinas/os* to designate populations with ethnic or historical roots in Latin America and the Caribbean (Romero and Habel-Pallán 2002). I am aware that the category itself is unstable and racially and ethnically complex and that it includes communities that seem to have little in common. It designates families with centuries-old roots in the U.S. territories, particularly in the Southwest, as well as immigrants who have just arrived. It includes colonial subjects such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, Cuban political refugees, part of the Latin American intellectual elites who have found themselves immigrants in the metropolises, and what some scholars call “economic refugees,” a large category of immigrants forced north for economic reasons. Differences notwithstanding, most of these communities have been ethnicized and racialized similarly by racial formations that construct them as foreign (regardless of their citizenship status) and as ethnic and racial others (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003, 2; Mayer 2004; Oboler 2006, 11; Pérez 2004; Rivero 2005, 129–131). Lastly, it is worth remarking that the culture of Latinas/os with Mexican ancestry looms large over other immigrants and Latino citizens and that this culture is also quasi-hegemonic. This produces tensions. For instance, in reference

to Puerto Ricans living in the United States, Gina Pérez (2004) refers to the pressure to assimilate to Mexican markers of *Latinidad* as the forced Mexicanization of Puerto Ricans (177).

5. I expand on nativism in chapters 2 and 3. I expand on ethnonationalism in chapter 4.
6. I am deeply indebted to Raymond Williams's (1977) ideas on Marxism and profoundly aware that Marx's concerns took him from the field of politics to the field of economics. Like others, I find myself filtering the world through an array of theories all inspired by Marx, including Marxian approaches to the sociology of culture and Marxian aesthetics. Unlike Marx, I stay within politics but note that the field of politics can be explained by referencing some basic economic rules, which I list later in the introduction. In addition, there are two clearly Marxist elements in this book. The first has to do with the recognition that the juridical and the political are bound and form a field where elites roam (see Marx, in R. Williams 1977, 75–78). The second element concerns Marx's notion of the superstructure, which Williams notes is constituted in institutions, forms of consciousness, and political and cultural practices (1977, 77). Although I do not use the term *superstructure*, I am inspired by it. This chapter, in fact, is organized to highlight the three elements of the superstructure noted by Williams.
7. The Tea Party began as a right-wing fringe to the Republican Party after the Republican defeats of 2008. It is based on the political values of radical populism, nativism, and neoliberalism. In 2010, the Tea Party succeeded at electing ultraright candidates to the House and Senate and helped the Republican Party retake control of the House.
8. For an elaboration on Bourdieu and political capital accumulation, see chapter 1.
9. See similar observations on African American challenges in Oliver and Shapiro (2006).
10. From here on, I use Pierre Bourdieu's term *field of power* to speak about the political market.
11. Law exists in two discrete markets: the judicial and the political. But there are no other two markets that share more members, and, for the purposes of this book, the difference between the judicial and political market is negligible. See R. Williams (1977, 75–82).
12. See note 11.
13. The most recent and significant example is the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*. The Supreme Court removed the ban on "electioneering communications" for incorporated organizations and unions. This ban prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to political candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a specific candidate.

14. I use *liberal* and *republican* in the way political scientists use them. In political theory, liberalism is a type of government that has the central goal of engendering individual freedoms and equal rights. Republicanism is a type of government controlled by the citizens and, thus, is the basis for democracy. The United States is typically historicized and theorized as a political organization based both on liberal and republican ideals.
15. On this I am not alone. Nicole Waligora-Davis (2011) does the significant work of refiguring the effects of race on African Americans by theorizing a racial location based on ethno-territoriality. Her work wisely privileges the terminology of *refugee*, *asylum seeker*, and *alien* to help us reimagine African American history from the position of space or, better, lack of space. Simply, centuries after arrival, African Americans are yet to find sanctuary in this nation, “a site in which the sanctity of human life is preserved” (xiii). Similar to Waligora-Davis in my commitment to reimagining race from the position of space and legal imaginaries, but less expectant that the nation can become sanctuary for Latina/os, my theory of citizenship excess avoids the language of yearning.
16. This issue was already relevant in Marx’s time. He discusses it in his famous writing “On the Jewish Question,” where he supports the evolution of an abstract, as opposed to religious or, I might add, ascriptionist, state (Marx 1975, 211–241).
17. For theories of the new racism, see Bonilla-Silva (2001, 193), Oliver and Shapiro (2006, 19), and Wilson (1996, 219).
18. For a detailed elaboration on subjectivity and self, see P. Smith (1988, xxiii–xiv) and Miller (1993).
19. There are significant differences in the way different communities relate to citizenship. The clearest cases are differences between Mexicans, who are often linked to foreignness and illegality, and Puerto Ricans, who have been U.S. citizens but colonial subjects for a century (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003).
20. To read on issues of whiteness in the Puerto Rican context, see Negrón-Muntaner (2002, 47–53).
21. It is worth noting that legal historian José Cabranes never found evidence that World War I had anything to do with the Jones Act or that the plan existed to extend citizenship to Puerto Ricans so that they could serve (1979, 15). Yet they did serve, and they were drafted. But Cabranes is correct in pointing out that citizenship was not required for Puerto Ricans to be drafted by the U.S. armed forces and that the first Puerto Rican regiment had been drafted in 1899.
22. Aziz Rana (2010) has noted that Rogers Smith’s work, while a significant improvement to the traditional account of American liberalism, tends to isolate democracy and its institutions from the critique of ascriptivism. The result is a theorization of the way the traditions of liberalism and republicanism are indebted to ascriptionism that does not recognize the way exclusionism energized U.S. democratic institutions. Rana, thus, proposes a history of

democratic institutions that makes evident their exclusionary roots. My work borrows from Smith but follows Rana's concern with institutions and their colonial history.

23. See note 7.
24. Coloniality is part of law, but it is also part of culture. Arguably, the performance work of Guillermo Gómez-Peña, the poetry work of Gloria Anzaldúa, and the musical work of Rubén Blades (Ana Rodríguez 2002) are examples of uses of culture that attempt to destabilize coloniality.
25. Devon W. Carbado (2005) offers ideas similar to Smith's. He argues that racial naturalization constitutes American citizenship because it is the legal a priori by which Americans become cognizable to law and to others.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. According to the 2010 census, there are fifty million Latinas/os and thirty-eight million Spanish speakers in the United States. The overlap between both populations is huge but hard to quantify. The census releases numbers on Spanish in relation to the ethnic category of Hispanic, and though we know that Spanish is the most learned language in universities, I have not found a reliable source listing the total numbers of Spanish speakers who are not Latinas/os. What we do know, thanks to the census, is that, 76 percent of Latinas/os five years and older speak Spanish at home, and thus it is possible to argue that the Latino public sphere is very similar to SLM. It is not, however, my intention to somehow erase the millions of non-Latinas/os who also speak Spanish.
2. Mendieta is at his strongest when pointing out the characteristics of publicity of Latino public intellectuals and at his weakest when engaging the specific cultural structures that Latino public intellectuals need in order to speak. See also comments on the subject by Paula Moya (2003), Jacqueline Martinez (2003), and Jane Juffer (2003).
3. See also Linda Bosniak's contribution to the conversation (2006, 23–28). Though she does not use the term *methodological nationalism*, her ideas are consistent with those of Chernilo and Wimmer and Schiller.
4. An example of this discursive monopoly is “political capital accumulation,” a notion central to this chapter. Inspired by several of Marx's concerns, including the power harnessed by capital accumulation and the relationship of media production, labor, law and politics, political capital accumulation is an imperfect tool of analysis because of its relentless bias for the national, which becomes the implicit exchange market giving currency to political capital.
5. Governmentality offers several opportunities for theorizing culture in general and media in particular. In the past, I have theorized it under the banner of technologies of self (Amaya 2010). Laurie Ouellette and James Hay (2008) use it in a similar manner to theorize production and consumption practices as they link to theories of self-management. Instead of linking the macro to the

micro with theories of self-management and self-governance, in this book I use the macro elements of Foucault's theories and concentrate on his ideas of the pastoral and securitization.

6. These issues are also investigated under the umbrella term *cultural citizenship*. For an exploration of Latino cultural citizenship, see Flores and Benmayor (1997).
7. Criticizing Marx, Dussel (1994) places the first capitalism and the first modernity in Pacific Asia, specifically China.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. The history of nativism against Latinas/os starts off with white settler migration to the Southwest and the takeover of large swaths of Mexican territory. In the 1840s and 1850s, as Tomás Almaguer has noted (1994), it was manifested through the idea of white supremacy. Other historians, such as Richard Peterson (1975) and Leonard Pitt (1966), refer to these decades of white supremacy as nativism, but I am with Almaguer in that it took some decades for white supremacy to acquire the element of "rights by birth," including the right to imagine and heavily regulate national membership, with which nativism is associated.
2. For a closer look at how practices of enumeration served nativist goals, see Inda (2006, 74–93).
3. Thanks to Representative Tancredo, the act included one provision prohibiting grants to federal, state, or local government agencies that enact a "sanctuary city policy." See the text of the act at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.4437.RFS>.
4. This includes important Latino figures such as Richard Rodriguez, who takes this position when he assumes that people migrate to the United States to assimilate and partake of liberal citizenship imagined as a legally neutral category (2002, 128–129).
5. Juridical subjectivity and its link to citizenship is relevant throughout history. Almaguer (1994) has described how land dispossession in California after the U.S. annexation of the territory was carried out partly through the legal cultures of the time. Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected the property rights of Mexicans, long litigations placed the Mexican ruling classes at the hands of the lawyer class and the court system. Even if a claim was decided in favor of the Mexican owner, he would often have to pay lawyers with the land itself (65–68).
6. See also the work of Robert McChesney (1993, 2004), Paul Starr (2004). For a look at how the FCC and media policy are involved in global issues of politics, see Michael Curtin (1993).
7. Grace Hong (2006) develops a related way of linking citizenship to the juridical. She theorizes the centrality of property in defining citizenship and argues

that American definitions of individualism are bound to property ownership (3–30). Property, I add, is a legal category, and so the primary principle of American individualism and, Marx would note, capitalism is based on law, the juridical and legal cultures.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. The connections between immigrant populations are often profound, and these include ways of theorizing the state. Here, I am indebted to the work of Grace Hong (2006) and Lisa Lowe (1996), who have theorized, historicized, and criticized U.S. citizenship from the Asian American perspective, often referencing the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II.
2. The ORR is an organization with very divided goals. Its mission statement fails to mention alien children, and the organization seems ill prepared to tackle the legal and administrative challenges of caring for alien children, particularly as the ORR sits relatively powerless between the legal guidelines set by international law on the care and custody of migrant children and the pressures imposed on them by the political realities of the DHS. Going through the central goals and objectives of the ORR, one quickly notices how the care and custody of unaccompanied children is not what the organization is meant to do. The bulk of the organization, as expressed on its website, is concerned with the multitude of challenges involved in the care of refugees and victims of human trafficking. See <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/index.html>.
3. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, 2006, H.R. Rep. No. 109-300 (2005), 38.
4. Brown (1993) helps us understand how processes such as the increase in size and complexity of the judicial system and neoliberal economic policies are today credited with expanded legal and educational rights and are de facto credited with producing the conditions of social well-being through the proper management of people and the economy. In this type of liberalism, which Streeter (1996) called corporate liberalism and others call neoliberalism, the problems caused by economic stratification and obsessive capitalism (Brown mentions “alienation, commodification, exploitation, displacement,” and others) move to the background and become depoliticized. But the problems persist, and Brown argues, their effects are displaced to identity politics claims for justice, which now bear “all the weight of the sufferings caused by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking” (395). Brown’s argument moves to explain the strong attachments people have to their politicized identities, to their own exclusion, in terms of resentment and even revenge. This is less useful to my project because in her assessment of contemporary liberalism and identity politics, Brown is much better at exacting the vices of a liberal psyche (is identity politics not engulfing us all?) than at

locating the array of affects particular to identity politics. However, her insights into the depoliticization of capitalism are quite useful here, as is her insistence that contemporary justice claims are increasingly based on identity.

5. The most important requirements found in the *Flores* settlement include the following:
 - Separation of minors from unrelated adults;
 - Preference for release of unaccompanied minors to the care of parents, legal guardians, other relatives, or foster homes or other facilities whenever possible;
 - Detention of minors in licensed programs that comply with all relevant child welfare laws and regulations;
 - Provision of suitable accommodations, food service, clothing and personal care items;
 - Affirmation of children's right to wear their own clothes;
 - Provision of routine medical and dental care, family planning services and emergency medical care; administration of prescription medicine and accommodations for dietary restrictions; provision of mental health interventions as appropriate;
 - One individual counseling session each week with a trained social worker and group counseling sessions at least twice each week;
 - Provision of educational services appropriate to a child's level of development and communications skills;
 - Recreation and leisure time including daily outdoor activity and one hour of large muscle activity each day;
 - Prohibition of corporal punishment, humiliation, mental abuse and punitive interference with such daily functions as eating and sleeping; disciplinary actions may not adversely impact a child's health, physical or psychological well-being or deny a child regular meals, sufficient sleep, exercise, medical care, the right to correspondence or legal assistance;
 - Expedient processing of apprehended minors and timely provision of notice of their rights and the availability of free legal services; and
 - Visitation privileges which encourage visitors and respect the child's privacy. (Women's Commission 2007, 7–8)
6. These issues have been present in much political philosophy and critical legal scholarship. Besides Wendy Brown, here I follow Enrique Dussel (2006), who uses a Marxist argumentation to theorize the fundamental rights of the state (including the right of coercion) and the disequilibrium to legal systems caused by counterhegemonic movements that use the logic of rights to argue their political positions.
7. Clearly, states do not need to behave as liberal states to claim legitimacy through liberalism or some of liberalism's central tenets. In my previous book, I found that practitioners of cultural politics in Cuba often resorted to the

language of liberalism (e.g., freedom, emancipation, self-determination) to justify themselves.

8. For a work that tracks down the historical roots of the idea of rights as property, from Hobbes and Locke to the present, see Zuckert (1994, 275–289).
9. Before continuing, I have to qualify my use of Walzer. His work is at times maddeningly nation-centric and, when it comes to talking about immigration, oddly parochial. For instance, Walzer assumes that immigrants are mostly trying to benefit from the material options of more advanced societies; yet he fails to see that advanced capitalisms, including our own, are mostly benefiting from the cheap labor of immigrants. This oversight makes him understand the social ethical dilemma of nations such as the United States as one centrally concerned with how to treat the disadvantaged other who has no choice but to leave her or his country (Schmidt Camacho 2008, 2). Seeing the issue of immigration in a different way (e.g., considering that immigrants arrive partly because they are expected) would force Walzer to rephrase the question of ethics as one of domination.
10. These results come from three databases: LexisNexis, Ethnic Newswatch, and the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. SLM is not equal to Latinas/os. Hence, the SLM-ELM difference is not equal to the Latino-majority difference. See chapter 2 on the difference between Spanish speakers and Latinas/os.
2. Starting in 1927, radio and, later, television, have been regulated by, among others, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which became the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934.
3. I am referring here to Spanish-language television in the mainland United States. For a history of Spanish-language television in Puerto Rico, see Rivero (2005).
4. Being part of English-language news organizations carries ethno-racial responsibilities. Navarrete and, for instance, Richard Rodriguez (2002, 114–115) are assimilationist because that is the way they ought to perform their professionalism.
5. My position (and Levy's), however, is not the only one. Anthony Appiah (2005) and Martha Nussbaum (1997), among others, have argued for the value of general political and cultural goals that can override the parochial grounds of ethnonationalisms. Both Appiah and Nussbaum refer to these in terms of identity and argue that identity is often the grounds for conflict (Appiah) and lack of global empathy (Nussbaum). Appiah and Nussbaum, like me, are trying to theorize social ethics with the goal of maximizing the chances for justice and egalitarianism. On this, we agree. However, Appiah's general goal of producing the conditions for a better liberalism and Nussbaum's goal of understanding the possibility for world citizenship leave to the side the difficult issue of whose

identity is overidentified with liberalism and cosmopolitanism and who, in practical terms, is required to forgo their identities, including languages, in order to achieve the ends proposed in these theoretical projects. Moreover, from my socio-historical location, I see no value in liberalism and cosmopolitanism if these ethical frameworks cannot protect Latinas/os from being forced into ethnic homogenization with majoritarian cultures. So my challenge is to use some of ethnonationalism for broad ethical projects such as liberalism and cosmopolitanism—hence the ongoing value, in my view, of Will Kymlicka’s radical multiculturalism.

6. Counting Mexicans in the Southwest territory is no easy task. The U.S. government did not have an official category for Hispanics, Mexicans, or Latinas/os, or for Native Americans, for most of our existence as a nation-state; in 1930, Latinas/os were quantified by the census as a race (Almaguer 1994, 46). Only in 1970 did the census include the category of Hispanic (Gibson and Jung 2006, 9–10). By scavenging through other documents, estimates can be put together. The best estimate to my knowledge is the one produced by Brian Gratton and Myron Gutmann (2000).
7. Because census practices are related to taxation, Native Americans, who were not taxed, were not counted. See also Rose (1999, 215).
8. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S.Amdt. 4064 to S. 2611, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (2006).
9. For arguments on the complexities of transnationalism and Latina/o culture, see Ana Rodríguez (2002), Romero and Habell-Pallán (2002, 4), Valdivia (2008), and Molina-Guzmán (2010, 14).
10. Burns 2007. I do not have reason to doubt Saban’s good intentions toward Latinas/os, but I question whether he can be consistently accountable to the political needs of Spanish speakers.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. On May 4, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the law that declared the use of someone else’s Social Security number an automatic aggravated identity theft and a felony that increased jail time by two years (Savage 2009).
2. The racial category of whiteness was first used by European settlers trying to differentiate themselves from Native Americans and, later, slaves. Historians debate whether whiteness was a strong factor differentiating white from black workers prior to 1800. What seems clear is that black revolts in the eighteenth century and the increasing political use of the term *slavery* to justify the fight for independence from Britain solidified the racial opposition of whites and blacks, clearly delineating white workers from black slaves. See Roediger (2007, 19–36) and Hong (2006, 2–25).
3. To further understand how media industries work as cultural, racial, and sexual echo chambers, see Caldwell (2008) and Mayer (2011).
4. Most industries and organizations have reacted similarly to media industries.

For resistance to the EEOC and affirmative action, see the work of James Coleman (1984) and Christopher Stone (1975).

5. The source was the website for Fox's office of diversity at <http://www.fox.com/diversity/> (accessed July 2009).
6. The source was ABC's Talent Development site at <http://www.abctalentdevelopment.com> (accessed July 2009).
7. See DiverseCity NBC at <http://www.diversecitynbc.com/>.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. As it is, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1440-1 grants a very limited version of citizenship that prohibits granting any benefits to survivors and limits filing privileges to next of kin.
2. This bill became an act on June 16, 2003.
3. For a discussion on how more recent drafting practices are illiberal and have affected Latinas/os, see Jorge Mariscal (1999) and Ramon Gutierrez (2007).
4. H.R. 1691, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (2003). See also its Senate counterpart, S. 783 ES, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (2003).
5. Fairness for America's Heroes Act of 2003, H.R. 1850, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (2003); Riayan Tejada Memorial Act of 2003, H.R. 2887, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (2003).
6. For a very practical take on the matter, see the U.S. Citizens and Immigration Services website. In the section titled "Office of Citizenship," the institution defines one of its roles as the training of legal residents on citizenship requirements. The goal is outlined as follows: "Reviving and emphasizing the common civic identity and shared values that are essential to citizenship." USCIS, "Office of Citizenship," February 7, 2004, <http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/citizenship/index.htm>.
7. Ibid.
8. For a look at the evolution of these ideals, see Schuck (1998, 12–81). For an examination of how naturalization law used whiteness as a legal standard, see Haney-López (1996, 3).
9. It is important to emphasize that the phrasing of this bill is common among these types of legislation. For instance, H.R. 150, which became public law on March 7, 1990, amended the Immigration and Nationality Act with a similar goal in mind, although it also included provisions to grant citizenship to aliens (8 U.S.C. Sec. 1440-1). The term *alien* may also refer to nonlegal residents or nonresidents of the United States. The term *legal noncitizen*, which was used in the 2003 bills, refers only to green-card holders. As it is written, the bill stipulated that according to the state, an alien who died while "serving on active duty with the US Armed Forces during certain periods of hostilities [was] to be considered a citizen of the United States at the time of the alien's death." Posthumous Citizenship for Active Duty Service Act of 1989, H.R. 150, 101th Cong., 1st sess. (2003).

10. See the speech by the Honorable Walter B. Jones of North Carolina in the House of Representatives on April 11, 2003. In this speech, Jones introduces the Fallen Heroes Immigrant Spouse Act, which aimed to extend rights to spouses of the fallen soldiers. See also the congressional record of the discussions on the Armed Forces Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 1954 (discussion that took place in the House on June 4, 2003).
11. Here is the full text of the oath:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.

“The Military Member’s Guide to Citizenship Application: Oath of Allegiance,” About.com, <http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/citizenship/blcitizen-4.htm>.
12. For some biographical information on the three soldiers, see *Fallen Heroes of Operation Iraqi Freedom*, a website-memorial to the soldiers fallen in combat: <http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/>.
13. Interview by the author with Fernando Suárez del Solar, father of the victim, in September 2005, Austin, Texas. The family migrated from Tijuana, Mexico, in 1997.
14. For instance, Texas Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee emphatically declared during the discussion of the bill, “This Nation continues to be a Nation built upon immigrants and their desire to be part of this great democracy.” She also refers to Martha Espinosa, one of José Gutiérrez’s foster parents, who stated that Gutiérrez once told her, “I was born the day I arrived in this country.” Washington Rep. Doc Hastings also declared, “Mr. Speaker, these patriotic men and women have willingly volunteered to carry out one of the most solemn duties any nation can ask of its citizens, the defense of freedom. In doing so, I believe that they have truly earned the opportunity to become citizens of the country that they serve to protect. . . . As my colleagues know, some of our troops who died in Iraq wearing the uniform of the United States gave their lives before they were truly entitled to call themselves Americans.” Both sets of statements are part of the House of Representative discussion, on June 4, 2003, regarding the Armed Forces Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 1954.
15. Notable exceptions include journalists such as David Conde (2003), David Halbfinger and Steven Holmes (2003), and Kristal Zook (2003).

16. The idea of the “citizen-soldier” as a political category of governance linked to idealized forms of citizenship is well documented. See Chambers (1987) and Cress (1982). For scholarship dealing with contemporary issues, including the issue of recruitment, see Moskos (2002) and Snyder (2003).
17. See also the publications in the Project on Youth and Non-Military Operations (YANO), directed by George Mariscal, <http://www.projectyano.org/>.
18. This bill became an act on June 16, 2003, as H.R. 1954 EH, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (June 16, 2003).
19. The importance of fantasy in the constitution of national identities has been argued by Michael McGee (1975, 239) and elaborated within the context of the construction of nationalism by M. Lane Bruner (2005, 311).
20. My position is the following: posthumous citizenship should be avoided in all cases involving noncitizens killed in combat. However, Congress should pass immigration law that would allow the families of the deceased soldiers to acquire the benefits of citizenship if so desired.
21. According to census figures, whites make up roughly 69 percent of the United States population but only account for about 58 percent of the armed forces. Numbers are taken from C. Johnson (1999, 24).

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. See for instance Ileana Rodríguez (2009), Darrel Enck-Wanzer (2011), and Hermann Herlinghaus (2009).
2. This is one of Dussel’s most clearly Marxist gestures, for in criticizing emancipation, he follows Marx’s advice found in “On the Jewish Question” (1975, 215).