Uncertainty Analysis of Simple Macroeconomic Models Using Angel-Daemon Games
We propose the use of an angel-daemon framework to perform an uncertainty analysis of
short-term macroeconomic models with exogenous components. An uncertainty profile
$\mathcal U $ is a short and macroscopic description of a potentially perturbed situation. The
angel-daemon framework uses $\mathcal U $ to define a strategic game where two agents,
the angel and the daemon, act selfishly having different goals. The Nash equilibria of those
games provide the stable strategies in perturbed situations, giving a natural estimation of …
short-term macroeconomic models with exogenous components. An uncertainty profile
$\mathcal U $ is a short and macroscopic description of a potentially perturbed situation. The
angel-daemon framework uses $\mathcal U $ to define a strategic game where two agents,
the angel and the daemon, act selfishly having different goals. The Nash equilibria of those
games provide the stable strategies in perturbed situations, giving a natural estimation of …
We propose the use of an angel-daemon framework to perform an uncertainty analysis of short-term macroeconomic models with exogenous components. An uncertainty profile is a short and macroscopic description of a potentially perturbed situation. The angel-daemon framework uses to define a strategic game where two agents, the angel and the daemon, act selfishly having different goals. The Nash equilibria of those games provide the stable strategies in perturbed situations, giving a natural estimation of uncertainty. In this initial work we apply the framework in order to get an uncertainty analysis of linear versions of the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. In those models, by considering uncertainty profiles, we can capture different economical situations. Some of them can be described in terms of macroeconomic policy coordination. In other cases we just analyse the results of the system under some possible perturbation level. Besides providing examples of application we analyse the structure of the Nash equilibria in some particular cases of interest.
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