We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether
or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. …

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players'
payoffs depend only on their own type (known‐own payoff case). We describe an algorithm …

We develop a theory of how the value of an agent's information advantage depends on the
persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, …

This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of [JC Harsanyi, R. Selten, A
General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, …

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory. org/] In games with
incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of …

This note provides simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparison of information
structures in zero-sum games. This solves an open problem of Grossner and Mertens […

How can we know in advance whether simplifying assumptions about beliefs will make a
difference in the conclusions of game-theoretic models? We define critical types to be types …

This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal
discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two …

This paper is concerned with the problem of combining a data set that identifies the conditional
distribution P(y|x) with one that identifies the conditional distribution P(z|x) to identify the …

Recent literature on testing experts shows that it is often impossible to determine whether
an expert knows the stochastic process that generates data. Despite this negative result, we …