Combinatorial auctions with budgets
arXiv preprint arXiv:1001.1686, 2010•arxiv.org
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $ i $ has a private
value $ v_i $, a budget $ b_i $, and is interested in all the items in $ S_i $. The value to
agent $ i $ of a set of items $ R $ is $| R\cap S_i|\cdot v_i $. Such auctions capture adword
auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for ads in response to an advertiser-dependent set of
adwords, and advertisers have budgets. It is known that even of all items are identical and
all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel …
value $ v_i $, a budget $ b_i $, and is interested in all the items in $ S_i $. The value to
agent $ i $ of a set of items $ R $ is $| R\cap S_i|\cdot v_i $. Such auctions capture adword
auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for ads in response to an advertiser-dependent set of
adwords, and advertisers have budgets. It is known that even of all items are identical and
all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel …
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder has a private value , a budget , and is interested in all the items in . The value to agent of a set of items is . Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for ads in response to an advertiser-dependent set of adwords, and advertisers have budgets. It is known that even of all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality for such auctions when the valuations are private and the budgets are public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski et al. (FOCS 2008) for auctions of multiple {\sl identical} items and public budgets to single-valued {\sl combinatorial} auctions with public budgets.
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